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Abstract 
This thesis examines the narrative function and significance of the future through its 
configurations in Aeschylus’ Oresteia. Drawing on the fields of narratology, literary criticism, 
and philosophy of history, it argues that the future is employed in the Oresteia as a narrative 
in a number of different ways. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 probe the teleological implications of the 
future in the four plays of the tetralogy, exploring the meaning of telos not only as a purposeful 
fulfilment but also as transition, deferral, and perpetual crisis. Those aspects of the future 
favour approaches that challenge and undermine the sense of a complete closure. They also 
draw connections between ancient and modern understandings of the future as something 
experienced in the present: either as a disruption outside one’s control (future present) or as a 
new order to be produced in and for the present (present future). Moving beyond the concept 
of telos, Chapter 5 demonstrates how the narrative of the Oresteia manipulates certain types of 
future-related knowledge through the literary terms of foreshadowing and sideshadowing. It is 
argued that, far from neat, the mapping of these terms onto the concepts of the open and closed 
future is often unpredictable. Finally, two other concepts explored are suspense and surprise 
(Chapters 6 and 7). They are both examined as intense experiences that are interconnected but 
distinct. The focus is on their centrality to the narrative mechanisms through which we find 
ourselves anticipating the future or marvelling at its unexpectedness. Taken together, the 
concepts explored in the thesis allow us to imagine and experience the future not as something 
remote and foreseeable, but as something at once tangible, unpredictable, and, thus, always 
open.  
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1 
1. Introduction 
This thesis explores the function and significance of the future in Aeschylus’ Oresteia (458 
BCE). While the tetralogy has been the focus of intensive criticism, the question of time and, 
especially, the future remains under-researched. In fact, there has a been a systematic lack of 
research on the issue of time in Greek tragedy. There are only a few critical works attempting 
a sustained analysis of how tragic plays engage with time, and discussions of the future are 
even more limited. My analysis explores the different functions of the future, and also offers 
a set of different perspectives with which to approach its significance in Aeschylus. More 
specifically, I study tragedy as a textual type of narrative (a discourse which is composed of 
events and characters, and tells a story),1 and whose value cannot limit itself to the historical 
and cultural framework of its original staging. 
This Introduction addresses three key questions. The first has to do with the 
significance of the future in narrative (section 1.1). The second question relates to my 
methodology (section 1.2). It draws on distinct but interconnected theoretical frameworks, 
from narratology to literary criticism and philosophy of history. My third question has to do 
with my choice of case study. I outline the reasons for choosing Aeschylus’ Oresteia and for 
the significance of reading it as a tetralogy rather than a trilogy (section 1.3). The Introduction 
concludes with an overview of the six chapters. 
 
1 Ricoeur (1984, I) e.g., 36; Barthes (1977) e.g., 79. More specifically, studies on Greek tragic narrative that draw on 
the above principle are, indicatively, Markantonatos (2002), Gould (2001), Lowe (2000) 18–20, Goward (1999) 9–12. 
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1.1. The future in narrative 
A question that informs my whole thesis and which I need to introduce first is related to the 
significance of the future in narrative. The key term of my topic, the future, holds immediate 
relevance for ways of living and thinking, as a temporal sphere to which the whole range of 
human activities is inevitably connected. However, while the future is central to how we 
organise time and how we anticipate events to come, it is nevertheless ontologically obscure, 
vague, and out of reach, because it is subject to reflection and to circumstances outside our 
control. One way to come to terms with the perplexing nature of the future as a concept is to 
explore it through its narrative configurations. It is on that basis that I argue that the 
preoccupations of the Oresteia with the future become meaningful for its spectators and 
readers. Although they live outside the horizon of the narrative configuration of the events of 
the story, they nevertheless organise their traversing and experience of time ‘in the manner of 
a narrative’,2 and turn to theatrical narrative, because it inserts a portrayal of the ‘features of 
temporal experience’.3 
I must make clear from the outset that, in examining the Oresteia as a narrative rather 
than as a dramatic text, I do not argue for a watertight distinction between the two. I do, 
however, favour the characterisation of the text as narrative rather than dramatic for two 
reasons. First, I stand for the argument that drama is a narrative genre, in line with the work 
undertaken recently by several narratologists. Second, any study of the future in drama has 
to acknowledge the significance of time as a key aspect of the study of narrative. An analysis 
of the future in the Oresteia as a dramatic text would have focused primarily on its literary and 
performance-related elements: literary conventions, lexical issues, characterisation, central 
themes, staging issues, the original audience, theatrical, political, domestic and ritual space. 
Despite the significance of these issues for what follows, my study of the future in the Oresteia 
will consider how my topic is understood and experienced by readers and spectators in ways 
that go beyond the specificities of the dramatic text.  
 
2 Ricoeur (1984, I) 3. 
3 Ricoeur (1984, I) 3. 
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Following Brian Richardson who paved the way for introducing drama into 
systematic narratological discussion,4 Monika Fludernik has shown that drama is ‘the most 
important narrative genre whose narrativity needs to be documented’, and that this 
documentation needs to go beyond the eventfulness of the plot, which has been so far 
considered as the main narrative element of drama.5 More specifically, Fludernik has shown 
how dramatic elements are used in narrative and how narrativity is used in drama.6 Ansgar 
Nünning and Roy Sommer offer specific examples of the diegetic type of narrativity in drama, 
arguing for the need to distinguish among types (diegetic and mimetic) and degrees of 
narrativity.7 Although such narrative models are key for exploring the narrativity of drama, 
they also have certain limitations for what I set out to do in my thesis. For example, the studies 
by Fludernik and by Nünning and Sommer address the audience as diegetic element in 
drama.8 My discussion includes direct modes of addressing the audience, to the extent that 
they contribute to my specific topic of the future, but it does not limit itself to them.9 In probing 
the future as narrativised in the Oresteia through both text-oriented and reception-oriented 
analysis, I set out to demonstrate how diegetic elements are employed in Aeschylus’ dramas 
in an immersive way, a consideration that informs the way I have organised my material 
throughout the thesis.  
Modern explorations of the future as a topic can be found in several disciplines: not 
only in the sciences, in disciplines such as physics, mathematics, and computers, but also in 
the humanities, especially in the philosophy of history, religious studies, philosophy, social 
studies, narratology, and literary and film studies. In the humanities, most explorations of the 
future, where attempted, remain part of broader discussions of the topic of time and refrain 
from establishing an independent research topic. For instance, Adrian Bardon’s studies on the 
history and the future of the philosophy of time offer a comprehensive introduction to the 
subject of time but with very limited focus on the future.10 Similarly, Barbara Adam’s 
 
4 Richardson (1988). See also (1987). 
5 Quote from Fludernik (1996) 348.  
6 See Fludernik (2008) 358–67 and 367–77, respectively. 
7 Nünning & Sommer (2002) e.g., 332; (2008). 
8 Fludernik (2008); Nünning & Sommer (2008) 332. 
9 See, for instance, in the chapters that follow: Athena (3.2), the Watchman (4.2.1), the Furies (6.4.2). 
10 Bardon (2013); Bardon (ed.) (2012), where only Ismael (2012) focuses on the matter of the future. 
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monograph Time, which discusses how the understanding of time has been culturally 
embedded across the centuries, devotes only a few pages to the future, and more specifically 
to cultural practices of dealing with the unknown future, ranging from divination to scientific 
prediction.11 Finally, in the edited volume Time, Temporality and Now by Harald Atmanspacher 
and Eva Ruhnau brings together scholars from a range of fields and perspectives, including 
philosophy, physics, and cognitive studies,12 but its focus on the tension between 
conceptualisation and experience of time leaves little room for a detailed and systematic study 
of the future.   
One of the earliest modern attempts to discuss the future as an independent topic 
comes from Jacques Derrida who, drawing on Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927), has 
developed the distinctive concept of l’àvenir (=the future to-come).13 Since then, other studies 
that have emerged in recent times include Jean-Paul Martinon’s On Futurity: Malabou, Nancy 
and Derrida (2007), a deconstructive analysis of futurity, through the focus on the act of 
translation. In the area of literary criticism, Amir Eshel’s Futurity: Contemporary Literature and 
the Quest for the Past (2012) considers a number of contemporary works of German, Israeli, and 
Anglo-American literature, and explores their capacities for creating tools and coming to 
terms with the future, what he calls ‘futurity’.14 In the area of social sciences, Barbara Adam’s 
and Chris Groves’ Future Matters: Action, Knowledge, Ethics (2007) draws on cultural history 
and discusses how future was told, imagined, and constructed in the past, exploring our 
contemporary relations to the future. Emma Uprichard’s article ‘Narratives of the Future: 
Complexity, Time and Temporality’ argues that future matters in both methodological and 
conceptual aspects in the field of social research: the study of social objects both in the present 
and the future is heavily dependent on narratives of the future.15 More recently, John Urry has 
pinpointed the importance of thinking futures as part of the strategic planning of 
organisations.16 Urry argues that social science must contribute to and benefit from the study 
of the future. He suggests overcoming the inherent difficulties of the issue through the 
 
11 E.g., Adam (2004) 82–89. 
12 Atmanspacher & Ruhnau (eds.) (1997). 
13 Derrida (1996) e.g., 68. References to the concept of l’àvenir can be found throughout Derrida’s oeuvre. 
14 Eshel (2013) 4–5. 
15 Uprichard (2011) e.g., 2. 
16 Urry (2016) e.g., 12. 
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deployment of the terms ‘possible futures’, ‘probable futures’, ‘preferable futures’, and 
‘plausible futures’. According to the author, such explorations can promote taking 
responsibility for what is involved when discussing the future. 
 From the area of narratology, there are two studies in particular that I would single 
out as influential for my thesis. Mark Currie’s About Time (2007) argues that the question of 
how we anticipate the future is a more effective tool to understand narratives than the 
retrospective account of the past. The author’s claim that ‘[t]he present is the object of a future 
memory, and we live it as such, in anticipation of the story we will tell later, envisaging the 
present as past’17 is illuminating for how a dialogue between (postmodern) literature and 
philosophy might be initiated. In shifting the focus from the practice of retrospection (past) 
towards the enterprise of anticipation (future), About Time develops an argument along lines 
similar to those pursued below. Despite its inspiring ideas and innovative perspective, 
however, Currie’s study has influenced this thesis less than it might have done for two 
reasons. First, this is due to limitations regarding its rather prescriptive handling of the future 
as always played out with the present as its projection and with the past as its recording. And, 
second, it is due to the grounding of its argument to four postmodern novels, case studies 
which are chronologically and generically far away from the scope of this thesis.  
Particularly relevant to my argument is the narratological series edited by Christoph 
Bode The Narrating Futures (2013), a five-volume series, which foregrounds the future and its 
qualities such as its openness and undecidedness, with a view to establishing a new area, the 
Future Narratives, on the grounds that ‘all the narratology we have is derived from the corpus 
of Past Narratives’.18 This series includes explorations of future narratives not only in print 
but also in film, in video games, in world climate change scenarios, and in other areas with 
relevant preoccupations. Finally, although the area of future studies (or futurology) counts 
several decades,19 its recent growth and expansion demonstrate the pressing need for a more 
systematised approach of the matter of ‘futures thinking’ (or ‘strategic foresight’). Although 
this area is not particularly preoccupied with the application of relevant theories and methods 
 
17 Currie (2007) 5. 
18 Bode (2013) vii. 
19 The term ‘futurology’ (from the German ‘futurologie’) was coined by Ossip K. Flechtheim in 1943 who published 
his book in 1970. 
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on works of literature, it nevertheless provides useful conceptual frameworks and a large 
body of case studies from other disciplines.20 
Classical studies have not followed closely this budding interest in the study of the 
future.21 One reason for the lack of scholarly discussions about the future in ancient Greek 
narrative is because the topic of the future is under-theorised among ancient Greek authors 
themselves. For example, one could argue that both historiography and tragedy are mainly 
preoccupied with the past and the narration of historical and mythical events. However, this 
would overlook the fact that historiography and tragedy are preoccupied not only with the 
past but also with the future. As Alexandra Lianeri points out, ‘[t]he future was formulated 
and considered in antiquity by evoking the plurality of its meaning.’22 
A few examples illustrate this plurality. Oracles, prophecies, and other divine 
manifestations related to the future can be found across Greek literature as a result of the 
broader narrativisation of the future as a temporal sphere in Greek culture.23 An obvious 
manifestation of the ancient interest in the future has to do with a strong awareness of 
posterity. For instance, Thucydides, in the prologue to his Histories, predicts the greatness of 
the Peloponnesian War (1.1.1) and states that his work will be a ‘possession of all time’ (κτῆμα 
ἐς αἰεὶ, 1.22.4).24 Based on this idea, James Porter has outlined the model of the ‘classical’, 
according to which classical works of art are projections of the present into the future 
(imagining future beholders look at the present of writing as a past).25 Another example is the 
imagining of a future which, by encompassing the past, will be better than the uncertainty of 
the present. Such an understanding of the future can be found in texts such as Aristophanes’ 
Clouds and Frogs. In both plays, Aeschylus wins as the classical poet, and the respect for the 
past (Aeschylus) outweighs the importance of novelty (Euripides). However limited, such 
 
20 See Cornish (2005). For more on future studies, see: the Journal of Futures Studies http://www.jfs.tku.edu.tw; the 
Open Futures Library http://openfutures.net/. 
21 For an overview of works which are preoccupied with the broad issue of time in antiquity (with references to 
ancient Greek literature), see Eidinow & Maurizio (2020) 1–12; Ben-Dov & Doerin (2017) 1–8; Dunn (2007) 7–8. See 
also Revermann (1993) 238 and n. 4. for a detailed bibliography on the matter of time in ancient Greek literature. 
22 Lianeri (2016) 12. 
23 See Eidinow’s study (2007), where an extensive collection of texts from the ancient Greek world demonstrates 
the multiple ways in which the uncertain future was perceived and managed.  
24 Translation by Mynott (2013). See Lianeri (2016) 1–2. 
25 Porter (2006) 48–55. 
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examples provide a sufficient idea of the range of uses of the future in ancient Greek 
narrative.26 
Special, even if brief, mention needs to be made here to Aristotle’s contribution to this 
diversity of meanings of the future in antiquity. Particularly useful is the use of the future in 
Aristotle’s Poetics. Here the notion of the future lies within the definition of the end (τελευτὴ) 
of the tragic work as a whole (ὅλον), ‘which itself naturally occurs, whether necessarily or 
usually, after a preceding event, but need not be followed by anything else’ (1450b26, 28–30). 
Although this quote does not explicitly refer to the relationship between poetic activity and 
temporal experience, it does emphasise the priority of the temporal over the spatial, while also 
raising the need for closure.27 It is unfortunate that among the influential scholarly works on 
the Poetics of recent decades, such as those by Stephen Halliwell, Richard Janko, Leonardo 
Tarán and Dimitri Gutas,28 there has been little interest in temporal aspects of the plot and an 
overall tendency to focus on the limitations imposed by what is missing from Aristotle’s essay 
rather than an appreciation of what is there. 
Also of relevance is the way in which Aristotle deals with the future in the Rhetoric, 
where the future is what is always lying ahead and from where it can be projected to the 
listeners’ minds and create anticipation (e.g., 1379a, 1412a, 1415a6). The implications of this 
stimulating observation require some unpacking but I will defer them for the moment as they 
will be pursued  in some detail in the Theoretical Preludes of Chapters 3, 5, 6, and 7 below.29 
By contrast, Aristotle’s more elaborate discussion of the broader topic of time in the Physics 
(Book IV (10–14)) has proved less relevant for the purpose and scope of my thesis: in forming 
a definition of time, the Physics offers a set of puzzles through which time gradually develops 
as a relational concept that can only be explained through its units (past, present, and future) 
and properties.30 Here, the future (usually τὸ μέλλον and its cognates) is conceived as the not-
yet existing (e.g., 218a1), which the ‘now’ holds together with the past (e.g., 222a10–11). The 
concepts of ‘change’ (κίνησις) and ‘movement’ (μεταβολή) are also introduced as 
 
26 For examples of the diverse articulations of the future in historiography, see Lianeri (2016). 
27 Michelakis (2013) 173. 
28 Halliwell (1987); House (1956). See also Janko (1987); Gutas & Tarán (2012). 
29 Cf. Ricoeur (1984, I, e.g., 52) who argues that Aristotle has no interest in the temporal preoccupations of the plot 
in the Poetics, unlike in the Physics. 
30 218a31: τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτῷ; 224a17: τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν οἰκείων. 
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instruments to specify the nature of time. However, despite their significance for the broader 
issue of Aristotle’s views on time, neither the ideas themselves pursued in the Physics nor the 
scholarly work they have triggered have much to contribute to a discussion of the future. The 
future is constantly pushed into the shadow of the present which, whether momentary or 
persistent,31 is constantly dominant32 and at the centre of a temporal asymmetry between a 
fulfilled past and a blank future.33 When it comes to discussing Aristotle’s views on the future 
and how it is experienced through narrative, the Poetics and the Rhetoric hold much more 
useful clues.  
 The strong preoccupation of Classical studies with the past has left little room for 
examinations of the future. Among the earlier and very influential studies of time in ancient 
Greek literature, Hermann Fraenkel’s article and Jacqueline De Romilly’s book approach time 
as a compact concept, mostly seen through the past, with the future appearing only in passing 
references.34 More recently, Irene De Jong’s and René Nünlist’s edited volume Time in Ancient 
Greek Literature (2007) offers numerous insights into the question of how time might be 
considered as a constituent element of narrative in Greek literary genres. Yet, this study limits 
itself to discussions of the future only as a motif and not as an independent topic and concept.35 
Other research on time in Greek literature that has emerged in recent years is also focused on 
the past. Jonas Grethlein’s The Greeks and their Past (2010) focuses on how different types of 
narrative introduce the past in the context of literary memory.36 Poulheria Kyriakou’s The Past 
in Aeschylus and Sophocles (2012) explores the notion of the past as mythological events 
preceding the tragic stories dramatised.37 The edited volume Greek Notions of the Past in the 
Archaic and Classical Eras (2012) analyses the importance and presence of the past at every level 
 
31 See e.g., Bostock (2006) 147–49. 
32 McGinnis (2003) e. g., 153. 
33 White (1989) e.g., 208. On time in Aristotle’s Physics, see further: Roark (2011), where, re-introducing Aristotle’s 
ideas on time into the contemporary thought, it is argued that Aristotle explores time as having both material 
aspect (as a motion) and formal aspect (as a perception); Coope (2005), whose interpretation of time as a type of a 
universal order (‘number’) overcomes misinterpretations and misjudgements of Aristotle’s study on time (e.g., 5). 
34 Fraenkel (1955), first published in 1931; De Romilly (1968). 
35 De Jong & Nünlist (2007). In this edited volume, see the following works on Greek drama: Barrett on Aeschylus 
(2007, 255–73); De Jong on Sophocles (2007, 275–92); Lloyd on Euripides (2007, 293–304), Bowie (2007, 305–17) on 
Aristophanes. For a similar approach, see Hopman’s study on Aeschylus’ Persians (2013). 
36 With a chapter on Aeschylus’ Persians (2010, 74–104). See also Grethlein (2007). 
37 Kyriakou (2012) 2. 
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of Greek society, through a wide selection of texts and authors.38 An exception to this 
preoccupation with the past is Francis Dunn’s Present Shock in Late Fifth-century Greece (2007), 
which shifts the focus from the mythical and historical past to the anxieties of a lived present 
of the fifth century BCE. Although references to the future are not absent from this study, they 
are part of an argument that foregrounds the present as a time of uncertainty. Overall, 
although these lines of research demonstrate the need for examining the temporalities of 
Greek narrative, considerations of the future are strikingly under-represented and under-
theorised. 
The lack of such considerations needs to be discussed in tandem with the tendency to 
examine the concept of time together with the concept of space. This tendency is linked to the 
general disposition to speak about and understand abstract domains, such as time, using 
terms from more concrete experiential domains, such as space.39 For instance, space can be 
seen, touched, passed through, and explored, while time cannot be typically observed and 
perceived by the senses. These ontological differences between time and space can favour 
explorations which prioritise space over time. Two such examples from the field of Classical 
studies are Alex Purves’ Space and Time in Ancient Greek Narrative (2010) and Richard Seaford’s 
Cosmology and the Polis: The Social Construction of Space and Time in the Tragedies of Aeschylus 
(2012). The first study offers a comprehensive study of space and a much less well-developed 
study of time in a range of texts (notably for my purposes not in tragedy). The second study 
explores how the unity of space and time (drawing on Mikhail Bakhtin’s idea of chronotope) 
can be employed in Aeschylus’ tragedies, though again with a primary focus on space rather 
than time, and with only passing references to the future.40 Despite the broad usefulness of 
how these discussions frame their arguments, I argue that the concept of time, and, more 
specifically, of the future, must be disengaged from the concept of space. My argument is not 
so much related to the use of metaphors of space for time. These are, in all respects, an 
established linguistic practice, examples of which one may find in this thesis as well. 
 
38 Marincola, Llewellyn-Jones & Maciver (eds.) (2012). 
39 See Lakoff & Johnson (1980) 42–46. Also, Deutscher (2005) 133–34; Morson (1994) 17. Koselleck (2004, 259–60) 
introduces the terms ‘space of experience’ and ‘horizon of expectation’ based on space-time metaphors. On the use 
of πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω in the same context, see Dunkel (1982–83), cited in Bassi (2016a, 221). 
40 See Chapter 2 on how Seaford’s model can be accommodated in such a discussion. For another example of a 
study on Greek tragedy which focuses on space more than time, see Lamari (2010). 
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However, when it comes to systematic explorations of time-related matters, one needs to 
search for and put to work a set of terms and concepts suitable to demonstrate the specificity 
of those matters. 
In studies of Greek tragedy, the preoccupation with the future is limited in topics, 
narrow in scope, and restrictive in methodology. The future is, overall, approached as a theme 
and as an object for observation and examination, isolated from contemporary discussions, 
and as something that pertains only to dramatic characters and their temporalities. Susanna 
Phillippo’s article ‘’A Future for Astyanax’: Alternative and Imagined Futures for Hector's son 
in Classical and European Drama’ (2007) presents the idea of a character’s future as something 
which goes beyond a single narrative. Gerry Wakker’s article ‘Future Expectations in 
Sophocles’ offers a linguistic approach to the future expressions of the verb μέλλω (2006). 
Anna Lamari’s essay ‘Knowing a Story’s End: Future Reflexive in the Narrative of the Argive 
Expedition Against Thebes’ (2007) focuses on the theoretical category of future reflexivity as 
the relation between the time of narration and the time of the story. Finally, Rebecca Bushnell’s 
book Tragic Time in Drama, Film, and Videogames: The Future in the Instant (2016) is concerned 
with the idea of tragic time which survives in a wide selection of narratives, but devotes only 
a handful of pages to Greek tragedy itself.41 
In Greek tragedy specifically, it is not only the topic of the future but also the broader 
topic of time that is still ‘in its infancy’.42 I have already mentioned the pioneering work by 
Herman Fraenkel which, although not directly related to the future, provides useful insights 
into time in works of ancient Greek literature from a developmental perspective.43 I have also 
touched on Jacqueline De Romilly’s work Time in Greek Tragedy, which tends to oversimplify 
complex issues.44 Similar to Fraenkel, De Romilly argues that, moving from Aeschylus to 
Euripides, temporal concepts are gradually ‘refined’.45 As both studies undermine the 
significance and complexity of temporality in Aeschylus, it is probably not surprising that 
they have not inspired other more focused studies. For more useful insights into time in 
 
41 Bushnell (2016) 5–11. 
42 Revermann (2008) 238. 
43 Fraenkel (1960). See also Momigliano (1966, 8–10) for an appraisal of Fraenkel’s views. 
44 As she puts it in her Introduction, the reason for her study is ‘of general curiosity’ (1968, 2). 
45 De Romilly (1968) 24. 
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Aeschylus one needs to turn to more general studies of the dramatist such as those published 
in the 1970s by Anne Lebeck (The Oresteia: A Study in Language and Structure) and Oliver Taplin 
(The Stagecraft of Aeschylus: the Dramatic Use of Exits and Entrances in Greek Tragedy). In the 1980s 
Thomas Rosenmeyer’s The Art of Aeschylus points out that ‘time is of the essence in 
Aeschylus’,46 but it nevertheless devotes only a section to issues of ‘Plot, Tension, Time’.47 A 
more recent book-length study, published in 2012, Marcel A. Widzisz’s Chronos on the 
Threshold, offers a thematic discussion of the Oresteia based on time as ritual and as agency. It 
however has surprisingly little on the future and neglects aspects of time in narrative which 
are central to my approach. 
Among the works in Classical studies whose focus, methodology, and approach have 
been influential for my work, I will single out the following. Of narrower but more direct 
relevance for my analysis is Simon Goldhill’s article ‘Two Notes on τέλος and Related Words 
in the Oresteia’ (1984), Charles Chiasson’s ‘Σωφρονοῦντες ἐν χρόνωι: Athenians and Time in 
Aeschylus’ Eumenides’ (1999–2000), and Martin Revermann’s ‘Aeschylus’ Eumenides, 
Chronotopes, and the ‘Aetiological Mode’’ (2008). Throughout the chapters that follow, I 
frequently return to these articles. Among recent studies of broader significance for my work, 
I will single out: Duncan Kennedy’s Antiquity and the Meanings of Time (2013), which 
demonstrates through several key texts (including Homer’s Odyssey, Sophocles’ Oedipus the 
King, Augustine’s Confessions) how conceptions of human time in antiquity enrich 
contemporary thought on temporality. Jonas Grethlein’s Experience and Teleology in Ancient 
Historiography: ‘Futures Past’ from Herodotus to Augustine (2013a) shows that the tension and 
the balance between experience (past) and teleology (future), which readers of 
historiographical narratives experience, results in a closer understanding of the matter of 
time.48 I would also add two edited volumes by Alexandra Lianeri which have shaped my 
thinking throughout this dissertation: The Western Time of Ancient History (2011) and Knowing 
the Future Time In and Through Greek Historiography (2016). Despite their focus on 
historiography, they both raise a series of stimulating questions about the uses of the future, 
which can be related to tragic narrative as well. 
 
46 Rosenmeyer (1982) 331 and n. 17. 
47 Rosenmeyer (1982) 311–36. 
48 See also Grethlein (2016) & (2014). 
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1.2. Theoretical and methodological framework 
In this section, I introduce the approach that has informed the arguments of my thesis, 
demonstrating how it builds on and goes beyond the studies I have examined so far.  
 I will begin by foregrounding the principal methodological perspective of my study: I 
argue that it is only by taking into consideration the engagement of both spectators and 
readers with the narrative that one can grasp how the future is presented as being at stake in 
the four plays of the Oresteia. In doing so, Ι shift my focus away from matters of historical 
specificity, which privilege the original spectators of the dramatic festival of 458 BCE over 
later readers and spectators, towards issues of narrative discourse which spectators and 
readers share. While the emphasis on the cultural and political background of the plays might 
point in the direction of historical specificity, I nevertheless focus on the eventfulness of the 
text which controls what the future holds in store for everyone who is exposed to it, whether 
they are spectators or readers, contemporary to Aeschylus or of a later period. In doing so, I 
draw on Ricoeur’s narrative theory as it emerges out of his foundational three-volume work 
Time and Narrative. 
In constructing his threefold model of mimesis, Ricoeur engages with Aristotle’s 
model of the tragic muthos. In the Poetics, Aristotle presents the tragic plot as a synthesis of 
multiple events arranged in a complete story. For Ricoeur, the tragedian ought to arrange those 
events in a way that ‘the discordances appear concordant’,49 and this is the result of artistic 
design (for example 1452a18–22). Aristotle himself does not deal extensively or explicitly with 
the temporal aspects of emplotment.50 By temporal aspects, Ricoeur means the traversal of 
mimesis through time, or, in other words, the human experience of time, whose elusive nature 
was eloquently described by Augustine in his Confessions, the second major text in Ricoeur’s 
Time and Narrative. Bringing together Aristotle’s and Augustine’s different priorities, Ricoeur 
argues that Aristotle’s ‘paradigm of order’ can function as ‘the poetic solution to the 
 
49 See Ricoeur (1984, I) e.g., x, 52. 
50 Ricoeur (1984, I) 48: ‘Unlike the Rhetoric, which subordinates the order of discourse to its effects on its audience, 
the Poetics indicates no explicit interest in the communication of the work to the public’. For a less sceptical view 
on Aristotle’s concern of the reception of tragedy, see Bouchard (2012, 186): ‘However, by contrast with the Rhetoric, 
little scholarly interest is imparted to the ‘audience’ factor in Aristotle’s treatise of poetics. The general tendency is 
rather to overlook this admittedly contingent factor and to make Aristotle the exponent of a self-standing ‘idea’ of 
tragedy that would be blind to the actual conditions of the reception of tragedy’. 
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speculative paradox of time’,51 whereas Augustine’s distentio animi describes the human 
experience of measuring time as it has passed.52 This merging of perspectives results in 
Ricoeur’s model of mimesis, according to which both understanding and experience are 
narrativised, whether we encounter them in fiction or in real life. 
Ricoeur’s model of mimesis consists of three layers of mimetic activity which 
concurrently take place while reading or watching.53 The first consists of mimesis 1, which 
describes the prenarrative structure of experience, according to which any individual shares 
a culture rooted in a human community (‘prefiguration’). From ‘the meaningful structures, 
symbolic resources, and temporal character’ of mimesis 1,54 we move on to mimesis 2, the 
mimesis of creation which turns such elements into emplotment (‘configuration’). Finally, 
mimesis 3 is the moment when two levels of time, that of the emplotment and that of the act of 
reading or spectating, which may initially seem distinct, bleed into each other.55 According to 
Ricoeur, through this process and with this intersection, mimesis reaches its complete 
fulfilment and the significance of the work of fiction discloses itself to the reader and the 
spectator (‘refiguration’).56 As Genevieve Liveley points out, the above model has ‘important 
implications for modelling how we live, tell, and read the future and how we process 
anticipation as if narratively configured.’57 
What makes Ricoeur’s model of mimesis the dominant model that shapes my 
theoretical and methodological frame is that, having as a point of departure Aristotle’s theory 
of the tragic plot (which is also important for my thesis), it moves towards a broader model 
which aspires to unlock the phenomenology of time (experience) through narrative (plot). 
Working with Ricoeur’s theory allows us to see how experience and plot can either enrich or 
distort each other, especially when it comes to anticipating the future. More specifically, 
Ricoeur’s theory addresses the question of how the emplotment of the future in the Oresteia 
 
51 Ricoeur (1984, I) 38. 
52 On Augustine’s Confessions, see Ricoeur (1984, I) 5–30; on Aristotle’s Poetics, see Ricoeur (1984, I) 31–51. 
53 Ricoeur (1984, I) 53–65. 
54 Ricoeur (1984, I) 54. 
55 Ricoeur (1984, I) 53: ‘the act of reading—the unity of the traversal from mimesis 1, to mimesis 3, by way of 
mimesis 2’. 
56 Ricoeur (1984, I) 71. See also Ricoeur (1988, III) 157–79. 
57 Liveley (2017) 7. 
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(mimesis 2) reconfigures the readers’ and the spectators’ experience of the future (mimesis 3), 
which then returns to practical life, which also shapes the prenarrative level of experience 
(mimesis 1), and so on and so forth. Τhe main idea which underlies the chapters that follow is 
that, no matter which aspect of a multi-faceted future do we turn towards, it is only by 
directing our attention to the convergence between the world of the text and the world of the 
receivers that we can actually engage with the status of the future as what is being at stake. 
Ricoeur’s fundamental contribution to this topic has been followed by a number of 
other studies preoccupied with temporality as an element of narrativity. Not all of them are 
of direct relevance, but here is a selection of those that are. Fludernik (2003) focuses on 
narrative tense and the question of how, from the point of view of narration, tenses are not 
always easy to map onto past, present, or future.58 In the chapters that follow, I often comment 
on the tenses which are associated with the future, which are not always future tenses.59 
Richardson (2002) discusses temporality through six strategies (circular, contradictory, 
antinomic, differential, conflated, dual or multiple), with examples from postmodern 
narratives with non-realistic constructions of time.60 Similar patterns related to the 
employment of the future I include in my own discussion, as for example in the case of the 
cyclical movement of time in the Agamemnon and the Libation Bearers, the placement of Proteus 
in the chronology of events of the Oresteia, Cassandra’s future present in the Agamemnon and 
the interchanging present future and future present in the Eumenides.61 Sternberg (1992) explores 
narrative dynamics and more specifically the role of surprise, suspense, and curiosity as three 
master forms of temporality.62 These are determined by the relation between chronology and 
teleology both within the arrangement of the whole and within its disarrangements, such as 
the anachronies of the plot. The most important contribution of Sternberg’s essay has to do 
with the question of whose surprise we are dealing with, and Chapter 7 below aspires to 
address this question with a difference: while in Sternberg’s narratological account of surprise 
the unexpected arrives from the future and relates to an unexplained past, in my argument 
 
58 Fludernik (2003). 
59 See for example the Chorus’ past narration (2.2), Cassandra’s future present (4.2.4), Orestes’ present future (4.3.1). 
60 For which Genette’s model is not adequate, as Richardson argues (2002, 47–48). 
61 In 3.2, 3.6, 4.2.4, and 4.4, respectively, below. 
62 Sternberg (1992). 
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surprise is always linked to an open future with the focus on its features as unexpected and 
disruptive, whose emergence does not explain, but startles and unsettles.    
Turning to studies with a focus on readerly experiences, I would single out Phelan 
(2007) which bridges narrative theory with the experience of reading and makes readerly 
responses central to what constitutes narrative experience. Phelan systematises such 
responses through a model based on the functions of judgements (interpretive, ethical, and 
aesthetic) and progressions (relying on textual dynamics).63 Dannenberg (2004) and (2008) 
explore the concept of ontological plotting according to which realist narrative fiction employs 
alternative possible worlds appearing to take place either in the past or the future through the 
mode of temporal orchestration.64 Caracciolo’s (2014) monograph on the experientiality of 
narrative draws mainly on the framework of enactive cognition. More specifically, the study 
draws on Ricoeur’s three-tiered approach to probe a theoretical discussion with the argument 
that ‘our engagement with narrative representations can only be understood within an 
experiential network that includes both our background and our reactions to stories.’65 
Although my scope and material is quite different from Caracciolo’s, there is common focus 
on how and why readerly and spectatorial experiences are shaped by narrative 
representations. 
The significance of Ricoeur’s narrative theory and of the works in its wake mentioned 
above lies in the fact that they provide a framework with which we can distance ourselves not 
only from historical specificity but also from the so-called transhistorical character of Greek 
tragedy.66 According to the first, the Oresteia needs to be approached as culturally specific, 
composed by Aeschylus as a tetralogy for the purpose of performance (διδασκαλία) in the 
Athenian dramatic festival of Great Dionysia in 458 BCE. According to the second, the 
meaning of the Oresteia is not historically and culturally specific but universal, one and the 
same for all ages (an example of that would be Aristotle’s καθόλου in the Poetics, 1451b5–10). 
 
63 See Chapters 6 (‘Suspense’) and 7 (‘Surprise’) where the term ‘narrative progression’ is central to my argument. 
See also Phelan (2002).    
64 See further Chapter 5 on Sideshadowing below, where the matter of alternative futures is explored (under section 
5.4.3). 
65 Caraciollo (2014) 48 n. 3. 
66 For an overview of these two approaches, see Michelakis (2013) 172 and n. 1–2. 
Introduction 
Page 16 of 269 
While I do not underestimate the significance of the original historical context in 
interpreting the Oresteia, I consider this only part of a larger process which includes the 
Oresteia’s ancient and modern reception. An example from the discipline of the philosophy of 
history and literary theory, which argues that, even in historical narratives, narrative 
discourse must be prioritised over historical representation, is Hayden White’s The Content of 
the Form.67 White argues that the narrative discourse constructs historical meaning and breaks 
the boundaries between the literary and the historical (according to White historical narratives 
do not seek to represent objective historical facts).68 Following a similar logic, I argue that we 
need to focus our attention on how narrative imagination in the Oresteia constructs meaning 
through language-based, plot-driven stories, which consist of both real and unreal events. 
If we now turn to the issue of the universality of Greek tragedy, I also take distance 
from arguments which consider it as something that withstands the passing of time or even 
stands outside time. What I mean by the phrase ‘across time’, in the opening lines of this 
Introduction, is not that there is a timeless, singular meaning of the Oresteia. It would be 
impossible for a work to deliver the exact same message even for contemporary readers or 
spectators, who may well have divergent views. Rather, I argue that ‘across time’ refers to 
anyone who lives in history, anticipating the future and being subject to its uncertainties, and 
comes across the Oresteia. It is only in this sense that one (anyone) can understand and become 
engaged with the necessities and probabilities or improbabilities of its plot.69 
I will now briefly address two aspects of the historical specificity of the Oresteia which 
are usually related to the preoccupations of Greek tragedy with time: the familiarity of the 
original audience with the earlier literary and artistic tradition, and the historical context of 
the original production of the tetralogy. 
As far as the original audience’s familiarity with earlier accounts concerned, the 
Oresteia deals with well-known mythological material which would have been widely 
reproduced and circulated in literature and art before its stage representation in 458 BCE. In 
this context, Aeschylus’ Oresteia enters into dialogue with a large set of earlier texts including 
 
67 White (1987). 
68 See in particular, White (1987) 1–25. 
69 See under 4.2.1 ‘The Watchman’ below for a brief example of how Bal’s model of crisis-form applied to the 
Oresteia demonstrates that the narrativization of crisis in dramatic narrative can transcend the temporal confines of 
different historical periods. 
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the Odyssey, the Cypria, Stesichorus’ Oresteia, and Pindar’s Pythian 11.70 The Agamemnon, the 
Libation Bearers, the Eumenides at a lesser extent, and, probably, Proteus, drawing on the 
material of the previous tradition, dramatise and re-invent the most popular aspects of the 
myth of the Atreides.71 What did fifth-century spectators know before the staging of new 
plays? What did they not know? What was the range of the audience? Was the audience 
homogeneous? Such questions have plagued scholarly debates both in antiquity and in 
modern times. In the fourth century BCE, while Aristotle argues that the plots were not widely 
known, and this is the reason why the poets should not seek ‘adherence to the traditional 
plots’ (1451b23–26), Antiphanes claims, evidently with comic bias, that tragic plays work only 
as reminders for what the audience knows already, as opposed to comedy where everything 
is invented.72 Oliver Taplin calls the tendency to privilege the original audience a ‘dogma’ 
which promotes several misconceived inferences: ‘that Greek tragedy was a repository of 
traditional tales, that the dramatist’s composition is ‘dictated by the myth’, that there is no 
element of suspense or surprise, that the tragedy is the working out of fate or destiny, that the 
characters are puppets of the gods. All these clichés I regard as more or less wrong.’73 Even if 
we had access to what each and every member of the original audience knew and thought, 
saw and heard, we would be still dealing with the fact that they were subject to all the 
uncertainties that the dramatic narrative generates as a result of the process of configuring a 
story anew. 
A clear example of how tragedy can engage with the historical realities of fifth-century 
Athens would be the Eumenides. This takes us to the second aspect of the issue of the historical 
specificity of Greek tragedy. In contrast with the other plays of the tetralogy, the associations 
built into the dramatic frame of the Eumenides such as the foundation of the institution of the 
Areopagus court and the cult of the Eumenides showcase powerful connections with the 
historical present and future of fifth-century Athens. Those issues have led to extensive 
 
70 On the literary sources of the myth of the Atreides, see Raeburn & Thomas (2011) xii–xxv; Sommerstein (2010c2) 
136–45; Goward (2005) 43–47; Garvie (1986) ix–xxvi; Gantz (1993) 664–85; Prag (1985), LIMC e.g., s.v. Agamemnon 
(I), Klytaimestra (V). On Aeschylus and Homer, see Sommerstein (2010c2) 241–53; on Aeschylus and Stesichorus, 
see Bowie (2015) 113–20. On the ancient sources of Orestes’ mythical character, see Mitchell-Boyask (2009) 19–21. 
71 On the matter of Aeschylus’ innovation in the Eumenides, see Dunn (1996) 211 n. 24. 
72 Antiphanes fr. 191 PCG. 
73 Taplin (20032) 119. Another scholar who succinctly grounds the same idea is Sommerstein (2010a, 209–23). In the 
same context, see van Erp Taalman Kip’s detailed study (1990). 
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discussions and contested views.74 For instance, the original production of the tetralogy just a 
few years after Ephialtes’ reformations has led Anthony Podlecki to remark that the play ‘was 
anchored to the Athenian present’,75 while Barbara Goward has shown how the play might 
have returned the audience to the present outside the world of the theatre.76 However, I argue 
that such interpretations can inevitably be speculative because of the ‘intricacy, density, and 
inconsistency’ of a script which, as Edith Hall points out, is ‘troublesome, slippery, and 
evasive’.77 I argue that one should take these interpretations into account as attestations of the 
tetralogy’s long and complex reception history, and not as secure or authoritative guidelines 
for the interpretation of the plays. 
Finally, a clarification is needed with regard to how I use the phrase ‘reader(s) and 
spectators’ (or ‘spectator(s) and reader(s)’) in this dissertation. According to Ricoeur’s 
definition of mimesis 3, ‘mimetic activity does not reach its intended term through the 
dynamism of the poetic text alone’ and ‘requires a spectator or reader’.78 This quote illustrates 
that, although the distinction between spectators and readers does not disappear completely 
in mimesis 3, separating out the two terms lies outside the parameters of Ricoeur’s analysis. 
In the scholarship of Greek drama, the differences between reading and spectating audiences 
have of course generated long debate around the question of whether ‘every significant action 
is indicated in the performance script.’79 As my methodological approach is aligned with 
Ricoeur’s mimesis 3, the introduction of any categorical distinctions between the reader and 
the spectator would defeat the purpose of this analysis which is to bring together the historical 
spectator with the implied reader as the one that is ‘never precisely pinpointed, but must always 
remain virtual, as it is not to be identified either with the reality of the text or with the 
 
74 Sommerstein (1989) 25–32; Wallace (1989); Podlecki (1989) 17–21; Macleod (1982). On the institution of the 
Eumenides as a divergence from popular religion, see Mikalson (1991) 214–17. For the political context of the 
Oresteia, see Parara (2010). 
75 Podlecki (1989) 17. 
76 Goward (1999) 55–56. 
77 Hall (2015) 263. 
78 Ricoeur (1984, I) 46. 
79 See in particular Taplin (1977) e.g., 28 & (1995); Revermann (2006) e.g., 46–65. See also Michelakis (2006) 216–17. 
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individual disposition of the reader’,80 and, in my case, the implied spectator as well.81 Therefore, 
throughout my dissertation I have demonstrated that replacing the phrase ‘reader(s) and 
spectator(s)’ by either ‘reader(s)’ or ‘spectator(s)’ is not only unnecessary but also insufficient. 
 Throughout my study I explore the issue of the future in dramatic narrative by 
bringing side by side examples of ancient and modern criticism. Some examples will help 
illustrate the key aspects that inform the six chapters that follow regarding the concepts of 
foreshadowing, sideshadowing, telos, closure, suspense, and surprise. More detailed theoretical 
analysis can be found in the introductory sections of the chapters themselves. 
Although, as suggested in the opening paragraphs of this Introduction, Aristotle’s 
Poetics does not deal extensively with the issue of (future) temporalities in his discussion of 
the qualities of a tragic work, it does, nevertheless, introduce critical terms which can be useful 
when thinking about the function of the future in the plot. Here I refer to three distinct but 
interlinked issues. First, one of the most significant contributions of the Poetics to literary and 
narrative theory is the argument for the prominence of the plot (often over the characters, e.g. 
1450a19–24).82 By situating the dynamics of the plot as a primary value of the tragic poetry, a 
series of matters which are intrinsically linked to the future emerge: expected and unexpected 
turns of future events, and, in general, future action. Second, the idea that the tragic work 
must have beginning, middle, and end, and must be complete (e.g., 1450b25–34) again suggests a 
teleological understanding of the plot. My third point follows up directly from the second, 
and has to do with Aristotle’s strong interest in spectatorial and readerly responses to tragedy 
to which the Poetics often returns.83 In Aristotle, as in Ricoeur, two different temporalities are 
at play, and, thus, for my purposes, two different futures interact: one within the plot and one 
outside the plot. Other terms that appear in Aristotle’s Poetics and are useful in this respect 
are probability and necessity (e.g., 1451a12–14), which have to do with the followability and 
coherence of the plot. These terms invite reflection on how readers and spectators view, 
 
80 Iser (1972) 279, discussed by Ricoeur (1985, II). On this front, Ricoeur draws on both Iser and Jauss: ‘For both 
[Iser and Jauss], the text is a set of instructions that the individual reader or the reading public executes in a passive 
or a creative way’ (1984, I, 77). 
81 See also Lowe (2000) 267 in Glossary, s.v. reader: ‘The mind that processes a text ‒ including here the audience 
or spectator of an oral, iconic, or audiovisual text.’ 
82 Lowe (2000) ix–xiii. 
83 Liveley (2019) 38, 50. See also n. 27 and n. 53 above. 
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anticipate, or, otherwise, access the future of the plot, and, for that reason, they need to be 
linked to the concepts of suspense and surprise, but as well as of foreshadowing and 
sideshadowing. 
Drawing on the earlier literary tradition, including Aristotle, and going beyond it, the 
ancient scholia demonstrate interest in several critical concepts which need to be linked to the 
exploration of the future in dramatic narrative. René Nünlist’s study on that demonstrates 
what the marginal comments in manuscripts of Greek literary texts have to offer. Nünlist’s 
organisation of material around critical terms and concepts facilitates their connection to and 
juxtaposition with modern concepts of literary criticism, and this is an approach I have sought 
to draw on and develop further in Chapters 3, 5, 6, and 7.84 Terms such as πρόληψις, 
προαναφώνησις, and προέκθεσις are all clearly related to the modern idea of narrative 
prolepsis (Chapter 5). The term ἀγωνία contributes to the concept of suspense (Chapter 6), 
while the term οἰκονομία as the postponement of the climax of the plot is associated not only 
with suspense (Chapter 6) but also with surprise (Chapter 7). Finally, the ancient scholia also 
touch on issues of closure (Chapter 3), discussing as they do the future of the plot and how it 
can be found either ‘internal[ly] to the main narrative or external[ly], alluding to an event 
falling outside of the narrative but within the compass of its wider story arc’.85 Although I try 
to pursue such connections throughout the thesis, there are two serious drawbacks in the use 
of ancient scholia as a source for my analysis. First and foremost, the extant scholia to 
Aeschylus’ tragedies are minimal when compared to those on Sophocles and Euripides, and 
their primary focus on textual issues rather than on literary criticism reduces the usefuleness. 
In addition to that, references to the future are scattered across a whole range of different 
terms and forms of expression that require systematisation and analysis. These vary from 
future participial expressions from μέλλω, to the future of εἰμί, adjectival phrases with 
χρόνος or without χρόνος (usually with the participle μέλλω), and syntactic and modal 
future-constructions within the Greek mood and tense system. As a result, my use of scholia 
is at once selective and cautious.  
 
84 See especially sections 3.2, 5.2, 6.2 and 7.2. 
85 Liveley (2019) 104. 
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Turning now to modern literary criticism, I will first refer briefly to three scholars of 
the second half of the twentieth century who have heavily influenced several disciplines, 
opened up new paths to critical thinking, and informed several works on which I draw. The 
cultural and literary theorist Roland Barthes has thoroughly impacted the way we interpret 
texts in general, as he has argued for the literary autonomy of the text and the production of 
multiple meanings and interpretations through reading, instead of a single and fixed 
meaning.86 The literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin has coined the term ‘essential surplus of 
knowledge’ as the narrator’s advantageous accessibility to the plot,87 which in the case of 
Greek tragedy raises interesting questions regarding the absence of an external narrator: this 
surplus can be attributed to special characters (in our case Cassandra) but also to readers and 
spectators who are or become aware of patterns that escape the characters, through 
foreshadowing and sideshadowing. Finally, Umberto Eco has formulated and developed the 
terms open and closed. In Eco’s system of ideas, while an open text is a work of literature which 
encourages the reader to interpret in multiple ways, a closed text urges them for a particular 
interpretation.88 Eco’s works and definitions favour the interpretation of the reader and, in my 
case, the spectator, and, as a result, they have strongly influenced the way I use the terms open 
and closed with regard to the ideas of open future and closed future, which feature prominently 
in my dissertation. The quote below from Eco’s The Open Work wraps up the issues discussed 
in this section, bridging modern and ancient literary theories: 
A work of art, therefore, is a corn-piece and closed form in its uniqueness as a 
balanced organic whole, while at the same time constituting an open product 
on account of its susceptibility to countless different interpretations which do 
not impinge on its unalterable specificity. Hence, every reception of a work of 
art is both an interpretation and a performance of it, because in every reception 
the work takes on a fresh perspective for itself.89 
 
86 Barthes (1977). 
87 Bakhtin (1981). 
88 Eco (1962/1989). 
89 Eco (1962/1989) 4. 
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Two studies of the last thirty years which move across the boundaries of literary criticism and 
philosophy of time have informed my thesis in a more direct manner. The first is Gary Saul 
Morson’s Narrative and Freedom: The Shadows of Time (1994), where foreshadowing and 
sideshadowing feature as significant literary concepts closely related to the future, as this is 
viewed and expected by readers and spectators. This is how they both contemplate narrative 
structure and find themselves at the same cognitive and emotional state as the dramatic 
characters. This is what Morson calls double temporality, based on the double experience of 
future time,90 which is similar to what Ricoeur argues for the involvement of the readers as 
simultaneously active and passive: they become deeply engaged by both action and 
reception.91 While foreshadowing as a literary technique casts a shadow of the future upon the 
present, providing foreknowledge, sideshadowing (the term was coined by both Morson and 
Michael Bernstein) casts shadows from the side upon the present, generating several future 
possibilities.92 Such explorations have given me the opportunity to examine future temporality 
in the Oresteia in a way that goes beyond deterministic approaches, where the future can only 
be seen as past. 
The second, more recent, study is Duncan Kennedy’s Antiquity and the Meanings of Time 
(2013), which has been mentioned earlier as one of the few contributions from the area of 
classical studies exploring the issue of temporality. Kennedy’s work regularly returns to 
Ricoeur’s main observation that time is understood and experienced in narrative terms.93 The 
usefulness of this study for my dissertation lies not only in its approach but also in its focus 
on Greek tragedy, and more specifically, on Sophocles’ Oedipus the King.94 Kennedy, drawing 
on Morson’s notion of double temporality, directs his attention to the tension between 
experiencing time and observing time as a characteristic which can be found in life (and not 
only in literature), where ‘individuals may come to insert themselves to narrative structures 
and to see themselves as characters emplotted (by themselves, by some higher power or by 
some idea) in such a way that they view their actions as in some way (pre-)determined.’95 The 
 
90 Morson (1994) 61. 
91 Ricoeur (1988, III) 166–67. 
92 On sideshadowing in Morson (1994), see 117–72; Bernstein (1994). 
93 Kennedy (2013) x. 
94 Kennedy (2013) 84–118. 
95 Kennedy (2013) 84. 
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paradigm of Oedipus demonstrates the economy, in Kennedy’s words, of the binary ‘free will 
and determinism’, one of the predominant issues in discussions of Greek tragedy,96 or, in 
narrative terms, the ‘contingency (open future) and fate (closed future)’. This is reinforced by 
the absence of narrators in drama: the story is ‘told’ entirely through the speeches of the 
characters unfolding simultaneously for them and the readers and spectators, regardless of 
their spatial and temporal distance.97 Kennedy’s argument takes us back to Bakhtin’s idea of 
the ‘essential surplus of knowledge’, which can be, in some cases, shared by the characters as 
well.98 Examples of characters who see their future as predetermined are Cassandra (who also 
has the essential surplus of knowledge) in the Agamemnon, and Orestes in the Libation Bearers. 
Finally, the act of interpretation itself does not necessarily take us away from contingency, 
even if it involves a teleological way of understanding. As Kennedy remarks: ‘As you exit the 
theatre, can you be entirely clear that you have stepped outside the metaphysical discourses 
which intersect Oedipus?’99 
 I conclude my discussion of methodological issues by introducing two works from the 
philosophy of history which focus on ideas of time, while also crossing the boundaries of 
different types of texts and narratives. The studies on which I draw offer systematic 
explorations of the ideas of telos, change, transition, experience, and expectation, which are central 
to my discussion of the Oresteia and, as a result, I will be returning to them throughout the 
dissertation. 
The first study is Reinhart Koselleck’s monograph Futures Past: On the Semantics of 
Historical Time.100 Its specific focus on how the future was seen and shaped in the past makes 
it particularly relevant for my discussion. In particular, Koselleck has examined ‘how 
expectations, hopes, or prognoses that are projected into the future become articulated into 
language’ and ‘how in a given present, the temporal dimensions of past and future are 
related’.101 In doing so, he has set the foundations for a non-linear approach to the future. One 
dimension of this approach can be seen in the term futures past, which conceptualises the idea 
 
96 Vernant (1988) 49–84; Vidal-Naquet (1986) 39–60. 
97 Kennedy (2013) 101. 
98 Kennedy (2013) 86. 
99 My emphasis. Kennedy (2013) 100. 
100 Koselleck (2004). 
101 Koselleck (2004) 3. 
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that each present was once an imagined future.102 Closely linked to the term futures past are two 
concepts which are central to this study, namely horizon of expectation and space of experience. 
These concepts do not refer to different temporalities. Rather they are incorporated into one 
another.103 Koselleck argues that such considerations may help us place ourselves within a 
temporality organised by human thought and limits as much as by the contingencies of 
uncontrolled events. Adapting Koselleck’s terminology, I use the term future present in an 
attempt to show that, whereas futures past refers to the pastness of the future, my focus is on 
the lived experience of the future in the present, as it manifests itself in the tetralogy. As we 
will see in the chapters that follow, despite the large chronological and cultural gap that 
separates Koselleck’s view on the future from Aeschylus’ Oresteia, there are similarities in how 
they both approach the concept of telos as an aspect of the future, which make it possible to 
relate the two with one another. 
Jonas Grethlein’s monograph Experience and Teleology in Ancient Historiography: 
‘Futures Past’ from Herodotus to Augustine elaborates on Koselleck’s futures past to demonstrate 
that in historical narrative the tension between experiential and teleological approaches 
constitutes ‘the core of our interest to the past’104 as a way of coming to terms with the 
uncertainties of the future.105 In this context, Grethlein uses Koselleck’s term future past to 
describe the temporal asymmetry between historical agents and historians. According to this 
asymmetry, the historiographer is on the vantage point of knowing the events relating to the 
historical agent (telos for Grethlein), and everything in the history that she or he writes about 
drives towards that point. Although Grethlein argues that teleology is closer to historiography 
than it is to fiction, I argue that the narrative of the Oresteia has teleological implications that 
transcend the polarity between historiography and fiction, and also the polarity between telos 
and experience. 
 
102 Translation of the term Vergangene Zukunft (xi, n. 13). First published in German (1979). 
103 See in particular, Koselleck (2004) 255–75. 
104 Grethlein (2013a) 3, 5. 
105 Grethlein (2013a). See also (2014), (2016). 
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1.3. The Oresteia as a tetralogy: a case study 
In this concluding section of the Introduction, I will present the Oresteia as my case study and 
explore my main reasons for this. I will then turn to a brief overview of earlier approaches to 
time in Aeschylus. Finally, I will offer an overview of the six chapters that follow. 
There are two main reasons that I have chosen Aeschylus’ Oresteia. First, I argue that 
explorations of the future in three thematically connected tragic narratives and in what can be 
gleaned from the narrative of the satyr drama Proteus (of which seventeen words have 
survived)106 provide important insights into the complexity of the issue of time in Aeschylus. 
Second, I contend that these narratives invite us to reflect on how the time of the story coexists 
and interacts with their narrated time (the time of the viewer and the reader) in ways that go 
well beyond the findings of earlier studies. Despite my focus on the Oresteia as the major text, 
I also draw attention to how it works as a paradigm. Throughout this study, I treat the Oresteia 
not as an exception but as an opportunity to develop methodological tools that can be applied 
to other Greek plays as well. 
The tendency to think of the Oresteia as a trilogy rather than a tetralogy can be 
understood from the scholarly focus on single, complete plays, and on the uniqueness of three 
interlinked plays.107 This has resulted in the neglect of the Proteus and its implications for the 
scope of the narrative.108 By considering the Oresteia as a trilogy rather than as a tetralogy, one 
reads and interprets the Eumenides as the final play. However, situating the Eumenides in the 
third and not the final place opens up a number of interpretative opportunities with regard to 
its preoccupations with the future. My discussion of the future in Proteus can only be 
speculative, of course, but it makes it possible to speak of a satyr drama which completes the 
tetralogy, instead of speaking about a satyr drama which follows on from a tragic trilogy. This 
approach allows us to go beyond an analysis of Proteus as a sequel of the preceding tragedies. 
Explorations of how Aeschylus’ satyr drama might have been connected to the rest of the 
 
106 See hypothesis of the Agamemnon, TrGF III F 210–15. For reconstructions, see Sommerstein (2010a, 135–36), also 
in (2010b); Griffith (2002); Sutton (1984). For further bibliography on Proteus, see also Marshall (2015) 79 n. 72. On 
satyr drama in general (including bibliography), see O’Sullivan and Collard (2013); Krumeich, Pechstein, & 
Seidensticker (1999); Easterling (1997) 37–44; Seaford (1984) 1–48; Sutton (1980). 
107 For the tetralogies in fifth-century BCE Athens, see Sommerstein (2010c2) 32–44; Gantz (1980), (1979). 
108 For the generalized downplay of the satyr drama, see Griffith (2002) 195 and n. 1 with bibliography. 
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tetralogy highlight the complex temporal relations among the four plays and discourage 
approaches based exclusively on linearity.109 
The six main chapters of this study (Chapters 2–7) provide distinct yet interlinked 
approaches and perspectives on the topic of the future in the Oresteia. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 
undertake an analysis of the concept of telos, as its prominence in the tetralogy has significant 
implications which pervade the broader scope of the whole dissertation. These chapters offer 
a three-stage approach to telos, arguing for the need to disentangle its complex and wide-
ranging associations. In Chapter 2 the three tragic plays are subjected to rigorous linguistic 
analysis. Mapping the lexical occurrences of τέλος and its cognates110 onto Seaford’s model of 
τέλος demonstrates two things: they oscillate between purpose and fulfilment and signify 
notions of deferral and crisis as well. In Chapter 3 the meaning of telos as ending is explored 
through a more narratologically oriented analysis. This takes on board not only the linguistic 
fabric of the narrative but also its interwoven structures as they emerge from the plot. In this 
Chapter, I argue that the idea of telos as ending needs to be identified not only with the idea 
of a complete closure of the plays driven by necessity and desire, but also with the possibilities 
and inconclusiveness of an open future. Chapter 4 completes my analysis of telos by 
introducing two important concepts, future present and present future. My argument is that the 
universe of the Oresteia does not limit itself to representations of the future which are only 
textual or narratorial, but it encompasses considerations of the future related to broader 
aspects of human life: to reflect on and construct the future (present future) and to be subjected 
to its invasive character (future present). Chapter 5 demonstrates how, through the techniques 
of foreshadowing and sideshadowing, the dramatic narrative manipulates the characters’ and the 
audiences’ expectations in unforeseen ways, challenging their understanding of an open or a 
closed future. This unpredictability of the future features prominently in Chapters 6 and 7 as 
well, where the concepts of suspense and surprise are explored. These two chapters are 
organised around two narrative movements, narrative progression and narrative misdirection, 
and around two models of narrative engagement, governed by immersion, for the anticipation 
of the future events of the plot, and by cognition, for their being experienced and understood. 
Throughout the six chapters, my discussion puts under examination a wide selection of 
 
109 See sections 3.6 (‘Closure as desire in Proteus’) and 4.5 (‘Proteus between present future and future present’). 
110 For a lexical inventory of the τέλος-headwords in the Oresteia, see Appendix: Τέλος-headwords in the Oresteia. 
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scenes, with some of them becoming central to more than one chapter (e.g. the ‘Cassandra 
scene’ in the Agamemnon, or the scene of Orestes’ hesitation before the matricide in the Libation 
Bearers). This approach demonstrates the benefits of considering the dense narrative of the 
Oresteia from multiple perspectives. 
Finally, a note on editions and translations. In the interest of remaining concise I quote 
from the text of Aeschylus only when I engage with it linguistically. The text is cited from 
Alan Sommerstein’s Loeb Edition (2008). Unless stated otherwise, the translation cited is of 
Christopher Collard (2002), which follows the Greek more closely. I use the Latinised version 
of all names throughout. Key Greek terms have been italicised only when transliterated (such 
as telos). 
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2 
2. Telos as purpose and fulfilment 
2.1. Introduction 
Telos as a term has a wide semantic range which in the Oresteia varies from the literal and 
mundane to the complex and conceptual.1 Telos embraces meanings of ‘consummation’, 
‘supreme power’, ‘decision’, ‘doom’, ‘duty’, ‘offerings to the gods’, ‘degree or state of 
completion’, ‘end as finish or cessation’, ‘achievement’, and ‘attainment’.2 This plurality has 
been at the centre of Frits Waanders’ study which focuses on the lexical spectrum of τέλος 
and τελέω from Homer to the end of fifth century BCE, and demonstrates the centrality of 
telos for the archaic and classical authors.3 
In this Chapter, this plethora of meanings of telos is revisited with the help of Seaford’s 
2012 discussion of telos in which the tel- root is mapped onto the inter-related spheres of 
completion, payment, ritual, and authority (2.2).4 These four categories make possible a 
comprehensive overview of the semantics of τέλος in the Oresteia. However, they cannot 
capture the teleological implications of Aeschylus’ plays in their full power. It is only by 
turning to hermeneutics and to the multi-layered interweaving of different semantic 
categories that readers and spectators can begin to engage with a thorough understanding of 
 
1 For a lexical inventory of the τέλος-headwords in the Oresteia, see Appendix: Τέλος-headwords in the Oresteia. 
2 LSJ9 s.v. τέλος. See also Lebeck (1971) 71 and n. 38, with reference to Boisacq (1950). 
3 On the meanings of τέλος in Aeschylus, see Waanders (1983) 85–89, 96–99. 
4 See Seaford (2012) 125–222. 
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the narrative (2.3). I then demonstrate how those findings are intertwined with the future as 
a concept, which explains why I situate this discussion at the beginning of my thesis. It should 
be noted that none of the seventeen surviving words of Proteus can shed light on how the last 
play of the tetralogy might have dealt with these issues at the level of diction. 
The preoccupation of the Oresteia with τέλος and its cognates was first observed in 
1939 by William Stanford: ‘the whole play [the Agamemnon] is full of references to differently 
conceived τέλη’.5 Almost three decades later, Ulrich Fischer undertook a much more detailed 
discussion of the concept of telos in the dramaturgy of Aeschylus. Fischer’s study, despite its 
perceptiveness, remains limited in scope, as it mainly focuses on the concept of telos as goal 
related with the divine.6 In her 1970s seminal work on the Oresteia, Anne Lebeck analysed 
further the significance of τέλος and the complexities around its usage in this narrative.7 More 
specifically, Lebeck notes: 
In the case of τέλος the number of possible meanings is multiplied several times, thus 
making it more difficult to determine the thematic importance of the word. This much 
is certain: the meaning of τέλος which is significant for the trilogy as a whole, that 
against which every secondary meaning plays, is a religious one. It is difficult to be 
more precise. τέλος denotes the fulfilment or consummation of one’s destiny, the end 
of a process of becoming, the completion of a cycle. Marriage is a τέλος, initiation into 
the mysteries is a τέλος, death is a τέλος. All these associations are evoked each time 
the word occurs.8 
Although the studies above paved the way for further explorations of telos in the Oresteia, only 
two, more recent, attempts  have returned to the topic, the studies by Seaford and Godlhill.9 
Goldhill’s influential but brief paper examines the various meanings and ambiguities of telos 
 
5 Stanford (1939) 157 and n. 1. See also Kenneth Burke’s remark: ‘[V]ariants of the word for completion, fulfilment, 
run through this trilogy like an idée fixe’ (1952, 390). 
6 Fischer (1965); telos is explored in relation to three different areas of influence: telos as fixed by humans (technical 
level), as fixed by fate (fateful-demonic level), and as fulfilled through the divine power (divine level). For 
criticisms of Fischer’s model, see Goldhill (1984b, briefly in 170–71 n. 1), Ambrose (1967), Lebeck (1967), Fitton-
Brown (1965). 
7 See, indicatively, Lebeck (1971) 68–73 and n. 42. 
8 Lebeck (1971) 72. See also Lebeck (1983) 81–82. 
9 See 1.1. 
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and its cognates in the tragic trilogy.10 It also raises the issue of the reductive nature of earlier 
studies of the topic, arguing that telos is under-theorised and noting that ‘this analysis, which 
could be extended, is offered to point towards the problematic relation between the present 
and the future, structured towards a telos’.11 While this article provides useful insights for the 
discussion that follows, it is, however, quite restricted in textual references and limited in 
terms of developing a conceptual framework.  
Seaford’s study has been briefly discussed at the beginning of this Chapter and will be 
further considered in what follows. As mentioned above, in the following section I will 
present how the telos words of the Oresteia can be classified under Seaford’s four semantic 
categories: telos as ‘completion’, as ‘ritual’, as ‘payment’, and as ‘authority’.12 Then, in 2.3, I 
will explain how and why this classification, linked to Seaford’s broader set of interests in 
space and time in Aeschylus, can only be located at beginning of my more focused study of 
the future.  
2.2. Τέλος in the Oresteia through Seaford’s categories 
2.2.1. Τέλος as ‘completion’ 
‘Completion’ is defined by Seaford as the positive sense of ‘fulfilment’13 and the negative sense 
of ‘limitation’ or ‘ending’. While the semantic category of τέλος as ‘completion’ is underlying 
in most occurrences of telos in the Oresteia, I will here include the ones in which this meaning 
is predominant.  
In the first example, the Carpet scene of the Agamemnon, Clytemnestra implies 
Agamemnon’s death using the participle of the verb τελευτῶ: ‘The man to call blest with 
success is the man | who ended his life (βίον τελευτήσαντ’) in precious well-being’ (928–
29). Later on, the meaning of τέλος takes the positive sense of fulfilment. Having witnessed 
 
10 Goldhill (1984b). 
11 Goldhill (1984b) 171, also 169–70 and n. 1. 
12 Seaford (2012) 127. 
13 For the motif of fulfilment in the Oresteia, see Roberts (1985) with further bibliography.  
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Clytemnestra’s prayer to Zeus (972–74), the elderly men respond employing the word 
τελεσφόρος, the compound adjective from τέλος, as ‘bringing fulfilment’, which plays an 
important role in this and the following play.14 At lines 996–1000 it is used twice in close 
proximity: 
with my mind correct | in judgement, my heart whirls round | at the 
fulfilment to come (τελεσφόροις δίναις). | I pray that my expectations | turn 
out false and do not come to be fulfilled (εἰς τὸ μὴ τελεσφόρον). 
The first use of τελεσφόρος by the Chorus manifests their cognitive and emotional alignment 
with the turns of the plot. They perceive that the fulfilment of Clytemnestra’s telos is coming 
closer and that her prior invocation cannot be refuted. For this reason, they activate wishful 
thinking, hoping that their grim expectations will not come true. Nonetheless, Clytemnestra 
will soon prove her quality as τελεσφόρος, as one who brings fulfilment, a quality that, as we 
shall see, will also be demonstrated by Orestes in the Libation Bearers. 
In the ‘Cassandra scene’ (1035–330),15 τέλος as ‘completion’ and ‘fulfilment’ appears 
several times (1107, 1109, 1202, 1253). First, it is employed to define the nature of Cassandra’s 
prophecies. Cassandra uses two cognates while witnessing the undertaking of a murder, the 
verb τελῶ for the act of the crime and the noun τέλος for the murder itself (1107–9): 
Cruel woman, will you take this to its end (τελεῖς)? | After you bathe the 
husband clean | who shares your bed— how shall I speak of the end (τέλος)? 
Considering the uses of τέλος by Clytemnestra above, Cassandra’s use of τέλος and of τελεῖς, 
with its morphological ambiguity (it can be construed both as present tense and as future 
tense), signifies the simultaneous enactment of purpose and fulfilment. These two occurrences 
represent a ‘new affliction’ (1101) which is anticipated and will lead things to their fulfilment 
while also being presented as a consequence of the past crimes that took place in the house 
 
14 For occurrences of τελεσφόρος elsewhere in Greek tragedy, see Garvie (1986) on 212. 
15 For an extensive bibliography on the ‘Cassandra scene’, see Pillinger (2019); Mitchell-Boyask (2006) 270 n. 2. 
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(1090–92, 1095–97). Fraenkel argues that, although Cassandra has started to complete the 
jigsaw of her visions, the precise events involved in the use of word τέλος remain obscure: 
πῶς φράσω τέλος does not mean that she has difficulty in finding the right 
expression: the τέλος at which Clytemnestra’s actions are aimed is not yet perceptible 
to Cassandra when she speaks these words, however much she may fear the outcome 
of this action (1107 τόδε) which she sees before her…In using the present tense 
[προτείνει] Cassandra returns from the possibilities of the future to what her vision 
shows her now.16 
According to the above quote, the nature and content of the action prophesied will stay 
unspecified for another seven lines, and the prophetess will shortly fill in any gaps, while the 
perpetrator fulfils their goal. However, I argue that the barrier does not lie between Cassandra 
and her access to the future, but between Cassandra and her communication with the Chorus. 
Her question ‘how shall I speak of the end?’ is not a genuine question based on Cassandra’s 
not-yet-discovery of the future, but it is a rhetorical question which is articulated because of 
the unspeakable spectacle she encounters. As Pillinger notes, ‘the word telos…describes not 
only the goal, the action that provides the ‘end’ of the story, but also the ‘crux’ of the matter.’17 
The murder is committed by a woman they all know: the not-yet-named Clytemnestra is 
trapping Agamemnon in a robe in his bath and is striking him.18 
In the Libation Bearers the adjective τελεσφόρος appears two times in the sense of 
fulfilment (212, 541). In the first instance, Orestes, who is disguised, asks Electra to pray for a 
successful future, on the grounds that her earlier requests regarding the return of her brother 
as the avenger ‘are now fulfilled’ (τελεσφόρους ευχάς, 212). The second occurrence is also 
spoken by Orestes who applies it to himself this time, and it is associated with his reaction to 
Clytemnestra’s dream as narrated by the Chorus. Orestes, eager for the Chorus to complete 
their narration, asks: ‘And the end of her story (τελευτᾷ)? Its culmination?’ (534).19 The 
 
16 Fraenkel (1950, II) on 1100. 
17 Pillinger (2019) 48. 
18 Cassandra’s prophecies are explored in detail in section 6.3.1. ‘Suspense through foreknowledge’. 
19 Sommerstein (2008) follows West’s interchange between 528 and 534 (1990). Cf. Garvie (1986), Collard (2002) and 
Brown (2018). The main reason why I adopt West’s correction is that Orestes’ question about the end of the story 
refers to the upcoming matricide and not to the dream. 
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narration of the dream is concluded with a transition to ‘real time’, when Clytemnestra 
awakens just before the snake’s fatal attack, as in the entrance song.20 Orestes seizes the 
opportunity and reveals his urge to bring the telos himself by becoming τελεσφόρος: ‘I pray 
to Earth here, then, and to my father’s tomb | that this dream may be fulfilled (τελεσφόρον) 
for me’ (540–41). Apparently, what the dream has left unfulfilled will be completed by Orestes 
as the telos bearer. Apart from bearing the telos of Clytemnestra’s murder as τελεσφόρος, 
Orestes will also perform his own telos as the rite de passage through the upcoming act of the 
matricide.21 This aspect will be further discussed in the next section. 
In the Eumenides, the first occurrence of τέλος is through the participle τελουμένας, 
from the verb τελοῦμαι. This is uttered by Orestes and reflects the semantic category of 
‘fulfilment’ to mean ‘to be performed’ or ‘to be executed’, referring to Apollo’s oracle:22 ‘and 
it [the oracle] spoke of further | visitations from Furies, exacted (τελουμένας) for a father’s 
blood’ (283–84). Qualifying ‘visitations’, τελουμένας describes the nature of the relationship 
between the Furies and Orestes in case he does not avenge his father’s murderers: as the 
meaning of τελουμένας shows, the punishment will be inescapable. The same participle 
recurs after Aegisthus’ murder when the Chorus responds to the victim’s cries, in close 
proximity with τέλος, with both expressing finality: ‘Let us stand aside from the business as 
it reaches | fulfilment (τελουμένου), so as to seem innocent of these troubles; the issue | of 
the fight has surely been decided (κεκύρωται τέλος)!’ (872–74). The Chorus’ repetition of 
tel- words marks the fulfilment of Orestes’ deed. The house servant immediately appears on 
stage to deliver the news that Aegisthus is dead in a way that, if we follow the manuscript’s 
reading, echoes the language of the Chorus: ‘Oh, woe, utter woe for our master struck | down 
(δεσπότου †τελουμένου†, 875–76)!’23 
 
20 I return to Clytemnestra’s dream which is analysed from other angles as well in Chapters 4 and 5 below: as a 
present future (4.3.1) and as a foreshadowing technique (5.3.3). 
21 Goldhill (1984b) 170 n. 4. 
22 LSJ9 s.v. τελέομαι-οῦμαι. See also Waanders (1983) 85. 
23 The manuscript’s reading τελουμένου has been seen with suspicion by a number of scholars. LSJ cites it for the 
meaning of τελοῦμαι as ‘come to one’s end’. Garvie (1986), Collard (2002), and Brown (2018) support Schütz’s 
correction (1811) πεπληγμένου on the grounds that there is no other evidence of the meaning of τελοῦμαι as ‘tο 
be killed’. Fischer (1965, 34 n. 23) argues that πεπληγμένου is supported by πεπληγμένος in line 884 creating a 
ring effect, and by the parallel use of πέπληγμαι and πεπληγμένος for Agamemnon’s murder (Agamemnon 1343, 
1345). I argue that a similar effect is achieved through the echoing of tel- words from 872–74. 
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The same dynamic of multiple occurrences of τέλος is in operation in the scene around 
the trial of Orestes where the forensic context complicates the idea of ‘judicial completion’.24 
Orestes addresses the image of the goddess Athena declaring that he awaits ‘the outcome of 
judgement’ (τέλος δίκης, 243). In doing so, he unites the idea of finality with the idea of justice 
or judgement.25 Athena’s judgement is supposed to release him of his troubles by fulfilling his 
prayers. However, as Goldhill points out, the phrase τέλος δίκης can also work towards a 
different direction: if τέλος means the end, and δίκη alludes to his punishment from the 
Furies, this might also imply death for Orestes and therefore success for the Furies.26 Although 
the same phrase is used by Apollo when he threatens the Furies that they will not ‘win the 
verdict’ (οὐκ ἔχουσα τῆς δίκης τέλος, 729), giving τέλος the meaning of fulfilment, the 
victory of Orestes does not bring with it the destruction of the Furies. Similarly, the Chorus 
accepts Athena’s role as the authority who will judge αἰτίας τέλος as an ‘upright judgement’ 
(434).27 By doing so, they resile from their claim of ‘final authority’ (see lines 320, 393). This 
τέλος looks forward to the end of the trial which, nevertheless, does not provide a fulfilment 
for the Furies. In the same manner, Athena announces that judging this matter is more 
important than any mortal thinks (470–81). She decides to pass it on to the citizens to judge 
(483–84) by establishing the ‘jurors’ duty’ (ἐπέσταλται τέλος, 743), but it is her who acquits 
Orestes with her vote. Finally, the Furies use an antonym of τέλος in legal contexts, ἀτέλειαν 
(360–61), as the ‘immunity’ they have offered to the gods, given that the Furies have taken 
over from them the unpleasant duty of judging and punishing. Technically, ἀτέλεια implies 
the full authority of the Furies to handle familial murders, but this comes to be violated by the 
newly established legal system.28 
2.2.2. Τέλος as ‘ritual’ 
In this section, I present examples of occurrences of τέλος in the context of rituals, such as 
marriage and prayers, from the Agamemnon and the Eumenides. The occurrences of τέλος as 
 
24 Seaford (2012) 136. 
25 Sommerstein (1989) on 243. 
26 Goldhill (1984b) 172. 
27 Sommerstein’s translation (2008). 
28 Sommerstein (2008) & (1989) on 361. 
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‘ritual’ in the Agamemnon is through the word προτέλεια which is employed by the Chorus 
twice in the parodos (65, 227) and, then, again in the third choral song (720, second stasimon). 
Προτέλεια derives from τέλος in the sense of ‘goal’ and ‘rite of marriage’, and it means 
‘actions prior to a goal’ and ‘prenuptial rites’.29 In the first example, προτέλεια is used as ‘first-
rites’ (65) for the casualties of the Greeks and the Trojans. The emerging questions are why 
the human catastrophe at war is referred to as ‘first-rites’ and what this telos is to which rites 
are needed as preludes. One possible interpretation is that the rites are prenuptial, and, thus, 
their telos is a marriage yet-to-happen. Lebeck comments that ‘προτέλεια are the initial 
sacrifice which culminates in the τέλος of the marriage ceremony.’30 Jean Bollack has argued 
that this might be the reunion of Helen and Menelaus, probably dramatised in the Proteus, the 
satyr drama that concludes the Oresteia (on which more below).31 Another possibility is that it 
alludes to the past and the beginning of the war. In that case the marriage between Helen and 
Paris might also represent a telos;32 as Stanford notes, it may represent a marriage which ‘began 
with cruel preliminaries.’33 
The first reference of προτέλεια and its ambiguous meaning discussed above prepares 
for the second reference (227) which appears in the Chorus’ narrative of Iphigenia’s sacrifice 
(184–249, parodos).34 In this context, προτέλεια is coordinated with ναῶν:  
‘So he [Agamemnon] was hard enough to sacrifice | his daughter, in aid of a 
war | to punish a woman | and as first-rites for the fleet to sail’. (224–27)  
Iphigenia’s killing functioned as a προτέλεια for the τέλος of the arrival of the Greek fleet at 
Troy and the ensuing Trojan war. Additionally, προτέλεια here can also be linked to 
implications of marriage as a different future for Iphigenia, or as an alleged wishful future as 
 
29 Waanders (1983) 188–90; LSJ9 s.v. τέλος (I. 6) and s.v. προτέλεια. See also Zeitlin (1965) 465. 
30 Lebeck (1971) 48. Fraenkel (1950, II) οn 65. See Lebeck (1983) 81 n. 29, where she correctly criticises Fischer’s view 
that προτέλεια in Aeschylus has nothing to do with marriage. 
31 Bollack (2001) οn 65, followed by Sommerstein (2008) οn 65 n. 15. 
32 Raeburn & Thomas (2011) on 63–67; Collard (2002) on 65. 
33 Stanford (1939) 142, where ‘a special innuendo’ is attributed to the word προτέλεια (as well as to the next 
reference of the word οn 227). 
34 The preoccupations of the parodos of the Agamemnon with the future are explored elsewhere as well: under 5.3.1 
‘Omens, prophecies, oracles’, under 6.4.3 ‘Suspense through action delayed’. 
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a bait. In this case, it may be possible that προτέλεια brings into mind other versions of the 
myth, where Iphigenia was lured to Aulis (the point of her sacrifice) on the false promise of 
the marriage between her and Achilles.35 There has been a large number of testimonies in 
several literary texts well-known to the audience of 458 BCE which employ this version of the 
myth such as the Cypria, while it is also dramatised in the much later Euripides’ play Iphigenia 
in Aulis. 36 An allusion to this may be found in the Agamemnon as well: Clytemnestra accuses 
Agamemnon for ‘treachery’ (1524) in her defence speech, after the killings of Agamemnon 
and Cassandra.37 As the scene of the sacrifice is revisited and dramatised by the Chorus in 
their entrance song, its outcome and consequences put προτέλεια in a problematic context 
and increase the readers’ and the spectators’ anticipation. In both occurrences of προτέλεια 
in 65 and 227 the rite which finally secures the safe departure of the fleet is literally and 
ironically prenuptial. 
The last instance of προτέλεια in the Oresteia appears in the teleological narrative of 
the lion cub (717–49) which is embedded in the third choral song (681–782).38 The word is 
employed with the meaning of ’first-rites of its life’, which is a metaphorical ritual meaning 
(ἐν βιότου προτελείοις, 720) describing the initially harmless nature of the young lion which 
is contrasted with what follows:39 when it reaches the age of maturity, its instincts take over 
and the lion causes bloodshed for the house (727–34). Through the retrospective lens of the 
Chorus (the whole narrative is in past tense), the house of the cub can be identified with 
 
35 Collard (2002) on 65; Sommerstein (2008) οn 227 n. 49; Zeitlin (1965) 465–67, 491, 493, 499. Zeitlin does not 
recognise an allusion to Iphigeneia’s sacrifice in line 65, but I cannot see how it is not an allusion, as the same word 
is used twice in a similar context. On the topic of the conflation of rituals of marriage and death, see Rehm (1994). 
36 See Cypria Argumentum 8 at West (2003) 74–75. Although in the Agamemnon Iphigenia’s sacrifice is not presented 
as inflicted by any divine force (see discussionsdiscussion in sections 5.3.1, 5.4.1, and 5.4.2), below), in Cypria the 
sacrifice is the result of Artemis’ demand. On the literary and iconographic history of Iphigenia’s myth, see 
Michelakis (2006) 21–23; Collard (2002) xx–xxiii; Gantz (1993) 582–88, 685–88; Prag (1985) 61–67, 73; LIMC s.v. 
‘Iphigeneia’. 
37 Raeburn & Thomas (2011) on 1523–424; Collard (2002) xxiii n. 10, also on 1522–424. Cf. Fraenkel (1950, III) on 
1523. 
38 On this as a common metaphor in the fifth-century BCE literature, see Stanford (1958) 194 on 1431b; Fraenkel 
(1950, II) on 736. 
39 Waanders (1983, 19) s.v. προτέλεια argues that this meaning as ‘in its young years’ is slightly different than the 
meaning as ‘first-rites’ (in the earlier examples), considering the meaning of τέλος as ‘maturity’. See also two other 
words with similar meaning in the Agamemnon: ἐντελέων ‘in their full prime’ (105) and τέλεον ‘full-grown’ (1504). 
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Priam’s: the destructive end of the Trojan War for the house of Priam was brought about by 
Helen who was initially welcomed.40 
The associations of τέλος and its cognates with the fulfilling power of the gods recurs 
after the murders towards the end of the play. In her description of the act of Agamemnon’s 
murder, Clytemnestra devotes her third and final blow to Zeus the Saviour (Ζεὺς σωτὴρ) as 
a thanksgiving offer (1386–87). This gesture evokes her earlier prayer to Zeus the master 
fulfiller (Ζεὺς τέλειος, 972–73) discussed above. Zeus has been transformed from a god with 
the potential to fulfil the future to a god who has saved Clytemnestra by fulfilling her prayers 
(1387). The adjective τέλειος as ‘indicating fulfilment by the gods’ appears again in her 
invocation of ‘Justice fulfilled (τέλειον)’ for her daughter Iphigenia (1432). This use 
demonstrates another successful divine intervention which assisted her in committing the 
murder alongside with Ruin and Fury (Ἄτην Ἐρινύν θ’, 1433). A similar idea is echoed by the 
Chorus who reiterates that the workings of Zeus’ justice prevail (1487): ‘For what is fulfilled 
(τελεῖται) for mortals without Zeus?’41 Again, the meaning of the verb τελοῦμαι lies in 
between the present and the future. 
Finally, the adjective τέλειος appears twice in the Eumenides in relation to the ritual of 
invocation. It is first found in the prologue, when Pythia invokes ‘Zeus the Fulfiller’ (τέλειον, 
28) as one of the divinities to whom the prophetess is indebted for her prophetic seat in Delphi 
(1–24). Usually, the word τέλειος is employed to address the gods invoking their power to 
fulfil a prayer, as in the Agamemnon where, for example, Clytemnestra invokes ‘Zeus the 
Fulfiller’ (Ζεῦ Ζεῦ τέλειε, 973–74). On the contrary, Pythia’s request for fulfilment is here 
frustrated. Her ritual reverence is violently interrupted by the vision of the Furies some lines 
later (33) who will soon be occupying the stage. As Goward points out, the monologue gives 
way to terror.42 The second occurrence of τέλειος is associated with Hera and her traditional 
title as the goddess of marriage.43 Her title and her marriage with Zeus represent the ritual 
 
40 Raeburn & Thomas (2011) on 744–49; Lebeck (1971) 48. 
41 This idea can also be observed in Aeschylus’ Suppliants 823–24: 'What is fulfilled (τέλειόν ἐστιν) for mortals 
without you?’ For Zeus in the Agamemnon, see Smith (1980), Lloyd-Jones (1956). 
42 Goward (1999) 60. The prologue of the Eumenides is also discussed in a number of sections: see further 5.3.2 
(‘Prayers and oaths’), 6.4.3 (‘Suspense through action delayed’), 0 (‘Surprise at the beginning’,), and 7.4.3 (‘Surprise 
through shock’). 
43 Sommerstein (1989) on 214. 
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consummation which is invoked by Apollo to support his case for Orestes: ‘the pledges given 
Hera (Ἥρας τελείας) and Zeus | for a marriage’s fulfilment’ (214).44 The meaning of τέλος 
as marriage reoccurs towards the end of the play. Although the Furies object to Apollo by 
favouring blood relations over marital relations, Athena subsequently declares that the Furies’ 
prerogative should be honoured with sacrifices to ensure the successful fulfilment of each 
marriage (γαμηλίου τέλους, 835). Having the ex-Furies, the Awesome Ones, secure the 
marital ceremony and relationship signifies the conditional dynamics of the telos-related 
words after the death of Clytemnestra. 
2.2.3. Τέλος as ‘payment’ 
The meaning of telos as payment is considered by Seaford as a completion of an obligation, 
ranging from financial to retributive.45 In the Agamemnon, the cognate of telos, the hapax 
compound τελεσσίφρων, has qualified Wrath as ‘purposeful’: the purposeful Wrath (Μῆνις) 
reached Troy, because Zeus Xenios was dishonoured by Paris who dishonoured his host 
Menelaus (700–6). The accompanying verbal form ‘drove on its way’ (ἤλασεν, 702), 
meanwhile, reveals its oracular character: the power of Wrath, having been activated at Aulis 
(Agamemnon 155), is now re-introduced and facilitates the flow of events. The significance of 
this passage extends beyond the limits of the ode, as Knox has pointed out, and the lion cub 
parable can equally be applied to Helen, Aegisthus, Agamemnon, Clytemnestra, and 
Orestes.46 Whichever character one might relate it to, what needs to be emphasised is that, in 
this fable, the will of gods, expressed by the personified powers of Ruin (Ἄτη, 735) and Fury 
(Ἐρινύς, 749), sets in motion all interpretations of προτέλεια at once.47  
In the Libation Bearers, the meaning of telos as ‘payment’ can also be found in the use 
of the verb τελοῦμαι as used by the Chorus and Orestes in the kommos (309–10, 385).48 In line 
310 the women of the Chorus refer to the idea of retaliatory justice: ‘[i]n return for hostile 
words, let hostile words be paid (τελείσθω)!’. The same is reiterated in line 313 through the 
 
44 Lebeck (1971) 69–70; Goldhill (1984b) 170. 
45 Seaford (2012) 127. 
46 Knox (1952). See also Lebeck (1971) 50–51. Cf. Nappa (1995) who suggests that Paris is the one implied. 
47 Raeburn & Thomas (2011) on 717–49; Collard (2002) on 717–49. 
48 For more on the kommos of the Libation Bearers, see Garvie (1986) 122–25. 
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principle δράσαντι παθεῖν: ‘For the doer, suffering’.49 According to this, a destructive future 
will always await the perpetrator. Later on, in 382–85 Orestes further builds on this idea by 
invoking Zeus: ‘Zeus, Zeus!... | likewise for the parents shall it be paid (τελεῖται)’.50 As in 
Clytemnestra’s invocation in the Agamemnon prior to her husband’s murder when Zeus had 
been presented as ‘fulfiller’ (972–73), the use of τελεῖται here manifests the confidence with 
which the speaker considers his future acts as certain and, therefore, complete. 
2.2.4. Τέλος as ‘authority’ 
Seaford’s final semantic category is associated with the power which leads to completion as 
‘authority’, ‘task,’ or duty’. The word τέλος appears twice in the ‘Carpet scene’ of the 
Agamemnon (783–974) with this meaning, once uttered by Clytemnestra and once by 
Agamemnon (908, 934). Clytemnestra uses τέλος as ‘duty’, referring to the servants’ 
spreading of fabrics for Agamemnon’s path to the palace (908–13), ostensibly to honour her 
husband and celebrate his return.51 For the spectator and the reader, however, who have been 
aware of Clytemnestra’s plan, τέλος also implies ‘purpose’ and ‘fulfilment’: the path ‘strewn 
with purples’ (910) will precipitate Agamemnon’s entrance to the house and, subsequently, 
the materialisation of a future. This future has been designed by Clytemnestra to be immediate 
(‘immediately’ 910) and unexpected (‘into a home unexpected’, 911). The repetition of τέλος 
as ‘duty’ by Agamemnon (934) shows that, despite his initial reservations, he will proceed to 
walk on the fabrics as Clytemnestra instructs. Again, τέλος means more than ‘duty’. 
Agamemnon gives into his wife’s orders which he asks to be executed ‘quickly’ (945). The 
‘Carpet scene’ ends with the necessary preparations for the successful completion of 
Clytemnestra’s plan: here, telos acquires also the meaning of ‘ritual performance’, through 
which Clytemnestra’s purpose will be fulfilled. As Vernant comments, ‘the moment 
Agamemnon sets foot on the carpet, the drama reaches its consummation’.52 
 
49 Garvie (1986) on 306–14. 
50 See n. 50. 
51 Similarly, in the Libation Bearers Cilissa speaks about her ‘duty’ (τέλος, 760) as both ‘a launderer and a nurse’. 
52 Vernant (1988) 47. 
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Telos with the meanings of ‘task’ and ‘duty’ as seen above (908) is also used by 
Cassandra to refer to her prophetic skill when speaking to the elderly men of the Chorus 
(1202). The prophetess reveals that this has been assigned to her by Apollo. According to the 
mythical tradition, Apollo taught Cassandra the skill of prophesy in exchange for sexual 
favours, which she finally refused, and the god punished her by making her prophecies 
unpersuasive.53 In this context, she employs τέλος as a form of communication and exchange 
between humans and the divine.54 During her violent visitations to the future, Cassandra also 
experiences her τέλος as the purpose and fulfilment of this duty as a prophetess, and, most 
importantly, she experiences her τέλος as an end, because she foreshadows Agamemnon’s 
and her own death (see the concept of future present in Chapter 4). The final telos-word of the 
scene reflects her inability to persuade the elderly men about the truth of her prophecies: they 
use τοῦ τελοῦντος (1253), the masculine participle of τελῶ, meaning ‘the (male) 
accomplisher’, whereas Cassandra has already revealed the female identity of the perpetrator. 
In the Libation Bearers, the third instance of τελεσφόρος with the meaning of authority 
appears in the final scene before the matricide. Orestes and Pylades, disguised as travellers 
bringing the news for the supposed death of Orestes to the masters of the house of the 
Atreides, ask for somebody who is τελεσφόρος to greet and welcome them: ‘Have someone 
with authority (τελεσφόρος) in the house come out, | the lady in charge— but a man is more 
seemly’ (663–64). Here the adjective τελεσφόρος can be interpreted in different ways. Orestes’ 
request for the arrival of someone who is τελεσφόρος in the sense of having authority 
responds to how the doorkeeper must understand the adjective. For Orestes, Pylades, the 
Chorus, as well as for reading and watching audiences, τελεσφόρος does not only signify the 
person in charge, but also represents the fulfilment of Orestes’ desire,55 echoing the previous 
occurrences (212, 541), to mean ‘to fulfil his prayers’.56 In both cases, this person would be 
either Clytemnestra or Aegisthus.57 
 
53 On the mythical account of the story of Apollo and Cassandra, see Raeburn & Thomas (2011) on 1202–13; Gantz 
(1993) 92–93. 
54 Goldhill (1984b) 179 n. 7; Fischer (1965) 24. 
55 Goldhill (1984a) 170. 
56 Garvie (1986) in 663. 
57 On Clytemnestra’s surprising appearance at the door instead of Aegisthus, see section under 7.3.3 ‘Surprise 
through unexpected appearances’. 
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2.3. Τέλος: from Semantics to Hermeneutics 
In what follows, the telos-vocabulary must be understood in ways that transcend the neat 
categorical distinctions followed so far. Through synthesis or antithesis, the four semantic 
categories discussed above can be shown to complement, contradict, or compete with one 
another. 
Moving away from the associations of προτέλεια with the event of a wedding in the 
Agamemnon, an added semantic layer relates it to the upcoming murders of the first two plays 
of the tetralogy. In this case, the telos for which προτέλεια prepares the ground might be 
Agamemnon’s murder. As Lebeck puts it: ‘The deaths at Troy are προτέλεια, preliminary 
sacrifices, which rouse dread about the fate of Agamemnon’.58 Although Froma Zeitlin’s study 
argues for the employment of the word προτέλεια only as sacrificial language, without 
relating it to possible allusions to the broader storyline, it does nevertheless acknowledge its 
‘unpropitious use’.59 However, within two lines from 65 these notions of the προτέλεια and 
its causal relation to future events are now undermined by another cognate of telos, the verbal 
form τελεῖται, employed by the Chorus: ’they [things] will be fulfilled (τελεῖται) in what is 
fated’ (68). This statement is marked by a sense of certainty for what the future will bring, 
which originates from the associations of τελεῖται with the fulfilling power of the gods and, 
more specifically, of Zeus, whose anger against the Trojans has led to their defeat (60–67). 
This, according to Collard, is ‘the first occurrence of this motif dominating’ the Oresteia,60 as 
the hymn to Zeus (160–83) also illustrates. The upcoming murders will be definitely fulfilled as 
τέλη, even if προτέλεια is not successful as a ritual.61 The interpretations of προτέλεια above 
convey an ironic tone: any celebratory connotations have been substituted by the destructive 
power of death.62 This power, which was firstly manifested in Troy, will continue to drive the 
narrative forward. Similarly, the word τελευτή, a cognate of τέλος, signals the ‘bitter 
 
58 Lebeck (1971) quote from 10, see also 60–63. 
59 Zeitlin (1965) 465. 
60 Collard (2002) on 68. For more on the motif of divine order in the Oresteia, see Goward (2005) 69–80; Collard 
(2002) xxx–xl. 
61 Seaford (2012) 190. 
62 In Chapter 6, I analyse how irony is employed in the narrative of the Oresteia to generate suspense (6.4.2 
‘Suspense through irony’). 
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fulfilment’ of the marriage between Helen and Paris (γάμου πικράς τελευτάς, 745).63  As 
Collard puts it, this is ‘a sardonic play upon the near-formula ‘fulfil the rite of marriage’’.64  
In the Carpet scene, Clytemnestra interprets her τέλος as ‘duty’ and ‘task’, whereas 
the external readers and audience interpret it as ‘purpose’ and ‘fulfilment’. In the case of 
Agamemnon, his use of telos is understood by Clytemnestra as well as by viewers and readers 
as associated with his death. As for Cassandra, her understanding of τέλος is transparent to 
readers and spectators but inaccessible to the Chorus. Cassandra and Clytemnestra are the 
only two characters who master the wide range of meanings and interpretations of telos. 
However, their experiences of τέλος are diametrically opposite. Cassandra’s use of telos will 
prove destructive for herself and Agamemnon, signifying victory for Clytemnestra. In the case 
of Clytemnestra, on the other hand, the adjective τέλειος activates both the senses of authority 
and ritual. Following Agamemnon’s announcement of his intention to walk on the fabric 
towards the palace, Clytemnestra delivers a seventeen-line-soliloquy which concludes with a 
striking fourfold repetition of τελ-: 
…ἀνδρὸς τελείου δῶμ’ ἐπιστρωφωμένου. | Ζεῦ Ζεῦ τέλειε, τὰς ἐμὰς εὐχὰς 
τέλει∙ | μέλοι δέ τοί σοι τῶνπερ ἂν μέλλῃς τελεῖν. 
…when the man its master moves about it [the house]. | Zeus, Zeus master-
fulfiller, give my prayers fulfilment! And | may you indeed take care of 
whatever you mean to fulfil! 
At line 972 the phrase τέλειος ἀνήρ refers to Agamemnon, signifying that he is the master of 
the house, a status which, however, the speaker is sabotaging in the most definite way. In this 
context, Agamemnon must be seen as activating the meaning of τέλειος as ‘the one who 
fulfils’, in a sense that the object of fulfilment, the telos, is the murder plan upon his return, 
through which he is becoming τέλειος. Additionally, the state of Agamemnon as τέλειος 
introduces the corrupted sacrifice motif.65 Although Edward Fraenkel argues for a reductive 
 
63 This leads to Paris’ indictment by the city of Troy as ‘fatal in marriage’ (713). 
64 Collard (2002) on 744. 
65 See also n. 19. 
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meaning of τέλειος and notes that ‘it is clearly chosen for the sake of the echo in Ζεῦ τέλειε’,66 
Raeburn and Thomas acknowledge that ‘[g]iven 972 τελείου and its sacrificial nuance, the 
wordplay might suggest the extra point that Agamemnon is a suitable victim for Zeus τέλειος 
to lead to his end’.67 The moment when Agamemnon crosses the threshold of the palace, 
Clytemnestra emphatically prays for the optimal actualisation of her ultimate goal, 
Agamemnon’s murder. The invocation to Zeus with the cult name τέλειος as the ‘master-
fulfiller’ (973) activates the multi-layered meaning of τέλειος used for Agamemnon above.68 
Goldhill points out that ‘[f]or Clytemnestra, this murder is also a consummation devoutly 
desired, as it is the end point of a narrative foretold’.69 However, lines 973–74, containing as 
they do three telos words, build up to a climactic finale while also dramatising a desire for the 
events to come. 
As mentioned in the previous section, all references to τελεσφόρος we have seen 
above have a sense of ‘payment’,70 and, as such, draw attention to the idea of revenge. 
Clytemnestra as τελεσφόρος will repay the murder with her own death as an act of retaliation 
and within the teleological pattern of ‘the doer who suffers’.71 In this sense the word 
τελεσφόρος expands from the meaning of ‘the one who brings fulfilment’, as seen in the 
Agamemnon, to ‘the one who bears fulfilment’ as in the Libation Bearers. In the first play, 
Clytemnestra is τελεσφόρος in the sense that she operates as the agent who has been planning 
Agamemnon’s murder. Her τέλος has associations of duty, purpose, and fulfilment, whereas 
his τέλος has associations of death. In the second play, Clytemnestra is the victim of Orestes’ 
τέλος as duty, purpose, and fulfilment. He is taking over the role of τελεσφόρος, while she is 
taking over the role of Agamemnon and the meaning of τέλος as end. As Taplin observes, 
there is a mirroring pattern between the scene in the Agamemnon where Clytemnestra 
welcomes her husband (855–913) and the scene in the Libation Bearers where she welcomes 
 
66 Fraenkel (1950, II) in 972. 
67 Raeburn & Thomas (2011) on 972. Stanford notes that ‘there is a kind of pun on the ἀνδρός τελείου’ (1939, 157). 
68 Lebeck (1983) 82–83. On Zeus as Fulfiller, see also in Aeschylus’ Suppliants 526 and in Seven against Thebes 167. 
Fischer (1965, 127–36) provides a detailed analysis of this subject. On religious language in Aeschylus, see Citti 
(1962). 
69 See Goldhill (2015) 237. 
70 Seaford (2012) 126–27; Goldhill (1984b) 170–71. 
71 Goldhill (1984b) 170. Lebeck (1983) argues that the imagery of the Oresteia illustrates this principle through three 
rituals: the sacrifice, the hunt, and the marriage. 
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Orestes and Pylades (668–73): while in the former she deceives her husband, in the latter she 
is being deceived by her son.72 
Although all telos-related words in the Libation Bearers so far have been related to 
purpose and fulfilment, the event of the matricide brings these to an end. In the kommos the 
Chorus recognise the need for an end to the misfortunes: ‘You great powers of Fate, may Zeus 
| grant an ending here (τελευτᾶν) | in which Justice changes to the other side!’ (306–8). This 
ending is supposed to be granted through the upcoming matricide. Just before the matricide, 
the women of the Chorus chant the song of victory employing towards the end of their song 
the phrase παντελὴς χρόνος ‘all-fulfilling Time’ (965).73 This phrase manifests the climactic 
restoration of order to the house of the Atreides which will be inflicted by the imminent 
murder of Clytemnestra (third stasimon, 935–71). However, after the matricide (the event 
which was supposed to grant an ending to the vicious cycle of violence) and Orestes’ 
appearance on the stage over the bodies of Aegisthus and Clytemnestra (exodos 973–1062), 
Orestes and the Chorus find themselves still in agony over how the situation will end. 
Although the murder of Clytemnestra has been committed, it has not produced the desired 
outcome. Orestes in despair admits: ‘I have no knowledge how it will end (τελεῖ)’ (1021). 
Although the women of the Chorus initially respond with the idea that the fulfilment of the 
matricide will operate as ‘the third family-storm | in turn to have blown itself out and come 
to fulfilment (ἐτελέσθη, 1066–67)’, in the very last couplet of the play they come to the 
realisation that Orestes’ fears are valid: ‘So where will it end (κρανεῖ), where will the power 
of Ruin | sink into sleep and cease (καταλήξει)?’74 (1075–76). In this last scene of the Libation 
Bearers, the employment of the broader vocabulary of telos illustrates that the state of 
fulfilment has been substituted by the deferral of fulfilment, not reaching the end but 
persisting as a dynamic course of action which requires constant input.75 
 
72 Taplin (1978) 92, (1977) 342–43. 
73 Here I cite Garvie’s translation (1986). Although Sommerstein (2008) and Collard (2002) follow West who follows 
Lafontaine in emending πρόμος as ‘prince’ (1990, 260), I follow Page (1972). In favour of χρόνος: Garvie (1986) in 
965; Goldhill (1984a) 197; Waanders (1983) 180; Lloyd-Jones (1990) 177; Widzisz (2012) 480–86. For the adjective 
παντελὴς, see also its use with the noun σαγὴν (560) meaning ‘complete with baggage’ (Collard’s translation). 
For the use of the adjective παντελής in Greek tragedy, see Waanders (1983) 179–80. Another adjective, cognate of 
τέλος, is found in the Agamemnon: ὑπερτελὴς (286), meaning ‘rising high in its strength’ for the absolute light that 
brought the news of the sack of Troy. Both adjectives signify the transcendence of the meaning of telos. 
74 Sommerstein’s translation (2008). 
75 Waanders (1983) 155. 
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Although Roberts has attributed a triple role to Orestes, as the fulfiller of the portent, 
as the interpreter of the portents, and as a portent himself,76 I argue that these need to be seen 
through the word τέλος and how it signifies the deferral of fulfilment in general. It is not only 
that Orestes fulfils, interprets, and incorporates the portent. Although the enactment of these 
roles leads to the fulfilment of the matricide, it also signifies the murderous act which will also 
take the Libation Bearers to the end, it will make Orestes unable to pursue his future in the 
Eumenides, and it will give a vague sense of purposeful fulfilment after Orestes’ acquittal. 
In the Eumenides the use of τέλος particularly associated with the Furies subverts the 
ideas of completion, finality, and finitude. In their binding song (307–96), the Furies employ 
several τελ- cognates as manifestations of their power of fulfilment. They present themselves 
as the ones ‘with final authority’77 (τελέως, 320) to put an end to the bloodshed and as the 
ones who will bring everything ‘to fulfilment’ as τέλειοι (382), because they hold ‘a power 
bestowed by the god to the full (τέλεον)’ (393). However, as Sommerstein aptly notes, ‘the 
justice they offer can never be final’.78 Responding to Athena’s announcement of the new legal 
system, the Furies defend their thesis that ‘an end (τέλος) is appointed and waits’ (544), with 
τέλος to imply their retribution that will certainly come. The endurance of the Furies’ power 
is also promised by Athena who responds to their request for pledges as the newly established 
Awesome Goddesses with the verb τελῶ, from τέλος as fulfilment:79 ‘for I may not say 
anything which I shall not fulfil’ (ἔξεστι γάρ μοι μὴ λέγειν ἃ μὴ τελῶ, 899). Athena 
communicates her intention emphatically with the double negative μή (‘not’) and the future 
indicative τελῶ (rather than present subjunctive), meaning ‘intend to fulfil’.80 But what she 
really means becomes clear only towards the end of the play where she uses the adverb 
τελέως (953) in ways that both echo and reverse its earlier use in 319–20 by the Furies 
discussed above. Here in 953 the adverb is used to highlight the present and future power of 
these goddesses, not as the Furies but as the Awesome Goddesses: ‘they work their will to 
fulfilment (τελέως)’. Just 130 lines before the end of the play the Furies finally agree to take 
 
76 Roberts (1985) 289–91 and n. 15–16. 
77 Sommerstein’s translation (2008). 
78 Sommerstein (1989) on 318–20. 
79 Seaford (2012) 195 and n. 15. 
80 Sommerstein (1989) on 899. 
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over a new sphere of influence, the human affairs (δέξομαι, ‘I shall accept’ 916). Due to the 
significance and the open-endedness of this position, its fulfilment is indefinitely postponed. 
2.4. Conclusion 
This Chapter has moved from the lexical analysis of specific semantic categories of telos in the 
the Oresteia (or at least in its tragic plays as there is no relevant lexical evidence for Proteus) to 
the undermining of such a categorisation. The lexical occurrences of telos in the tragic plays of 
the tetralogy push readers and spectators into two different directions: towards telos as an act 
of fulfilment purposefully planned (2.2) and towards telos as a possibility open to fulfilment 
and/or non-fulfilment (2.3).  
While telos as purpose and telos as fulfilment complement each other in the Agamemnon 
and in most of the Libation Bearers, their relation appears either unstable or fractured after the 
completion of the matricide and until the end of the Eumenides. More specifically, in the first 
play, the treatment of telos by Clytemnestra, Agamemnon, Cassandra, and the Chorus 
demonstrates a difference in meaning and interpretation between what the characters intend 
and how this is understood internally by other characters or externally by readers and 
spectators. In the Libation Bearers, the most powerful telos word, τελεσφόρος, fails to fulfil the 
expectations of its implications, as the completion of the matricide no longer signifies a 
desirable culmination of the future. The Eumenides maintains and develops this subversion of 
the meaning of τέλος that we see in the final scene of the Libation Bearers. The sense of telos as 
fulfilment and end is being substituted by an idea of telos as an on-going movement towards 
an unforeseeable future and its infinite possibilities. 
The abundance and range of the τέλος-words in Aeschylus’ three tragedies make us 
think about the meanings of telos in numerous ways, both in context and out of context. As a 
result, the linguistic analysis undertaken in this Chapter foregrounds the strong link that 
exists between telos and the future, and prepares the ground for the concepts to be examined 
in Chapters 3–7: narrative closure, future present and present future, foreshadowing and 
sideshadowing, suspense, and surprise. 
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More specifically, the oscillation of the semantic implications of telos from purposeful 
fulfilment, completion, ritual, payment, and authority on the one hand to non-fulfilment, 
ending, and crisis on the other hand calls for a more narratologically oriented analysis in 
Chapter 3. The meaning of telos does not only imply ending, but also points towards the end 
of the narrative, which can also deviate from the meaning of telos as end. Although this aspect 
of telos may seem incompatible with a study of the future, it is actually central to it as it raises 
plot-related issues regarding the future and where to look for it, whether inside the 
boundaries of the narrative or beyond them, inside the world of the text or outside, in the 
world of its receivers. The linguistic analysis of τέλος above also paves the way for the 
conceptual approach of telos in Chapter 4. There the meanings of transition, deferral, and 
perpetual crisis, having been activated through telos, will be further explored as the aftermath 
of the interaction between the present and the future not in synergy, but in discordance, 
through future present and present future. Similarly, the understanding of foreshadowing and 
sideshadowing in Chapter 5 presupposes the reconsideration of telos and its unexpected 
implications as well. The meanings of the indefinite, infinite possibilities of the future, the 
postponement and frustration of completion emerging from the employment of telos in the 
Oresteia are all instrumental for the discussion of foreshadowing and sideshadowing and the open 
and closed future. Finally, the examination of suspense and surprise (Chapters 6 and 7) also 
draws on how the teleological implications of the Oresteia shape our understanding and 
experience of the future, arguing for the immersive power of the narrative. 
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3 
3. Telos as ending 
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I move to telos as narrative goal and closure in order to further explore the 
broad teleological implications of the future in the Oresteia. The previous chapter followed 
closely the meanings of the Greek word τέλος with a view to constructing a lexical map of the 
τέλος words of the tetralogy. The scope of this Chapter is more specific in that it explores the 
narrative connotation of telos as closure, an approach which pushes the lexical analysis of 
τέλος more firmly in the direction of a teleological reading of the Oresteia. Combining my 
analysis in Chapter 2 with the one offered in this chapter, I argue that calling attention to the 
future in Aeschylus also means calling attention to understanding the notions of telos: not only 
in terms of purposes and their fulfilment which lie in the future (Chapter 2), but also in terms 
of closure as anticipated in the future of the plot which we witness as readers/spectators.  
Although the narratological concepts of closure and end have been discussed in 
classical scholarship in relation to Greek tragedy, their association with Aeschylus’ tragic 
narrative remains under-explored.1 With the notable exception of A. F. Garvie, to whom I 
return below, the issue of indeterminacy has been applied to the endings of Sophocles and 
 
1 For studies on closure and Greek tragedy (including bibliography) see in particular, Goldhill (2015) on Sophocles; 
Garvie (2014) on Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides; Hopman (2013) on Aeschylus; Roberts (2005) on Aeschylus, 
Sophocles, and Euripides, (1988) on Sophocles, (1987) on Sophocles and Euripides; Segal (2001, 108–22) on 
Sophocles, (1996) on Sophocles and Euripides; Dunn (1996) and Fowler (1989) on Euripides; Taplin (1983) on 
Sophocles. On closure in Greek and Latin literature in general, see West (2007); Roberts, Dunn & Fowler (1997), 
Fowler (1989). 
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Euripides much more systematically than to Aeschylus.2 In brief, the scholars’ tendency to 
treat Aeschylean endings as uncomplicated has impeded the relevant research so far. Francis 
Dunn has shown that the endings of Euripides try ‘to let a single enactment indicate the 
infinite continuity of experience’.3 The following analysis argues that such a statement can 
also be applied to Aeschylus’ Oresteia. Although the existing discussion on closure in the 
Oresteia (to which I will also return below) is mostly preoccupied with the question of whether 
the Eumenides meets the requirements for a complete closure, the exploration of telos 
undertaken here considers the Eumenides within a tetralogic structure that takes into account 
the endings of three other plays (including the satyr drama Proteus). The open ending of the 
Eumenides which is advocated in this chapter is often associated with changes to the text 
introduced by modern artistic adaptations such as those by Pier Paolo Pasolini, Athol Fugard, 
Ariane Mnouchkine, Peter Stein.4 My argument is that such a reading is fully compatible with 
the play itself rather than being the result of modern rewritings of it. Before I embark on an 
analysis of the plays themselves, I offer a theoretical prelude where I approach narrative closure 
as ‘a reception phenomenon’5 which operates through the refiguration of the narrative by the 
plays themselves as well as by readers and spectators. 
3.2. Theoretical prelude: τέλος and narrative closure 
The importance of the narrative ending as a meaningful part of the plot was acknowledged at 
least as early by Aristotle in the Poetics.6 Aristotle uses the word λύσις for the denouement of a 
tragic play.7 More specifically, λύσις is defined as ‘the denouement (λύσιν) extending from 
 
2 Garvie (2014, 31–32 and n. 48, 53) argues against the old assumption that ‘Greek tragedy always did aim at 
complete closure’, citing Cameron (1971) and Hester (1984). 
3 Dunn (1996) 78. 
4 See for instance, Nooter (2016); Bierl (1997). 
5 Klauk, Koppe & Wescott (2016) 26. 
6 Nünlist (2014, 157) notes that ‘[t]he fundamental questions of ‘where to begin’ and ‘where to end’ must be as old 
as literature itself in his discussion of how ancient critics have approached the issues of beginnings and endings in 
the Odyssey and the Iliad. On ancient literary criticism on closure before Aristotle, see Halliwell (1998) 6–27; Lucas 
(1968) xiv–xxii; after Aristotle, see Fowler (1989) 104–8. 
7 Carroll (2007, 3–4) acknowledges Aristotle as the first philosopher to be concerned with closure on the grounds 
of the definition of tragedy as a ‘complete’ action (τελείας, 1449b24) and not on his reflections on λύσις as 
‘denouement’. 
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the beginning of the transformation till the end (μέχρι τέλους)’8 and ‘should issue from the 
plot as such’.9 In the following centuries, other terms with similar content were used to 
conceptualise narrative ending such as solutio and dénouement which were coined by Latin 
theoreticians and dramaturgists of French classicism respectively.10 Since the late 1960s, the 
concept of narrative ending has become the centre of in-depth discussions by literary critics, 
as well as narrative and drama theorists.11 The term closure is first introduced by Barbara Smith 
in 1968.12 Smith defines poetic closure as ‘the sense of stable conclusiveness, finality, or ‘clinch’ 
which we experience’, while narrative is not at the centre of her arguments.13 One of the most 
influential studies in the modern scholarship of literary theory is Frank Kermode’s The Sense 
of an Ending which was also published in 1967. Kermode offers an apocalyptic reading of 
fiction in which the sense of ending is rooted in the human nature that aspires to provide life 
with shape, structure, and explanation, while being under the shadow of the end.14 Following 
this logic, the readers (and, for the purposes of our discussion, spectators) live in medias res, 
experiencing endings as always immanent and not imminent.15 
What the following scholarly works have in common is that they privilege the ending 
of the narrative as a key element for broader issues of its interpretation. Aristotle’s idea of the 
denouement (λύσις), alongside with his idea of the completeness (τελεία, e.g., 1449b24) has 
led to modern explorations of closure which are very useful for my study. Drawing on 
Aristotle, Paul Ricoeur argues that ‘unknotting’ (as λύσις) and ‘end’ do not correspond to the 
same idea of closure. He argues that, while incidents can be interminable, as real life, and, 
thus, open to their refiguration, narrative as muthos needs to be terminable, and, thus, closed 
to its configuration.16 Another account on closure comes from H. Porter Abbott who draws on 
 
8 In contrast to δέσις (1455b25–28): ‘I define the complication (δέσιν) as extending from the beginning to the furthest 
point before the transformation to prosperity or adversity.’ 
9 Aristotle goes on (1454a38–1454b2): ‘…and not from a deus ex machina as in Medea and the scene of departure in 
the Iliad.’ Elsewhere: ‘[m]any poets handle the complication well, the denouement badly (λύουσι κακῶς, 1456a9–
10).’ 
10 Pfister (1988) 95 and n. 72 with bibliography. 
11 For bibliography on closure, see Klauk, Köppe & Onea (2016) 2 n. 1; Pfister (1988) 302 n. 72. See also n. 1 above. 
12 Fowler (1989, 76–77) argues for Smith’s (and less Kermode’s) significant impact on classical literary criticism. 
13 Smith (1968) 2. On Smith’s view on anticlosure, see Ricoeur’s brief comment (1985, II) 165. 
14 Kermode (1967) 6. 
15 Kermode (1967) e.g. 25. See also Kermode (1978). 
16 Ricoeur (1985, II) 20, 165 n. 29. Δέσις is also rendered as ‘unknotting’. Klauk, Köppe & Onea (2016, 2 n. 3) also 
raise the difference between the end of the plot and the end of the narrative. 
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Roland Barthes’ ideas of ‘proairetic code’ and ‘hermeneutic code’ which operate as guides to 
closure: the first refers to expectations fulfilled and the second to questions answered by the end 
of the narrative.17 Similar cognitive preoccupations with closure are also at the centre of Noël 
Carroll’s work. For Carroll, narrative closure is closely associated with the matter of answered 
questions thanks to which the reader, the viewer, or the listener has a ‘sense of finality’.18 
Although this might be reminiscent of Kermode’s ‘sense of an ending’, Carroll states that, 
while Kermode is interested in ‘speculation about the significance of narrative closure for 
human life’, his own interest lies in the structure of narrative closure.19 For Greek tragedy 
specifically, he adds that tragic closure is related to its inherent ‘aura of necessity’.20 In a similar 
cognitive context, Tobias Klauk et al. have put into experimentation several theoretical 
concepts of narrative closure and argue that its strongest correlates are the completeness of the 
work and the absence of unanswered questions.21 Finally, in his study of classical plots, Nick 
Lowe also privileges closure as primary narrative value (alongside with unity and tight 
economy) and acknowledges several levels, and varying degree and quality to closure.22 For all 
its value, this argument for a narrative universe ‘strongly closed’ and the idea that the reader 
must see the narrative ‘as a perfectly programmed machine’ is at odds with my 
preoccupations with Ricoeur’s mimesis 3.23 I argue that, while any teleological drive of the 
plot looks forward to its ending,24 that ending does not always represent a telos in the sense of 
goal, fulfilment, and end. 
The link between telos and narrative closure is rooted in the meaning of the Greek 
word τέλος as end and has generated several discussions on the grounds of the temporal 
relation between closure and end. A twofold question arises: does the narrative closure happen 
 
17 Barthes (1977) cited by Abbott (2008) 57–58 (further readings on closure 65–66). The matter of expectations and 
questions as associated with suspense and surprise will be explored in Chapters 6 and 7 respectively. 
18 Carroll (2007) 2–3. 
19 Carroll (2007, 1) n. 1, author’s emphasis. 
20 Carroll (2006) 4. 
21 Klauk, Köppe & Weskott (2016a) 27–28. See also Klauk, Köppe & Onea (2016, 4 n. 12) on a brief summary of how 
several narrative theorists define closure. The difficulties to involve the emotional aspect of narrative closure in the 
discussion in a similar way with the cognitive are also explained. 
22 Lowe (2000) 27, author’s emphasis. 
23 Lowe (2000) quotes from 33, 62, and 78. Lowe also notes (2000, 264) that the meaning of closure as the reader’s 
‘sense of an ending’ lies outside the scope of his study. 
24 E.g. Chatman (2009) 32: ‘It [narrative] directs us from one moment to the next. The direction is usually forward, 
from an initial state of affairs to a final one.’ 
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at the end of the narrative, bringing a desirable ending to it, and is the ending of the narrative 
accompanied by narrative closure? First, the ending of the narrative cannot always educe 
closure, and closure is not educed only at the ending of the narrative.25 The concept of closure 
needs to be explored not only as a phenomenon occurring at the end of the narrative, but also 
as a condition that lies within the narrative.26 Second, the usual associations between 
teleology27 and narrative, often manifested through phrases such as ‘narrative teleology’, 
‘teleology of narrative’ and ‘teleological narrative’,28 downplay the openness of narrative as a 
quality of narrativity. Philip Ajouri defines as strong narrative teleology the situation when 
the reader ‘is made to believe that the protagonist(s) or the whole narrated world has a goal 
or serves a function that depends on some higher power’.29 In his study of the problems of 
closure in nineteenth-century novel D. A. Miller argues that, although narratives always 
directs us towards their end, ‘they are not always governed by it’.30 Another view on closure 
as not exclusively being dominated by a teleologically determined linearity towards telos has 
been expressed by Franco Moretti. As opposed to the tendency of a ‘teleological rhetoric’ 
which Moretti classifies as the model of classification, he also presents the model of 
transformation, according to which ‘what makes a story meaningful is its narrativity, its being 
an open-ended process.’31 In the recent series Narrating Futures, Felicitas Meifert-Menhardt 
notes that even texts which do not perform ‘the selection between multiple options for 
continuation’, namely ‘future narratives’, can also offer ways to explore future possibilities 
and resist formal closure.32 
 
25 See Klauk, Köppe & Weskott (2016) 26; Klauk, Köppe & Onea (2016) 1; Abbott (2008) 56, 62; Segal (2007). 
26 Carroll (2007) 10–13; Lowe (2000). 
27 In Buchanan (2010) s. v. teleology: ‘the study of, and the implicit assumption that everything has, a final purpose’. 
Derrida defines teleology as ‘a negation of the future’, cited by Kennedy (2013, 61). In religious terms, teleology as 
eschatology is equated with God's design including the Final Judgement and is compared to fatalism. 
28 Ajouri (2015) 49–51; Currie (2013) 48. See Grethlein (2013a, 1–26) who suggests a balanced approach between 
teleology and experience in the field of the historiography. 
29 Ajouri (2015) quote from 50–51. The author touches upon several strategies which enhance and weaken the 
narrative teleology. 
30 Miller (1981) xiv. See also xi n. 2 on his use of the term ‘closure’ and on a criticism to Smith (1968). In a sketching 
of the two trends about closure, Segal (2007) presents Miller as a representative disputant of strong closure. 
31 Moretti (1987) 7. 
32 Meifert-Menhardt (2013) 37 (and n. 36), 102. In the same context, Morson’s term sideshadowing (1994) illustrates 
the anti-teleological tendency of some narratives. See Chapter 5 on Sideshadowing in the Oresteia (section 5.4). 
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Apart from the term λύσις as ‘denouement’, Aristotle also uses τέλος to discuss two 
concepts around which many of the issues above revolve: narrative ending and narrative goal. 
To be sure, Aristotle speaks about the ‘exit scene’ in spatial rather than temporal terms 
through the word ἔξοδος: ’the exodos is the whole portion of a tragedy following the final 
choral song’ (1452b21–22).33 However, the narrative ending is expressed in temporal terms by 
τέλος and two cognates, the adjective τελεία and the noun τελευτή. The adjective is present 
at the definition of tragedy, according to which tragedy is an imitation of an action which is 
complete (τελείας, 1449b24, also in 1452a2). Both τελεία and τελευτὴ occur later in a 
recapitulation of that definition (1450b23–26): ‘We have stipulated that tragedy is mimesis of 
an action that is complete (τελείας), whole, and of magnitude’, arguing that a whole is that 
‘which has a beginning, middle, and end (τελευτήν)’.34 Aristotle continues by defining 
τελευτή as something ‘which itself naturally occurs, whether necessarily or usually, after a 
preceding event, but need not be followed by anything else’ (1450b28–30).35 This definition 
allows for an understanding of τελευτή not only as textual termination point, but as 
something with duration, that is ‘ending’ rather than ‘end’. This is also reflected in how  
Liveley defines lusis: ‘Aristotle’s term to describe the ‘loosening’ of a plot towards its 
denouement.’36 It is in this sense that the ending of a play (as opposed to its end) provides a 
resolution and should not be followed by anything else.37 It is also in this sense that the verbal 
form τελευτᾶν is used to pinpoint that the plots should not end at an arbitrary point; τελευτή 
is a part of the plot which requires duration through which the poet should employ their 
skillfulness (1450b33–36). The statement of 1450b23–26 is repeated for epic poetry, this time 
with τέλος as synonym of τελευτή to mean again part of the plot rather than point: ‘it is clear 
that plots, as in tragedy, should be constructed dramatically, that is, around a single, whole, 
and complete (τελείαν) action, with beginning, middle, and end (τέλος)’ (1459a16–19). As 
 
33 Kremer (1971, 117) suggests the replacement of ‘exodos’ with ‘final act’. 
34 See Plato’s Parmenides (145A, B) for the same idea and terminology: ‘Then the one, it appears, will have a 
beginning (ἀρχὴν), a middle (μέσον), and an end (τελευτὴν).’ 
35 Elsewhere the words τελευτῶσιν, τελευτῶσα, and τελευτῆς mean ‘end’ (1453a26, 32–33, 38). 
36 Liveley (2019) 255, in Glossary. 
37 For an analysis of Aristotle’s expression τὰ ἔξω τοῡ δράματος (‘events outside the drama’, 1454b2–3), see Roberts 
(1992). 
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seen so far, tragedy must be τελεία meaning that it is a whole which has an end,38 and must 
also reach its narrative end with an appropriate ending, expressed by both τελευτή and τέλος. 
Moving on to τέλος as narrative goal, this is distinct from τελευτή for the following 
reasons. As Aristotle argues, tragedy is structured for the sake of a goal (τέλος), which is ‘a 
certain kind of action’ (1450a18). The achievement of this goal depends on the prioritisation 
of the plot over character: ‘Thus the events and the plot (μῦθος) are the goal (τέλος) of 
tragedy, and the goal (τέλος) is the most important thing of all’ (1450a21–23).39 Thus, being 
complete (τελεία), a tragedy can pursue its goal (τέλος) which is the emplotment of tragic 
narrative, the selection and order of events in a certain way. Grasping the plot is to understand 
both the unity and the purpose of the actions that are represented. Stephen Halliwell 
interprets the telos of tragedy (or ergon40) as a complex type of aesthetic pleasure which derives 
from the interaction of three parameters within the tragic narrative: pleasure, understanding, 
and emotion.41 Telos develops into a core concept of Aristotle’s literary criticism and as such it 
can be a useful frame for our discussion of the narrative closure in fifth-century drama. 
Although Aristotle’s theory of the dramatic plot is not normally credited with 
temporal preoccupations,42 I hope the paragraphs above have shown that this view is 
reductive. If we combine what has been discussed here with Ricoeur’s insights, we might say 
that the plot of the Oresteia is a synthesis of multiple events arranged in a complete and whole 
narrative (τελεία and ὅλη), with a beginning, a middle, and an end (τέλος). To follow this 
narrative means ‘to move forward…under the guidance of an expectation that finds its 
fulfilment in the conclusion’ of the narrative.43 For this reason, it is useful to look at how the 
plots of the four plays (and I include here Proteus to the extent that one can comment on its 
plot) move towards their endings. 
 
38 Hussain (2001): ‘Teleias is elaborated as holes’. Lucas (1968, in 1450b24) argues that ‘whole’ and ‘complete’ work 
as synonyms for an emphasis. 
39 See also 1450a38–39: ‘Plot, then, is the first principle and, as it were, soul of tragedy, while character is secondary’. 
Other occurrences of τέλος as goal: 1459a26, 28, 1462b17–18, 1462b14. Husain (2001, 68) suggests the translation of 
τέλος as the technical term ‘final cause’, instead of colloquial translations such as purpose, goal or end. 
40 On τέλος and ἔργον, see Woodruff (2009); Halliwell (2002) 204–6 and n. 65. 
41 Halliwell (2002) 177–206, (1992). Heath (1996) argues in favour of a hedonist reading of tragedy, cf. Heath (2006) 
& (2014). 
42 See Introduction p. 5 and n. 17. 
43 Ricoeur (1984, I) 66. 
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In the Agamemnon, the movement of time is directed towards the killings of 
Agamemnon and Cassandra. As Bernard Knox points out, ‘the whole play has been moving 
with the slow sureness of some natural force towards the moment of Agamemnon’s death, 
and now, when that moment seems at hand, the rhythm of action is brusquely interrupted.’44 
In the Libation Bearers, the plot gravitates towards Clytemnestra’s murder. However, in both 
plays this linear pattern takes place alongside with a second cyclical pattern, in the sense that 
one fulfilled goal must be followed by another through acts of killing and revenge. Manfred 
Pfister has noted that both patterns of dramatic temporal movement embrace a certain idea of 
progression and can work simultaneously, as ‘it depends on the author’s intention and the 
audience’s perspective as to which of them is seen to predominate’.45 As it will be argued 
below, the moment when the pre-set goals in both plays, the four murders (including 
Aegisthus’ murder), are fulfilled, the sense of linearity is gradually substituted by a perception 
of time having no boundaries. As a result, the experience of tragic time at the end of the 
Agamemnon and the Libation Bearers, when the characters (Clytemnestra, Aegisthus, and 
Orestes) must deal with the aftermath of their deeds, shifts from linear to achronic.46 The 
achrony in the case of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus points to eutopia where future is an ally, 
while the achrony in the case of Orestes bears characteristics of an endless ordeal, a dystopia. 
The sense of interchanging linear and cyclical movement in the Agamemnon and the 
Libation Bearers is substituted in the Eumenides and, maybe, Proteus, by the sense of condensing 
time through the features of ellipsis and pause. Ellipsis is ‘a narrative jump ahead in story time’,47 
with a subsequent gap in the flow of information.48 Although ellipsis is a feature of narrative 
time common in later European drama, it is rare, if not unique, in fifth century BCE Greek 
tragedy.49 In this third play, instead of repetitions of patterns and events which dominated in 
the previous two plays, changes of time and space occur during a short period of narrative 
 
44 Knox (1972) 111. 
45 Pfister (1988) 290. Shakespeare’s plays and tragedies of French classicism are used as examples. 
46 On how narratives may point towards the aftermath, undermining the sense of closure, see Roberts (1997). 
47 Lowe (2000), quote from 164. It was first introduced by Genette (1980, 106–9) to describe narrative speed or 
narrative duration. 
48 Bal (1985) 78–79, 90–92, 97. 
49 Lowe (2000) 40–41, 164–65; Taplin (1978) 24. 
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time.50 The end of the Libation Bearers finds Orestes fleeing from Argos pursued by the Furies. 
His plan to become a suppliant at Delphi (1034–39) is actualised in the first scene of the 
Eumenides, where Pythia speaks of her shock at the view of Orestes and the Furies (34–67). 
From his temple in Delphi Apollo orders another transfer for Orestes who this time departs 
for Athens (74–84), while the Furies leave shortly afterwards (in line 231) and after twelve 
lines show up in Athens as well. Apparently, what constitutes a commitment for all extant 
tragedies, the unity of time, is not at all a prerequisite for the Eumenides: it is the only extant 
tragedy which does not fit within ‘a single revolution of the sun’.51 
This sense of rushing towards the future is interrupted by long lyrical sections sung 
by the Furies which result in several pauses. In the first stasimon, the ‘binding song’ (307–96), 
the Furies outline how they will bind the community in perpetuity, while in the second 
stasimon they repeatedly spread fear through threats about a future where anarchy will 
prevail (490–565). In the closing scene (778–1047), immediately after Orestes’ acquittal, the 
thematic repetition of their violent overthrow is also demonstrated by verbatim repetitions: 
lines 808–22 repeat 778–92 and lines 870–80 repeat 837–46.52 After their agreement to take on 
the role of the Awesome Goddesses in the city of Athens (Σεμναί Θεαί, 1041), the following 
verbatim repetitions take place as celebratory exchanges among Athena, the new Eumenides 
and other members of the festive procession: the verb χαίρετε (‘rejoice’) in 996 [x2], 997, 1003, 
1014[x2], the verb εὐφαμεῖτε (‘keep holy silence’) in 1035 and 1038, and the phrase ὀλολύξατέ 
νυν ἐπὶ μολπαῖς (‘Cry out in joy now, in song’) in 1043 and 1047. On one hand, the recurring 
themes of human catastrophe, and, on the other hand, the continual acclamations suspend the 
flow of time, causing an achrony due to the lack of temporal information.53 The recursivity of 
the lyrical parts above breaks the sense of the passing of time and forces the narrative into a 
temporal stasis. To put it in Pfister’s terms: ‘the cyclical quality of certain repeated words, 
 
50 Another example of ellipsis is also observed at the beginning of the Libation Bearers (and not within the play, as 
in the Eumenides), when the plot starts some years after the end of the Agamemnon. On the discussion with regard 
to the interval between the two plays, see Brown (2018) 1–2 and n. 4. 
51 Περίοδος in Aristotle’s Poetics (1449b12). On the unity of time, see Iakov (1982). The unity of space (which 
Aristotle does not comment) is also not applicable to the Eumenides. See Lowe (2000) 165 n. 13. 
52 For the significance of repetitions in poetic structure and closure, see Smith (1968) e.g., 38. For repetitions of a 
strophe, Smith (1968, 66) notes: ‘The repetition of an entire stanza is not only a formal repetition but a thematic one 
as well: it is the reassertion of an utterance’. 
53 For this as a main characteristic of achrony, see Genette (1980, 84): ‘dateless and ageless’. See also Bal (1985) 85–
86. 
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actions and gestures underlines the impression of stasis’.54 As we head towards the end of the 
play, the sense of a pause predominates, undermining the expectation of closure at the end of 
the Eumenides. 
Proteus is different from the Eumenides in the sense that the return of Menelaus home, 
which, possibly, takes place only at the end of the play, does bring closure, as well as a sense 
of the concept of homecoming that we find in the Agamemnon. However, it is also like the 
Eumenides in the sense that it condenses time through ellipsis, pause or both. A series of 
unfortunate events such as the transformations of Proteus keeps delaying Menelaus’ 
homecoming (see below), whereas changes of dramatic setting (at the very least from Egypt 
to Menelaus’ home) create a sense of narrative jumps.55 
3.3. Closure as necessity in the Agamemnon 
The preoccupations of the Agamemnon with τέλος as end are mostly related to the murders of 
Agamemnon and Cassandra by Clytemnestra and manifest a desire for closure. 
Clytemnestra uses a cognate of τέλος, the adjective τελευταῖος, meaning ‘the last’ 
(314): she is the ‘last’ one to receive the beacon light sent by Agamemnon from Troy. She 
observes that both she and Agamemnon are equally victorious (‘the first and last to run were 
winners’), which is, of course, valid, given that, in the competition of torch-races, every 
member of the team was responsible for the victory, but also overtly ironic.56 The Chorus 
welcomes Agamemnon back with praises for the good ‘end’ to which he brought his case 
(τελέσασιν, 806). They also use the word τέρμα as synonym of τέλος to comment on the 
absolute power of the personified Justice (Δίκα, 773) who directs all things to their ‘end’ 
(τέρμα, 781). Agamemnon himself, before he enters the palace, defines a man as fortunate 
when he finishes his life with prosperity (βίον τελευτήσαντ’, 929). After Clytemnestra’s 
invocation to Zeus (973–74), the Chorus use the word τέρμα as ‘end’ for a second time (μάλα 
 
54 Pfister (1988) 291. 
55 As Menelaus narrates in the Odyssey (4. 349–586), the delay in Proteus’ land lasted for twenty days of the total 
eight-year adventure away from home. If the narrative of Proteus follows closely the temporal framework of the 
Odyssey, these twenty days take over the whole narrative of Proteus. 
56 Sommerstein (2008) on 314; Collard (2002) on 314. 
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γέ τοι †τᾶς πολλᾶς ὑγιείας | ἀκόρεστον† τέρμα, 1001–3) for something that will definitely 
come, and for a third time to express their despair about the advent of this end: ‘for the ending 
I am helpless’ (τέρμα δ’ ἀμηχανῶ, 1177). Finally, after Agamemnon’s murder, the Chorus 
declare their wish not to reach the end they have been looking for during the whole play. Τhey 
wish instead for an unending sleep (ἀτέλευτον ὕπνον, 1451) so as to endure the fortunes 
that fell over the house. They also refer to Agamemnon’s death as Helen’s ‘final adornment’ 
(τελέαν, 1458).57 Another character who employs τέλος as ‘end’ in the tragic narrative with 
regard to Agamemnon’s death is Cassandra. The prophetess uses τελεῖς (1107) and τέλος 
(1109) when she finally sees Clytemnestra’s future actions through her experience of future 
present (see section 4.2. ‘The future present in the Agamemnon’). Apart from Agamemnon, the 
word τέλος as end is also used by the Chorus in relation to Menelaus. Following the news 
delivered by the herald (624–25, 628–29, 632–33), they express their agony about how 
Menelaus’ troubles will end (τελευτῆσαί, 635). Another cognate of τέλος, the word τελευτή, 
appears later on, again in association with Menelaus, as ‘bitter fulfilment’ for his marriage to 
Helen (πικράς γάμου τελευτάς, 745), thus, foreshadowing some of the thematic 
preoccupations of Proteus. 
Agamemnon’s death may come across as the main event around which the plot is 
structured, but, in fact, it does not tie all the loose ends. Deborah Roberts and Barbara Smith 
argue that the event of a death which is situated at the end of the narrative is ‘a natural marker 
of an ending’ and a ‘closural allusion’ respectively.58 However, in the Agamemnon 
Agamemnon’s death does not coincide with the end of the play and does not secure closure: 
its occurrence around 320 lines before the end (1345 in total of 1673 lines) allows enough time 
for several narrative developments to take place and undermines the expectation of a neat 
ending. In these lines, the Chorus and Clytemnestra are in dispute over the justice of the 
murders, during which Clytemnestra’s motives become even more obscure. While she 
acknowledges that this is the concluding act of the drama (‘victory has come in fulfilment—
late, but come it has’, 1378), she is reminded of the inevitable public rage against 
Agamemnon’s murderers (1411, 1413) and of the certainty of her punishment by Orestes who 
is not yet named but, undoubtedly, insinuated (1429–30, 1507–12, 1530–36, 1560–66). 
 
57 Sommerstein (2008) on 1458. 
58 Roberts (2005) 143, (1993) 573; Smith (1968) 172–82. 
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Another type of closural marker that is undermined in the closing scene of the 
Agamemnon is that of burial ritual which may signify the ending or a transition.59 When the 
Chorus express their concern about Agamemnon’s burial (1541–59), we learn that this will be 
conducted by his own murderers, without the participation of any other members of the 
household. As Roberts comments, this ‘undercuts any closural effect that the reference of the 
burial might have.’60 Roberts also names this type of closure ‘reductive closure’ which ‘leaves 
in place or expresses the complexities that precede it.’61 Thus, although the narrative raises the 
possibility of releasing some of the tension through the event of death and the ritual of burial, 
this is not accomplished in the final scene of the Agamemnon.62 
Despite the pertinence of Roberts’ argument for closural motifs, the discussion around 
the absence of a complete closure at the end of the Agamemnon needs to be addressed from a 
narratological perspective as well. Carroll points out that closure is achieved ‘when all of the 
presiding macro-questions and all the micro-questions that are relevant to settling the macro-
questions have been answered’.63 In the final scene (1577–673), whereas Aegisthus’ appearance 
is supposed to help Clytemnestra secure a formal closure, more references to Orestes affirm 
that the cycle of violence is not yet complete.64 In addition to lines 1507–12 and 1530–36 
discussed above, the men of the Chorus point twice to Orestes’ future return, this time in the 
presence of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus: ‘Is Orestes alive somewhere, | to come back home 
with fortune's favour | and to be the all-victorious killer of these two here?’ (1646–48); ‘No, 
not if fortune directs Orestes to come here’ (1667). Thus, the promise of a complete closure 
cannot be fulfilled. It needs to be reminded here that Cassandra was the first to foreshadow 
Orestes’ homecoming (1280–84): ‘there will come another in turn to avenge us, | a child born 
to kill his mother, one to exact penalty for his father. | A fugitive, a wanderer, an exile from 
this land | he will come home to put a coping-stone on these ruinous acts for his family; | his 
father thrown on his back on the ground will bring him back’. Thus, the narrative, instead of 
 
59 Note the striking absence of a similar discussion at the end of the Libation Bearers. 
60 Roberts (1993) quote from 577. 
61 Roberts (1993) 587. 
62 Roberts (1993) 575–77. 
63 Carroll (2007) 6. 
64 For another discussion on Aegisthus’ appearance with regard to the future of the plot, see also 7.3.3. ‘Surprise 
through unexpected appearances’ below. 
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looking forward to closing all open matters, allows information leakages which will not be 
processed as such. It will, nevertheless, stay suspended until Orestes’ appearance in the 
following play. Questions such as ‘Where is Orestes now?’ and ‘Where will Orestes return to 
his homeland?’ are considered as micro-questions in the Agamemnon, as they are not related 
‘to the presiding question directly and completely’. However, they play an important role in 
undermining closure.65 
In strict terms, considering that the main events, the murders of Agamemnon and 
Cassandra, have been successfully committed, the necessity and desire for closure have been 
met. Nonetheless, Clytemnestra’s certainty (‘These things had to be as we have done them’, 
1658–59; ‘In our twin mastery of this house | [I] and you will | make things [well]’, 1672–73) 
is overshadowed by the multiple references to Orestes. 
3.4. Closure as inconclusiveness in the Libation Bearers 
In the Libation Bearers, τέλος and its cognates appears in a handful of cases, but they all require 
a careful look. First, the Chorus prays to Zeus for an end to come with the infinitive τελευτᾶν 
meaning ‘to grant an ending’ (306). Then, Orestes himself seeks for the end in the Chorus’ 
narration of Clytemnestra’s dream: ‘And the end of her story (τελευτᾷ)? Its culmination 
(καρανοῦται)?’ (534).66 Although the matricide is fulfilled, the telos as end is not yet obvious, 
as Orestes confesses: ‘I have no knowledge how it will end (τελεῖ)’ (1021). Orestes’ aporetic 
preoccupations transcend the limits of the plot and expand to broader closure. 
What Duncan Kennedy points out about Aeneas in Virgil’s Aeneid may be applied to 
Orestes in the Libation Bearers as well: ‘Aeneas searches for a shape or form, in which the events 
which join beginning to end are meaningfully linked […] He thus seeks to understand his 
own situation precisely in narrative terms.’67 Both Orestes and Aeneas realise that their 
perspective of events is very limited, so they are not able to know and speak about the end. 
However, while for Aeneas finis, the Latin equivalent for τέλος, ‘can signify not simply an 
 
65 Carroll (2007) 6. 
66 See n. 46. 
67 Kennedy (2013) 50. 
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end, but a trajectory and a goal as well’,68 for the Orestes of the end of the Libation Bearers τέλος 
fails to unite the achievement of a goal, the sense of closure to be derived from it and the end 
of the play. 
Another cognate of telos with significant closural preoccupations is the adjective 
τελεσφόρος, which was also discussed in the previous chapter in association with its relation 
to purpose and fulfilment. Goldhill has pointed out that the position of τελεσφόρος in the 
Oresteia goes beyond the textual level: 
Reading τελεσφόρος cannot be simple, then. It opens a series of questions 
about the teleology of reading, about criticism’s object (in all its senses) and 
method, about the boundaries and excesses of meaning— ‘a (ceaseless) process 
of questioning’ to question the (teleological) answer. Reading τελεσφόρος 
involves one in an inconclusive process.69 
As I have tried to show throughout my discussion on telos, the issues raised in the quotation 
above have much wider implications than Goldhill allows. However, when we look at the 
word τελεσφόρος as Aeschylus uses it for Clytemnestra and Orestes, it is certainly evident 
that it does not operate in total alignment with its meaning as ‘the one who brings telos as 
fulfilment or end’. Although by being τελεσφόροι Clytemnestra and Orestes hope to put an 
end to the familial troubles and bring to a conclusion in the Agamemnon and the Libation Bearers 
respectively, neither of them can provide a complete closure. As we saw above, Orestes even 
realises and articulates this weakness himself. 
The Libation Bearers ends with the Chorus’ observation that the promise for fulfilment 
driven by the matricide has been misleading.70 Prior to that, they express their positive 
thinking using an adjective cognate of τέλος, παντελὴς, which with χρόνος (965) means ‘all-
fulfilling Time’.71 They hope that the ‘all-fulfilling Time’ will bring an end to the misfortunes 
 
68 Kennedy (2013, 50). See also Kennedy (2013, 51) comments on the use of finis in the Aeneid: Aeneas says ‘god will 
grant an end (finem) to these things also’ 1. 199, Venus says to Jupiter ‘what end (finem) of toils do you give?’ 1. 241. 
69 Goldhill (1984b) 174. 
70 Roberts (2005, 142) notes the Chorus’ prominent role in the Aeschylean endings. Specifically, in the second and 
third play of the Oresteia they say the last word. 
71 See p. 45 and n. 73. 
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and inaugurate a new era for the house of the Atreides. They also reiterate this wishful 
thought with another cognate of τέλος, the verbal form ἐτελέσθη (1067), meaning ‘come to 
fulfilment’, which is positioned less than ten lines before the end of the play. Their expectation 
for fulfilment becomes more evident through their repeated use of the number-three pattern, 
according to which, the sequence of the beginning, the middle and the end constitute a unity.72 
The first reference to the pattern is about the third and, they hope last, crime in the family, the 
matricide, (‘the third family-storm’, 1066). The second reference to the pattern is about Orestes 
who is the third saviour (‘a third has come from somewhere to bring safety’, 1073). These 
references are reminiscent of previous references to the number three: the third draught of the 
Fury for Aegisthus’ death (577–78) in the Libation Bearers and the third libation to Zeus (246–
47) and blow to Agamemnon (1386–87) in the Agamemnon.73 However, the Chorus 
unknowingly casts doubt on whether Orestes is the saviour of the house or its destruction: 
‘Now in turn a third has come from somewhere to bring safety–or should I say, death?’ (1073–
74). The grade of insecurity increases until the two last lines of the play where any wishful 
thinking is overridden, and the expectation for fulfilment becomes an urgent desire for an end 
which is nevertheless being put in doubt.74 The meaning of τέλος as end is here stressed with 
the words κρανεῖ, καταλήξει and μετακοιμισθέν: ‘So where will it end (κρανεῖ), where will 
the power of Ruin sink into sleep (μετακοιμισθὲν) and cease (καταλήξει)?’ (1075–76).75 As 
Oliver Taplin puts it in relation to the stage action at this point in the play: 
The rapidity with which the play draws to a close after the murder, contrasting 
with the Agamemnon, conveys with a horrible vividness the speed and sureness 
of the Erinyes’ work. Once Orestes has gone, the chorus quickly disperses 
(down an eisodos, not into the palace) with a few anapaestic lines of shocked 
 
72 For the significance of number three in Aeschylus, see Clay (1969); Rosenmeyer (1982) 333. Aristotle discusses 
this significance in his work On the Heavens (268a11–13): ‘It is just as the Pythagoreans say, the whole world and 
all things in it are summed up in the number three; for end (τελευτὴ), middle and beginning give the number of 
the whole, and their number is the triad.’ Translation by Guthrie (1939). 
73 See Raeburn & Thomas (2011, on 1386–87) for a brief overview of similar references in the Oresteia. 
74 Collard (2002) on 1074; Goldhill (1984b) 171. 
75 Sommerstein’s translation (2008). 
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response. The play ends with a question, literally; everything, far from being 
finished, is still unresolved.76 
Even if in the Agamemnon Clytemnestra’s power to bring things to fruition is being 
undermined by several references to Orestes, in the Libation Bearers Orestes’ power is even 
more obviously undermined by the references to the Furies (1026, 1048–50, 1053–54, 1057–58, 
1061–62). These references are signs which point to the upcoming and ongoing crisis, a 
perpetual crisis in Kermode’s words which is always immanent. This crescendo will reach its 
peak at the end of the Eumenides, where, as we will see below, the idea of crisis as something 
immanent will be present in the most definite and explicit way. 
Considering all the above, the end of the Libation Bearers is marked by a disjunction 
between the meaning of τέλος as goal and completion. By contrast to the Agamemnon, where 
the narrative concludes with the aftermath of the murders, as Clytemnestra and Aegisthus 
look at a bright future ahead, in the Libation Bearers Orestes is forced to flee despite the success 
of the plan to kill Clytemnestra. Neither of the two plays concludes with the core event of the 
murder, and, in both cases, the concluding scene finds the murderers in the defensive. 
However, whereas the Agamemnon ends with a sense of control and security, at least as 
expressed by the characters, the ending of the Libation Bearers engages more vividly with the 
emergence of an interminable anxiety.77 
3.5. Closure as possibility in the Eumenides 
The Eumenides begins with Pythia in the prologue whose appearance signals the temporal and 
spatial transition to Delphi.78 As Martin Revermann argues drawing on Mikhail Bakhtin, the 
Eumenides is the only surviving play which combines fluid space (Delphi, Athens) and 
discontinuous time.79 Orestes resorts as a suppliant to Delphi, while the Furies are still 
 
76 Taplin (1977) 361. 
77 Dunn argues (1996, 23) that in Aeschylus there is no consistency in the means of ending. 
78 Dunn (1996, 22) notes that there is an ‘unparalleled case of the continuity’ between the closing lines of the Libation 
Bearers with the beginning of the Eumenides. 
79 Revermann (2008) 256, on spatial (239–48) and temporal dynamics (248–56). 
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pursuing him to take revenge for the committed matricide. Although Orestes is finally 
exonerated, the promise of his return to Argos lies beyond the final scene of the play which 
provides an early, Aeschylean example of what Dunn argues for Euripidean endings: ‘the 
infinite continuum of experience cannot be contained in a single dramatic action’.80 As pointed 
out at the beginning of this chapter, scholars have tended to read Aeschylus’ endings as 
uncomplicated. For instance, Dunn argues that ‘the process of closure is clearly a central 
problem for Aeschylus in the Eumenides’ only in the sense that ‘he wants to bring within the 
action of the trilogy any possible loose ends.’81 Similarly, in his study on closure in Greek 
tragedy, Gerd Kremer argues that the Eumenides is the only tragedy by Aeschylus which 
belongs to the resolution type. These remarks do not do justice to the ways in which the 
Eumenides problematises the future as part of a larger dramatic unit that consists of four plays. 
The textual preoccupations of the Eumenides with τέλος as end revolve around 
Orestes’ τέλος as seen by the character himself, as well as by Apollo, Athena, and the Furies. 
With the phrase ‘through to the end’ (διά τέλους, 64) Apollo promises his support to Orestes 
in the future, without, however, clarifying the connotations of this τέλος: does it imply 
Orestes’ acquittal, which does not take place at the end of the play? Does it refer to this end of 
the play? Or does it refer to Orestes’ triumphant return to Argos? Orestes uses the word τέλος 
with the same ambiguity. When he claims that he ‘await[s] the outcome of judgement’ 
(ἀναμένω τέλος δίκης, 243),82 he could be referring to the end of the trial or to a kind of 
restoration of justice associated through a return to a normal life back in the house of the 
Atreides. The quest for an end preoccupies Athena as well. With the word τέρμα, a synonym 
of τέλος as end, Athena asks the Furies about their pursuit of Orestes and when it will reach 
an end (422): ‘And where has the killer an end of his flight (τέρμα φυγής)?’. Even without 
knowing the details of the case, she desires to know the range and boundaries of the Furies’ 
power. The Furies declare that humans’ efforts to end their troubles will be in vain with 
another synonym of τέλος, the noun λῆξιν (505).83 The perpetuity of Orestes’ ordeal is also 
brought out in their repetition of the idea of τέλος as end in the phrase ‘an end is appointed 
 
80 Dunn (1996) 83. 
81 Dunn (1996) 79: ‘In the context of anticipating the concluding prophecy’. 
82 See p. 35 on the interpretation of τέλος δίκης in the context of the meaning of τέλος as purpose and fulfilment. 
83 From the verb λήγω, also used in the last lines of the Libation Bearers: καταλήξει (1075). 
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and waits (κύριον μένει τέλος, 544)’, where the verb μένω stresses the unspecified period of 
time involved.84 Finally, the word τέρμα reoccurs as end, when Orestes himself realises the 
nodal nature of his own future: ‘A noose is the end (τέρματ’) for me now, or to see the 
daylight!’ (746).85 Here Orestes uses exactly the same term Athena used in line 422. But 
whereas Athena has previously used the same word τέρμα as end with φυγής with regard to 
the possibility of his flight and salvation, Orestes employs it to the opposite effect to refer to a 
possible death punishment. This handful of references to telos as end show that the Eumenides 
is less preoccupied with this particular meaning of the word than it is with telos as purpose 
and fulfilment that we saw in the previous chapter. It also suggests that it is less important 
than τέλος as end in the previous two plays. In fact, the characters’ need for an end is 
frustrated by a plot that has its own dynamic that takes us beyond the case of Orestes. 
Apart from the words which signify telos as end, one can find in the Eumenides a 
plethora of expressions which point beyond the case of Orestes and beyond the end of the 
play and towards an extra-dramatic future. Apollo urges Orestes to leave Delphi and resort 
to Athens where judges will save him ‘once and for all (εἰς τό πᾶν) from these miseries’ (84). 
Although Delphi is initially presented as a land promising future resolution, it is finally 
unable to meet those expectations, while Athens provides the hope of a ‘fresh start’.86 
As soon as the Furies assemble in a chorus (parodos 143–77), they pronounce twice 
that Orestes will never be free: ‘…. this man, who after he flees below is never (οὔποτ’) to be 
free’ (175–76), ‘I will never (ποτέ) leave this man alone!’ (225). As the Furies put it, Orestes’ 
future is characterised by finality (which comes with certainty) without finitude (which comes 
without temporal boundaries), which is reiterated in the Furies’ binding song: ‘and after death 
he is not too free’ (339–40). Similar adverbial phrases pointing towards the distant future are 
used by Apollo (three times) and Orestes (once) to promise eternal alliance between Argos 
and Athens: ‘forever’87 (εἰς τό πᾶν, 291), ‘for all time’ (εἰς τό πᾶν χρόνου, 670), ‘to eternity’ 
(αἰανῶς, 672), ‘always’ (αἰεί, 773). Athena also attributes eternal power to the new legal 
system of her establishment (‘for all time’, εἰς ἅπαντ᾽…. χρόνον, 484). Although this power 
 
84 For the use of the verb μένω in the Oresteia, see Goldhill (1994b) 172. 
85 This node is further discussed in sections 4.4.1 and 5.4.1 below. 
86 Revermann (2008) 246. 
87 Sommerstein’s translation (2008). 
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is questioned by the Furies who warn of ongoing consequences (‘in time hereafter’, μεταῦθις 
ἐν χρόνω, 498), Athena insists that that the authority of the new legal system will be 
everlasting (‘for all time’, εἰς τόν αἰανῆ χρόνον, 572; ‘for the rest of time’, ἔσται δὲ καὶ τὸ 
λοιπὸν, 683; ‘always’, αἰεί, 684; ‘for the future’, εἰς τὸ λοιπὸν, 708 and 1031). In the 
negotiations between Athena and the Furies following Orestes’ acquittal, the goddess 
guarantees that their power will last forever (‘for evermore’, ἐς αἰεὶ, 836; ‘for ever’, εἰς τό πᾶν, 
891; ‘for all time’, χρόνου, 898). Equally, the citizens must ‘always’ (αἰεί, 992) act respectfully 
towards them as the newly established goddesses, the Awesome Ones (1041). Finally, 
Athena’s own victory will last ‘for all time’ (διὰ παντός, 975). All the above demonstrate a 
preoccupation of the characters with a future that lies outside the boundaries of the narrative. 
Such references, alongside the play’s avoidance of self-closural references (such as ‘last’, 
‘finished’, ‘end’, ‘rest’, ‘peace’, or ‘no more’88), raise the expectation of continuation and, 
therefore, undermine closure.89 
Although the core event around which the plot of the Eumenides is structured is 
Orestes’ acquittal, its actualisation does not lead to the end of the play which is postponed for 
another 270 lines (778–1047). Throughout these lines another complication emerges, ‘a 
beginning of a new beginning,’ as Taplin puts it.90 This is accentuated by the fact that the final 
scene of the play (916–1047) does not comply with Aristotle’s definition of exodos as ‘the 
whole portion of a tragedy following the final choral song’ (1452b21–22).91 First, Athena sets 
out to convince the Furies to renounce their present role and eschew from perpetual acts of 
retaliation in the future. In exchange, the goddess promises to transform them into the 
‘Awesome Goddesses’ (Σεμναί Θεαί,92 1041) (778–915). Second, the final scene (916–1047) 
commences with the Furies conceding to Athena’s offer through the future verbal form 
δέξομαι ‘I shall accept’ (916).93 In the last 45 lines of the play (1003–1047), a procession is 
 
88 Smith (1968) 172. See id. 56: ‘closure is, of course, always weakened by the expectation of continuation.’ 
89 Cf. Dunn (1996) 79: ‘The other surviving tragedians do not seem to have shared Euripides’ interest in the 
temporal continuum.’ 
90 Taplin (20032) 108. Also: ‘The Oresteia does not end with the acquittal of Orestes.’ 
91 For a bibliographical on the final scene of the Eumenides, see Chiasson (1999–2000) 156 n. 50. 
92 cf. 383 Σεμναί (‘Awesome’). For an overview of the topic of the Furies in Greek tragedy, see Brown (1984) and 
on ‘the Erinyes in the Oresteia’ (1983). For the cult of Σεμναί Θεαί (with ancient sources), see Konstantinidou (2014) 
17 n. 43. 
93 Taplin (20032, 108–9) discusses the scenic sequence of this part of the play. 
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dramatised, consisting of an unusually large number of characters on stage:94 Athena as the 
leader, the newly established Awesome Goddesses, the members of the Areopagus council 
and, possibly, a supplementary chorus.95 The number of participants increases further if we 
take Athena’s invitation to sing along to include the audience (1039). In any case, the very last 
line finds the participants celebrating ritually the beginning of something new (1047): ‘Cry out 
your joy now, in song!’.96 
Pfister, in his discussion of dramatic endings, argues that the terms ‘closed’ and ‘open’ 
signal the grade of the discrepancies each type of ending carries.97 Closed endings in drama, 
which are regarded as ‘the norm in classical theories of drama’,98 are associated with a very 
high level of resolution of all open questions and conflicts at the ending of the narrative. This 
can be manifested on stage, according to Pfister, through a series of devices such as the 
appearance of the whole cast, festivities, speeches looking forward to a secure future, and 
comments towards the audience.99 Those can, of course, be observed at varying levels in the 
final scene of the Eumenides (916–1047). For instance, although there is no full cast appearance 
on stage at the end of the play, there is, however, a large number of participants, among whom 
are some of the main characters, who participate in a ceremonial procession.100 Similarly, 
Athena’s last words fifteen lines before the end of the play look forward to a better future to 
come: ‘And let the | light of fire set out on its way, so that this company for the | land may in 
future (τὸ λοιπὸν) be pre-eminent for its goodwill, with the | fortune of noble manhood!’ 
(1029–31). This callout for reconciliation has led Roberts to argue that the Eumenides is one of 
the plays which end ‘with deliverance, reunion, or reconciliation’.101 This sense of 
 
94 Sommerstein (2008) 482–83 n. 198. 
95 Easterling (1988, 99 and n. 28). Taplin argues that the jurors act as the second chorus in the final scene (1977, 410–
11). 
96 Sommerstein (2008) on 1039 n. 202; (1989) on 1039, see also note on 566. 
97 The terms ‘open’ and ‘closed’ are discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
98 Pfister (1988) 95–96. 
99 Pfister (1988) 95–96. 
100 This is not the only play by Aeschylus to conclude with a procession. Garvie (2014, 23) notes that, although the 
Seven against Thebes ends with a funeral procession, such a device does not necessarily point to a closed ending. 
101 Roberts (2005) 136. In Roberts (1993) reconciliation is filed under the cultural markers for closure (see also p. 10 
and n. 60). Whitmarsh in his discussion of the different senses of telos in ancient Greek novel (2011, 177–213) also 
classifies reconciliation as a closural motif. Fowler (1989, 81–82) has noted for the closural motif of reconciliation 
at the end of the Iliad that: ‘The Iliad ends with a truce, not a peace treaty, and we know that the war is not over’. 
This sounds very relevant to the end of the Eumenides as well. 
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reconciliation also leads Gerd Kremer to classify Eumenides’ ending as ‘Handlungsschlüsse’, 
those which conclude the action with a kind of resolution.102 Although Kremer’s twofold 
model of endings in Greek tragedy is one of the few studies mapping the ending trends of the 
Greek tragic plays, it does not take into account the tragic endings’ complications and 
inconsistencies which cannot be resolved by a mere classification using content-related 
criteria. 
Although the ending of the Eumenides takes place in the context of conflict and 
reconciliation which could potentially meet the standards for an uncomplicated and neat 
closure, several informational discrepancies within the tragic narrative undermine that 
expectation.103 It converses with Pfister’s type of ‘open ending’.104 Because of the loose ends of 
the agreement between Athena and the Furies, the threat of a crisis hovers over the whole 
ending. As a reminder of Carroll’s point mentioned above, ‘closure obtains when all of the 
presiding macro-questions and all the micro-questions that are relevant to settling the macro-
questions have been answered’.105 The agreement between the Furies and Athena leads to their 
conditional transformation into Eumenides. This transformation is conditional because it is 
contingent upon the citizens’ conduct and practices. As such, it raises a series of questions 
such as whether the Eumenides and the Athenian citizens will succeed in their cooperation: 
how will the Eumenides live in peace with the Athenians? Will the Athenians meet the 
expectations that the Awesome Goddesses and Athena have set? And what happens if the 
Eumenides do not comply with the agreement? This set of macro-questions is also 
accompanied by micro-questions arisen by the abrupt transformation of Furies into the 
Awesome Goddesses. 
 
102 Kremer (1971) 118–22, 127–28. The second type is the one which in the conclusion the act and the offender are 
presented and interpreted as fate (‘Ecceschlusse’ or ‘Präsentationsschluss'). See also Iakov (2012) who draws on 
Kremer. 
103 Chiasson (1999–2000, 155) comments that the ending of the Eumenides ‘is fundamentally progressive but not 
utterly euphoric’. Fusillo (1997, 227) refers to the Eumenides as an example of a play with a ‘polyedric range of 
solution’ combining ‘tensions and contradictions’ in a ‘happy ending’. Marshall (2017, 12–13) argues that the 
Eumenides ‘does not produce an unambiguously positive result’; Collard (2002, xlii) notes that the Eumenides 
‘transforms the inevitabilities of Agamemnon and Libation Bearers into confident hope’. Hall (2015) argues for 
Aeschylus’ ambiguity between a ‘superficial message’ of reconciliation (p. 256) and ‘a dark undertow’ (p. 267). For 
a reading of the Eumenides’ ending from the perspective of deconstruction (between ‘progressive and reactionary 
label’ n. 67) see Goldhill (1984a, 279–83). 
104 Pfister (1988) 96. 
105 Carroll (2007) 6. 
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After the verb δέξομαι (‘I shall accept’, 916), the Furies finally assent to the deal which 
was offered by Athena, and the agreement between the two parts is applied with immediate 
effect. However, this contradicts the Furies’ perseverance from the beginning of the play to 
lead the matter to the end (until line 891 in a total of 1047 lines). Athena’s offer comes at line 
804 and their acceptance at 916. In the meantime, the Furies have been uttering curses for the 
city of Athens (778–891) which are substituted by blessing songs at the end of the play (916–
1047). At the end of the play, despite the anger, the cursing, and the disputes between the 
Furies, Orestes and their delegates, all conflicts appear to have been put aside as if they have 
never existed. This tends to invalidate the reliability of the prior narrative. The answers to 
these questions are left open, as they belong to a future which is for the readers and spectators 
to contemplate. Thus, the start of the new era which is promised by Athena with her last words 
in the play is not necessarily rosy.106 It makes possible the generation of possible outcomes for 
the near and distant future. Although Dunn argues that in Aeschylus loose ends are tied up 
before the end of the play as opposed to Euripides where time is stretched to fit the future 
events,107 I have argued that in the case of the Eumenides time is stretched in ways that leave a 
number of questions open. 
Another example of how cognitive discrepancies persist at the end of the narrative and 
suggest an open ending has to do with Orestes’ departure 270 lines before the end of the 
narrative (777). Unlike the Agamemnon and the Libation Bearers where the macro-questions 
about Clytemnestra’s and Orestes’s future are at least addressed before the end of each play, the 
narrative of the Eumenides withholds significant information about Orestes’ future. The macro-
question that lingers is ‘what finally happens to Orestes?’.108 Although Orestes can return to 
the human community after his acquittal, this is not what is celebrated on stage. His 
announcement that he will return to Argos as the new ruler (754–62) is never revisited in the 
rest of the play. The character has vanished without leaving any marks, as is also the case with 
Electra in the Libation Bearers.109 However, unlike Electra, this is not an abrupt disappearance 
but a gradual transition from a character who holds together much of the rest of the narrative 
 
106 Garvie (2014) 39. Garvie observes a ‘slight note of uncertainty raised by the conditional nature of the promise’. 
107 Dunn (1996) 79–80. 
108 Bacon (2001) 51. 
109 For both Electra’s and Orestes’ futures as unexposed, see 5.4.2. 
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of the three tragic plays into a missing link.110 Early signs of this can be observed in the trial 
scene (463–68, 611–13).111 As Roberts puts it: ‘Orestes here relinquishes all claims to action and 
to interpretation; he becomes a suppliant subject to the decisions of others, can only state what 
he has done, not judge it’.112 At the end of the Eumenides, the readers’ and the spectators’ 
expectations for a complete resolution, which were built up from the beginning of the play, 
remain unfulfilled despite Orestes’ successful plea for acquittal. 
Even though Orestes is freed from the crime of the matricide, he is overshadowed by 
the new institutions established by Athena. This is reminiscent of the Chorus’ remark early in 
the narrative that Orestes will soon be a shadow and not a human anymore (σκιάν, 302). 
Additionally, the absence of any reference to stories which tell of his purification in various 
places in the Peloponnese demonstrates his insignificance.113 During the trial, Apollo takes 
responsibility for the matricide and argues on behalf of Orestes. For the accounts of the myth, 
Orestes is Agamemnon’s and Clytemnestra’s son, the man who committed the most heinous 
of crimes. His narrative life ends upon the matricide and begins and ends with him as a 
wanderer.114 
One final example of how the Eumenides challenges a tight ending has to do with the 
role of Athena. Although, as Lowe argues, the character of Athena in the Eumenides 
inaugurates the device of deus/dea ex machina (‘god/goddess from the machine’) in the tragic 
theatre, Dunn argues that what we have in the Eumenides is only the precursor of a device that 
will establish itself some decades later through Euripides’ plays.115 Despite any differences 
between these views, they are in line with how Athena’ intervention is dramatised in the play. 
Typically, the deus/dea ex machina is a device activated at the very end of a tragic play, when 
the loose ends of the plot cannot be tied together in any other way.116 However, Athena 
emerges as one of the main characters in the Eumenides as early as in line 397, where she 
 
110 There is a possibility that Orestes appears in the narrative of Proteus as well (see below). 
111 For the mythological accounts of Orestes’ trial, see Mitchell-Boyask (2009) 22–23. For an analysis of the 
theatricality of the trial scene, see Bakewell (2013). 
112 Roberts (1985) 295. 
113 Garvie (2014) 39. See also Rosenmeyer (1982) 344. 
114 Taplin (20032) 24. 
115 Lowe (2000) 167–68; Dunn (1996) 26, 37–38. Sommerstein (2010c2, 23) and Rosenmeyer (1982, 347–49) reject this 
even as a possibility. 
116 For the use of the deus ex machina device in Greek drama, see Dunn (1996); Easterling (1993); Mastronarde (1990). 
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appears upon the request for her assistance, transporting herself from Scamander to Athens.117 
She is authorised by both Orestes and the Chorus to make up ‘the final decision’ (αἰτίας τέλος, 
434). Athena’s role involves listening to both sides, that of the prosecutors, the Furies, and that 
of the defendant, Orestes. It also involves the announcement of the trial as the way resolving 
the matter (470–89, 566–75) and the introduction of the voting system (674–75, 681–710). Her 
function reaches its peak with her own voting and final decision in favour of the defendant 
(734–43, 752–53), about 300 lines before the end of the play and the final scene where the 
deployment of the deus/dea ex machina device would be expected. Pfister includes deus/dea ex 
machina in the classical form of closed dramatic ending, where ‘the informational deficits and 
value conflicts cannot be necessarily or plausibly resolved from the information provided in 
the text itself’.118 This type of resolution is achieved by Athena well before the final scene. 
Therefore, the early deployment of the dea ex machina device in the play dissociates it from 
discussions around closure in the final scene of the play. 
What is the role of Athena in the final scene of the play then? 119 It could be argued that 
the role of Athena changes from arbitrator in the trial scene (until 777) to mediator in the 
‘crucial transitional bargaining’120 (until 916), and then to director until the end, where she 
leads the procession off stage (1047).121 In the lines which follow the announcement of Orestes’ 
acquittal (752–53), Apollo’s exit (possibly after 753) and Orestes’ exit (777), Athena’s role as 
arbitrator reaches its end. She is now taking on the role of the mediator between the city of 
Athens and the Furies. From line 778 until 916, Athena is trying to persuade the Furies not to 
realise their destructive plans for the city of Athens in reaction to Orestes’ acquittal. Such a 
reaction would be the only scenario which would be consistent with their stance earlier in the 
 
117 On the means by which Athena arrives on stage, see Chiasson (1999–2000) 142 and n. 11. More recently, on the 
use of μηχανή in the Eumenides see Jouanna (2009, 79–80, 69–71, 93, 118), cited by Garvie (2016, 47). 
118 Pfister (1988) 96. Aristotle argues against the efficiency of deus ex machina device to secure resolution (1454b1–
5): ‘Clearly the denouements (λύσεις) of plots should issue from the plot as such, and not from a deus ex machina 
as in Medea and the scene of departure in the Iliad. The deus ex machina should be employed for events outside the 
drama (τὰ ἔξω τοῦ δράματος) —preceding events beyond human knowledge, or subsequent events requiring 
prediction and announcement; for we ascribe to the gods the capacity to see all things.’ See also n. 9 and n. 37. 
119 Any ambiguities of the Eumenides’ ending have been mostly discussed in the context of Athena’s vote. See for 
example, Dunn (1997, 38): ‘the play ends ambiguously because we do not know if the case has been resolved by 
Athena or the juries.’ 
120 Taplin (1977) 410. 
121 Although Easterling (1993) discusses the directorial function of the gods on stage in the beginnings and endings 
of tragic plays, she does not include Aeschylus’ Eumenides in her set of examples. 
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play. In the final scene (916–1047), having fulfilled her role as mediator, Athena is performing 
the role of the one who directs the exit of the characters through a procession. Athena’s 
functions as arbitrator, as mediator, and as director are reminiscent of her appearances in the 
Odyssey. However, while in the epic those roles are combined, in the Eumenides they are 
fragmented and successive. As a result, the reader and the spectator needs to decide: either 
Athena’s final role as director of a grand fiesta122 is celebratory and goes beyond her limited 
powers earlier in the play, or it calls for redefining what constitutes a successful ending from 
the kind one would expect from a stage epiphany.123 This dilemma opens up issues about crisis 
as regulation and crisis as debate which transcend the world of the characters and need to be 
addressed by readers and spectators.124 
3.6. Closure as desire in Proteus 
In a discussion of ending in the Oresteia we need to take into account its unity as a set of four 
plays, and, more specifically, the contribution of the satyr drama as the final play to an 
understanding of the narrative as a whole. Although the play has been largely neglected due 
to its fragmentary nature, I argue that there are benefits to be had from reflection on its plot 
and, more specifically, on its temporal relations with the tragic plays that precede it. In what 
follows, I offer an example of how Proteus can participate in a discussion about temporalities 
of the future in the Oresteia, and, more specifically, about how it employs the idea of closure 
as a way of coming to terms with the future. 
Before anything else, I must address the issue of the chronological placement of the 
events dramatised in Proteus within the storyline of the Oresteia. In the Agamemnon, the herald 
announces that Menelaus is considered as missing since the storm in the Aegean Sea (671–79) 
when many members of the Greek army had also perished. It is likely that one more reference 
to Menelaus is made in the Libation Bearers (1041), just before Orestes’ departure from Argos 
due to his pursuit by the Furies. Although the line and its context are dubious, one can assume 
 
122 Taplin (1977) 410–15. 
123 Henrichs (1995) 64. 
124 The concept of crisis is discussed throughout Chapter 4 below. 
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that Orestes is wishing for Menelaus’ return.125 Thus, Menelaus is still considered as missing 
at the end of the Libation Bearers. There are no references to Menelaus in the Eumenides. 
Considering that at the end of Proteus Menelaus’ return to Argos still lies in the future, it is 
plausible to assume that the satyr play follows the Eumenides.  
As it is unanimously agreed that Aeschylus’ version of Menelaus’ adventures after 
Troy follows the Odyssey and not Stesichorus’ Palinode,126 it is useful to look at the 
corresponding passages. The references to Proteus occur in Odyssey 4, where Menelaus shares 
his adventures in Egypt before his return to Argos with Telemachus (4.349–586). Proteus is 
the sea-god who, as Eidothea, his daughter, claims, ‘can speak infallibly’ (4.385). After hard 
efforts, Menelaus finally succeeds in obtaining Proteus’ knowledge about the past 
(Agamemnon’s murder) and advice on the future. Menelaus must hurry to Argos and 
participate either in the act of revenge against Aegisthus, or, if this has already been exacted 
by Orestes, in the funeral rites. Similarly, in Odyssey 3, Nestor, the king of Pylos, recounts that 
Agamemnon had already been killed while Menelaus was in Egypt, and that, when Menelaus 
returned, Orestes had already killed Aegisthus and Clytemnestra. The following 
counterfactual is expressed by Nestor (3. 254–57): 
I will tell everything—though you can guess| what would have happened if 
fair Menelaus| had found Aegisthus living in his halls| on his return.127  
It would be plausible to assume that such a counterfactual might have intrigued Aeschylus: it 
expands the field of the known storyline by raising the possibility of Menelaus’ taking revenge 
for his brother instead of Orestes’ taking revenge for his father. Such a possibility could have 
been pursued in the Proteus in some way (counterfactual, conditional, or otherwise), and it 
would have been at odds with Orestes’ role in the Libation Bearers. Not only would it focus 
attention on the possibility of revenge being taken by Menelaus rather than Orestes, but also 
the primary target of that revenge would have been Aegisthus rather than Clytemnestra.  
 
125 See Garvie (1986) on 1040–41, Collard (2002) on 1040–43; Brown (2018) 444–45. 
126 See p. 25 and n. 106. 
127 Wilson (2018). 
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If one tries to map Proteus’ storyline onto the Odyssey’s, one reasonable conclusion 
might be that Proteus ends chronologically somewhere after the end of the Libation Bearers, or 
even after the Eumenides. This might be used to explain why Menelaus does not appear in the 
tragic trilogy. An alternative possibility for the events dramatised in the Proteus might be that 
they fit chronologically somewhere between the Agamemnon and Libation Bearers. This would 
not necessarily be contradicted by Menelaus’ absence from the Libation Bearers and Eumenides, 
as his return voyage could have been predicted by Proteus to be long and perilous (as in 
Odyssey 4). As mentioned above, the identification of the starting point of Proteus’ plot poses 
greater difficulties. If one assumes that the satyr drama kicks off with the shipwreck of 
Menelaus and his crew near Egypt, such a moment can be placed anywhere before or after the 
Agamemnon. This might or might not be the shipwreck of the herald’s speech in lines (671–79). 
It would certainly provide a justification for the length of time Menelaus spends in the land 
of Egypt and for the long interval before his homecoming. 
We cannot be sure how long Menelaus was delayed in Egypt: if the narrative of the 
Proteus follows closely the temporal framework of the Odyssey, it enacts events that lasted 
twenty days. Nor do we know how long Menelaus takes to return to Greece. A technique that 
may have been exploited in the Proteus to address the issue of events unfolding over a period 
of time is that of narrative jumps. For example, placing the Proteus after the Eumenides gives 
the option that Menelaus arrives in Egypt at the point when Orestes leaves Athens for Argos. 
Menelaus will only return to Argos (an event not dramatised in the Oresteia) when Orestes 
returns to Argos (an event also not dramatised in the Oresteia), after the end of the Eumenides, 
in a distant future which lies within the audience’s imagination.  If Proteus’ plot starts after (or 
even before) the beginning of the tragic trilogy, a narrative jump could have been employed 
of the kind we find in the Agamemnon when the news for the capture of Troy is immediately 
succeeded by Agamemnon’s arrival.128  
 There are two objections regarding such speculations. The first is that trying to 
understand the Proteus through the Odyssey must have limits. The narrative of the Oresteia 
demonstrates that the handling of the myth took a significant turn in the hands of Aeschylus. 
Second, the surviving fragments of the Proteus suggest that the play may start with a 
 
128 On narrative jumps, see also 3.2. 
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shipwreck from which Menelaus and his companions recover and then start fighting for their 
return. It is unclear if this is before or after Menelaus’ gathering of riches. It is not 
inconceivable that the gathering was stopped by another shipwreck. This is why it may be 
misleading to read the Proteus via the Odyssey. What we can do is to keep the Odyssey as a 
possible source for Aeschylus but without excluding other possibilities. 
Effectively, the connection between the satyr play and the tragic plays does not depend 
exclusively on where exactly it fits within the story of the tetralogy. Τhe satyr drama actually 
coexists with the tragic plays, as Griffith argues, ‘side by side, face to face or back to back, as 
alternative realities or parallel universes’.129 In the context of the plays of the Oresteia lying in 
parallel universes, another term that can be used to describe their relationship is paraquel.130 
The term paraquel has been employed by Liveley to explore how Ovid’s Heroides are 
interrelated with the master narratives of Homer and Virgil.131 Although Proteus is not 
counterfactual for the three tragic plays of the Oresteia and these do not function as the master 
narratives for Proteus, there are still some similarities that would allow us to think of Proteus 
as a paraquel. Its plot is likely to have filled in temporal gaps within the story, it could have 
been placed ‘somewhere on the established timeline’132 of the other plays, while it also could 
have undermined their certainties (see my analysis below).Lyndsay Coo also discusses the 
issue of temporality in and of satyr drama, and more specifically, how in Aeschylus’ 
tetralogies the satyr drama is interconnected with the three tragic plays.133 Coo argues that 
Proteus needs to be seen as a nostalgic response to the Agamemnon, as the Proteus represents 
the happy past and the Agamemnon its grim aftermath.134 Although both Griffith and Coo stress 
the need to examine the issue of temporality in the Oresteia as a tetralogy including the satyr 
drama, and not as a trilogy, in my discussion of Proteus I argue that Proteus with the happy 
end of Menelaus’ nostos counterbalances the ambiguities of the ending of the Eumenides and 
the Oresteia as a tragic trilogy. 
 
129 Griffith (2015) 133. For the place of the satyr drama in the tetralogy see Coo (2019) 1 n. 1; Di Marco (2017) 434 n. 
4, Griffith (2002). Sansone (2015) argues that Proteus has the first place in the tetralogy, a rather unpersuasive view. 
130 Morson (1994) 51. 
131 Liveley (2008) 95–96. 
132 Morson (1994) 51. 
133 Coo (2019). I would like to thank Dr Lyndsay Coo for allowing me to access her article prior to publication. 
134 Coo (2019) 13–18. 
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The telos dramatised in the Proteus is the exact opposite of the telos dramatised in the 
Agamemnon. Although both plays are preoccupied with a return to the oikos as the end point 
and completion of a long journey, one of them is destructive while the other one is blissful. 
With a common starting point in the sack of Troy,135 or perhaps an even earlier common 
starting point in the departure of the Greek fleet from Aulis, they allow us to concentrate on 
two very different stories. While Menelaus’ telos has a celebratory tone and is identified with 
‘fulfilment’, Agamemnon’s telos is identified with ‘death’ (as I have shown in Chapter 2). 
Apart from the juxtaposition of the different types of telos between Menelaus and 
Agamemnon, Proteus also draws connections between Menelaus and Orestes. Although both 
characters are absent in the Agamemnon, their relevance for the plays to come is foreshadowed 
(as discussed in Chapter 5 below). Additionally, Menelaus’ absence from Argos (while he was 
in Egypt) provoked Orestes to take over the responsibility to commit the matricide and 
Aegisthus’ murder.136 On the basis of what happens in the Odyssey, it is plausible to assume 
that Proteus, or even Eido, would have disclosed Orestes’ return and plans to Menelaus, 
alongside with information about Agamemnon’s murder (4.512–37, 543–47). Menelaus as 
second in the hierarchy after his brother Agamemnon would be keen to avenge Aegisthus, as 
the usurper putting an end to the familial rivalry, and Clytemnestra as his relative by affinity 
(rather than by blood). However, Menelaus is delayed in the land of Proteus, and Proteus’ 
transformations are likely to have a significant contribution to this delay. With Menelaus 
being stranded away from Argos, only Orestes could retaliate for Agamemnon’s murder. 
Indeed, in the Libation Bearers, Orestes expresses his despair for having to commit the 
matricide (899). While at that time his options were either to kill or to spare his mother, at the 
end of the tetralogy we (presumably) learn that this could have been different had Menelaus 
arrived on time at his ancestral land or had Orestes held off from killing his mother for the 
time being. This extra information can be seen as bringing back some of the uncertainty and 
anxiety of the aftermath at the matricide at the end of the Libation Bearers. 
 
135 Revermann (2008) 250. 
136 Sommerstein (2010b) 79–80. 
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Massimo di Marco, in his paper on the function of satyr play, employs Aristotle’s 
concept of τέλος to demonstrate the purpose of Proteus’ narrative as part of the grand 
narrative of the Oresteia: 
 In his Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes between τέλος, the end as 
something given, and σκοπός, the end as object of deliberation.137 We could 
say, using this subtle distinction, that the τέλος immanent in satyr play….is to 
celebrate Dionysus, but, at the same time, that it is from this very necessity that 
the author derives his σκοπός: namely, to recover the joyful dimension proper 
to the civic cult of Dionysus, and to do so through the jokes of the satyrs. This 
is the main purpose of satyr play.138 
According to Di Marco, then, the main purpose of the satyr drama and Proteus in particular is 
‘to recover’ and ‘to restore’. Considering Proteus as the fourth part of the Oresteia as a tetralogy 
invites us to think about the opportunities that this condition creates. First, it can be seen as 
an advantage for a tragedian to have a satyr drama following a tragic trilogy which deals with 
familial, social, and political malfunctions. The appearance of the satyrs places the narrative 
back to the world of myth which would be a ‘release from the high stakes of tragedy’.139 
Second, the Proteus as the final play offers a conclusion which leaves the audience not less 
confused but ‘more comfortable’.140 Menelaus’ and, possibly, Helen’s return to Greece fulfils a 
much-expected sense of narrative closure in the shape of nostos.141 Had the uncomfortable 
ending of the Eumenides been the final impression of the narrative for the Athenian audience 
of the 458 BCE, the plays performed would fail in fulfilling their educational role in the culture 
 
137Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics (1227a7–9): ‘But since one who deliberates always deliberates for the sake of some 
object (ἕνεκά τινος), and a man deliberating always has some aim (σκοπός) in view with reference to which he 
considers what is expedient, nobody deliberates about his End (περὶ μὲν τοῦ τέλους), but this is a starting-point 
or assumption.’ For the distinction between τέλος and σκοπός see Di Marco (2017) 448 n. 50. 
138 Di Marco (2017) 447–48. 
139 Rehm (20172) 83. 
140 Griffith (2002) 249. 
141 For Helen’s role in Proteus, see Marshall (2015) 83–86. For the emotional bonds between people and places in the 
nostos patterns of the epic and drama, see Lowe (2018). 
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of fifth-century Athens.142 This is no different for subsequent readers and spectators. It is only 
with the help of the Proteus that the Oresteia allows spectators and readers to return to the 
world of history with an understanding of the wider complexities of the concept of telos as 
closure. 
3.7. Conclusion 
In the Oresteia the concept of telos addresses the matter of closure in both textual and 
narratological terms. Depending on the nature of their preoccupations with future, each play 
situates telos where the two axes shift to intersect at various points (which operate 
simultaneously at the level of the characters and the level of the readers/spectators), one of 
which is between necessity and desire and the other between closure and crisis. The narrative 
of the Agamemnon manifests a desire and a necessity for closure which are fulfilled to a high 
degree by the end of the play, while the narrative of the Libation Bearers manifests a necessity 
for open-endedness, with the desire for closure remaining unfulfilled. The narrative of the 
Eumenides expresses both necessity and desire, gesturing towards a more conventional type 
of closure without fully following one. What is a movement from closure to crisis within the 
Oresteia as a trilogy, with openness emerging as the future’s quintessential trait, is most likely 
accompanied by an opposite movement from crisis to closure when considering that the end 
of the narrative lies in a satyr drama. 
As I have argued, the insights offered by this Chapter are useful for understanding the 
direct and indirect implications of telos as ending being the future towards which each one of 
the single plays progresses, either within or outside the narrative boundaries, challenging the 
conventional pairing of closure with a closed future. At the same time, they are also critical 
for engaging with the discussions that follow: the demonstration in Chapters 4–7 of how the 
future manifests itself in the Oresteia through diverse closural functions analysed in this 
Chapter efficiently prepares for considerations of the future as always open and, thus, being 
at risk.
 
142 On the educational role of Athenian tragedy, see Scodel (2008); Rabinowitz (2008) 16–18, 33–58; Croally (1994) 
17–47. 
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4 
4. Telos between future present and present future 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines how the concept of telos in Aeschylus’ Oresteia can be associated not 
only with textual and narratological approaches explored so far in Chapters 2 and 3, but also 
with contemporary discussions around the philosophy of time. Discussions of human time1  
are normally undertaken in and through historical narratives which tend to focus on the 
relationship between present and past.2 By contrast, fictional narratives allow readers and 
spectators to go beyond traditional approaches of telos as a historical category, as these 
narratives are preoccupied not only with the past and the present, but also with the future. 
Therefore, in a text that dramatises present and future at both the level of the action 
(characters) and the level of reception (readers and spectators), I set out to explore how the 
concepts of future present and present future may operate as central narrative modes. The term 
future present refers to a future controlled by gods and fate, a closed future that ‘can be known, 
‘seen’ and anticipated’, whereas the term present future is ‘the imagined, planned, projected 
and produced future in and for the present.’3 Whereas in the Agamemnon telos is activated as 
 
1 Here I use the concept of ‘human time’ in the sense of ‘historical/phenomenological time’, in order to differentiate 
it from ‘cosmological time’. Just to note that in this instance I do not use the term in Ricoeur’s meaning, according 
to whom human time is ‘the fusion of phenomenological time and cosmological time and is organized after the 
manner of a narrative.’ (1984 I, 13). 
2 For an example of an exception to this tendency, see Lianeri (2016), also mentioned in p. 4 and p. 8 of the 
Introduction. See also Danto (1985) e.g., 15. 
3 Quotes from Adam & Groves (2007) 18, 28, respectively. 
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future present and in the Libation Bearers it is used as present future, in the Eumenides telos is 
conceptualised as a fusion of present future and future present. A discussion of Proteus allows 
us to see how the satyr drama can revisit and juxtapose the different attitudes towards future 
present and present future of the three tragic plays. 
The concepts of future present and present future, first coined by the social scientist 
Niklas Luhmann in his study of the structures of modern society, have been central to 
discussions about temporality in several other areas of interest during the last decades.4 In 
their recent study, Barbara Adam and Chris Groves, drawing on Luhmann, discuss the 
definitions and the distinction between the two terms and suggest that future present is the 
divine future, the future known, seen and anticipated, already shaped with no much room for 
changes; whereas present future is ‘the imagined, planned, projected and produced future in 
and for the present.’5 I use the two concepts drawing on the definitions above and on the 
critical framework of the philosophy of history which heavily influences the current research 
on the topic. More specifically, I draw on Reinhart Koselleck and a third concept that he 
introduces, the concept of futures past.6 Futures past conceptualises the tension between two 
historical categories, expectation (future) and experience (past), as it manifests itself across 
different cultures and times.7 It draws attention to the pastness of the future, specifically on 
‘how expectations, hopes, or prognoses that are projected into the future become articulated 
into language’ and ‘how in a given present, the temporal dimensions of past and future are 
related’.8 Jonas Grethlein draws systematically on Koselleck’s term futures past as a framework 
for a discussion of ancient historiography. Grethlein combines Koselleck’s terminology with 
the concept of telos which for him becomes the vantage point of the historian who looks at 
historical events retrospectively. For Grethlein, the historiographer is at the vantage point of 
knowing the events relating to the historical agent, and everything in the history that she or 
he writes about drives towards that point.9 In Grethlein’s approach, both experiential and 
 
4 Luhmann (1998) 70; (1982) 281; (1976) 142–43. On future present as a mode of philosophical thought, see also Pinsky 
(2003). 
5 Adam & Groves (2007) e.g., 18, 28, 176 n. 6, 200. 
6 Koselleck (2004) e.g., 3. The original German term is vergangene Zukunft. 
7 Koselleck (2004) 255–75. 
8 Koselleck (2004) 3. 
9 Grethlein (2016) 59–77; (2014); (2013a). 
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teleological narratives can be explored as two sides of the same coin which is telos: what is 
seen as future for the historical characters (experience) is seen as past for the historian 
(teleology). 
Despite the large chronological and cultural gap that separates Aeschylus’ plays from 
Luhmann’s, Koselleck’s and Grethlein’s ideas, and the differences of the frameworks 
themselves, there is a common interest in how temporality is intertwined with human activity. 
Therefore, I argue that future present and present future as conceptualisations of time produced 
by and tested in historical narratives can also inform, enrich, and illuminate similar 
explorations in dramatic narratives. In this context, future present and present future operate as 
conceptualisations not only of a future known and anticipated or unknown and unexpected, 
but also of a future experienced in the dramatic present by readers and spectators alongside 
the characters. Such discussions, which consider the Oresteia as a work preoccupied with ideas 
pertinent to the area of philosophy of time, have not been the focus of the relevant scholarship. 
Even Simon Goldhill, who acknowledges that the Oresteia dramatises the problematic relation 
between the present and the future (‘a relation that structures the narrative of the Oresteia 
importantly’10), does not tease out the broader implications of his analysis. In what follows, I 
show how the concepts of future present and present future can open up a number of 
interpretative possibilities for the four plays of the tetralogy. In the Agamemnon, a close 
reading is undertaken of four characters, the Watchman, Agamemnon, Clytemnestra, and 
Cassandra, and how they experience their future present, a future outside their control. I then 
move to Apollo’s oracle and Clytemnestra’s dream in the Libation Bearers to show how they 
help Orestes imagine a future for himself. In the Eumenides we encounter how the present future 
persists as the future that will be decided in a courtroom under the threat of an upcoming 
major crisis. After Orestes’ acquittal and departure (777), we also revisit the concept of the 
future present not as a fixed reality but as an eternal futurity. In the last play of the tetralogy, 
the transformations of Proteus and the return home of Menelaus can be used to reflect on how 
present future meets the future present. 
 
10 Goldhill (1984b). 
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4.2. The future present in the Agamemnon 
In the Agamemnon, the future present manifests itself as the collision and the convergence 
between the desire for a fixed future and the uncertainties of a lived present. More specifically, 
telos is not identified with the characters’ expectations to control the future and with the 
prospect of the fulfilment of those expectations in the future; it is a lived, present condition 
which the characters and the readers and the spectators experience in unexpected and intense 
ways. For this quality of the future I use the term presentness.11 
4.2.1. The Watchman 
In the prologue (1–39), the Watchman’s future present is dramatised through the fulfilment of 
his telos at the present. As the guard on duty, the watchman looks forward to the beacon light, 
the signal of the sack of Troy. The very first line of the Agamemnon articulates the Watchman’s 
preoccupation with an optative future. With the performative utterance ‘I ask’ (αἰτῶ12), he 
prays to the gods with the request for ‘release’ from his present misery, the never-ending and 
tedious anticipation of the beacon light (ἀπαλλαγὴν πόνων, 1). The prayer is accompanied 
by a detailed description of his cognitive and emotional state. His night-watching duty brings 
him ‘misery’ (1), ‘fear’ (14), and weeping ‘lament’ (18). This tension urges him to recapitulate 
his plea in the next couplet. It starts with the adverb of time ‘now’ (νῦν, 20) and includes an 
optative wish reiterating the goal of the prayer, echoing the very first line of the prologue: 
‘Now I wish (γένοιτ’) for a happy release (ἀπαλλαγὴ) from misery | when the fire in the dark 
has appeared with its good news’ (20–21). What follows is the unexpected realisation of his 
much-desired future. At the moment when he finishes his lines, the beacon light finally arrives 
and becomes visible to him. The Watchman welcomes its advent with warm enthusiasm and 
relief: ‘Greetings to you!’ (22). The enactment of the Watchman’s telos as goal, which is the 
appearance of the beacon light in the first half of the prologue (1–21), is identified with the 
enactment of his telos as fulfilment and as end of his performance in the second half (22–39). 
 
11 We will revisit the concept of future present under the section 4.3.2. ‘Apollo’s oracle’, where, instead of the 
presentness of the future, I argue that we see the presence of the future. For the concepts of presentness and presence 
within art criticism and art history, see Fried (1998) 148–72, originally published in 1967. 
12 On performative language in the Oresteia, see Fletcher (2011) 35–69. 
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The Watchman experiences his future present in a way that minimises the distance 
between the narrative and those who witness the scene. As the beacon light arrives at the end 
of his prayer (20–21), the desired future has turned into a present fact. In Aristotelian terms, 
the beginning of the play (ἀρχή) concurs with a telos (τέλος) as the end and fulfilment both of 
the Watchman’s duty and of sack of Troy. More specifically, the Watchman’s duty reaches a 
sudden end that marks his joyous departure from the narrative at the exact moment that the 
hope for the fall of Troy is fulfilled. Thus, one can argue that the Aeschylean tetralogy 
commences with a micro-narrative and employs a happy micro-ending which is in sharp 
contrast with the painful future presents to follow. 
Moreover, as seen above, the readers of the historical narratives are positioned at the 
vantage point of knowing the events, what Grethlein defines as the telos of the observer’s 
vantage point, whereas the historical characters are subject to the eventfulness of the future.13 
However, the readers and the spectators of the dramatic narrative experience the advent of 
the future in similar terms with the dramatic characters. What is striking in this scene is that 
their telos must be considered as less advantageous than the Watchman’s. Bassi has argued 
for the non-privileged position of the reader in this scene on the grounds that ‘the ‘watching’ 
is the sign of the absent visual experience and as such, ‘does not put the reading subject in a 
position of power, but rather,…in the grip of ‘panic and euphoria’’.14 I would add that, 
although the Watchman has no other audience, his telos is not identified, aligned, and 
synchronised with the telos of the narrative. What comes as a personal fulfilment for the 
Watchman operates as only the beginning for the readers and spectators, whose expectations 
about the future narrative open up at this exact point. The prologue concludes with a desire 
for resolution, a ‘redemptive conclusion’,15 and a sense of a deterministic closed future which, 
if anything, does not prepare at all for the painful future present that Agamemnon and 
Cassandra will experience. 
 
13 See p. 82 and n. 9. 
14 Bassi (2005) 262, citing Mitchell (2005) 348. 
15 Fletcher (2011) 35. 
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The Watchman’s narrative constitutes a unique case of a minor, anonymous character 
who acts upon the reader’s and the spectator’s engagement with the development of the plot.16 
According to Mieke Bal, classical tragedy illustrates how crisis is narrativised.17 In narrative, 
crisis operates within a restricted temporal span. The dramatic narrative is able to tackle this 
restriction. One way in doing so is through the participation of a minor character, who, as Bal 
argues, is the protagonist ‘of his own fabula’, creating a sub-fabula. I argue that the Watchman 
of the Agamemnon might operate as an example of this model. Another characteristic of 
classical tragedy which contributes to the extension of the temporal span of crisis is the 
references to past and future. These references are also in abundance in the Watchman’s 
speech (2–7, 10–19, 22–35). Thus, drawing on Bal’s model, the Watchman scene presents a 
model of crisis-form which transcends its temporal confines. 
4.2.2. Agamemnon 
The arrival of the beacon light is followed by Agamemnon’s return to his homeland, Argos, 
where another dramatisation of the future present takes place. As was illustrated previously in 
Chapter 2, Agamemnon’s scene is strongly preoccupied with the ideas of telos as completion 
and end. Here, Agamemnon’s telos must be understood as the interaction between his present 
and his future. While his present is dramatised onstage with him before Clytemnestra, the 
Chorus, and the readers/spectators, his future is dramatised also in the present but offstage 
and is witnessed by Clytemnestra and Cassandra (on which more see below). Like the 
Watchman, Agamemnon is a character who encounters his telos as a present experience and 
not simply as an expectation for the future, as a fact in the present rather than as a possibility 
for the future. His homecoming to Argos marks a violent telos very different from the one 
anticipated. Following a long introduction by the Chorus (782–809), Agamemnon appears 
onstage and stays for less than 200 lines (781–957), with his speaking part confined to less than 
100 lines (810–54, 914–57). His brief role is in contrast with the intensity with which he 
experiences his future present. 
 
16 For the significance of the Watchman as an anonymous character, see Fraenkel (1950, II) 25–26. For further 
bibliography, see Yoon (2012) 41 n. 7. None of these works, however, comment on the Watchman’s contribution to 
the development of the plot not only for the Agamemnon but also for the Oresteia as a whole. 
17 Bal (1997) 178. See also Liveley (2008, 90) on her discussion of time and narrative in Ovid’s Heroides. 
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For their part, the spectators and the readers are invited to reflect upon Agamemnon’s 
future in a twofold way. One is aligned with the way the Chorus deals with the future. The 
other forces them to contemplate on the narrative from an outside vantage point. The Chorus 
advises Agamemnon that the passing of time will be beneficial for him: ‘You will perceive and 
know with time (γνώσῃ δὲ χρόνῳ διαπευθόμενος) | which of your citizens staying at home 
| acted rightfully and which improperly’ (807–9). This generalised advice refers to a distant 
future that blatantly contradicts any knowledge of the myth (including its treatment by 
Aeschylus), according to which Agamemnon will be murdered by Clytemnestra and will have 
no opportunity to shape his own future. 
4.2.3. Clytemnestra 
Another example of future present in the Agamemnon is offered by Clytemnestra who, like the 
Watchman, experiences her future present with the sense of telos as fulfilment, without the 
disastrous implications of Agamemnon’s and Cassandra’s telos (on which more below). 
Clytemnestra’s telos comes across as celebratory, because, as in the case of the Watchman, the 
much desired and anticipated goal of taking her revenge on Agamemnon becomes suddenly 
actualised. As seen in Chapter 2, Agamemnon is τέλειος (972) for Clytemnestra, meaning both 
the man in authority and the perfect victim in ritual terms.18 What materialises the 
Watchman’s future present, Agamemnon’s return, also prepares for Clytemnestra’s future 
present, Agamemnon’s murder, which is, of course, also Agamemnon’s future present. Her 
invocation to Zeus with the request to fulfil her prayer (973–74), which was at the time of 
uttering a desirable future, subsequently becomes a desirable present, and her telos as 
fulfilment is exacted through Agamemnon’s telos as end (1343, 1345). Thus, through these 
interchanging temporalities described with the term future present, the readers and the 
spectators are invited to revisit Clytemnestra’s actions both as future and as present, both as 
in anticipation of a future and as witnesses of a present unfolding. 
 
18 See section 2.2. 
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4.2.4. Cassandra 
A final example of how the concept of future present can be employed in the Agamemnon takes 
place in the ‘Cassandra scene’ (1035–330), where a striking type of prolepsis features.19 While 
in conventional narrative prolepsis future is anticipated at the present, Cassandra’s future is 
lived at the present as her future present in the most agonising way, whereas the actualisation 
of her prophecies is still being anticipated and not happening until line 1343. Cassandra’s time 
travels offer the opportunity to the readers and the spectators to traverse time back and forth 
with her, and this is how Cassandra’s future present differentiates itself from Koselleck’s and 
Grethlein’s future(s) past. 
Cassandra accesses the future in ways that go beyond conventional understandings of 
the term prophet and seer.20 Strictly speaking, the word ‘prophet’, προφήτης, derives from 
the compound πρὸ+φημὶ/λέγω for the ‘one who speaks for a god and interprets his will to 
man’.21 Τhe preposition πρό indicates knowledge of the future events before they happen.22 
The prophet’s direct access of the future is stressed by Arthur Danto who notes: 
 The prophet is one who speaks about the future in a manner which is 
appropriate only to the past, or who speaks of the present in the light of a future 
treated as a fait accompli. A prophet treats the present in a perspective ordinarily 
available only to future historians to whom present events are past, and for 
who, the meaning of present events is discernible.23 
In Danto’s terms, Cassandra acts as a future historian. However, Danto’s definition of the 
prophet corresponds only partially to Cassandra’s involvement. Cassandra speaks about the 
future as something happening at the present and from which she cannot escape, with a level 
 
19 On prolepsis (and analepsis), see Genette (1980) 67–85, 48–67, respectively. Chapter 5 below discusses proleptic 
narratives in more detail. For the seers in ancient Greece, see Flower & Allmon (2008). 
20 On the meanings of προφήτης and μάντις (including bibliography), see Pillinger (2019) 9–12; Rehm (2005) 345 
and n. 10; Nagy (1990). 
21 LSJ9 s.v. προφήτης. 
22 Fraenkel (1950, III) on 1099: ‘προφήτης does primarily denote one who ‘prophesies’, i.e. foretells future events. 
The word, akin to προειπεῖν…, means literally ‘pronouncer’… It is not synonymous with μάντις.’ 
23 Danto (1968) 9. 
Chapter 4 
Page 89 of 269 
of certainty suitable only to statements about past events. As Cassandra is an eyewitness of 
the future herself, she also acts unlike a future historian, because she does not only speak about 
the future but lives in the future, not with the privilege of advance knowledge, but at her own 
personal cost. 
Cassandra’s role is also different from conventional understandings of the term ‘seer’. 
The English noun ‘seer’ derives from the verb ‘to see’ and means ‘someone who has clear 
vision’, similar to the French ‘clairvoyant’.24 Both seer and clairvoyant are relate to the Greek 
μάντις. Unlike other prophetic figures such as Teiresias (in Sophocles’ Antigone and Oedipus 
the King)25 and Polymestor (in Euripides’ Hecuba) who are unable to see (Teiresias is blind and 
Polymestor cannot see when it comes to predict the future),26 Cassandra actually sees the 
future and the past and describes in speech what she sees, revealing the horror of her vision. 
For example, she can see the blood on the floor of the house (‘a floor sprinkled with blood!’, 
1092), a net as the murderer’s weapon (‘Is it some catch-net of Death? | No, the trap-net 
sharing his bed, sharing guilt | for his blood’, 1115–7), the murder scene (1125–29), and 
Thyestes’ murdered children (1217–22). However, the terms ‘seer’ and ‘clairvoyant’ are not 
sufficient for her. What completes Cassandra’s unique performance is the multisensorial type 
of experience through synaesthesia.27 She is not only a clairvoyant able to see what others 
cannot; she can also activate and mobilise other senses to access knowledge of the past and 
future. She can hear from the past Thyestes’ children crying (‘these are infants weeping for 
their slaughter, | and over their roasted flesh which their father devoured’, 1096–97) and from 
the future the Erinyes singing (‘This house will never be abandoned by a choir of voices in 
unison, | unlovely in tone because it does not tell of good’, 1186–87). She can also smell the 
evil, the blood and its origins (‘The stranger has a keen nose it seems, like a hound, | she is 
searching for blood and will discover whose murder it was, 1093–94; ‘I track closely on the 
scent | of evil done long ago’, 1184–85; ‘The vapour is just like that from a tomb; it’s so 
evident!’, 1311).28 
 
24 Rehm (2005, 347–48 and n. 16) notes that ‘clear vision’ is not literal, as it has to do with the clearance of mind. 
25 Pillinger (2019) 13–14. 
26 Rehm (2005) 347. 
27 On the broader implications of the term synaesthesia, see Butler & Purves (2013). 
28 Mazzoldi (2002) 147 and n. 7. 
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The intensity with which the future is lived by Cassandra as present becomes evident 
by her use of interjections and inarticulate language as well. Although Agamemnon and 
Cassandra enter the stage together, her presence remains unannounced and unexplained, 
being thrown into invisibility, immobility and silence.29 Agamemnon is the first character who 
refers to the Trojan princess as ‘woman stranger’ (950), 170 lines after their appearance on 
stage. First, Cassandra remains in the carriage speechless and motionless, and, then, finally 
descends from the carriage following Clytemnestra. However, she suddenly stops and utters 
her very first words in the play, an invocation to Apollo which she soon repeats (1072–73, 
1076–77):30 ‘Ototototoi, popoi, dah! | Apollo! Apollo!’ (ὀτοτοτοτοῖ ποποῖ δᾶ· | ὦπολλον 
ὦπολλον).31 This cry, ‘a formulaic cry of grief and terror’,32 between articulate and 
inarticulate,33 expresses her agony and marks the starting point of her unlimited access to 
different temporal spheres.34 
Cassandra’s continuous callings to Apollo (1080–82, 1085–87) demonstrate the 
awakening of her prophetic skill. As seen before, Agamemnon has been able to experience 
only part of his own future present, and in a restricted timeframe: his return to Argos, once a 
future, becomes a present. However, in the case of Cassandra, the details about Agamemnon’s 
death are revealed gradually, and upon each revelation Cassandra responds with an 
interjection which illustrates the vehemence of the future events: ‘Ió, popoi!’ (ἰὼ ποποῖ, 1100–
4); ‘Ió’ (ἰὼ, 1107–11); ‘Ah, ah! Papai, papai!’ (ἒ ἒ παπαῖ παπαῖ, 1114–17); ‘Oh, oh! See, see!’ (ἆ 
ἆ ἰδοὺ ἰδού, 1125–29). Not only is she the victim of Apollo’s punishment of not being believed 
by her listeners, but also, she is a unique type of a prophetess who is wholly and fiercely 
involved in the prophesied future. What follows represents the most powerful experience for 
a living person, the disclosure of the details about their own death. In four sets of lines, ‘Ió ió’, 
 
29 For the staging of ‘the Cassandra scene’, see Taplin (1977) 305–6, 317–22. On silence in this scene, see Pillinger 
(2019) 31. 
30 Knox (1972, 109) notes that Aeschylus activates his new ‘third actor technique’ only for the character of 
Cassandra. 
31 Here I cite Sommerstein’s translation (2008) instead of Collard’s (2002): ‘O-o-o-oh! Horror! No! O Apollo, O 
Apollo!’. For a discussion of Cassandra’s cry and its English translation, see Prins (2005), who focuses on Virginia 
Woolf’s interest in learning Greek through Aeschylus’ Agamemnon and her (and other Victorian writers’ and 
translators’) decision not to render Cassandra’s cry into English. 
32 Knox (1972) 111. 
33 Brault (2009) 205. 
34 Mazzoldi (2002) 146 and n. 6. 
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(ἰὼ ἰὼ, 1136–39), ‘Ió ió’ (ἰὼ ἰὼ, 1146–49), ‘Ió’ (ἰὼ, 1156–61), ‘Ió’ (ἰὼ, 1167–72), Cassandra realises 
that her telos is imminent: she will be murdered as soon as she enters the palace. Cassandra 
experiences violent encounters with the future on two more occasions (1214–55, 1256–94), 
again marked by interjections which initiate two long narratives about Agamemnon’s and her 
own death: ‘Iou, iou! Oh! Oh! The pain!’ (ἰοὺ ἰού, ὢ ὢ κακά, 1214) and ‘Papai! How the fire 
comes upon me! Ototoi!’ (παπαῖ· οἷον τὸ πῦρ ἐπέρχεται· ὀτοτοῖ, 1256).35 
The uniqueness of Cassandra’s prophetic skill, which lies in the instant dramatisation 
of the prophecy in front of her own eyes, has been discussed by Pascale-Anne Brault and 
Emily Pillinger. Brault, drawing on David Aune’s work in religious studies, employs the 
concept of futuristic present.36 Brault turns the use of futuristic present from a morphological 
expression to a temporal zone which illustrates the simultaneity of present and future events. 
As Cassandra is foreshadowing future events, she communicates the information in present 
tense: ‘she strikes’, ‘he falls’ (τύπτει, πίτνει, 1128). Instead of foretelling the future (i.e. 
‘Clytemnestra will strike’ and ‘Agamemnon will fall’), Cassandra describes as fulfilled future 
actions which have not yet been committed.37 In her discussion of the ‘Cassandra-scene’, 
Pillinger reintroduces the term ‘realisation’ which has been suggested by several scholars as 
a way to conceptualise prophetic communication.38 According to this concept of ‘realisation’, 
the boundaries between the articulation of the prophecy and its ultimate materialisation 
become fluid. The articulation of the prophecy is not just the mere description of future events, 
but it is also their interpretation. This might trigger ‘speculations, assumptions, 
reconsiderations and actions’; thus, the prophecy ‘turns out to be ‘realised’ through the very 
act of its interpretation’.39 Brault’s and Pillinger’s terminology can be helpful for thinking 
about Cassandra’s relation to the future but needs to be developed further if ones wants to do 
 
35 Sommerstein’s translation (2008), see Chapter 4, n. 30. On the symbolism of fire, see Pillinger (2019) 33. 
36 Brault (2009) 207–10, citing Aune (1983, 56). In his taxonomy of prophecy, Aune introduces futuristic present as a 
tense of the indicative, representative of the category of ‘predictive oracles’, under which Cassandra’s oracular 
speech is filed. 
37 This can be related to the term ‘future present’ which Abbott (2005, 534) uses as ‘an exact analogue of the 
‘historical present’ (the rendering of past action in the present tense). 
38 Pillinger (2019) 7 and n. 16 for bibliography. 
39 Pillinger (2019) 7. 
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justice to Cassandra’s experience of the future, its dynamics, range and interplay with the 
readers and the spectators. Those issues are further explored in the chapters that follow.40 
Cassandra’s time travels include not only the view of her own death and 
Agamemnon’s but extend well beyond the limits of the dramatic future and past of the play. 
First, the prophetess exposes the background of her personal story and involvement with 
Apollo who gave her his divine skill but took from her the power to warn her recipients, or 
even more, to save herself from death (1082, 1202–13, 1263–78). She also sees the invisible 
Furies, the chorus of the Eumenides, who are the eternal occupants, ‘embedded’ in the house 
of Atreides.41 Cassandra reveals the Furies’ past, present, and future omnipresence (1186–93) 
which ranges from the killing of the children of Thyestes (1217–22),42 to the advent of Orestes 
as the matricide (1280–84, 1324–25) and to the unknown future of the end of the Eumenides.43 
Cassandra’ insight encompasses the past, the present, and the future history of the Atreides’ 
family, from the very beginning to its uncertain end. 
It is this exact temporal dynamic of the ‘Cassandra scene’, the fusion of past, present, 
and future, which brings the readers and spectators closer to the characters. The readers and 
spectators are invited to comprehend Cassandra’s agony in its full scale and wider context. 
The fact that Cassandra is alienated from the other dramatic characters (as the only character 
in extant tragedy who prophesies to people with whom she is unfamiliar) does not only 
eliminate the distance between her and the spectators and readers, but ‘can make her even 
more sympathetic to the audience’.44 Not only the original audience but anyone engaging the 
narrative is offered the chance to watch a dramatic persona encountering the moment of her 
death. The distinctiveness of the tragic narrative, the absence of a narrator as mediator, aligns 
the time taken to narrate with the time narrated and effectively invites anyone engaging with 
the narrative to experience time and to anticipate the future alongside Cassandra, despite their 
 
40 For Cassandra’s prophecies as foreshadowing technique, see Chapter 5 (under 5.3.1) For the suspenseful and 
surprising elements of ‘the Cassandra scene’, see Chapters 6 (under 6.3.1, 6.4.2, and 6.4.3) and 7 (under 7.3.3 and 
7.4.2) respectively. 
41 The term ‘embedded’ is used by Pillinger (2019, 61 and n. 78), citing Padel (1992, 181) who argues for ’the 
development of the Furies through the Oresteia’. 
42 For this type of temporal experience which exceeds the temporal boundaries of the narrative towards the past, 
see Grethlein’s & Krebs’ study on ‘plupast’, a term which conceptualises past events prior to their narrative's 
proper past, a past embedded in the past (2012). 
43 See in Chapter 3, section 3.5 (‘Closure as possibility in the Eumenides’). 
44 Rehm (2005) 347. 
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spatial and temporal separation, bringing spectators and readers into contact with something 
beyond their normal experience.45 Cassandra offers for them to see through her what for others 
will remain inaccessible and unintelligible: she becomes the medium through which the 
fusion of the fictional and the real world breaks down the limits between expectation and 
experience. Although they are aware of the irreversibility of the events that follow due to their 
prior familiarity with the myth or expectations about the genre, any certainty and security 
give their place to an opportunity to reflect on what it is like to experience time in tragedy. 
Cassandra’s telos through her experience of the future present needs to be understood 
as both comparable to, and very different from the telos of Grethlein’s historian. In 
historiography, as Grethlein argues, the concept of telos is associated with the vantage point 
of the historian, whereas the future past expresses the temporal asymmetries between 
historians and historical characters, which offers the former ones the hindsight to interpret 
historical facts. In the case of Cassandra, her telos emerges out of her ‘vantage’ point of 
remembering, knowing, understanding, forefeeling and seeing the truth beyond temporal 
limits and constraints. This ability of handling and controlling knowledge is reminiscent of 
Grethlein’s historian. However, unlike Grethlein’s historian, the paradox of Cassandra’s 
vantage point is that it comes with a realisation of the limited power of her own skill (1260–
8). Cassandra also operates like Grethlein’s historical characters: the kind of knowledge 
Cassandra possesses is not sufficient to help her navigate and escape her narrative future. She 
revisits a past of violent memories and she is transported into a future which is unwanted but 
inevitable. Therefore, by contrast to the telos which is presented in a celebratory manner in 
historiography, in the Agamemnon the knowledge gained by the characters comes at a very 
high personal cost that outweighs any benefit and undermines any sense of control. 
In the Agamemnon, telos is not a privileged vantage point from which to look at the past 
or to create certainties about the future. Rather it is a set of intense bodily and mental 
experiences crystallised as the future present. Those experiences are shared between individual 
characters and external spectators and readers who experience each future present with a 
different degree of intensity building up to a powerful climax: from the Watchman’s and 
 
45 Easterling (2005) 29. 
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Clytemnestra’s redemptive experience of the future to Agamemnon and Cassandra’s painful 
one. 
4.3. The present future in the Libation Bearers 
Here I move from the future present to the present future as another conceptualisation of a future 
understood and experienced in the dramatic present by the characters alongside the readers 
and the spectators. By contrast to the future present, where a pre-decided and fixed future is 
seen and experienced in the present, the present future is associated with the future as 
‘imagined, planned, projected, and produced’ in and for the present.46 The narrative of the 
Libation Bearers employs the present future as a future being constructed at the present, and 
subsequently, an open future which departs from the determinism of the future present 
experienced in the Agamemnon. This concept is explored through two micro-narratives, 
Clytemnestra’s dream and Apollo’s oracle which, despite their default closed future 
associations, determine the matricide in a way that manifests Orestes’ and Clytemnestra’s 
futures as open fields with possibilities awaiting to be fulfilled. Although the type of future 
related to divination is the future present and not the present future (as we saw in the case of 
Cassandra), the employment of the dream and the oracle invites the readers and spectators to 
explore how a tragic narrative can accommodate contingency and openness, even when it 
employs conventional modes of storytelling. 
4.3.1. Clytemnestra’s dream 
The employment of Clytemnestra’s dream in the narrative of the Libation Bearers invites the 
readers and spectators to engage with Clytemnestra’s future as possible and not yet fixed.47 
The narrative of Clytemnestra’s dream consists of three fragmentary micronarratives, two by 
the Chorus (23–41, 523–39) and one by Orestes (540–50), and offers an idea of the future that 
can be imagined and, thus, altered. Although Clytemnestra’s dream is expected to depict a 
 
46 Adam & Groves (2007) 28. See section 4.1. 
47 For a different interpretation of Clytemnestra’s dream which, nevertheless, emphasises the guilt-driven nature 
rather than the prophetic, see Devereux (1976) 180–218. 
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future present because of its teleological implications, it is actually employed as an aspect of 
Clytemnestra’s and Orestes’ present future. 
Following the two narratives of the dream by the Chorus (23–41, 523–39), Orestes is 
looking for clues that would empower him to plan and then execute the murder. The last lines 
of his dream interpretation manifest how Orestes himself constructs his future at the present: 
‘I have been made into the snake and am | to kill (κτείνω) her, as this dream tells’ (549–50). 
The use of the present tense κτείνω has sometimes been interpreted as 'prophetic present 
tense’48 or as ‘timeless present’.49 What is important for the purposes of this discussion, 
however, is that through this 'prophetic present tense’ and ‘timeless present’ it is Orestes 
himself who authorises his own killing of Clytemnestra. He is also publicly accepted and 
celebrated by the Chorus as τερασκόπος, as a diviner: ‘I choose your interpretation of this 
portent’ (551). Thus, this interpretation of the dream involves Orestes himself as τελεσφόρος 
(541) and constructs a causal relation with the matricide. Clytemnestra too argues for a causal 
relation between the dream and her death, as her end is approaching (928–29). However, as 
we saw in Chapter 3 (section 3.4), and although Orestes acts as a telos bearer (τελεσφόρον, 
541), the matricide in the Libation Bearers cannot be identified with τέλος as fulfilment and 
end. It provides not continuity and closure, but discontinuity. As Adam and Groves note for 
the present future, ‘[w]hatever it will contain, we feel that it is subordinate to what happens 
here in the present,’50 and this is certainly case for Orestes and for Clytemnestra. 
Although the snake of the dream is not explicitly identified with a human agent, and 
there is no direct reference to Orestes, the maternal relationship between Clytemnestra and 
the snake leaves no room for alternative readings. By putting Orestes in the position of the 
snake, the tragic narrative invites readers and spectators to look at Clytemnestra’s future and 
to anticipate the act of matricide. This treatment of the dream-narrative deviates significantly 
from its predecessor, Stesichorus’ Oresteia, where Agamemnon is the snake-agent visiting 
from the past.51 While in Stesichorus’ Oresteia any presence of Orestes would epitomise the 
 
48 Collard (2002) on 550. 
49 Garvie (1986) on 550. 
50 Adam & Groves (2007) 122. 
51 PMG 219=fr. 180 Davies & Finglass. Garvie (1986, xx) argues that both lines of the fragment refer to Agamemnon, 
while Finglass (2018, 32) argues that βασιλεύς of the second line refers to Orestes. For a discussion of the 
differences between Stesichorus’ and Aeschylus’ treatments, see Swift (2015). 
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continuity of the line and the perpetuation of the revenge cycle, in the Libation Bearers it is 
associated with a crime which comes across as abhorrent and, therefore, discontinued. As 
Garvie argues, Aeschylus’ innovation lies in the fact that ‘he involved the personal decision 
and responsibility of each person who came under it (family curse)’.52 This is how the present 
future is put in a tragic light. 
4.3.2. Apollo’s oracle 
A second example for the concept of the present future in the Libation Bearers can be found in 
the case of Apollo’s oracle. The narrative of the oracle appears four times in the play, three 
times by Orestes (269–96, 557–59, 1029–33) and once by Pylades (900–2). As with 
Clytemnestra’s dream, the deployment of the narrative of Apollo’s oracle dramatises another 
example of a future planned, designed, and executed in the present.53 By contrast to the default 
perception of the oracular speech as deterministic, Apollo’s oracle as a both final and causal 
power towards the matricide.54 
In the first reference to the oracle in the Libation Bearers, Orestes communicates its 
content to Electra and the Chorus without however quoting it word for word (269–96). 
According to Orestes, ‘Loxias' great and powerful oracle’ which orders him ‘to go through 
this danger’ will not betray him (269–70). As he explains, Apollo ‘loud and often’ warned 
Orestes of many troubles in case of failing to kill the murderers of his father (271–74). The 
troubles of which Apollo warned Orestes involve the immediate danger of losing his life. 
What follows is a detailed description of the Furies’ function as avengers of the dead (278–90). 
What transforms the oracle from a prophetic device which determines the future to a 
demonstration of Orestes’ own present future is, first, the absence of the verbatim repetition of 
the divine speech as the authority and the guarantor of the oracle, and, second, Orestes’ 
doubting the validity of the oracle: ‘Are not such oracles to be trusted? | Even if I do not trust 
them, the deed has to be done’ (297–98). Despite, or perhaps, because of the shadow that these 
issues cast on the prophetic power of Apollo’s oracle, in the following lines, Orestes exposes 
 
52 Garvie (1986) xxv–vi and n. 52; Davies (1969) 260. 
53 On the issue of oracles and decision-making in antiquity, see Eidinow (2007) 11–24. 
54 The employment of the narrative of Apollo’s oracle is also discussed in the next Chapter (section under 5.3.1) in 
the context of foreshadowing techniques. 
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the reasons which add up to the oracle urging him to commit the murders: grief for his father, 
and the deprivation of both his property and his kingship in Argos (299–301). 
In the second reference to the oracle, Orestes addresses the Chorus in front of Electra 
and asks for their cooperation, deploying two strategically important claims: first, that Apollo 
ordered this double murder, and, second, that Apollo has never made an error in the past 
(557–59). This attitude is a strong manifestation that Orestes sees his future as present future, 
because he is fully aware that the successful completion of his plan requires the persuasion 
and synergy of the Chorus. Orestes’ future actions are heavily defined by his present and not 
by any already determined future that awaits him. 
The third reference to the oracle is made by Pylades, just before Orestes and himself 
force Clytemnestra inside the palace to commit the matricide. At the sight of his mother’s 
gestures of motherhood, Orestes seems to abandon the rhetoric of a deterministic future 
shaped by the oracle. It is at this particular point when Pylades reminds him of the 
presumably binding nature of the oracle, once again demonstrating how a prophetic oracle 
becomes part of a rhetorical strategy: ‘Then where's the future for Loxias' oracles, delivered | 
by the Pythia, and the pledges sworn on oath? Think of | all men as your enemies rather than 
the gods!’ (900–2). The fact that Orestes is having doubts about the matricide brings out clearly 
the fact that the matricide is a human plan rather than a divine order, and makes it necessary 
for Pylades to use the oracle as a tool for their plan to materialise.55 
The final reference to Apollo’s oracle in the Libation Bearers comes after the matricide 
(1029–33). In these lines, Orestes looks back at the point when the matricide was still a future 
and argues once again that it was god-driven. More specifically, Orestes explicitly attributes 
the matricide to Apollo on the grounds that this oracle determined Orestes’ future. According 
to Orestes, the oracle promised, on the one hand, that committing the matricide would leave 
him unpolluted, and on the other hand, that in the case of failure he would be punished. 
However, he also adds other reasons that led him to this deed: it was a just deed, because his 
mother is miasma and hated by the gods (‘it was not without justice | that I killed my mother, 
the pollution who killed my father | and an abomination to the gods’, 1027–29). 
 
55 This scene is also discussed in the following sections: 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 with regard to Apollo’s oracle and the oath 
(which Pylades is referring to) respectively as foreshadowing techniques; 5.4.1 with regard to Orestes’ hesitation as 
a nodal point; 6.4.3 for its suspenseful element; 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 for its surprising element. 
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What this final reference to the oracle suggests is that Orestes’ ability to shape the 
future through claims in the present continues until quite late in the play. It is only with the 
appearance of the Furies (whether or not they are visible to the spectators) after the matricide 
that this ability comes to an end. Whereas from the beginning of the play Orestes uses the 
oracle to move away from a future he cannot control, the arrival of the Furies marks a forceful 
transition from a present future to a future present reminiscent of Cassandra. 
In the lines 1010–76 (the end of the play), what Orestes experiences reveals a different 
attitude towards the future. Although Orestes claimed earlier that he had no option but to kill 
Clytemnestra, he now faces what it is to have no option, which is evidently demonstrated in 
the line 1062: ‘I'm being driven, I tell you; I can't stay here longer!’ (also 1050: ‘I can't stay here 
longer!’). This scene illustrates Orestes’ transition from his present future to an instant future 
present, unlike Clytemnestra’s in the Agamemnon. He reaches a moment of enlightenment 
seeing his own future clearly after the deed, while Clytemnestra’s such opportunity is 
overridden by Aegisthus’ appearance. As Taplin comments, Orestes now has ‘more foresight 
and more insight’.56 
Orestes, then, deploys the devices of the dream and the oracle and manipulates their 
narratives in order to build a causal association between them and his future actions, and 
mainly, the matricide. However, this future which Orestes presents as his own and which he 
claims to be determined by superhuman forces can be seen as a future in the making, a future 
being constructed by human actions and desires, as the play progresses. Whereas in the 
Agamemnon, the Watchman, Clytemnestra, Agamemnon, and Cassandra experience their 
future in the form of a future present, with the future invading into the present, in the Libation 
Bearers, Orestes, through Clytemnestra’s dream and Apollo’s oracle, implements his own telos 
as goal and Clytemnestra’s telos as an end. 
4.4. The present future and future present in the Eumenides 
In the Eumenides the discussion around telos and the two terms, present future and future 
present, involves a more systematic dialogue between the play and the contemporary 
 
56 Taplin (1977) 359. 
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discourse of philosophy of time. The play dramatises a ground-breaking change in the way in 
which people, both as individuals and collectively, will never look at the future again in the 
same way they did in the past. Concentrating on the scene of Orestes’ trial and its aftermath, 
I will explore this in relation to Orestes and the Furies, and in terms of how it encompasses 
the readers and the spectators. In doing so, I draw on modern discussions in philosophy of 
ancient and modern history and in literary criticism, where the matter of the future as seen 
and experienced both by agents and recipients of the narrative is central. 
4.4.1. A new present future 
The establishment of the Areopagus brings about the transition to a present future which is no 
longer ordained by the laws of revenge and the imposition of supernatural forces as seen in 
the previous two plays. In that sense, the idea of the present future as the future that is 
‘pictured, planned, projected, pursued, and performed in the present’57 does not repeat what 
we have seen in the Libation Bearers, but departs from it especially in the scene of the trial (470–
753). Specifically, two groups of lines demonstrate how the idea of the present future is 
dramatised in the plot: the first set refers to Athena’s announcement of the establishment of 
the Areopagus council (470–89), and the second set refers to the voting and to Orestes’ 
acquittal (681–753). From the establishment of the Areopagus to the announcement of Orestes’ 
acquittal, the future is seen as constructed out of several presents. 
The first expression of the present future in the Eumenides takes place when Athena 
announces the establishment of the Areopagus’ council (482–85).58 The first hearing of the case 
by Athena (397–469), following her appearance on stage, does not lead to a final decision, as 
requested by both parties (433, 468–69). The reason for that is that, whatever the outcome, one 
of the two parties would be outraged. As Athena explains, on the one hand, Orestes requests 
for his right as a suppliant to be listened to and exonerated (473–74), and on the other hand, 
the Furies’ ‘allotted role’ (μοῖραν, 476) demands fulfilment, otherwise an ‘intolerable 
 
57 Adam & Groves (2007) 32. 
58 On the prehistory and history of the Areopagus’ council, see Henrichs (1994). 
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everlasting sickness’ will fall over Athens (αἰανής νόσος, 479).59 Thus, Athena, under the fear 
of causing the downfall of the city, decides to bring about a pivotal change in how the decision 
of a murder charge or acquittal will be made. From now on, this responsibility is devolved to 
the council members of the Areopagus council. According to this newly founded system, the 
members of the council, made up by the best citizens of Athens (487), will act as judges 
(δικαστάς, 484). The process of judging a murder case will also include the examination of 
witnesses and evidence (μαρτύριά τε καὶ τεκμήρια, 485). As soon as Athena finds the citizens 
chosen to act as jurors (presumably they appear on stage in line 566),60 the council commences 
its workings with the completion of the voting process (674–75, 708–10). From now on, one’s 
future will hinge upon the judgement of the Areopagus council which constitutes a powerful 
demonstration of the present future marking a watershed in the making of Athenian history. 
The second manifestation of the present future in the Eumenides takes place in the trial 
scene itself, where Orestes and the Furies present their cases and perform their roles in order 
to prevail (566–751). What will define their future status is this exact performance during the 
trial, while their engagement with the past fades away. Both parties try to make a strong case 
for themselves. On the one hand Orestes, and especially, Apollo argue for the matricide as a 
result of Orestes’ revenge for the murder of his father. On the other hand, the Furies argue for 
their ancient privilege to punish the ones who commit interfamilial murder. In the case of 
Orestes, it is the first time that Apollo explicitly takes on responsibility for the matricide: ‘I am 
responsible | for the killing of his mother. You must bring | this case to trial and determine it 
with the best knowledge you have’ (579–81). The Furies expose their case through a 
stichomythia with Orestes and focus on the grounds the matricide was executed (585–608), 
while Orestes turns again to Apollo who seeks to create a new context for the debate. Apollo 
deploys a series of rhetorical strategies. First, he presents Zeus as the omnipotent one who 
ordered Clytemnestra’s murder (614–21, 644–51), second, he argues for the natural superiority 
of fatherhood (Agamemnon) against motherhood (Clytemnestra) using the two examples of 
 
59 This phrase also appears when the Furies revoke their curses after their agreement to act as the Awesome Ones: 
‘and may no persistent disease invade, destroying the crops’ (μηδ᾿ ἄκαρπος αἰα- | νὴς ἐφερπέτω νόσος, 942). 
The adjective αἰανής appears three more times in the Eumenides: ‘We are Night’s eternal children’ (Νυκτὸς αἰανῆ 
τέκνα, 416), ‘for all time’ (εἰς τὸν αἰανῆ χρόνον, 572), ‘to eternity’ (αἰανῶς, 672). 
60 On the number of the judges, see Sommerstein (2008) 425; Collard (2002) on 711–33, 735. 
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Athena and of himself (625–39, 657–66). Finally, at the end of his defence, Apollo draws 
everybody’s attention, including Athena’s, to the future both near and distant (667–73): 
Pallas, I shall make (τεύξω) your city and your | people great in other ways, as 
I know how, but above all I have | sent Orestes here as suppliant at your 
temple's hearth to | pledge loyalty for all time (εἰς τό πᾶν χρόνου), and for 
you to gain him, as your | ally, goddess, and those after him (τοὺς ἔπειτα); 
and in order that these | things should remain to eternity (αἰανῶς), for the 
Athenians' later | generations (τοὺς ἐπισπόρους) to honour the pledges 
sworn.61 
As seen in the quote above, Apollo’s instrumental shift of the focus from the past to the future 
is the direct result of the establishment of the Areopagus council, an unprecedented fact in the 
Athenian history. 
 In the final part of the trial scene, the voting of the judges and of Athena leads to 
Orestes’ acquittal. After Athena’s brief proclamation for the legitimacy and reliability of this 
legal institution in the future (681–708), the judges cast their votes into the urns (during the 
lines 711–33), followed by Athena who casts the final vote which is accompanied by her 
argument in support of Orestes (734–43). The future of Orestes and the Furies will soon 
materialise. While the votes are counted, both grasp the tension of the moment and wonder 
how their troubles will end (744–47):62 
ORESTES: Phoebus Apollo! How will the issue be decided? 
CHORUS: O Night, black mother! Are you seeing this? 
ORESTES: A noose is the end for me now, or to see the daylight! 
CHORUS: Yes, and for us it is extinction, or maintaining our prerogatives 
hereafter! 
 
61 On the use of adverbial phrases which point out to the extra-dramatic future, see under section 3.5. ‘Closure as 
possibility in the Eumenides’. 
62 On these lines as manifestations of nodal points, see section 5.4.1. 
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Apollo highlights the moment by urging the jurors to be attentive while counting, because 
‘[w]hen good judgement's | gone away, great harm happens; but if a single vote comes in, |  
it can set a house upright’ (749–51). The announcement of the outcome comes as a 
confirmation of how the advent of the future is shaped by the experience of the present: 
Orestes is acquitted because the counting finds the votes equal. 
As mentioned before, Koselleck’s future(s) past conceptualises a major change in the 
experience of historic time with the advent of modernity in the late eighteenth century.63 The 
term future(s) past demonstrates the tension between the past and the future and between 
experience and expectation respectively. Although before the advent of modernity the 
expectations were wholly defined by experiences which were spaced out, the acceleration of 
time in modernity leads to a disconnect between expectation and experience. What Koselleck 
argues for the advent of modernity with the French Revolution may be also applied to the 
moment of the Athenian history being dramatised in the Eumenides: ‘the previously existing 
space of experience is not sufficient for the determination of the horizon of expectation.’64 As 
in Koselleck, the introduction of the Areopagus court contracts the space of experience. 
Whereas in the past that space was determined by the law of revenge and occupied a long 
span of time (what we normally call the cycle of revenge) is now fused with the horizon of 
expectations which are and will be determined by the jurors’ idea and sense of justice. 
In this first part of the Eumenides, the future appears as wholly dependent on the 
present. The establishment of the Areopagus promises that it will obey the needs of the 
present, as the case of Orestes demonstrates. It is introduced as ‘a future by action’ in 
Kermode’s words.65 However, unlike the present future in the Libation Bearers, the framework 
of the dream and the oracle is replaced here by judgement of the best citizens and the goddess 
that protects the city. 
 
63 See section 3.5 above (‘Closure as possibility in the Eumenides’). 
64 Koselleck (2004) 263, 267. 
65 Kermode (1967) 88. 
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4.4.2. The telos as the end of the world 
The idea of present future as seen above is not the only outcome of the new judicial system 
which Athena institutes. The transition from the old to the new triggers the Furies’ reaction 
which is conceptualised with the word telos. Telos has been already examined as a lexical term 
which means ‘completion’, ‘payment’, ‘ritual’, and ‘duty’ (Chapter 2) and also as a lexical and 
narrative term meaning ‘ending’ (Chapter 3). Here, telos is employed as a concept with 
eschatological implications. I argue that the Furies experience the transition to the new 
through the certainty that the future will be catastrophic. Their experience of telos takes place 
in two phases: first, in the scene following the announcement of the institution of the 
Areopagus council (490–565), and, second, after Orestes’ acquittal which needs to be seen as 
an example of the present future (754–915). 
Just after Athena’s announcement of the new judicial institution, the Furies’ lyrical 
song interrupts and substitutes the experience of the present future as seen above with the idea 
of telos as the future which is identified with the end of the human world (490–565). Between 
present future (section 4.4.1 above) and future present (section 4.4.3 below), the Furies describe 
the existence of a future that threatens the survival of humanity. They start their song with 
the adverb ‘Now’ (νῦν) and a conditional of the real: ‘Catastrophe now is coming | from new 
ordinances, if a justice | which is harm to justice shall prevail | for this man here, the 
matricide’ (490–93). This catastrophe will also bring about a series of other disasters, expressed 
by the words ‘suffering’ (πάθεα, 497), ‘rancour’ (κότος, 501), ‘κακά’ (504), ‘torment’ (μόχθων, 
505), which are associated with parents being assailed by their children ‘in time hereafter’ 
(μεταῦθις ἐν χρόνῳ, 498). As a result of the disruption of justice, the Furies will ‘launch every 
death’ on mortals (πάντ᾿ ἐφήσω μόρον, 502) who will be looking for an escape in vain (503–
7). Employing future verbal forms and adverbial expressions, the Furies delineate a future 
aligned with the extinction of the human race. 
The vocabulary in the next strophic pair not only maintains but also intensifies the 
eschatological tone. The telos that the Furies recount is loaded with ‘disaster’ (ξυμφορᾷ, 509), 
‘lament’ (οἶκτον, 515) and ‘grief’ (στένει, 521). Following an interval of exhortations (526–42), 
the language revives the atmosphere of catastrophe: ‘total destruction’ (πανώλεθρος, 552), 
‘in violence’ (βιαίως, 555), ‘trouble’ (πόνος, 556), ‘in helpless torment’ (ἀμηχάνοις δύαις, 561–
Telos between future present and present future 
Page 104 of 269 
62). The final line of their lyric part eloquently describes the fortunes of humanity: ‘he dies 
unwept, unseen’ (ὤλετ᾿ ἄκλαυτος, ᾆστος, 565). Thus, while the transition from the system of 
retaliatory justice to the establishment of the Areopagus council is supposed to resolve the 
tension between past and future, the Furies see this change as a natural disaster happening 
now and lasting for all time to come. Their view of what is ahead is evidently illustrated with 
the line: ‘an end is appointed and waits’ (κύριον μένει τέλος, 544). In this sentence, the word 
τέλος means not only ongoing punishment without respite but also ultimate demise. 
After Orestes’ acquittal (752–53) and his celebratory speech (754–77), this sense of the 
telos as the world’s end is revived. Upon the announcement of the verdict, the Chorus bursts 
out with a lyric song consisting of two strophic pairs, where each strophe is repeated in the 
antistrophe (778–92=808–22, 837–46=870–80). The Furies, enraged by the outcome of the trial, 
present themselves to Athena as victims of the struggle between the ‘ancient laws’ which they 
represent (778, 808, 838, 871) and the ‘younger gods’ (778, 808). Their singing constitutes 
continuous lament, this time of their own future, which they experience as their telos. 
However, they do not refrain from their desire to cause the downfall of the city as well (780–
87=810–17): 
my heavy rancour | releases on this land—woe to it! — | a poison, a poison 
from my heart to requite my grief, | dripping from below the earth, intolerable. 
From this | a canker destroying leaves, destroying offspring—O Justice 
[Justice]! — | will sweep over and strike the land | with a blight killing men. 
In these lines above, the Furies argue that their grief will cause the end of Athens. In the lines 
which follow and in the second strophic pair, the Furies experience their telos intensely. The 
Furies experience their own telos as the failure to complete their role as avengers in ways 
reminiscent of how Cassandra experiences her telos as her own death. Their metaphorical 
death is rooted in the new laws that have been established by Athena and the voting of the 
judges (788–92=818–22, 837–46=870–80). They are so immersed in this experience that Athena 
will need to intervene four times for them to begin to think about an alternative (794–807, 824–
36, 848–69, 881–91). 
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In the two lyrical songs above, the idea of crisis, which is well embedded in the tragic 
narrative of the Eumenides as also seen in the previous chapter with regard to narrative 
closure,66 is experienced as the consequence of the battle between the old and the new, leading 
now to another consequence, the ultimate end of the world. This bears characteristics of the 
imagery of crisis as defined by Kermode in his analysis of the apocalyptic in fiction.67 
Kermode’s model of crisis consists of elements (‘elements of the apocalyptic pattern’), such as 
terror, decadence, and scepticism, all demonstrated in abundance in the Furies’ choral songs. 
In this sense, the Eumenides might be seen as constituting a fiction of the end not only as a fiction 
which dramatises the end of a world, but also in the sense that the End is ‘happening at every 
moment’,68 or as being always ‘immanent’.69 I will explore in the next section how crisis can be 
perpetual while also superseded. 
4.4.3. A new future present: the presence of the future 
The decision of the Areopagus court to acquit Orestes marks a turning point in the narrative 
when the future becomes the only temporal sphere that matters for Orestes, Athena, and the 
Furies. The idea of the future present that we have previously seen dramatised in the 
Agamemnon comes back with a difference. While the future present in the Agamemnon invades 
and transforms the present, the future present in the Eumenides gives access to a future which 
exists within a present meant to last forever, exceeding the boundaries of the tetralogy. If the 
future present in the Agamemnon can be interpreted as the presentness of the future, the future 
present in the Eumenides should be interpreted as the ongoing presence of the future. The 
difference between the presentness of the future and the presence of the future lies in the 
particular way the future engages with the present: the future through its presentness becomes 
a powerful but momentary experience which breaks into the present, while the future through 
its presence evolves into an experience which promises to be unbroken and unending. 
 
66 See section 3.5. above (‘Closure as possibility in the Eumenides’). 
67 See for example, Kermode (1967) 82–88 for his analysis of the apocalyptic mode in Shakespeare’s tragedies. See 
Michelakis (2013, 183–88) for an apocalyptic reading of the film version of Euripides’ Medea by Lars von Trier. 
68 Kermode (1967) 25. 
69 Kermode (1967) e.g., 25. 
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The first demonstration of the future present in the Eumenides takes place in Orestes’ 
speech.70 In lines 754–77, Orestes celebrates his acquittal as his right to return to Argos and 
imagines his fame being spread in the future among the Greeks (‘Among the Greeks they will 
be saying’, 756). As representative of the people of Argos (by contrast to the Libation Bearers it 
is not clear at this point it is not if he envisages this role as the role of the king), he declares 
the peace between Athens and Argos with an oath which will have effect ‘for the whole 
greatness of future time’ (763). This eternal validity of the oath will be secured by himself even 
after death, as the dead will act against the violators of the oath. This is presented by Orestes 
by a strong sense of finality (766–73): 
Though we shall | ourselves be in our tomb by then, we shall bar the road | 
with impossible disasters for those who transgress my oaths | sworn now; we 
shall bring despair and ill omens to their | passage, so that they repent of their 
effort; but if oaths are fully | kept and if they always honour this city of Pallas 
with their | army in alliance, we are to be more kind towards them. 
Orestes and the other dead will judge how the living respect his oath, and they will either 
inflict misfortunes, until the violators repent, or give blessings. While one might have 
expected for Orestes to experience his present future after his acquittal as the ultimate 
fulfilment of his role, this expectation is confounded. Orestes experiences his future as not 
something which is or will be materialised at the present, but as something which traverses the 
boundaries of the narrative, and of realism. Early signs of this future present have also made 
their appearance after Athena’s brief proclamation (681–708) on the legitimacy and reliability 
of this legal institution for the future: ‘For the future too this council of jurors | shall always 
exist for Aegeus' people’ (683–84). As the above suggests, the progression of narrative time 
becomes suspended and the future is no longer pursued but is looked upon as a period solid 
and unending. 
Another example of this type of future present is the blessings of the Furies which refer 
to the future of Athens under their authority as the Awesome Goddesses. As soon as they 
 
70 For the first part of Orestes’ speech (754–64) and Orestes’ oath, see sections 4.4.3. (‘A new future present: the 
presence of the future’) and 5.3.2. (‘Prayers and oaths’).  
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engage with Athena and her proposal, according to which they had to quit their role as 
avengers, their negotiations give way to an agreement (892–915). From now on the Furies will 
be the new, benevolent powers and protectors of the city of Athens. As such, their previous 
utterances promising the end of the world (778–93=808–23; 837–46=870–80) are also 
transformed into blessings for the city and its people (916–26, 938–49, 956–68, 976–88).71 These 
blessings mark the beginning of the final scene of the play (916–1047). More specifically, the 
Athenian land will be always protected from the wind, the heat, and plant diseases, while it 
will always (ἀεὶ, 946) enjoy fertility as well (938–49). The Athenian people will be blessed with 
longevity ‘at all times’ (παντὶ χρόνῳ, 965) and protected forever (μήποτ’, 977) from civil strife 
in a city where concord will prevail (956–68, 976–88). The abundance of future and optative 
verbal forms (916, 917, 922, 938, 943, 946, 948, 957, 960, 979, 984) alongside the atmosphere of 
a utopian world highlights this sense of the presence of the future as being always present. 
I will now focus on how the final scene of the Eumenides (916–1047) invites the readers 
and the spectators to engage with the idea of the future present as a crystallised temporal sphere 
which is always present.72 Its beginning is marked by the Furies’ announcement that they 
finally agree to integrate into the religious and political life of Athens as the Awesome 
Goddesses (‘I shall accept’, 916). Taking on their new role immediately, they offer the city of 
Athens their blessings which have eternal effect, as discussed in the previous paragraph (916–
26, 938–49, 956–68, 976–88). However, their celebratory songs are interrupted four times by 
Athena who also reminds of their permanent role as the Furies who punish the perpetrators 
(927–37, 949–55, 968–75, 998–95). This function will not be suspended in the future. The new 
Athenian deities can give not only ‘some cause for singing’ but also ‘a life with eyes dimmed 
by tears’ (953–55), as a reminder of what lies ahead can materialise at any minute. Their 
agreement is sealed through celebratory exchanges between them (996–1002, 1014–20) and 
Athena (1003–13), which also include all the Athenians. The new goddesses refer to the 
‘people of Athens’ (ἀστικὸς λεώς, 997), while Athena refers to them as ‘citizens’ (πολίταις, 
 
71 Konstantinidou (2014) 17. 
72 For a different discussion of this scene, see section 3.5 above. 
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1113) and to the Awesome Goddesses as ‘settlers’ (μετοίκοις, 1011).73 The blend of the future 
horizon with the present circumstances turns the future into a future present. 
Τhe idea of the future present concludes the play through the dramatisation of a 
procession (1032–47). Athena summons the servants of her temple to escort the Awesome 
Goddesses to their new home. Despite a textual gap of a couple of lines, it is most probable 
that, during the procession, the new goddesses are dressed up with celebratory, ‘red-dyed 
clothing’ (1028).74 From now on, the new Athenian goddesses will incarnate both the Furies 
and the Eumenides, as what changes is their status of the Furies and not their identity.75 
Members of the Athenian society also participate in the procession. The secondary chorus, the 
women of the temple-servants, address them as ‘countrymen’ (1035) and as ‘all people’ (1038) 
and invite them twice to participate: ‘Cry out your joy now, in song!’ (1043, 1047). The call 
‘Cry out your joy now, in song!’ is the final line of the play and awaits for a response every 
time the play is watched or read. Although Athena promises that this is a condition that will 
last for all future time (‘for all time’, διὰ παντός 975; ‘always’, αἰεὶ 992; ‘in future’, τὸ λοιπὸν 
1031), the resolution which is offered is provisional, as it ‘must be fought for again and again 
in the theatre and in the society that produces it.’76 What they all celebrate is that past crimes 
will no longer determine the future, not only the future of the Atreides, as the acquittal of 
Orestes demonstrates, but also the future of everyone engaging with the play. The future 
present as seen at the end of the Eumenides is this co-existence of an endless future and 
recurring encounters with crises accompanied by the concurrent need for decision-making. 
The matter of the intertemporality in the final scene of the Eumenides has been 
discussed in detail by Martin Revermann and Charles Chiasson in the contexts of ritual and 
aetiology, and of mythologisation respectively.77 As it will be demonstrated below, although 
 
73 Collard (2002, on 1010) notes that the use of μετοίκοις for the Furies bear both similarities and differences with 
metics in classical Athens: like metics, the Furies will be sharing house and home, unlike metics they will acquire 
‘permanent home’ and ‘permanent and special tokens of worship’. Like metics, the Furies will have a sponsor, 
Athena. Unlike metics, they do not need a citizen sponsor, as Athena acts as a sponsor, ‘before she urges the citizens 
jurors to accept them’. 
74 Easterling (1988) 99 and n. 31; Taplin (1977) 412–13. Wilson & Taplin (1993) 180 n. 45: ‘The fact that the robes 
must have been on over their dark outfits makes of their action a ‘(re)costuming and not a ‘reidentification’. See 
also Macleod (1975) on the clothing in the Oresteia. 
75 Bacon (2001) 58–59. See also previous note. 
76 Rehm (1992) 105. 
77 Grethlein (2013b) has used the term ‘intertemporality’ for the temporal dynamics in the choral songs of the 
Oresteia. See section 5.3.1. below (‘Omens, prophecies, oracles’).  
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these discussions are useful in our understanding of how the ending of the Eumenides becomes 
relevant to the reader and the viewer, I suggest that they point in the direction of a 
timelessness which does not do justice to the ongoing nature of crisis and decision-making 
that the end of the play keeps open. 
Revermann, drawing on Bakhtin’s theory on chronotopes, points out that the temporal 
(and spatial) dynamics of the play invite the readers and the spectators to briefly dissociate 
from the presented world.78 These dynamics are manifested through two aetiologies, the 
establishment of the Areopagus council and the worship of the Eumenides.79 Their narratives 
as aetiologies involve the conflation of the present, the one dramatised on stage by the 
characters, with the past, the one experienced in real life by the audience.80 The aetiological 
narratives of the Eumenides shift the focus to the future, as they can be read as compact and 
complete and not confined to what becomes in Euripides a closural device.81 As Revermann 
points out, ‘the notion of ritually suspended time, ...is iterative, cyclical, and emphatically 
‘ever-present’’.82 That ever-presence in my analysis has to do not only with aetiology, but also 
with an ongoing oscillation between aetiology and judgement. 
Chiasson argues that the Athenians are mythologised by Athena in the final scene of 
the Eumenides. In doing so, he introduces a parallelism between the Athenians and the heroic 
age of Hesiod. Chiasson also employs the term ‘apocalyptic’, noting that ‘Aeschylus' 
apocalyptic Athens serves as a local rebuttal to Hesiod's pan-Hellenic myth of increasing 
human alienation from the divine over time’.83 In Hesiod’ Works and Days the heroic age is 
presented outside the limits of the human world, away from human concerns such as the fear 
 
78 Revermann (2008). He acknowledges the Eumenides as ‘an excellent point of departure’ to discuss poetics of time 
(and space) (239). 
79 On the Areopagus council, see Wallace (1989). On the associations of the Oresteia with the political situation of 
458 BC, see Hall (2015) 255–56, Fletcher (2011) 67–69. On bibliography on the ending of the Eumenides with regard 
to the connection between the Furies and the Σεμναί Θεαί, see Konstantinidou (2014) 17 n. 42. 
80 Although scholars do not agree about their existence in the religious life of Athens or it is Aeschylus’ innovation. 
See previous note. For example, Mikalson (1991, 214–17) argues that the aetiology of the Eumenides as Athenian 
goddesses does not reflect the current state, but it is something completely new. 
81 Revermann (2008) 253. Wilson & Taplin note that ‘this ‘aetiology’ opens a perspective beyond the end of the 
drama, and beyond the confines of the orchestra, to the future of tragedy itself’ (1993, 177). On bibliography about 
aetiology and tragedy, see Romano (2012) 128 n. 5. 
82 Revermann (2008) 249. 
83 Chiasson (1999–2000) 139. On the matter of the address to the Athenian audience, see Chiasson (1999–2000) 146 
and n. 19. 
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of death. Chiasson argues that, although the Athenians will benefit from an eternal prosperity 
which is reminiscent of this heroic age, the mythologisation in the Eumenides eliminates the 
temporal distance between the world of the audience and the world of the play.84 Although 
the absence of the flow of real time reinforces the similarities between the closing scene and a 
utopian fantasy where the sense of fulfilment is always deferred to the future, Chiasson 
suggests that in the closing scene the humans and the gods collaborate and look at a common 
future, even if the prosperity is conditional on the reverence of the Athenians towards the 
gods. This is similar to what Konstantinidou sees as the necessary balance between the new 
legal establishment and the need for religiousness,85 as it is assumed that the Awesome 
Goddesses will have a parallel role with the human council. Once again, while I agree that 
conditionality is an important feature of the end of the Eumenides, in my analysis that 
conditionality is defined not by the performativity of ritual, but by the need to allow for crisis 
and decision-making. 
The above brings us back to Kermode’s idea of the apocalyptic in fiction and its 
embedded idea of renovation.86 For Kermode, a period of decadence is followed by a period 
of renovation. In the Eumenides, this period is identified by the establishment of the Areopagus 
council which brings about a major change from the practice of retaliation to the constitution 
of a judicial system. As I argued above, this marks the beginning of a new world.87 However, 
this new beginning does not cancel the fear of the end of the world which was fuelled by the 
Furies in their two choral songs (490–565, 754–915). Although their transformation into the 
Awesome Goddesses saves the world from catastrophe, this is only temporary, as Athena 
takes over the role of the one who warns for the future (926–37, 949–55, 968–75, 988–95). Thus, 
the apocalyptic mode of thought is not fulfilled through the end of the world itself. The 
apocalyptic way of thinking in the Eumenides revolves not only around the end but also 
around ways of averting it. As Kermode notes: ‘For to make sense of our lives from where we 
are, as it were, stranded in the middle, we need fictions of beginnings and fictions of ends, 
 
84 Chiasson (1999–2000) 149. Chiasson illustrates the Panathenaic procession of the Parthenon’s frieze as parallel of 
the closing scene of the Eumenides in the sense that in both the citizens of Athens outlived their physical death (157–
59). On the connection between the procession in the play and Panathenaea, see also Easterling (1988) 99 and n. 31. 
85 Konstantinidou (2014) 18–19. 
86 Kermode (1967) e.g., 9, 189. 
87 Kermode (1967, 5–6) juxtaposes the Odyssey and the Aeneid, with only the latter to follow the apocalyptic model. 
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fictions which unite beginning and end and endow the interval between them with 
meaning.’88 
The preoccupations of the final scene of the Eumenides (916–1047) with the extra-
dramatic time highlight the idea of the presentness of the future and redefine the tension 
between the concepts of expectation and experience.89 As the secondary chorus ask from the 
participants and the attendants of the procession to sing along, the closing lines of the play 
call for the participation of individuals who are situated both inside and outside the dramatic 
space and time. As we discussed above, the establishment of the Areopagus council as the 
advent of modernity is lived as a new present future where the fulfilment of expectations is 
realised instantaneously.90 In this new world, the past is no longer a burden, and the future 
becomes a fast-changing environment where people will have to adapt themselves more 
quickly. This temporal acceleration shows how the future does not derive exclusively from 
past experience. Expectations can take the shape of hope, fear, wishes, desires, and whatever 
else the future might bring.91 At the end of the play this temporal acceleration that we find in 
the rest of the narrative is suspended. What takes overs suggests that the future is imagined 
as imminent. This future present is identified with the telos ‘as an immovable limit to the 
horizon of expectation’.92 If this is a characteristic that Koselleck associates with the pre-
modern period, the final scene of the Eumenides takes us a step further: the future is not 
presented as always unreachable and detached from the idea of experience. One is offered the 
opportunity to observe how the expectation of the future is identified and conflated with the 
experience of the future, and the future is dramatised through its presence. 
Drawing on how Grethlein employs future past in historiography, I argue that the 
concept of future present, apart from conveying a tension between present and future within a 
narrative, also outlines the temporal dynamics between the characters and those who engage 
with this narrative. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, Grethlein defines the 
concept of future past as the endpoint (telos) from which the historian or the reader looks at the 
 
88 Kermode (1967) 190. 
89 For more on those preoccupations which take over the whole narrative, see section 3.5 (especially, p. 66). 
90 In Koselleck’s argument, the sphere of the fulfilment of the future shifts from the Hereafter before modernity to 
the real world after modernity (2004, 265). 
91 For an extended discussion, see Koselleck (2004) 255–75. 
92 Koselleck (2004) 264. 
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past events, and the subsequent temporal asymmetry which lies between the characters and 
the historian or the readers of the historical narrative.93 This temporal asymmetry puts the 
historian or the reader in a position which is privileged by hindsight. According to Grethlein, 
this hindsight we gain from future past ‘lets us replace the fragility of our lives with 
sovereignty.’94 In tragic narrative, the terms future present and present future do not 
conceptualise a similar temporal asymmetry between the tragic characters and their observers 
which would leave their observers with a sense of a hindsight. What these terms conceptualise 
is a complex, plot-generated temporal experience which is lived by both those inside and 
outside the tragic narrative. By contrast to historiography, tragedy does not equip any of the 
parties involved with a hindsight that would offer a similar type of ‘sovereignty’. In the 
Agamemnon and the Libation Bearers, the hindsight, originated either in foreshadowing devices 
(characters, spectators and readers) or prior knowledge (spectators and readers), does not 
prevent them from the agonising encounter with the future. In the Eumenides, this encounter 
grows into an ongoing process, and is transferred to those who can grasp extra-dramatic time, 
when crisis and decision-making are at the centre of human activity. 
What happens in the Eumenides can be seen by analogy to the tension between the 
readers, the character, and the narrator in the Aeneid that Duncan Kennedy studies.95 Kennedy 
argues that, unlike other fictional worlds such as the Odyssey or Oedipus the King, where the 
reader or the spectator subscribes to the temporal worldview of the plot from the outside, the 
narrative of the Aeneid has Jupiter prophesying historical events of the Augustan era that 
implicate the reader in more direct way. These events are future for Aeneas who looks 
forward to them, but past for the Virgilian narrator and his readers who look back on them.96 
One can find similar characteristics in the Eumenides. By contrast to the plots of the Agamemnon 
and the Libation Bearers which are based on myth, the Eumenides dramatises historical events, 
such as the alliance between Athens and Argos and the establishment of the Areopagus 
 
93 See section 4.1 above. 
94 Grethlein (2013a) 6. 
95 Kennedy (2013) 95: ‘It is the explicit representation in the person of Jupiter within the narrative of the view 
forwards of the future from the narrative’s present as known, its end and its significance already determined, that 
has made the Aeneid the paradigm of teleological narrative.’ 
96 Kennedy (2013) 94. 
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court,97 which are prophesied by Orestes and Athena. Like Virgil’s Jupiter, Athena and Orestes 
declare an endless future,98 combined with the idea that the present is transient.99 However, 
although the Aeneid employs ‘the representation within the narrative of an embodied 
providential perspective’,100 the Eumenides employs the representation within the narrative of 
an embodied perspective which has to do with judgment and consensus building. 
The ideas of progress, change, decision-making, and crisis, which define how the 
Eumenides ends, are also central for the end of Aristophanes’ Frogs, the comedy of 405 BCE, 
whose final ten lines (1524–33) re-enact the final fifteen lines of the Eumenides (1033–47) in both 
visual and verbal terms.101 The comedy, often seen as a ‘foundational work of literary and 
cultural tradition’102 which performs a ‘historical awareness of literary change’,103 quotes 
almost verbatim Athena’s optimistic remarks about the future of the city at the end of the 
Eumenides (1012–13 of the Eumenides in 1530 of the Frogs). First, both plays dramatise a 
judgement and its aftermath. Second, in both plays, the resolution is provided at the very end 
and has implications that extend beyond the play and into the world of its audience and 
readers. Finally, both narratives reinstate the past, which in the Eumenides is incarnated by the 
Furies as Awesome Goddesses, and in the Frogs by Aeschylus, resurrected from the dead, as 
the future saviour of Athens. A closer reading of the two scenes goes beyond the scope of this 
discussion, but, to put it simply, both endings deal with the aftermath of a κρίσις (judgment) 
and the question of how it will not turn into an going crisis (catastrophe). 
Although Garvie notes that ‘[t]he Eumenides is perhaps the most difficult to relate to 
modern concerns’,104 I have argued that the play should be related to modern 
conceptualisations of time such as future present and present future precisely, because it 
dramatises periods of transition and crisis, in the context of dealing with the future and its 
 
97 Another historical event is possibly the establishment of the cult of the Eumenides. 
98 For the Aeneid (1, 278–9), see for example: ‘To these I give no bounded times or power, | but empire without end 
(‘sine fine)’. For a comparison between finis in the Aeneid and τέλος in the Libation Bearers, see section 3.4. 
99 Kennedy (2013) 96. 
100 Kennedy (2013) 96. 
101 Wilson & Taplin (1993, 180 n. 40) note: ‘a visual and verbal ‘re-play’ of the end of the Eumenides.’ On the textual 
similarities, difference, and more details, see Bassi (2016b) 173–74 and n. 105–7; Sells (2012) 91–93. 
102 Bassi (2016b) 145 and n. 5. 
103 Kennedy (1989) ix. Chiasson (1999–2000, 158 and n. 55) citing Dover (1997, 15–16) argues that the audience of 
the Frogs was equally familiar with Aeschylus’ plays as with Euripides’ plays. 
104 Garvie (2014) 35. 
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uncertainty. Shifting from a progressive future radically different from the past, to the future 
as the end of the world, and, finally, to the future as solidified and always present at the end 
of the play, the Eumenides revisits and dramatises elusive concepts such as crisis, change, and 
progress, and implicates anyone who reads and watches in thinking through them. 
4.5. Proteus between present future and future present 
Arguably Proteus revisits the experience of present future and future present in a way that 
concludes the tetralogy in a comforting way, following previous encounters with the 
uncertainty of time. One can assume that, in a play which, most likely, dramatises a shipwreck 
and the troubles of its crew, the relation between the present and the future can best be 
understood through the concept of present future. Events such the perilous voyage of Menelaus 
and his companions (who end up adrift in Egypt, far from mainland Greece), and the 
castaways’ arrival in an unknown shore, point in the direction of a future which revolves 
around a day-by-day existence. If the story follows the Odyssey, Menelaus and his companions 
have to capture Proteus and find a way to put an end to his transformations, a scene which 
would be an eloquent example of the present future, as it is based on unpredictability and 
contingency. 
If Proteus is forced to prophesy Menelaus’ future, features of the present future may 
quickly give way to control and necessity which are more typically associated with the future 
present. It is quite likely that Proteus (and perhaps his daughter’s Eido), prophesies Menelaus’ 
return to Argos. While in the Eumenides Orestes’ return to Argos is embedded in the narrative 
only as a promise, in Proteus Menelaus’ return must be much more central to the plot. Thus, 
Menelaus’ experience of his future present works as a counterbalance and conclusion of his 
previous experience of the present future, which makes him the only character in the tetralogy 
whose transition from present future to future present is successfully completed. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Coo argues that the celebratory ending of the 
play must be seen in the context of the temporal relation between Proteus and the tragic plays 
as ‘the desire for (aspects of) an idealised past’.105 Coo draws on a model of nostalgia according 
 
105 Coo (2019) 2. 
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to which Menelaus’ present in Proteus needs to be seen as a happy past that predates the 
Agamemnon, contrasted to the gloomy future that Menelaus has on his return to mainland 
Greece.106 This reading suggests a cyclical understanding of time, according to which the 
characters’ future is something that lies outside the plot and, therefore, needs to be searched 
outside the plot. I would argue that this approach needs to be complemented by addressing 
the question of what configurations of time might be dramatised within Proteus. 
Within Proteus, the combination of present future and future present, and, arguably, the 
transition from one to the other, shows how Menelaus, like the other characters of the play, 
imagines and experiences his future at the present of the dramatic action. While in the 
Eumenides, the transition from the present future to the future present transforms the idea of 
catastrophe as certainty to catastrophe as potentiality, in the case of Proteus this transition 
transforms catastrophe as a lived reality to something that can be left behind. 
4.6. Conclusion 
In addition to the semantic variations of the word telos discussed in the Chapters 2 and 3, the 
idea of telos can be also associated with the different types of temporal experiences 
conceptualised through the terms present future and future present. As critical stances towards 
the future, these concepts interact with one another across the four plays. In the Agamemnon 
the future of the characters breaks forcefully into the present (future present). In the Libation 
Bearers it is a reverse process that takes place, with the present of the characters being the one 
that breaks into their future (present future), while the end of the play brings in another future 
present as a reminder of their synergy. In the Eumenides the focus shifts to the present future as 
the present which determines the future not as a disruption (as in the Libation Bearers), but as 
a new order. The Eumenides engages with the mode of the future present as a new order that 
has to co-exist with the possibility of crisis. Placing Proteus at the end of the tetralogy makes 
possible to return to the ideas of future present and present future in a way that facilitates the 
readers’ and the spectators’ engagement with the idea of a future which is contained within 
the world of myth, and can, therefore, be brought under control. 
 
106 See Coo (2019) 13–18. 
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5 
5. Foreshadowing and Sideshadowing: 
between open and closed futures 
5.1. Introduction 
Τhe terms open and closed convey the different levels of accessibility which one can develop in 
relation to the future as a sphere of human activity.1 In this chapter, ‘open future’ and ‘closed 
future’ are used as guidelines for grasping the future which is created within the dramatic 
narrative. In order to shed light into the different ways in which the openness and closedness 
of the future manifest themselves while being experienced by the readers and the spectators 
through Ricoeur’s Mimesis 3, I employ the concepts of foreshadowing and sideshadowing.  
Although the use of foreshadowing in archaic and classic Greek narrative has been widely 
acknowledged since antiquity (see further section 5.2 below), sideshadowing is a recent term in 
the history of literary criticism. The technique of foreshadowing offers a glimpse of the future 
before it happens, while the technique of sideshadowing highlights that the future ahead is only 
one of several other possibilities. These two concepts are instrumental for bridging any gaps 
created between the conceptualisation of openness and closedness of the future and their 
narrativisation in the Oresteia. By employing foreshadowing and sideshadowing in my 
discussion, I focus on what it is to be for a reader or a spectator to follow a story and 
contemplate the future which is either brought to the fore prematurely (foreshadowing) or 
 
1 Segal (2007). 
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arrives from the sideways (sideshadowing). In what follows, I discuss omens, prophecies, 
oracles, oaths, dreams, and prayers as foreshadowing techniques. I also discuss nodal points, 
unexposed backstories, and statements of alternative futures as sideshadowing techniques. I 
argue that such techniques help us map the diverse ways in which the dramatic narrative 
invites us to engage with the ideas of the open future and closed future. Whereas in Chapters 
3 and 4 I used the terms ‘open’ and ‘closed’ in the context of the literary phenomenon of 
closure and discussions of the philosophy of time respectively, in this Chapter I subject the 
same terms to a closer analysis with the help of foreshadowing and sideshadowing. My main 
argument is that foreshadowing and sideshadowing in the Oresteia operate not as secure guides 
for a distinction between closed future and open future respectively, but as indicators of their 
interchangeable employment within the dramatic narrative. This invites us to witness how 
foreshadowing and sideshadowing become disengaged from their traditional counterparts, the 
closed and open future (and related terms such as accessibility and predictability, and 
inaccessibility and unpredictability of the future), and reassemble with those counterparts in 
unexpected ways. 
5.2. Theoretical prelude 
The term foreshadowing has not been developed systematically as a critical term, but it is 
commonly used to describe a regular and generic literary effect.2 Expressions such as ‘the 
shadow thrown before (an object)’ and ‘the imperfect representation of something to come’3 
show clearly how foreshadowing takes place in narrative. By casting a ‘shadow’ of the future 
onto the present, the future is foretold only partially and indirectly. Foreshadowing is one of 
the effects of the broader phenomenon that Genette identifies as prolepsis: ‘any narrative 
manoeuvre that consists of narrating or evoking in advance an event that will take place later’.4 
In this chapter, I use the term foreshadowing drawing on Gary Saul Morson who uses it as a 
narrative technique for future events that cast a shadow over the unfolding of the action. In 
 
2 For examples, see Morson (1994) 54–55. 
3 OED s. v. foreshadow (v). 
4 Genette (1980) 40. For the relation between prolepsis and anticipation, see Liveley (2017). On anticipation and 
suspense, see Chapter 6 ‘Suspense’. 
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this sense, the future is represented as inevitable, and, thus, closed.5 However, as my analysis 
will show, foreshadowing techniques can also point towards an open future. 
The concept of sideshadowing was developed in the early 1990s by the literary theorists 
Michael André Bernstein and Gary Saul Morson, by analogy with the concept of 
foreshadowing.6 Morson employs sideshadowing in fictional narrative and, more specifically, 
in the Russian novel,7 while Bernstein discusses sideshadowing in relation to historical 
narrative. While in foreshadowing a shadow of the future is cast upon the present, in 
sideshadowing, as Bernstein and Morson argue, a shadow from the side is cast upon the present. 
This ‘side’ refers to a future which is considered open, in the sense that it involves alternative 
paths to the one actualised.8 Because sideshadowing embraces more than one path, it challenges 
the concept of inevitability. Considering not only which path becomes actualised, but also 
which one is rejected, sideshadowing enhances our understanding of the future as consisting of 
multiple possibilities. As Morson suggests, the unactualised possibilities define the quality of 
the actualised ones.9 
Although the terms foreshadowing and sideshadowing are interrelated, their history in 
classical studies is dissimilar. The earliest known evidence of acknowledging the employment 
of advance references and hints at future events as a narrative technique can be found in the 
ancient scholia of epic poetry.10 This technique is conceptualised by the scholiasts mainly with 
the Greek terms prooikonomia (πρoοικονομία), proanaphonesis (προαναφώνησις), and 
proekthesis (προέκθεσις), and can be associated with the modern terms of narrative prolepsis 
 
5 Morson (1994) 8, (1998) 600. For a critique on Morson’s idea of foreshadowing, see Kennedy (2013) 89–102. 
6 Morson (1994) 6 n. 4; Bernstein (1994). 
7 Morson (1994, 120) considers Fyod or Dostoevsky ‘a master of sideshadowing’. Morson (1994, 120, 148) provides 
extracts from Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina and War and Peace and Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment, The Idiot and The 
Possessed. See also Morson (1994, 148–50) on sideshadowing beyond the Russian novel. On the application of 
sideshadowing in education studies, see Reilly (2009), and in film studies, Skoller (2005). 
8 Morson (1998) 602. 
9 Morson (1994) 119–20. 
10 In the Greek scholia as προλαμβάνειν. On prolepsis in ancient scholia, see Liveley (2019) 88–89, 103–5, (2017) 8; 
Grethlein (2017) 114; Nünlist (2009) 35 and n. 40; Meijering (1987) 209. For an overview of the scholia in Aeschylus 
(with bibliography), see Dickey (2007) 35–38; on the standard edition of the scholia in five plays of Aeschylus, see 
Smith (1982) and (1976). 
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and foreshadowing.11 Although these terms are used by the ancient scholiasts varyingly,12 they 
all adhere to the rules of oikonomia, the author’s technique of managing and arranging the 
available material.13 More specifically, oikonomia in dramatic poetry points to the playwright’s 
application of narrative techniques for achieving the maximum aesthetic effect, while also 
observing the rules of unfolding the plot in a coherent manner.14  
The aspect of oikonomia which matters the most for the concept of foreshadowing is, as 
already mentioned, pro-oikonomia. The technique of prooikonomia refers to the writer’s 
aspiration of arranging the material and presenting the events of the plot ahead and in advance 
- as the prefix pro- implies, for the sake not only of enhancing the causality of the plot, but also 
of generating curiosity for what is coming next.15 The emphasis on the chronological priority 
of prooikonomia is central to discussions of foreshadowing, suspense, and surprise. As the scholia 
suggest, prooikonomia expresses the meaning of preparation for what is to come, while 
proanaphonesis refers to explicit hints to the future of the plot and to how these hints affect the 
reader. This observation makes the discussion of proanaphonesis useful also for the discussion 
of suspense in Chapter 6.16 
Most of the ancient scholia on the terms above relate to the Iliad and the Odyssey,17 
rather than to tragedy. The relevant comments on tragedy are very limited: although they 
provide some background, they do not offer any detailed insights into foreshadowing as a 
literary technique in Aeschylus. 
 
11 Other relevant terms that have survived: prokataskeue (προκατασκευή, προκατασκευάζειν), proparaskeue 
(προπαρασκευή, προπαρασκευάζειν), protherapeia (προθεραπεία, προθεραπεύειν). See Meijering (1987) 202. 
12 Of the terms mentioned above, prooikonomia has the weakest connection to prolepsis and foreshadowing and 
proanaphonesis the strongest. See Nünlist (2009) 35. 
13 The term oikonomia is also found in Aristotle who uses it, albeit without much clarity, as a significant requirement 
which Euripides fails to meet (oikonomein 1453a22). On the concept and meanings of oikonomia, see Nünlist (2009) 
24–27 with accompanying notes. See also Meijering (1987) 135. 
14 For the link between oikonomia and plausibility, see Nünlist (2009) 28 and n. 17. 
15 On the aspect of oikonomia as the postponement of the climax of the plot in the ancient scholia, see Chapter 6 
below, especially sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.3. 
16 For an example of how oikonomia is related to suspense, see section 6.2 below. 
17 The scholia on the Iliad also attest to the employment of external prolepsis (Schol. bT Il. 21.376 ex.), in which the 
promise for future fulfilment lies outside the temporal boundaries of the text. See Nünlist (2009) 41. This type of 
prolepsis shares some characteristics with the modern idea of sideshadowing. Although an external prolepsis may still 
include details about a future to come, such a future retains its character as only pending and possible when narrative 
concludes. See further in section 5.4 (‘Sideshadowing’) below. 
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In an article written as early as 1931, George Duckworth demonstrated how 
proanaphonesis and related terms are used in epic scholia, and he discussed these terms with 
the help of the modern term foreshadowing. The main argument of the article was that 
foreshadowing prepares the Homeric audiences for what follows in such a way that it reduces 
their experience of uncertainty, fear, and agony.18 By contrast to the effect that foreshadowing is 
supposed to achieve in the Iliad and the Odyssey according to Duckworth, I will show below 
that the effect of foreshadowing in the Oresteia rests on the following two conditions: the 
development of the reader’s and the spectator’s knowledge which, however, prepares only 
for a future which is going to be uncertain, full of surprises, and indefinitely unspecified (see 
further section 5.3 below). 
What one can learn about foreshadowing from the tragic scholia comes primarily from 
Euripides’ Electra and Sophocles’ Ajax. Here, the views displayed on the effect of foreshadowing 
point in rather different directions. Take, for instance, the employment of the foreshadowing 
technique at the prologue of the play, where Euripides ‘foreshadows the future’.19 This 
comment constitutes a criticism against Euripides’ employment of foreshadowing technique at 
this part of the play: the nurse unveils too much and prematurely through her uncertainty 
about how Medea will cope with her anger and sadness.20 By contrast, the scholia give credit 
to Sophocles for foreshadowing or prolepsis of the kind that does not spoil the story ‘by 
anticipating the future’ but makes the spectator attentive, ‘because he is curious to learn how 
the fearful will come’.21 The above offer a general idea of how ancient critics of drama may 
have evaluated employments of foreshadowing both as a device of efficient oikonomia and as a 
rhetorical device utilised to affect the audience. The issue of how ancient criticism approaches 
suspenseful narratives will be further pursued in Chapter 6 in relation to suspense.22  
 
18 Duckworth (1931) 330. 
19 Euripides’ Medea schol.: προλέγειν τα μέλλοντα/ τα μέλλοντα ἀναφωνεῑ. See Meijering (1987) 207. 
20 See Nünlist (2009) 142. See also Meijering (1987) 207–8, for an additional example from Euripides’ Hecuba where 
the scholiast refers to Euripides’ tendency to offer not just hints but clarity about the upcoming events. 
21 Sophocles’ Ajax schol. 389c: ‘prolepses’ for προφωνήσεις, ‘by anticipating the future’ for προλαμβάνουσαι τό 
μέλλον. On the ancient scholia and the effect of suspense, see section 6.2 below. 
22 Especially in section 6.2 ‘Theoretical prelude’. 
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While foreshadowing is a term with a long history that goes back to the beginning of the 
20th century,23 sideshadowing was adopted in classical scholarship much more recently, 
following its coining in 1994.24 As far as the study of Greek drama is concerned, while 
foreshadowing has been used extensively (even if not systematically), there has been reluctance 
to use the term sideshadowing. This is probably a symptom of a more general tendency, 
discussed in Chapter 3, to read Greek tragedy teleologically. 
A recent exception to this tendency is Duncan Kennedy’s analysis of Sophocles’ 
Oedipus the King which indicates that both open future and closed future can be at play.25 
Unlike the certainty with which many scholars argue that the prophecy foreshadows the 
future in a deterministic way that rules out free will,26 Kennedy argues that a series of 
‘unresolved discrepancies’27 in the plot do not necessarily point to the ‘grand affirmation of 
the prophecy’.28 What Kennedy sees in Oedipus is an individual who, first, believes that he is 
free to determine his future, but, then, entangled by the narrative, he succumbs to the idea 
that the world is deterministic. Such a combination of free will and determinism as constituent 
elements of the narrative creates infinite possibilities of readings and interpretations. 
5.3.  Foreshadowing 
It is often acknowledged that the Oresteia ‘is filled with the portentous’.29 The technique of 
foreshadowing relies on the ‘surplus of knowledge’30 which is usually possessed by the gods 
and goddesses. In other words ‘[d]ivination presupposes the pervasive contrast between 
divine epistemic superiority (often, omniscience) and mortal epistemic limitation.’ 31 The gods 
 
23 See for example, Murgatroyd (2001) on Apuleius; Moskalew (1983) on Vergil; Davies (1989a) on myth; Stanley 
(1965) on Vergil; Beaty (1960) on Silius Italicus; Duckworth (1934) on Homer, Vergil and Apollonius; Stuart (1918) 
on Euripides. See also Morrison (1991) 146 and n. 2 with further bibliography. 
24 Liveley (2017, 15–16) on Livy, (2008) on Ovid; Grethlein (2013a) 14, (2010) 242, 248–52, (2009) & Hau (2013) on 
Greek historiography; Pagán (2006) on Latin historiography; Cowan (2008) on Silius Italicus. 
25 Kennedy (2013) 84–118, more specifically 100–17, citing Peradotto (1992) and Goodhart (1978). 
26 One example is Morson (1994) 58–61. 
27 Kennedy (2013) 109. 
28 Kennedy (2013) 107. 
29 Quote by Roberts (1985) 283 and n. 1. See also, Goward (1999) 55–56. 
30 Bakhtin (1981), cited and discussed by Morson (1994, 44) and Kennedy (2013, 86, 94). See section 1.2. 
31 Tor (2017) 108. 
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and the goddesses decide to share this knowledge with the human characters through omens, 
prophecies, and oracles. Other ways of sharing knowledge involve prayers, oaths, and dreams 
where the divine approval or disapproval frames the characters’ hopes and desires. Although 
Aeschylus’ theology is a much discussed topic in the Classical studies,32 its explorations have 
been rather restricted both in methodology and themes.33 What follows explores how the 
narrative employs the idea of the divine intervention through the foreshadowing technique, but 
also how foreshadowing can be understood in a context that goes beyond the idea of closed 
future and divine providence. 
5.3.1. Omens, prophecies, oracles 
In this section I focus on examples of prophetic and oracular discourse.34 First, I will discuss 
the omen which takes place in the parodos of the Agamemnon (104–259). Then, I will move to 
Cassandra’s prophecies in the same play (1035–330) and to the prophecies articulated by 
Athena in the Eumenides (681–706; 794–807, 824–36, 847–69, 968–75). Finally, my focus will 
shift to the oracle in the Libation Bearers, where Apollo’s oracle is mentioned on several 
occasions, according to which Orestes must commit the matricide (269–355, 554–59, 900-2, 
1029–39). The section concludes with a brief discussion of the satyr drama Proteus and, more 
specifically, of Proteus’ prophecy regarding Menelaus’ future. 
The narrative of the omen (104–259) occupies a large part of the parodos of the 
Agamemnon, the ‘longest choral sequence in surviving Tragedy’ (40–257).35 During this 
sequence, the elders of Argos narrate the recent past, revisit the background of the Trojan War 
(40–82), comment on the present, while they are unaware of the sack of Troy (82–103), and, 
then, move on to the remote past which precedes the departure of the Greek army for Troy 
(104–247), before returning to the present (248–57). It is within this intertemporal framework 
 
32 See for example, Rader (2015); Citti (1962). 
33 See also Mikalson (1991, 217) who argues that the study of Aeschylus’ theological system and of the particular 
character of the ‘religion’ it generates are really subjects of literary criticism and intellectual history, not of 
Religiosgeschichte.’ 
34 For bibliography on prophecy and portents in the Oresteia, see Roberts (1985) 283 n. 1. See Kamerbeek (1965) 
where the ‘eminent relevancy of these phenomena both to dramatic structure and to tragic meaning’ is emphasized 
in a number of examples. 
35 Collard (2002) 116. 
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that the narrative of the omen is placed at the centre of the choral sequence.36 Thus, the omen 
becomes immediately relevant to the dramatic future which lies ahead, not only of the 
Agamemnon, but also those of the following plays, maintaining its ominous power for events 
to come. 
The parodos begins with an extended simile (40–67), where Menelaus’ and 
Agamemnon’s cries for the abduction of Helen are likened to vultures’ cries who have been 
deprived of their children. The Chorus, considering the Trojan war which inflicted many 
casualties to the Trojans and the Danaans (63–66), draws the following conclusion (67–71): 
Things are now as they are (ἔστι δ᾿ ὅπῃ νῦν ἐστι); | they will be fulfilled in 
what is fated (τελεῖται δ᾿ ἐς τὸ πεπρωμένον);37 | neither burnt sacrifice nor 
libation | of offerings without fire | will soothe (παραθέλξει) intense anger 
away. 
The use of present and future tenses and the reference to the power of fate are markers of the 
foreshadowing technique. Their reference to Paris’ futile sacrifices as an attempt to appease the 
divine anger prepares for their detailed description of Clytemnestra’s similar efforts to 
appease the gods through sacrifices (87–96, 100–3). The conclusion to be drawn is that, just as 
Paris’ offerings did not impede the sack of Troy and as the sacrifice of Iphigenia did not 
impede the loss of many Greeks, so will Clytemnestra’s sacrifices not appease the anger 
gathering over the house of Agamemnon. Although the omen is narrated in the context of 
recalling the past, it is employed to foreshadow the future. 
The members of the Chorus declare themselves as accurate interpreters of past events 
(104–5) and embark on the narration of the omen which dates back to the time when the Greek 
fleet was preparing to depart for Troy. They start with a past narration in which a bird of 
omen which attacks a hare bearing offspring personifies Menelaus and Agamemnon (104–21). 
The interpretation of the omen by Calchas is recalled in an embedded narrative quoted 
verbatim in direct speech (126–55): 
 
36 For the term ‘intertemporal’, I draw on Grethlein’s essay on the issue of intertemporality of the Chorus in the 
Agamemnon (2013b). 
37 On the meaning of τελεῖται as ‘(will be) fulfilled’ see sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
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‘In time | our advance captures Priam’s city, | and Fate before its walls will 
sack| its teeming herds of people, | all of them there, in violence;| only let no 
jealousy from god | bring darkness on Troy’s great bridle-bit | if that is stricken 
first, now it goes | on campaign! Pity makes holy Artemis | grudge her father’s 
winged hounds | the wretched hare, unborn litter and all, their sacrifice; | she 
loathes the eagles’ meal. | Cry 'Sorrow, sorrow!', but let the good prevail! | 
Such is Hecate's great goodwill | to the dewy, helpless young of ravening lions, 
| and her delight in the suckling whelps | of all beasts that haunt the wild; | 
she asks fulfilment for these omens. | The manifestation of the birds is 
favourable but means blame. | Apollo there! Healer indeed, I call on you, | lest 
she make contrary winds for the Danaans, | long delays that keep the ships 
from sailing, | in her urge for a second sacrifice, | one with no music, no 
feasting, | an architect of feuds born in the family, | with no fear of the man; | 
for there stays in wait (μίμνει) a fearsome, resurgent, | treacherous keeper of 
the house, an unforgetting (μνάμων) Wrath | (Μῆνις) which avenges 
children.’ 
According to Calchas, Artemis orders Iphigeneia’s sacrifice38 which will finally allow the 
Greek fleet to depart from Aulis and to fulfil their victory at Troy. The direct speech which 
the Chorus uses to bring the past back to life breaks down the distinction between past and 
present and allows the omen to foreshadow not only events that have taken place but also 
events that are still to come.39 
The narrative of the omen in the Agamemnon bears specific elements which are not 
typical of other prophetic speeches. As both parts of the Chorus’ narration refer to events 
which were fulfilled in the past, such as the sacrifice of Iphigeneia and the sack of Troy, one 
could argue that the omen is employed as a framework which serves merely the purpose of 
exposition of past events (125–34). Nevertheless, I argue that the omen transcends the future 
that it refers to and maintains its power to relate to events yet to come. While for Calchas the 
 
38 For reasons which do not come up as clear and binding for Agamemnon, as the section under 5.4.1. ‘Nodal 
points’ below explores. 
39 For the use of direct speech in choral odes, see Rutherford (2006) 17; Fletcher (1997); Bers (1997). 
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omen was instantly interpreted as a manifestation of Artemis’ anger for Iphigenia’s sacrifice, 
and therefore as a sign of the future that ends with the sack of Troy, the omen also operates as 
a warning for the future beyond that, contributing to a sense of impending doom. Although 
omens are generally employed as manifestations of a closed future, and this is certainly how 
Calchas approaches his task of interpreting it, the omen in the parodos of the Agamemnon 
expands this sense of inevitability to include events yet to be identified. 
The last two lines of Calchas’ interpretation are of particular importance for our 
understanding of the omen as a foreshadowing device in the Agamemnon. The verb μίμνει 
(‘stays in wait’) displays the prolonged impact of Iphigenia’s sacrifice into the future. This 
impact is identified as μῆνις (‘Wrath’), a recurrent theme in the plays.40 This wrath is 
‘resurgent’ (παλίνορτος, 154) which means that it rises again and again, despite periods of 
dormancy. The next three adjectives demonstrate that the Wrath becomes now identified with 
the person in whom the wrath will reside.41 It is a ‘treacherous keeper of the house’, 
‘unforgetting’ and ‘child-avenging’ (οἰκονόμος δολία, μνάμων Μῆνις τεκνόποινος, 155), in 
the sense that the agent of the wrath will act in the future motivated by past crimes, and the 
aim of the action will be to avenge the loss of a child/children (Iphigeneia and maybe Thyestes’ 
children). It is possible that the adjective τεκνόποινος alludes to another child, Orestes, who 
will manifest himself as an agent of revenge for the death of his father as dramatised in the 
Libation Bearers.42 Thus, although the narrative of the omen refers to events that predate the 
plot, it also foreshadows events of the future ahead. 
 Morson in his discussion of foreshadowing defines omens as ‘signs of the future, traces 
‘left’ by events to come’.43 This is valid for the omen in the Agamemnon as well. Additionally, 
Morson argues that omens can foreshadow not the future but a future.44 In this sense, the omen 
operates as a warning rather than as a sign of the future (or as a sign of a future rather than as 
a sign of the future), while it also shows what might happen if no action is taken.45 While the 
 
40 See for example Agamemnon 702; Eumenides 234, 314. 
41 Sommerstein (2008) on 155. 
42 On the arguments for this double meaning τεκνόποινος, see Schein (2009) 393 and (1982) 14; Goldhill (1984) 25; 
Edwards (1977) 35 and n. 32. Cf. Kyriakou (2012, 107–8 n. 30) who argues that an allusion to Orestes in τεκνόποινος 
here is less relevant. 
43 Morson (1994) 
44 Morson (1994) 61. 
45 Morson (1994) 69. 
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omen as part of the Chorus’ narration of the past has a clear endpoint (sack of Troy) and 
medium (Iphigenia’s sacrifice), the omen as foreshadowing what still lies ahead has neither. 
What is even more striking is that this message does not reach the characters able to avert the 
doom. Although Morson argues that the omens are ‘instances of foreshadowing discernible 
from within experience’,46 in its new context, the omen lacks authoritative voice, as the 
members of the Chorus are only bearers of the warning message and not its interpreters.47 Thus, 
the ominous power of the message aims for its readers and spectators as the only recipients 
of the foreshadowing technique. 
The Chorus’ time travel back to the launch of the Trojan expedition at Aulis draws 
attention to what Jonas Grethlein and Christopher Krebs call ‘plupast’. In historiography 
‘plupast’ refers to ‘a past completed prior to the past that the narrator focuses on’.48 Grethlein 
and Krebs note that ‘[t]ragedy is a special case: the actors and the chorus refer to a previous 
past, but the staging makes the mythical past a performative presence’.49 In the case of the 
Chorus’ entrance song in the Agamemnon, the events that predate the Trojan War are relevant 
not only to the present but primarily to the future of the plot. This is achieved with the help 
of the omen which connects past, present, and future. 
Another example of how future is foreshadowed is Cassandra’s prophecies in the 
relevant scene (1035–330).50 These prophecies are the outcome of the uneven distribution of 
‘the essential surplus of knowledge’,51 which in this case is associated with just one character, 
Cassandra. The content of her surplus of knowledge is not identified with a generalised sense 
of a forthcoming doom, as the omen above is. Rather it refers to major future events, both of 
the near future, namely Agamemnon’s death (1100–4, 1107–11, 1114–18, 1125–29, 1223–41, 
1246, 1313–14) and Cassandra’s death (1136–39, 1146–49, 1172, 1256–78), and of the distant 
future, namely Orestes’ return to Argos (1280–85).52 Unlike Calchas (and as we will see below, 
 
46 Morson (1994) 61, 63. 
47 Sommerstein (2010a) 17: ‘The lines 134–52 are ‘understood by the audience, and no doubt with hindsight by the 
chorus, but by no one at the time when it was uttered.’ 
48 Grethlein & Krebs (2012) 1. 
49 Grethlein & Krebs (2012) 11–12. 
50 Other aspects of the ‘Cassandra scene’ are explored elsewhere as well: see Chapter 4 n. 40. 
51 See section 1.2 in the Introduction. 
52 For other themes included in Cassandra’s prophecies, see also 4.2.4. 
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Proteus) who simply interprets signs of a future (μάντις, 201),53 Cassandra directly accesses a 
future.54 In Chapter 4 above, this immediacy and personal suffering which characterise 
Cassandra’s prophetic skill were discussed as an example of how future present can be 
dramatised. In this chapter, although one could argue that foreshadowing and future present are 
mutually exclusive terms, I argue that Cassandra’s role combines qualities of both 
foreshadowing and experience of the future. 
While the term foreshadowing generally describes the chronological priority of the 
prophet’s position (as the prefix fore- suggests) in relation to the events prophesied, in the case 
of Cassandra her position does not lie before but within the events (future present). This is 
effectively demonstrated through the references in which Cassandra prophesies her own 
death. As soon as Cassandra realises that she, like Agamemnon, will be murdered, she offers 
a series of glimpses of a future she experiences in the present: ‘Cruel woman, will you take 
this to its end?’ (1107); ‘So why did you lead me here, wretch that I am— | for nothing at all, 
except to share dying! What else?’ (1138–39); ‘For myself cleaving awaits, by a blade with two 
sides!’ (1149); ‘I soon fall to Under-Earth, with my mind heated still’ (1172); ‘Papai! How the 
fire comes upon me! | Ototoi! Apollo the Wolf-god! Ah me, ah me, <the pain!>’55 (1256–57). 
These examples manifest Cassandra’s binary function as both agent and recipient of the 
prophecy. In Cassandra’s case, the future does not cast its shadow over the present. What 
Cassandra experiences is the emergence of the future in the present, with all the suffering it 
entails for her (and Agamemnon) not as a warning, but as an actuality. Cassandra dramatises 
the motif of the Oresteia πάθει μάθος56 in a powerful way: when her death finally takes place, 
she will have experienced it for a second time. 
Of course, Cassandra can foretell the future in a more conventional way, in the way 
that Calchas and Teiresias do. This aspect of her skill works in two ways. First, Cassandra 
reiterates in a structurally organised speech her previous knowledge of her and 
 
53 And Teiresias who, for instance, knows the future in Sophocles’ Oedipus the King. See Kennedy (2013) 91–92. 
54 Cassandra refers to herself as μάντις (1098, 1202, 1275), while Chorus refer to Cassandra as προφήτης (1099). 
For more on these terms in the ‘Cassandra scene’, see section under 4.2.4. See also Pillinger (2019) 30 and n. 8, n. 
66. For a comparison between Calchas and Cassandra, see Pillinger (2019) 47; Schein (1982) 11–12. 
55 Sommerstein’s translation (2008). See Chapter 4 n. 31. 
56 Agamemnon 177. For a similar meaning, see Agamemnon 250, 1564, 1658; Libation Bearers 313. For the theme of 
πάθει μάθος in the Oresteia, see Marshall (2017) 9–10; Raeburn & Thomas (2011) 86–87, 95–96. 
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Agamemnon’s future death: ‘I say that you will look upon the death of Agamemnon’ (1246); 
‘Now I shall go to keen in the house as well,΄ | over my fate and over Agamemnon's (1313–
14); ‘now I am to die (1320); ‘I pray to my last daylight from the sun, that my | master's 
avengers requite my murder too on our enemies’ (1324–25). Second, she foretells events of the 
distant future, the Furies’ on-going presence in the house of the Atreides (1186–90) and 
Orestes’ homecoming (1280–85, 1323–26): 
This house will never be abandoned by a choir of voices in | unison, unlovely 
in tone because it does not tell of good. No, | and now that it has drunk human 
blood for greater boldness, | the revel-band remains in the house, hard to 
expel, of family | Furies. 
…there will come another in turn to avenge us, a | child born to kill his mother, 
one to exact penalty for his | father. A fugitive, a wanderer, an exile from this 
land he will | come home to put a coping-stone on these ruinous acts for his | 
family; his father thrown on his back on the ground will bring | him back. 
There is one speech more I wish to make—or my | own dirge: I pray to my last 
daylight from the sun, that my | master's avengers requite my murder too on 
our enemies; | mine is a slave's death, an easy victory. 
As the quotes above show, Cassandra foreshadows Orestes’ and the Furies’ role in the Libation 
Bearers and the Eumenides. While Cassandra presents a closed future for herself and 
Agamemnon, she promises an open future through the references to the Furies and Orestes. 
Another example of prophetic speech is found in the Eumenides where Athena 
prophesies the power which the Areopagus court and the cult of Eumenides will hold in the 
future (681–706; 794–807, 824–36, 847–69, 968–75). As a matter of fact, this play is not often 
discussed in the context of proleptic narratives. For example, Goward argues that it is one of 
the two plays by Aeschylus that lacks major proleptic narratives.57 However, I argue that the 
 
57 Goward (1999) 55. The second is The Suppliants. 
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play is preoccupied with a type of prophetic speech which, although it meets the standards of 
a conventional prophecy, as those found in the Agamemnon and elsewhere,58 it also has aspects 
which challenge its associations with foreshadowing. 
Athena outlines the eternal future of Athens in two separate scenes, one preceding 
Orestes’ trial and one following his acquittal.59 In her first announcement, Athena declares that 
the future of Athens will always encompass the Areopagus court (‘Now hear my ordinance, 
people of Athens’, 681). In her second announcement, Athena foretells that the Furies will 
always be respected by the Athenian citizens as the (newly established) Awesome Goddesses 
and in exchange for their eternal protection (‘I here give you my promise, in all right’, 804; ‘I 
foretell’, 852; ‘Such are the things you may choose from me’, 867). As both statements are 
articulated by a divine authority who plots out the future, they can be considered as prophetic. 
However, two elements suggest their atypical character. First, both announcements include a 
level of conditionality. Promises and ordinances are not necessarily identical to prophecy and 
make the future appear less certain, something which undermines Athena’s omniscience. 
Second, unlike the type of Cassandra’s prophecies which become fulfilled in the Agamemnon 
and the Libation Bearers, Athena’s prophecies will not be fulfilled before the end of the 
narrative of the tetralogy. 
While, so far, our examples of prophetic speech manifest themselves as utterances 
communicated by a prophetic agent, Apollo’s oracle in the Libation Bearers allows us to look 
at prophecies primarily from the perspective of the recipient. As discussed in Chapter 4 above, 
the oracle is embedded in the narrative through Orestes’ narration (and Pylades’ narration).60 
This section explores how the oracle both contains and interacts with foreshadowing. I argue 
that while the oracle is expected to point to and effectively safeguard a closed future, the 
multiple references to Apollo’s oracle can also be seen as undermining the necessity of the 
matricide it commands. 
To start with, the initial reference to the oracle in the play (269–355) is not, strictly 
speaking, required by the plot and does not meet any dramatic purpose of the kind that 
 
58 For one more example of foreshadowing techniques in the Eumenides, see the section 5.3.2 ‘Prayers and oaths’ that 
follows. 
59 For the relevant textual indicators, see section under 3.5 ‘Closure as possibility in the Eumenides’. 
60 See section 4.3.2. 
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Cassandra’s prophecies serve in the Agamemnon (see above).61 The plot has already started to 
build up as matricide-driven before its report by Orestes. Second, what the oracle actually 
orders is vague, and key elements of the oracle remain unknown to us: what was the question 
posed by Orestes to Apollo and what is the exact content of the oracle? It prescribes dreadful 
consequences (269–96), including visitations from the Furies ‘exacted for a father's blood’ 
(283–84). But do these consequences only apply in the case of failure? What about the 
aftermath of the matricide as the fulfilment of the oracle? How can the Furies ‘exacted for a 
father's blood’ be different from the ones exacted for a mother’s blood who emerge at the end 
of the play and start pursuing Orestes? In this sense, Orestes’ case is a ‘double bind’,62 as 
punishment will be ensued ‘both despite and because of the matricidal action’.63 Third, 
Apollo’s oracle is subject to the general tendency to question the reliability of oracles (556–59). 
This is highlighted even more due to the ‘enigmatic figure’64 of Apollo in this play. Therefore, 
knowing in advance the consequences of ignoring the oracle is not adequate as a determining 
factor for the matricide. The power of the oracle as a foreshadowing device gradually gives way 
to the rather different function as a reminder and stimulant when necessary. 
Another prophecy arguably takes place in the satyr drama Proteus and foreshadows 
Menelaus’ future.65 Proteus is probably represented as in the Odyssey (Book 4),66 a god with 
knowledge of the past and the future. In this sense he operates as the ‘authoritative divine 
voice’, similarly to Cassandra and Apollo in the previous plays.67 Proteus’ daughter Eido 
might also have the skill of foretelling the future (fr. 212 Εἰδώ).68 The main storyline dramatises 
Menelaus’ efforts to elicit information from Proteus, who is constantly changing forms, about 
the future. The prophecy which Menelaus receives, addresses his main concern, his return to 
Greece and the circumstances under which this can be successful, while it presumably situates 
 
61 For the position of the oracle in the play, see Goward (1999) 66. 
62 Goward (1999) 67. 
63 Goward (1999) 67. 
64 Roberts (1984) 11. This study offers a detailed analysis of the role of Apollo in the Oresteia. 
65 For a discussion of Proteus as the last play of the Oresteia as a tetralogy, see section under 3.6 ‘Closure as desire 
in Proteus’. 
66 See Introduction, n. 106. 
67 Marshall (2015) 96–97 and n. 101. 
68 It is assumed that Eido is the name of Eidothea of the Odyssey (4.366). Both names incorporate the quality of the 
beauty or knowledge. 
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that return within a broader context (political instability in Argos, faithfulness of Helen, 
Hermione’s future) which transcends Menelaus’ current preoccupations. By contrast to 
Cassandra who is both agent and recipient of her prophecy, whose skill is imposed on her and 
is unenviable, Proteus is represented as powerful and privileged. By contrast to Orestes whose 
access to Apollo’s oracle appears to be without obstacles, Menelaus has to work hard to obtain 
the knowledge that Proteus possesses. In that way, the narrative of Proteus reinstates the value 
of foreknowledge, employs it in a celebratory and playful manner, and presents at least once 
how knowing the future can be really a privilege. 
The examples of prophetic utterances above offer a set of cases studies for how 
foreshadowing is employed in the four plays. As I have demonstrated, the omen, the 
prophecies, and the oracle affirm, undermine, and transcend foreshadowing. The omen in the 
Agamemnon does not only maintain its power to predict future events, but it also surpasses 
those events to foreshadow the more distant future as dramatised in the second half of the 
Agamemnon and the Libation Bearers. Cassandra’s prophecies are also fulfilled in the near 
future, but they also prepare for events dramatised in the next two plays. The employment of 
Apollo’s oracle in the Libation Bearers undermines the power of foreshadowing, as its fulfilment 
does not guarantee the end of Orestes’ troubles at the end of the play and in the Eumenides. In 
the Eumenides, Athena’s prophecies ordain a future beyond her control and, therefore, a future 
which cannot be ordained. At the end of the tetralogy, the Proteus reaffirms the advantage of 
knowing the future, but it also arguably foreshadows a future which lies beyond Menelaus’ 
return to Greece. 
5.3.2. Prayers and oaths 
Prayers and oaths are mobilised by the characters’ main concerns and desires for their future 
and are associated with foreshadowing in the sense that they are addressed to or approved by 
divine authorities (as claimed by the characters). Both prayers and oaths refer to the future by 
cultivating desirable future scenarios. However, they differ in the way these scenarios can be 
fulfilled. The fulfilment of a prayer is presented as god-induced, while the compliance with 
an oath is seen as depending on the character’s attitude to its violation. As examples of prayers 
I discuss Clytemnestra’s prayer to Zeus in the Agamemnon (973–74), Electra’s, Chorus’ and 
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Orestes’ prayers in the Libation Bearers (1–509, 820–37, 855–68), and Pythias’ prayer in the 
Eumenides (1–63). As examples of oaths I examine Clytemnestra’s oaths in the Agamemnon 
(1431–47, 1569–73), Orestes’ and Pylades’ references to past oaths in the Libation Bearers (901, 
977–79), and Orestes’ oath for the peace treaty between Argos and Athens in the Eumenides 
(767–71). I argue that, although the prayers and oaths express the characters’ need for a 
controlled future, their fulfilment, when it takes place, is delayed, disrupted, or exposed as a 
human construct. 
The literary history of prayers as anticipatory devices begins in the epic poetry.69 
According to Morrison, a typical Homeric prayer consists of an introductory scene, the prayer 
and the divine response.70 However, in Greek tragedy prayers remain unanswered. They are 
not followed by either the affirmation or the rejection of the request. Their outcome is known 
(if at all) only by their materialisation onstage and offstage.71 In the examples below, the 
requests of the prayers are either materialised (directly after their utterance or after some time) 
or suspended without materialisation. 
Clytemnestra’s prayer to Zeus the Fulfiller72 in the Agamemnon (973–74) and the 
prayers by Orestes, Electra, and the Chorus to Agamemnon’s tomb in the Libation Bearers (246–
509) remain unfulfilled for several hundred lines. In the first example, although 
Clytemnestra’s prayer prepares for Agamemnon’s murder, it is not followed by Zeus’ 
approval. Although Clytemnestra’s request for support by Zeus looks like (due to the god’s 
expertise in fulfilling wishes) it can guarantee the success of her plan, and although 
Clytemnestra’s prayer foreshadows its fulfilment as imminent, this will not be materialised 
for more than 350 lines. During those lines, before the first of Agamemnon’s screams is heard 
from inside the palace (1343), we learn from Cassandra (1073–330) how Clytemnestra’s careful 
planning and execution will finally lead to Agamemnon’s murder. The second example, from 
the Libation Bearers, foreshadows the event of the matricide. Following the recognition scene 
(211–45), Orestes and Electra invoke Zeus (246–63), their father (315–22, 332–38, 394–99, 497–
 
69 Morrison (1991) 145: ‘[P]rayer scenes normally provide the audience with information about the future by 
anticipating later episodes’. 
70 Morrison (1991) 146–49. 
71 On the matter of the unanswered prayers in Greek tragedy, see Mikalson (1989), where he argues that the single 
example of unanswered prayers in Aeschylus takes place in the Suppliants (1989, 93). 
72 For the cognates of τέλος in Clytemnestra’s prayer, see section 2.2. 
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99), the Earth (479–80, 481–82, 489), and Persephone (490). Once again there is no divine 
response. Although they ask persistently for fulfilment of the prayers, there are almost 500 
lines to follow before the matricide. In these lines, the construction of their plan takes place, 
including Orestes’ hesitation to commit the crime. The volume of prayers in the first half of 
the play creates a strong sense of inevitability for its second half, but what follows makes clear 
that they frame the main events of the plot rather than control them. 
The next set of examples refers to Electra’s and the Chorus’ prayers in the Libation 
Bearers. By contrast to prayers discussed above, these are fulfilled almost directly after their 
utterance. Electra, hoping for Orestes’ return, addresses her dead father and prays to Hermes 
to increase the effectiveness of her appeal (124–63, 129–48). The Chorus, by addressing the 
dead Agamemnon, reiterates the need for the avenger who will set the house free again (157–
63). As soon as they complete their utterances, Orestes appears and announces that Electra’s 
prayers have been answered: ‘Pray for the future and success! Tell the gods, your | prayers 
are now fulfilled!’ (212–13). Later in the play, the Chorus pray to Zeus and, as soon as their 
prayer is complete (820–37, 855–68), Aegisthus’ screams are heard from backstage. In both 
examples, the response to the prayer is direct and successful. However, it is important to note 
that the responses have only temporal and not causal relation to the requests. In the first case, 
Orestes has arrived already before Electra begins her prayers. In the second case, Aegisthus’ 
murder is the outcome of a collaboration between Orestes, Electra, the Chorus, Cilissa, and 
Pylades. Therefore, the sense that the prayers foreshadow the future is undermined by the 
plot itself. 
Pythia’s prayer in the prologue of the Eumenides raises expectations which are not 
fulfilled, and so does not succeed in foreshadowing the future, featuring a request which has 
been left suspended.73 More specifically, Pythia, Apollo’s prophetess at Delphi, prays to a 
number of different divinities: Earth (1–2), Themis (2–4), Phoebe (4–7), Apollo (7–19), Athena 
(21), Nymphs (22–23), Dionysus (24–26), Pleistus (27), Poseidon (27), and Zeus (28–29). 
Through her prayer, Pythia requests reliability and effectiveness for her prophetic skill: ‘And 
now I wish they may grant me better success by far than | at my entrances before’ (30–31). 
The invocation of the divinities also sanctifies and solemnises the prophecy-giving procedure. 
 
73 For the Eumenides’ prologue as surprise-generator, see sections under 7.3.1. ‘Surprise at the beginning’, 7.4.3. 
‘Surprise through shock’. 
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However, as soon as Pythia enters the temple to fulfil her role as prophetess (μάντις 29, 
μαντεύομαι 33), she runs out full of terror due to the presence of the Furies (34). In that way, 
the prayer in the beginning of the Eumenides undermines the possibility of foreshadowing and 
creates great uncertainty for the future. 
Let us now turn to oaths. Oaths can be divided into assertory oaths (for the present and 
past) and promissory oaths (for the future).74 Divine authorisation can guarantee not only that 
the oath will be materialised but also that its violation will incur divine wrath. In this sense, 
the employment of oaths points to a closed future, as compliance to the oath remains the only 
possibility. I argue that, although the following examples (Clytemnestra’s oaths in the 
Agamemnon 1431–47, 1569–73; Orestes’ and Pylades’ oaths in the Libation Bearers 901, 977–79, 
987–9; Athena’s and Orestes’ oath in the Eumenides 483–84, 489; 767–71) express the desire and 
prepare for a certain and specific future, they all entertain the possibility of an open future 
despite the existence of a sworn statement. 
Clytemnestra in the Agamemnon takes a promissory oath with regard to the future she 
imagines for Aegisthus and herself (1431–37): 
And now you are to hear my oaths, in their | full right: I swear by Justice 
fulfilled for my child, by Ruin | and by the Fury, for all of whom I slew this 
man, that for me | no expectation treads in fear’s palace so long as fire is burned 
| at my hearth by Aegisthus, loyal towards me in the past; he | is no small 
confidence of us. 
With this oath, Clytemnestra showcases her disregard of the Chorus’ threats regarding her 
punishment in the future (‘Payment in return you have still to make, and you shall be | 
deprived of your friends; | a blow is a pay for a blow’, 1428–30). Her invocation of Justice, 
Ruin, and Fury, in the name of whom the oath is undertaken, creates the sense of a future 
planned, protected, and carefree. Additionally, this sense of security is strengthened later on, 
again by Clytemnestra through another oath. More specifically, she swears (ὅρκους θεμένη, 
 
74 Sommerstein (2014a) 1–5. On the matter of language in oaths, see Sommerstein (2014b) 76–81. For a general 
overview of the oaths in ancient Greek religion and culture, see Sommerstein & Torrance (2014); Mikalson (1991) 
80–88. 
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570) for a pact with the demon of the Pleisthenids, the family curse, whereby the demon will 
finally leave the house (1568–73). The last lines of the play belong to Clytemnestra and are 
characteristic of her self-assured stance towards the future (1672–73): ‘Take no account of this 
empty yelping! In our twin mastery of this house [I] | and you will make things [well]’. 
However, these words and, more significantly, her oaths, come after the Chorus’ previous 
references to Orestes’ future homecoming (1290, 1284). At the end of the play, the sense that 
lingers is that Clytemnestra’s and Aegisthus’ future lies beyond their control. 
Although two oaths in the Libation Bearers refer to the past and the present rather than 
the future and thus belong to the assertory type, their invocation serves the purpose of 
presenting a future once foreshadowed and now fulfilled. The first reference comes from 
Pylades who reminds Orestes of an oath sworn in the past by which he is bound to kill his 
mother (‘…and the pledges sworn on oath?’, 901). However, the content of the oath and the 
identity of the oath-taker are unclear.75 Is it an oath by Orestes who swears to Apollo to commit 
the matricide, or is it Apollo who swears to protect Orestes after committing the crime? 
Additionally, nowhere in the Eumenides, where Apollo appears as a character of the play, is 
this oath mentioned. Orestes refers to another oath, this one sworn by Clytemnestra and 
Aegisthus, according to which the couple exchanged vows to stay together until their death 
(‘and their oath stays by its pledges: | they swore together upon death for my poor father, | 
and to die together; and here their oath holds true,’ 977–79). In this case, Orestes situates the 
two crimes within the closed future that an oath dictates. The above examples highlight the 
characters’ need to present their actions as embedded in a foreshadowed future. 
While Clytemnestra’s oath in the Agamemnon is outweighed by Orestes’ return in the 
Libation Bearers (validation cancelled), the validation of the oaths in the Eumenides lies outside 
the parameters of the tetralogy (validation deferred).76 Athena binds the members of the 
Areopagus court with the dicastic oath which will have everlasting power: ‘…with respect for 
oaths under an ordinance which I shall | lay down for all time’ (483–84), ‘…with no 
transgression of their oath through unjust minds’ (489).77 Similarly, Orestes takes an oath 
 
75 Torrance (2015) 287–88 and n. 30. 
76 On the matter of oaths in the Eumenides, see Konstantinidou (2014) 6–19; Fletcher (2011) 35–69; Sommerstein 
(2010a) 200–9. 
77 Also 679–80 (Chorus): ‘bring in your vote, strangers, with respect for your oath in | your hearts.’ For more on 
the dicastic oath, see Sommerstein (2010b). 
Chapter 5 
Page 137 of 269 
which guarantees the everlasting peaceful future between Athens, the city of his salvation, 
and Argos, his homeland (762–74).78 The two oaths cannot be proved invalid, because their 
span makes the validation of their fulfilment within the plays impossible. More specifically, 
Orestes’ oath has inconsistencies and uncertainties which cannot promise a perpetually 
unproblematic relation between Argos and Athens.79 Meanwhile, Apollo bluntly asserts that 
oaths can be superseded by other powers such as the marriage and the will of Zeus: ‘A man 
and wife's | marriage-bed once under destiny is greater than any oath, | with justice as its 
guardian’ (216–18), ‘an oath is in no way stronger than Zeus’(621). While Apollo argues that 
the oaths can be tilted,80 Athena later on urges the jurors to maintain their oaths (708–10). The 
play oscillates between the idea that the oaths foreshadow a distant future and the idea that 
the oaths are invalid. 
The prayers and the oaths, then, are associated with foreshadowing in the dramatic 
narrative in multiple ways. A prayer can affirm foreshadowing through its fulfilment (this is 
the case by Clytemnestra in the Agamemnon, and Orestes and Electra the Libation Bearers), 
while it can also undermine foreshadowing through the suspension of its fulfilment (Pythia’s 
prayer in the Eumenides). Similarly, an oath can either affirm foreshadowing, when the 
fulfilment of the oath takes place within the narrative (Orestes’s oaths in the Libation Bearers), 
or undermine foreshadowing when its fulfilment transcends the individual’s control 
(Clytemnestra’s oath in the Agamemnon) or the boundaries of the tetralogy (the jurors’ and 
Orestes’ oath in the Eumenides). 
5.3.3. Dreams: Clytemnestra and the Furies 
Similarly to the prayers and oaths, dreams are also preoccupied with the future of the plot,81 
and as such they can be seen as another way with which the characters communicate their 
 
78 See Torrance (2015) 282 n. 5; Konstantinidou (2014) 14 and n. 32; Torrance (2014) 150 and n. 72–73; Fletcher (2011) 
67 and n. 79; Quincey (1964). 
79 For a detailed analysis of these aspects, see Torrance (2015) 291–94. On Athena’s prophecy, see 5.3.1; on Orestes’ 
oath as future present, see 4.4.3. 
80 Torrance (2015) 288–89, 291; Mikalson (1991) 85. 
81 See Xenophon’s On the Cavalry Commander (9.7–9.9), where the dreams are listed as means by which the gods 
give signs to men. Cited by Mikalson (1991) 101. Goward (1999, 64) and Roberts (1985, 283) list prophecies and 
dreams under proleptic narratives. 
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concerns, wishes, and desires for the future.82 As examples of dreams in the Oresteia I examine 
Clytemnestra’s allegorical dream in the Libation Bearers (32–46, 523–39, 540–50)83 and the 
Furies’ admonitory dream in the Eumenides (94–139). Both foreshadow certain aspects of the 
future, mostly related to Clytemnestra’s and Orestes’.84 More specifically, I argue that 
Clytemnestra’s dream in the Libation Bearers foreshadows the future with the sense of a 
warning. This is distinctly different from the use of dreams elsewhere in Aeschylus where 
dreams operate as confirmations of the impending catastrophe rather than possibilities of the 
future. The Furies’ dream in the Eumenides foreshadows the future with a sense of 
inevitability. While both operate as confirmations of the doom and not as possibilities for the 
future, Clytemnestra’s dream as seen in this section and elsewhere in the Libation Bearers is 
elevated into a device which, instead of foreshadowing a fixed future, works rather as a 
warning. 
Clytemnestra’s dream presents two different ideas of foreshadowing. First, the dream, 
as reported by the Chorus (32–46, 523–39) who witness the tumult in the house (‘I do know, 
my son, for I was there’, 523), is interpreted by experts in the house,85 as sent by ‘those under 
the earth’ (40). More specifically, the dream is originated in the wrath of the dead against the 
killers (38–41, 538–39) and features Clytemnestra herself giving birth to a snake which 
attacked and hurt her during breastfeeding (527, 529, 531, 533, 535–39). Although 
Clytemnestra in the Agamemnon rejects dreams as ‘fancies of a drowsing mind’ (275),86 she 
now acknowledges the foreshadowing value of the dream. However, this foreshadowing 
power is received only as a warning for the future and not as something definite. For that 
reason, Clytemnestra seeks to take the future under her control by appeasing the wrath of the 
dead. The dream’s ominous character foreshadows the future not in the sense of predicting but 
 
82 On the subject of dreams in ancient Greek literature, see Pigman (2019) 15–85. 
83 Clytemnestra’s dream is also explored in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 in relation to the concepts of: present future (4.3.1), 
foreshadowing (5.3.3), suspense (6.3.1). 
84 See also Atossa’s dream in Aeschylus’ Persians (176–330, 517–26, 215–25, 518–19) and Io’s dream in Aeschylus’ 
Prometheus Bound (640–72, 645–57). Goward (1999, 65) also sees a difference between the Persians and the Libation 
Bearers: ‘But the dream here, more than the dream in Persians, is a slippery motif of a multiple relevance and still 
has an important part to play.’ 
85 Line 38: κριταί; line 542: κρινεῖ. On the vocabulary of the interpretation of dreams, see Pigman (2019) 27. 
86 A similar view on the validity of dreams is expressed by the Chorus in the Agamemnon 420–26 and 491. In the 
first example, the Chorus describes Menelaus’ despair who sees Helen in his dreams (‘Apparitions in dreams’) 
which, however, ’bring empty delight’. In the second, they expect to hear if the good news about Troy were true 
or: ‘whether this joyful light which came cheated our minds like a dream’. 
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in the sense of preparing for the future. However, the final reference to Clytemnestra’s dream 
by Orestes later in the play (540–50) reverses the idea of foreshadowing as described above. 
While the dream as experienced by Clytemnestra foreshadows a possible future, Orestes’ 
interpretation of the dream foreshadows a future which for him is fixed. 
By contrast to Clytemnestra’s dream which is a subjective experience, reported by the 
Chorus, the Furies’ dream in the Eumenides is an event which takes place on stage. 
Clytemnestra’s ghost appears in their sleep to awaken them so as to pursue Orestes who has 
fled to Athens (94–139).87 Clytemnestra’s ghost urges the Furies with references to the past 
(94–116) as well as through multiple imperatives (131–39), and stimulates even more their 
insatiable desire for the pursuit and annihilation of Orestes as a revenge for the matricide. 
Although this creates a strong sense of foreshadowing regarding Orestes’ punishment, the 
Furies will not pursue Orestes to the end and the dream will not come true. 
In both cases, the dreams are received by the characters as foreshadowing the future in 
a certain way that soon proves to be invalid. In this sense, they illustrate what I have tried to 
show throughout this section which is that foreshadowing does not only exist within the 
fulfilment of the future but also within the frustration of this fulfilment. Clytemnestra perceives 
her dream as a warning that she can move away from, only to find out that by the end of the 
play it becomes fulfilled. The Furies perceive their dream as specific instructions that 
necessitated the punishment of Orestes, but they will soon need to come to terms with a very 
different future. 
As examples of ‘the shadow of the future in the present’, prophetic speeches, prayers, 
oaths, and dreams do, of course, feature and entertain elements of foreknowledge; in that way, 
the foreshadowed future becomes fulfilled. However, they may also undermine and 
contradict foreknowledge; in that way, the foreshadowed future is either averted or 
postponed. In its both functions, foreshadowing (and sideshadowing below) cultivate effects such 
as suspense and surprise which will be explored in detail in the next two chapters. 
 
87 Mikalson leaves out from his discussion Clytemnestra’s appearance in the Furies’ dream (1991, 267 n. 169). 
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5.4.  Sideshadowing 
Moving on from the idea of foreshadowing which points to a future which may or may not be 
fulfilled, I now turn to the related but distinct question of how the dramatic narrative also 
accommodates the idea of a future which consists of alternative possibilities. As already 
discussed in 5.2, the concept of sideshadowing was coined by Morson who explored it in the 
context the Russian novel. Morson’s sideshadowing involves modalities (e.g. ‘may’, ‘must’, 
‘could’), modal expressions for describing reality (e.g. ‘It is possible that..’), emphasis on the 
personal perspective and its potentially misleading nature (e.g. ‘I fancied’, ‘but I may not have 
seen rightly’), words used to express uncertainty (e.g. ‘perhaps’), and other perspectives of 
the same event (e.g.’ It is asserted’, ‘on the contrary’, ‘though’, ‘however’).88 As Morson argues, 
these techniques intend to create several possible stories, through which a whole field of 
possibilities appear as several shadows from the side, undermining the actual event.89 
In this section, I offer several examples of sideshadowing that I group around three 
broad categories: nodal points, unexposed backstory, alternative futures. While, as shown 
above, Morson draws our attention to textual markers as indicators of sideshadowing, I propose 
three categories not only as guides for identifying the presence of sideshadowing in the plays 
(including the search for textual indicators), but also as frameworks for mapping the idea of 
sideshadowing in the plays in a more systematic way. The first category, nodal points, is useful 
because it shows how the narrative employs the idea of the characters’ decision-making in a 
non-deterministic universe. The second category, the unexposed backstory, demonstrates 
how other paths for the (once) future are embedded in the narrative in more subtle ways. The 
third category, alternative futures, displays cases where an alternative future is imagined and 
expressed by the characters. 
 
88 Morson (1994) 120–22 (examples from The Possessed). 
89 Morson (1994) 122. 
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5.4.1. Nodal points 
According to Christoph Bode and Felicitas Meifert-Menhard, nodes or nodal points are the 
essential unit and the prerequisite of any future narrative.90 The dramatic narrative does not 
exemplify the pure future narrative in the way Bode and Meifert-Menhard specify. The 
Oresteia belongs to the category of ‘thematic prototypes’ which for Bode and Meifert-Menhard 
refers to texts featuring elements of the future such as its openness, without being exclusively 
preoccupied with the branching structure. I suggest that nodes are foregrounded to represent 
the idea of sideshadowing as the presence of more than one paths and, thus, can bring us closer 
to the idea of an open future. There are numerous nodal points throughout the tetralogy but 
for the purpose of this discussion I examine selectively the following: Agamemnon’s dilemma 
(211) and Chorus’ response to Agamemnon’s murder cries (1348–71) in the Agamemnon, one 
set of nodes by Clytemnestra and Orestes (889–91, 899) and another node for Orestes with 
regard to Aegisthus’ murder (571–78) in the Libation Bearers, and, finally, from the Eumenides 
I include one mor set of nodes, by Orestes and the Furies (744–47). 
My starting point is the narrative node that can be found in the Chorus’ narration of 
Iphigeneia’s sacrifice in the Agamemnon (205–47).91 This nodal point, being part of a past 
narrative, is reminiscent of the applications of sideshadowing in historiography. More 
specifically, the members of the Chorus act as historians who look at past events from a 
vantage point and recount in detail one of the most appalling chapters of the Atreides’ family 
history. However, unlike historiography, the use of direct speech to convey Agamemnon’s 
dilemma presents the matter not as ‘solved’ or ‘settled’, but as still ongoing (see section 5.3.1 
above). Iphigenia’s murder is presented as an event that belongs to a future that may or may 
not happen. While this future of Agamemnon’s dilemma has already been past for someone 
who uses strict historiographical criteria, in the Chorus’ tragic language is still lying ahead as 
unrealised. Here is how the Chorus reports Agamemnon’s thoughts which form a node in 
respect of Artemis’ mandate (206–17): 
 
90 See Bode (2013) e.g., 1; Meifert-Menhard (2013) e.g., 2. For the series Narrating Futures to which these works 
belong, see section 1.1. 
91 On the literary and iconographic history of Iphigenia’s myth before Aeschylus, see Chapter 2 n. 36. 
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‘It is a grievous doom not to comply, | and a grievous one if I am to slay my 
child, the delight of my house, | polluting a father’s hands | with streams of a 
slaughtered maiden’s blood close by | the altar. Which of these options is free 
from evil? | How can I become a deserter of the fleet, | losing my alliance? | 
That they should long with intense passion | for a sacrifice to end the winds | 
and for the blood of a maiden | is quite natural. May all be well!’’92 
Agamemnon is presented as divided between whether or not to comply with the goddess’ 
ordinance.93 The question ‘Which of these options is free from evil?’ (τί τῶνδ᾿ἄνευ κακῶν; 
211) effectively communicates Agamemnon’s dilemma,94 a nodal point in narrative terms 
which is formed as a bifurcation consisting of two possible paths.95 However, despite the 
presence of the node, Agamemnon can be described as one with the tendency, as Morson 
notes in a different context, ‘to trace straight lines of causality’,96 instead of embracing the 
different possibilities the future can bring. 
The second example is an elaborate narrative node articulated by the Chorus in lines 
1348–71.97 After recapitulating in a couplet the major event which just occurred, Agamemnon’s 
cries being heard off stage indicating his murder, they decide to make action plans. The long 
quote below illustrates in the most effective way this multiple narrative node which consists 
of twelve couplets:98 
-I tell you my proposal, | to have criers call the townsfolk here to the house, to 
help. 
 
92 I quote Sommerstein’s translation (2008). 
93 Michelakis (2006) 23: ‘The narrative focuses on the conditional nature of Artemis’ anger, on Agamemnon’s 
freedom of choice, and on Iphigenia’s helplessness, which prepare the ground for Clytemnestra’s subsequent 
justification of her own killing of Agamemnon’. 
94 For discussions on Agamemnon’s decision, see Kyriakou (2012) 524–25 and n. 26 for bibliography; Conacher 
(1987) 76–83; Edwards (1977). 
95 Vernant (1988, 33) describes this in similar terms as ‘crossroads of a choice’. 
96 Morson (1994) 119. 
97 Collard (2002, 157) argues that this is an unprecedented and unique example of the Chorus’ division in the history 
of Greek tragedy. Taplin (1977, 393 n. 1) argues that lines 585–608 of the Eumenides are also distributed among the 
members of the Chorus. 
98 On the number of the members of the tragic Chorus, see Taplin (1977) 323 n. 3. 
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-No, my idea is to rush in at once | and prove the deed together with the freshly 
streaming sword. 
-I share a proposal like that, | and I vote for action; it’s a moment for no delay! 
-It’s here to see: this is their prelude to actions | which mean tyranny for the 
city. 
-Yes, we are taking our time while they trample down delay’s reputation, | and 
their hands are not asleep. 
-I do not know what plan to hit on and say; | the man of action has also to plan 
for it. 
-I’ m like that too, at a loss | for words to resurrect the dead. 
-Are we really to drag out our lives | in submitting like that to these violators 
of the house as our rulers? 
-That is not tolerable, it is better to die; | it is a fate milder than tyranny. 
-Why, are we to divine from the evidence of his groans | that the man is dead? 
-We should be discussing this from clear knowledge; | guessing is different 
from knowing clearly. 
-I am getting a majority from all sides for approving this course, | to know 
exactly how things are with the son of Atreus. 
Whereas line 211 discussed above features a bi-furcation, lines 1348–71 feature a multi-
furcation which is comprised by twelve different ‘branches’. These branches are summarised 
into four distinct approaches by the members of the Chorus to Agamemnon’s murder: asking 
for external help (1348–49), rushing into the palace to catch the murderer red-handed (1350–
51, 1352–53, 1354–55, 1356–57), expressing puzzlement (1358–59, 1360–61, 1362–63, 1364–65), 
and pointing out the urgency to investigate the validity of their perception that Agamemnon 
has been murdered (1366–67, 1368–69, 1370–71). This dramatisation of the Chorus’ response 
is not far away from a real-life human reaction to a major event, manifesting as it does 
different types of promptitude, bewilderment, and suspicion. The prevailing approach is that 
of suspicion. The sense of future openness that accompanies this discussion is immediately 
frustrated by the onstage appearance of Clytemnestra with the dead bodies of Agamemnon 
and Cassandra. 
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The next example of sideshadowing comes from the Libation Bearers and consists of two 
nodal points, one expressed by Clytemnestra (889–91) and one expressed by Orestes (899), 
during their final encounter before the matricide (891–930). As soon as Clytemnestra finds out 
about the murder of Aegisthus, she seeks to create possibilities for herself (889–91): 
Someone give me an axe to slay a man, at once! | Let us see if we are to win or 
lose the victory! | That is where I have come to now in this evil business. 
As the quote above illustrates, Clytemnestra resists Orestes’ determination to close down her 
future options through the matricide. The nodal point featuring in the line ‘Let us see if we 
are to win or lose the victory!’ (εἰδῶμεν εἰ νικῶμεν ἢ νικώμεθα, 890), consists of two clauses 
featuring the same verb separated by the conjunction ἢ and demonstrates Clytemnestra’s 
eagerness to expand the field of her possibilities. She will either be defeated or survive, after 
fighting for her life with a sword. This prepares for another nodal point which has to do with 
the question of whether or not an axe will be brought to her and, if so, by whom. As is the 
case with the Chorus at the end of the Agamemnon, Clytemnestra will never have the 
opportunity to take action. Clytemnestra’s sense of an open future is frustrated by Orestes’ 
appearance with a sword. 
Clytemnestra’s and Orestes’ dispute leads climactically to Orestes’ hesitation to go 
ahead with the matricide and his address of his friend Pylades. This nodal point is employed 
with question (899): 
 Pylades, what am I to do? Is such respect to stop me from killing my mother? 
This plot twist99 transforms the once fixed future (planned by Orestes with the help of Orestes’ 
oracle) into an uncertain future. What Orestes is meant to do turns from a straight-line path 
into a forking path. Morson argues that the fulfilment of an oracle tends to be specified, 
whereas the path of an oracle is not. In the case of Orestes it is the fulfilment that is put into 
 
99 See section 6.4.3 ‘Suspense through action delayed’ and 7.4.1 ‘Surprise through reversals’. 
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doubt through line 899.100 What follows is Pylades’ intervention which reminds Orestes of the 
oracle and the oath (244–45, 435–37, 540).101 Although this temporarily restores Orestes’ view 
of a closed future that is easier for him to actualise (900–2), the nodal point entertains in a 
powerful way the idea that Clytemnestra’s matricide could have been avoided. 
My last example from the Libation Bearers is the two scenarios included in Orestes’ plan 
to kill Aegisthus. Orestes sketches out in detail the different actions involved in two separate 
story lines (570–78): 
 But if I get | across the threshold of the outer doors and find him on my | 
father's throne, or if he actually comes back and speaks to me | face to face—
you can be sure, as soon as I get sight of him, | before he can say, 'What 
country's the stranger from?', I'll | make a corpse of him; I'll cover him with 
blows from my swift | blade. The Fury will not be stinted of bloodshed, she 
will | drink pure blood to the third draught. 
According to the plan, Orestes and Pylades, disguised as foreigners, will appear at the palace’s 
door. The two alternative scenarios are as follows: Orestes gets in the palace and attacks 
Aegisthus who is on Agamemnon’s throne (572), and alternatively Aegisthus comes and 
receives Orestes (573–74).102 The alternative possibilities embedded in Orestes’ plan 
demonstrate how any plan is subject to contingency and uncertainty. However, in both cases, 
death awaits Aegisthus. Unlike the nodal point of killing Clytemnestra (899), this nodal point 
raises expectations that are fulfilled (869). 
I conclude this section by looking at a set of nodes introduced by Orestes and the Furies 
in the trial scene of the Eumenides (566–751). More specifically, after the exposition of their 
cases, the two parties express their anguish for the outcome of the trial which is about to be 
announced (744–47): 
 
100 Morson (1994, 64) notes that omens and oracles project to inevitable outcomes, but they do not ‘necessarily 
specify the path leading to [them]’, because ‘whatever path is chosen and whatever choices are made the omen 
will be fulfilled.’  
101 For the oath, see sections 5.3.2 ‘Prayers and oaths’  above and 7.4.2 ‘Surprise through small-scale changes’ below. 
102 Garvie (1986) on 572–76. 
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ORESTES: O Phoebus Apollo! How will the issue be decided? 
FURIES: O Night, black mother! Are you seeing this? 
ORESTES: A noose is the end for me now, or (ἢ) to see the daylight! 
FURIES: Yes, and for us it is extinction, or (ἢ) maintaining our prerogatives 
after! 
The first two lines include two questions, each addressed to a protector, Orestes’ to Apollo 
and the Furies’ to Night. The next two lines are structured around nodes marked by the 
conjunction ἢ which demonstrates that both paths are equally possible. For Orestes, the future 
will bring either death by suicide or salvation (νῦν ἀγχόνης μοι τέρματ᾿, ἢ φάος βλέπειν, 
746).103 For the Furies, the future will bring extinction or continuity (ἡμῖν γὰρ ἔρρειν, ἢ πρόσω 
τιμὰς νέμειν, 747). These lines highlight uncertainty as a typical feature of expectations 
related to the outcome of any trial. Finally, the votes are counted and found equal, an outcome 
which does not immediately point to a clear verdict: the equality of the votes maintains the 
uncertainty of sideshadowing. Even when this becomes resolved through Athena’s intervention 
and Orestes’ acquittal, neither of the possibilities entertained by Orestes and by the Furies in 
744–47 is finally materialised. 
 In this section I have argued that sideshadowing manifests its presence in the dramatic 
narrative through nodal points. These point to two or more paths, of which only one is to be 
followed. However, the path chosen by the characters is not always materialised. In this sense, 
the sense of uncertainty that sideshadowing generates is not dissolved. In some cases, nodal 
points are employed to frustrate the prospect of an open future (the Chorus at the end of the 
Agamemnon, Clytemnestra in the Libation Bearers). In other cases, they are employed to deepen 
the sense of an open future (Agamemnon in the Agamemnon, Orestes in the Libation Bearers). 
Finally, there are cases where nodal points are employed to accommodate the sense of an open 
future which is maintained (Orestes and the Furies in the Eumenides). 
 
103 For the line 747 ‘νῦν ἀγχόνης μοι τέρματ’…’, see Sommerstein (2008) n. 154. 
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5.4.2. Unexposed stories 
Sideshadowing also takes place in the Oresteia in another way, namely through the presence of 
stories with unexposed aspects. These stories are either closely associated with the main 
storyline or they refer to side-stories emerging from the main narrative. In Morson’s words, 
stories multiply ‘if other ‘facts’ lie behind the ostensible ones’.104 While the previous (5.4.1) and 
the following section (5.4.3) explore sideshadowing as incorporated in the narrative through 
nodal points and statements referring to alternative futures respectively, this section tracks 
down sideshadowing in possibilities generated by stories incorporated in the narrative. As 
examples I examine unexposed or less exposed aspects of Iphigeneia’s sacrifice in the 
Agamemnon, of Iphigenia’s sacrifice and Electra’s role in the Libation Bearers, and of Orestes’ 
future in the Eumenides. 
Agamemnon’s dilemma in the Agamemnon was discussed as a nodal point (5.4.1), but 
there are aspects of it to which we need to return. The first part of the node, the non-
compliance to Artemis’ ordain, raises a question which is not adequately answered: How do 
we know that Artemis asks for Iphigenia to be sacrificed? The narrative does not provide a 
sufficient answer about Artemis’ anger, how this is mitigated, and how Iphigenia is 
involved.105 In the following lines, the Chorus incorporate Calchas’ interpretation of Artemis’ 
mandate in direct speech (150–52): 
…in her urge for a second sacrifice, | one with no music, no feasting, an 
architect of feuds born in the family, | with no fear of the man. 
However, the significance of the request is disproportionate to the accuracy and the validity 
of its exposition and justification. The quote above does not expose the reasons behind 
Artemis’ request and does not mention Iphigenia as the selected victim. As pointed out by 
Fraenkel, the epithets ἄνομον and ἄδαιτον of θυσίαν may only allude to Iphigenia, an allusion 
which can only be understood by those who might know the story.106 In a similar way, Duncan 
 
104 Morson (1994) 121. 
105 On the mythical account on Artemis’ anger, see Fraenkel (1950, II) 97–99; Lloyd-Jones (1983). See also Furley 
(1986) on an analysis of different interpretations of Artemis’ anger. 
106 Fraenkel (1950, II) on 153. 
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Kennedy discusses the ambiguities in Sophocles’ Oedipus the King which do not allow us to 
claim with certainty that Oedipus was the one who killed his father: 
Whether the traveller that Oedipus killed was Laius is never explicitly spelled 
out in the play, though Oedipus himself jumps to that conclusion, as do most 
readers and viewers: we know that Oedipus and married his mother, don’t we? 
Everybody knows. But how do we know? And why is the play so hazy about 
details when, if it is the grand affirmation of prophecy, fate and a deterministic 
worldview it is so generally taken to be, it could surely have made everything 
as ‘clear’ as Oedipus has come to believe it is? 107 
The obscurity of Artemis’ message and its interpretation continues to the next reference to 
Iphigeneia by the Chorus in lines 198–204: 
[W]hen too the seer cried to the chiefs | a further, more heavy means | against 
the bitter storm, | he named Artemis as cause, enough | for the Atreidae | to 
thump their staffs upon the ground | and not be able to restrain their tears. 
As the lines above suggest, Artemis requests an animal sacrifice which is ‘more heavy’ than 
ordinary, without again specifying explicitly the identity of the desired victim. 
A scrutiny of the second part of Agamemnon’s dilemma which has to do with 
compliance to Artemis, also leaves certain questions unanswered. According to Agamemnon, 
this compliance will make him ‘a deserter of his fleet losing his alliance’ (210). In 
Sommerstein’s words, ‘Agamemnon puts the alternative in the worst possible light’.108 More 
specifically, it is left unclear whether the military expedition to Troy cannot set out, if 
Agamemnon withdraws on the grounds of an immense cost such as the killing of his child. In 
addition, it is also unclear whether Agamemnon is obliged to his allies in a way that would 
bind him to accept Iphigenia’s killing.109 Furthermore, Agamemnon’s use of the word θέμις 
 
107 Kennedy (2013) 107. Author’s emphases. 
108 Sommerstein (2008) on 212 n. 46. 
109 Sommerstein (2008) on 212–13 n. 46–47. See also Sommerstein (2010c2) 363–65. 
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for the army’s desire as ‘natural’ (217110) and the Chorus’ reference to this as ‘the yoke-strap of 
compulsion’ which, however, Agamemnon voluntarily puts on111 (ἐπεί δ’ ἀνάγκας ἔδυ 
λέπαδνον, 218) shorten the story and raise questions of whether Iphigenia needs to be 
sacrificed.112 
After the narration of Agamemnon’s dilemma (206–17) and of the sacrifice (218–47), 
the Chorus concludes with a final reference to Iphigenia (248–49): 
What followed, I neither saw nor do I say; | but Calchas’ skills did not go 
unfulfilled. 
With this vague line the Chorus completes their narration about the past. Although the 
speeches of Calchas’ and Agamemnon’s secure accuracy and validity, what they also do is to 
enhance the effectiveness of sideshadowing. In the absence of more information to frame the 
speeches and to justify Iphigenia’s killing, the possibility is left open for imagining a different 
future for Iphigenia. 
The next example of sideshadowing also refers to Iphigenia and is found in the Libation 
Bearers (242, 255–56, 694–95). Despite their scarcity, these references bring back memories of 
the event of her killing and problematise its necessity. In line 242, the only one with an explicit 
reference to Iphigenia, she is mentioned by Electra in the prayers to their father. Iphigenia is 
mentioned as the sister ‘who was ruthlessly sacrificed’ (242). The use of the adverb νηλεῶς 
(‘ruthlessly’) is puzzling, as it sounds out of place.113 If we receive it as a criticism of 
Agamemnon, it is very brief. It is also used by Electra who is ‘fiercely loyal’,114 in a prayer to 
her father, whose loss she mourns every day. It is nevertheless a poignant reminder ‘that 
Agamemnon was not a guiltless victim’.115 In a less direct way, lines 255–56 return to 
 
110 I follow Page and Sommerstein who attribute θέμις to the army’s desire to sacrifice Iphigenia. For another 
interpretation (based on West’s correction), see Raeburn & Thomas (2011) and Collard (2002) on 217. For similar 
meanings of θέμις, see Sommerstein (2008) on 217 n. 48. 
111 Raeburn & Thomas (2011) on 218. 
112 For other references to Iphigenia in the Agamemnon, see 1415–20, 1525–28, 1555–58. 
113 See Brown (2018) in 242, citing Zeilin (1965, 490) and van Erp Taalman Kip (1996, 121). 
114 Brown (2018) in 242. 
115 Garvie (1986) in 242. 
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Agamemnon as a sacrifice (τοῦ θυτήρος) in what is an appeal by Electra and Orestes to Zeus 
(the question of whether or not this is intended by the characters as a reference to the sacrifice 
of Iphigenia is irrelevant to my argument).116 Finally, at 694–95, in the context of 
Clytemnestra’s accusations against the Curse of the house (Ἀρά, 693) which wiped out all of 
her dear ones (φίλων, 695), the use of the plural alludes the killing of Iphigenia.117 These 
references work as reminders not only of Iphigenia’s victimhood but, more importantly, of 
Agamemnon’s guilt and of Clytemnestra’s motives in killing him, whose dramatic purpose is 
to complicate the upcoming matricide. 
Another example of sideshadowing that can be found in the Libation Bearers has to do 
with Electra who seems to disappear in the second half of the play. In the first half of the play, 
Electra has a leading role, from her (and the Chorus’) arrival at the tomb of Agamemnon to 
the scene of the recognition and the construction of the matricide plan. More specifically, she 
is the one who exposes in detail the present and past life in the palace after Agamemnon’s 
murder. She is also the one who expresses her personal sufferings and hatred towards her 
mother and Aegisthus (132–37, 241, 332–39, 418–22, 429–43, 444–50, 481–82, 486–88). As Peter 
Arnott points out, Electra’s character has been built up in the first half of the play to dominate 
the stage, as ‘we see the lurid history of the House of Atreus through her eyes’.118 In that way, 
she ‘helps galvanise Orestes’119 so as for him to commit the two murders which will reinstate 
their positions in their father’s house (243). It is in this context of being reinstated in Argos 
that she expects to be married (487 and perhaps 482).120 She, then, gets inside the palace after 
line 584 to follow Orestes’ orders: ‘You must therefore now keep a good guard | upon things 
inside, so that all this succeeds in fitting closely | together’ (579–81). Although the success of 
the murder plans indicates that she probably follows Orestes’ orders, she never reappears and 
we never learn what happens to her in this or the following play(s).121 We never learn how she 
receives the events of Clytemnestra’s and Aegisthus’ murders and, more significantly, 
 
116 See further Garvie (1986) on 242. 
117 Collard (2002) on 695. 
118 Arnott (1989) 184–85. 
119 Marshall (2017) 96. 
120 The meaning of line 482 is the product of restoration. See Sommerstein (2008) on 482 (n. 104); Brown (2018) on 
486–87. 
121 I consider lines 691–95 to be spoken by Clytemnestra rather than Electra, on the grounds outlined by Garvie 
(1986) in 691–95. 
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Orestes’ pursuit by the Furies. We also never learn how Electra experiences the fact that she 
will have to endure more suffering as Orestes will flee again from Argos, now as a source of 
pollution. The aftermath of the matricide frustrates all future plans for a normal life, and, 
perhaps, a future marriage, in the royal house of Argos. In the case of Electra, this holds true 
for the Eumenides as well. In this play, Orestes imagines his own future, but without any 
reference to the sister he left behind.122 The unexposed story of Electra’s future is precisely the 
gap that Euripides will seek to dramatise in his plays. 
I will conclude this section on sideshadowing with one example from the Eumenides 
which relates to Orestes’ future. In his speech as an acquitted man, Orestes announces his 
return to Argos (754–62): 123 
O Pallas! O saviour of | my house! You have restored me to my home when I 
was | deprived of my father's land. Among the Greeks they will be | saying, 
'The man is again an Argive, and living on his father's | property'—thanks to 
Pallas, and to Loxias, and to him the | third, the Saviour, who accomplishes 
everything, who from | proper regard for my father's death has brought me 
safety, on | seeing these advocates for my mother. | Now I will go to my 
home… 
As this quote suggests, Orestes celebrates his imminent return to Argos after many years of 
suffering. Finally, the house of the Atreides can hope for a brighter future. However, this 
desirable nostos is not dramatised in the play. Taplin notes that Orestes’ ‘purposeful, confident 
exit marks the reversal of his former desperation and shows his true return home in contrast 
to his ‘return’ at the beginning of Choephoroi.’124 However, this sense of purpose and confidence 
that Taplin attributes to Orestes’ exit lies only in the future we imagine for him. The 
preoccupations of the rest of the play lie elsewhere and Orestes has no role to play in them. 
 
122 Carroll (2007) 6. In Carroll’s theory of closure, the early departure of a character who has dominated the stage 
works against closure. 
123 Orestes’ speech in the Eumenides was also discussed earlier in this Chapter (under 5.3.2 ‘Prayers and oaths’) and 
in the previous Chapter (under 4.4.3) where the focus lay on Orestes’ future seen as future present. 
124 Taplin (20032) 26. 
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His future in Argos is not foreshadowed. Rather, it is sideshadowed as a possible future which 
might or might not be realised. 
 As this section has shown, unexposed aspects of the life of the characters can feature a 
distinct type of sideshadowing. They draw our attention to futures which can be explored on 
the side of the main storyline. Half-told stories and discontinuities from within the plot allow 
us to imagine another future for Iphigenia (Agamemnon, Libation Bearers) and to envisage 
Electra’s future (Libation Bearers and Eumenides). Even in the case of Orestes, his future is 
imagined as possible rather than certain, as it never becomes part of the dramatic plot 
(Eumenides). Although all this is not integrated in the closed universe of the plot, it 
nevertheless contributes to building up a wide nexus of interrelated stories. 
5.4.3. Alternative futures 
Another type of sideshadowing refers to alternative futures. These relate to narratives in which 
the future is imagined as being different from the future actualised in the plot.125 Such 
alternative futures are the product of the distinct ways in which the characters interpret what 
happens to them and anticipate future events.126 This section presents examples which are 
similar to the ones we have seen so far in the sense that they refer to what is only possibilities 
for the future, but they also differ from what we have seen so far in the sense that they 
foreground the ‘what if?’ question in a more pronounced way. As examples of alternative 
futures I discuss the wishful thinking of the Watchman, the Chorus, Agamemnon, and 
Clytemnestra in the Agamemnon (33–35, 807–9, 599–614, and 850–54 respectively), the 
contrary-to-fact thinking of Orestes and Electra in the Libation Bearers (346–53, 363–71), and 
the future feared by the Furies in the Eumenides (490–65, 778–92, 808–22, 836–46, 869–80). In 
these cases, each speaker outlines alternative futures which can be realised or could have been 
realised in the future. 
In the first play, the Watchman, the Chorus, and Agamemnon express wishes which 
refer to a future with Agamemnon as the king of Argos. The Watchman imagines the moment 
 
125 For the history of the term, see Singles (2013) 1–4. Other terms for similar preoccupations of this branch of 
literature are: ‘alternate history,’ ‘alternative future,’ ‘alternate future’. 
126 Hau (2013) discusses this in Thucydides and Xenophon. 
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when he will greet Agamemnon clasping his hand: ‘My real wish however, when the house's 
lord has come, is | to clasp his well-loved hand in mine’ (34–35). With the optative mood 
(γένοιτο, 34), he projects to a wishful future which he constructs and vividly visualises 
through the image of hand-contact. This future represents an alternative version of the story 
as we know it, as the Watchman will never have the chance to meet his king whose life will 
end soon after his return. In the same context, the Chorus looks forward to Agamemnon’s 
resumption of power, as something which will bring justice and set things in order by 
distinguishing the loyal citizens from the disloyal ones (807–9). Finally, a bright future is also 
imagined by Agamemnon, for himself and the city. In lines 844–54 of the ‘Carpet scene’ (783-
974), he announces how his return will bring a better future for Argos, and how peace, justice, 
and order will dominate, using several verbal forms in future tense: βουλευσόμεθα (‘we 
will…consult’, 846), μενεῖ (‘may remain’, 847), πειρασόμεσθα (‘we shall try’, 850), 
δεξιώσομαι (‘…to greet’, 852). All the references above draw our attention to the possibility 
of a future in which Agamemnon will reinstate himself as the ruler of Argos. 
Clytemnestra’s speech before Agamemnon’s return also features an example of 
alternative futures (587–614). As soon as she learns the news for the sack of Troy, her hopes 
for the accomplishment of her plan to kill Agamemnon are reignited. This enthusiasm is 
concealed in an announcement regarding their common future as a couple, similar to the one 
imagined by the Watchman and the Chorus (599–611): 
I shall learn the whole story from my lord himself; and I must | hasten to give 
my revered husband the best of welcomes now | he has come back. For what 
light of day is sweeter for a wife to | see than this, with the gates opened up 
when god has brought | back her husband safely from campaign? Take this 
message | away to my husband, to come as soon as possible; he is the | city's 
beloved darling. As to his wife, I wish he may find her | when he comes just as 
faithful in his home as the one he left | behind, the house's watch-dog true to 
him while hostile to ill- | wishers, and similar in everything else, with no seal 
broken in | the length of time… 
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While the lines above conceal Clytemnestra’s plans, they also outline an alternative future for 
Agamemnon. According to these lines, she imagines their future as a couple, how she will 
welcome her husband, and how she will seek to learn about his adventures in the war and the 
sea. 
A different approach to the concept of an alternative future, the one of 
‘counterfactuality’, can be found in the Libation Bearers, and, more specifically, in Orestes’ and 
Electra’s prayers for their lost father (345–53, 363–71). The example consists of two wishes, one 
by Orestes and one by Electra, which refer to how Agamemnon’s future and ultimate death 
could have been very different, had he not been murdered by Clytemnestra and Aegisthus. 
With a ‘contrary-to-fact’ conditional (εἰ κατηναρίσθης, λιπὼν ἂν...τ’.... κτίσας ἂν εἶχες), 
Orestes wishes to have lost his father on the battlefield (345–53): 
If only there under Troy | some Lycian with his spear, father, | had cut you 
down and stripped you! | You would have bequeathed fame in your house, | 
founded a life for your children making eyes turn in the streets, | and in a land 
overseas | had your tomb heaped high, | an easy thing for your house to bear. 
This alternative death of Agamemnon, instead of his dishonourable death at the hands of his 
wife, would bring glory to his children who would also enjoy a different life. Then, Electra 
also imagines an alternative future (363–71): 
Not even under Troy's walls | do I wish you had died, father, | buried near 
Scamander's ford | with our other folk slain by the spear! | Rather should his 
killers had died so,127 laid low in fate bringing | death [to enemies], for someone 
| far off to find out, | unaffected by these troubles here! 
Electra’s wishes go even beyond Orestes’ wishes. She imagines a future where Aegisthus (and 
maybe Clytemnestra) would have been killed without being able to affect their family. 
 
127 As Garvie notes, πάρος is 'rather', not 'before that happened'. This is also followed by Sommerstein (2008). For 
the anomalies of 363–66, 367–71, see Garvie (1986): ‘it would be wrong to look for realism in what is in any case an 
unreal wish.’ 
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Although set in the past, this is obviously a future if we consider how counterfactuals work: 
had Agamemnon’s murder been avoided, Orestes and Electra would have also been able to 
imagine an alternative future for themselves.  
As already mentioned, the scene above invites a discussion that brings side by side 
two critical terms: counterfactuality and possible worlds. Such a discussion offers an example of 
how ongoing explorations can be benefited by a future-oriented approach of the 
counterfactuals. According to Hilary P. Dannenberg a ‘counterfactual is a hypothetical 
alteration in a past sequence of events that changes the events in a factual sequence in order 
to create a different, counterfactual outcome.’128 In the case of Orestes and Electra, their 
invocations demonstrate how reality could have been different for them. However, that reality 
does not refer only to their past: although the counterfactual points out ‘a past sequence of 
events’ (as the definition above suggests) related to their father’s murder, it is closely 
associated with how the two siblings think about their present and, most significantly, about 
their future, near and distant, foreseeable and unforeseeable. Similar discussions would open 
up possibilities for explorations of counterfactuals and the future elsewhere in ancient Greek 
literature. However, they have been largely missing from the bibliography. 
One exception is the essay by Victoria Wohl who explores counterfactuals in 
Euripides’ Helen.129 Drawing on Aristotle’s ideas on probability and necessity of the events 
within the plot, Wohl shows how the play represents and fictionalises a counterfactual history 
of the Trojan war by making the improbable look probable. Turning to the scene under 
discussion from the Libation Bearers, the counterfactual, although not embedded within the 
plot as is the case with Helen, is employed in a structured and perspicuous manner that again 
invites us to reflect on the future. In their prayers, Orestes and Electra ponder about an 
alternative past, while also trying to keep a balance between the actualities of Agamemnon’s 
murder by Clytemnestra and Aegisthus on the one hand, and their wishful counterfactuals 
on the other hand. At the same time, characters and readers/spectators are left completely free 
to wonder about the alternatives in both present and future (even if such alternatives are not 
 
128 Dannenberg (2008) 119. The study explores counterfactuality through the development of the modern novel 
from the nineteenth to twenty-first century. For more about the history of the concept, see Ryan (2013, under 
section 3). 
129 Wohl (2014). On counterfactuals in ancient Greek thought, see also Wohl (ed.) (2014).  
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mentioned by the characters themselves): what kind of present and, most significantly, what 
kind of future would those counterfactuals be able to generate? What would be the chain 
events surrounding Agamemnon’s glorious death in Troy or his successful resumption of 
power in Argos following his return? Apart from the events presented in the apodosis by 
Orestes (348–53) and by Electra (367–71), the most ground-breaking and meaningful event of 
the near future that could take place in the alternative ‘possible world’ they have constructed 
is the averting of the matricide.130 Events that could happen in the distant future might include 
aspects of Orestes’ and Electra’s lives which I explored as ‘unexposed stories’ under section 
5.4.2 above.  
The final contribution to my discussion of alternative futures in the Libation Bearers 
comes from the theoretical framework of ‘possible worlds’,131 whose relation with the future 
needs to be emphasised. Drawing on the idea of the perception of reality as being constructed 
by multiple distinct worlds, actual and non-actual,132 Marie-Laure Ryan argues that the term 
‘possible worlds’ helps us focus on counterfactuals not as events that never happened but as 
events that could have happened. In this light, the definition of the plot is developed as follows: 
‘a complex network of relations between the factual and the nonfactual, the actual and the 
virtual.’133 Thus, instead of understanding Orestes’ and Electra’s wishes as lost opportunities 
which belong to the past, I argue that one needs to recognise those wishes as units of a macro-
plot consisting of actualities and virtualities able to form more than one future. 
Along the same lines, the significance of the future also needs to be teased out in 
Dannenberg’s definition of a counterfactual world as ‘a consciously virtual alternate version 
of the past world constructed in a thought experiment that asks, “What would have happened 
if . . . ?”’.134 Dannenberg argues that counterfactuality is associated with the divergence of 
narrative paths (while coincidence is associated with their convergence). Therefore, through 
counterfactuality the plot expands by branching out towards a net of interrelated events. My 
case study of the alternative futures in the Libation Bearers subscribes to this observation, while 
 
130 See Frizzarin (2017) for a focused analysis of the morphology of the counterfactuals in the Aeneid. 
131 The history and the significance of the theory of ‘possible worlds’ have been presented by Marie-Laure Ryan in 
her monograph (1991) and essay (2013) [revised version of (2012) article]. 
132 Ryan (2013) section 2. 
133 Ryan (2013) section 3.1.4. 
134 Dannenberg (2008) 53. 
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also pointing out that, beyond present and past, it is the future that accommodates all the 
narrative paths that are generated. Despite the tendency to identify tragic narratives with a 
sense of a closed future, the employment of Electra’s and Orestes’ alternative futures in the 
Libation Bearers puts forward the idea of the open future in the Oresteia as a network of possible 
continuations which can be simultaneously activated while reading or watching.  
The final example of an alternative future I have singled out refers to a future feared, 
and it comes from the Eumenides. The Furies expose in detail a possible future which will be 
realised in the event of Orestes’ acquittal. More specifically, before the announcement of the 
judicial decision (752–53), the Furies sketch out how the future world will be if Orestes is saved 
(490–565). In order to construct the image of the future world, they use adverbial phrases 
(μεταῦθις ἐν χρόνῳ ‘in time hereafter’, 498; ξὺν χρόνῳ ‘in time, 555), and verbs in the future 
(e.g. συναρμόσει ‘will accustom’, 495; ἐφέρψει ‘will…come upon’, 500–1; ἐφήσω ‘ I shall 
launch’, 502; σπεύσεται ‘will be eager’, 503; ἔπεσται ‘results’, 542; ἔσται ‘he will be’, 551) and 
in the optative (ἂν…οἰκτίσαιτ᾿ ‘may wail in lament’, 513–5; ἂν σέβοι ‘would any revere…?’ 
525; πανώλεθρος δ᾿ οὔποτ᾿ ἂν γένοιτο ‘will not fail to prosper’, 552). The new world will be 
dominated by injustice and disrespect for parents, and the Furies will act as punishers 
spreading out death to the violators: ‘I shall launch (ἐφήσω) every death at them’ (502). 
Instead of a sense of conclusiveness and finality, their singing bears a sense of warning and 
demonstrates a future of ‘what if’. Although the Furies’ alternative future is not materialised 
with Orestes’ acquittal (for reasons discussed in Chapter 4 above), it nevertheless maintains 
its quality as an alternative future until the end of the play and beyond. 
Alternative futures, then, are introduced through characters’ wishes which may or 
may not be fulfilled. In the Agamemnon, the characters imagine their future as one where 
Agamemnon will reinstate his position as the king of Argos, which, nevertheless, will be 
sabotaged by Clytemnestra’s plans. In the Libation Bearers, Electra and Orestes present the 
unrealised alternatives of their father’s future. Finally, in the Eumenides, the alternative future 
that the Furies outline remains an open possibility for the future. 
I have argued that the idea of sideshadowing can be tracked down with the help of nodal 
points, unexposed stories, and alternative futures. In doing so, I have offered only a sample 
of the various ways this can take place. Nodal points can offer two narrative paths 
(Agamemnon in the Agamemnon, Orestes and Clytemnestra in the Libation Bearers, the Furies 
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in the Eumenides) or more than two narrative paths (the Chorus in the Agamemnon), with 
specific content and with equal chances for materialisation. The examples of unexposed 
stories (Electra in the Libation Bearers) or semi-exposed stories (Iphigenia in the Agamemnon 
and the Libation Bearers, Orestes in the Eumenides) are preoccupied with a future which lies 
outside the plot and, thus, will not be realised. Finally, alternative futures manifest themselves 
as possible but unfulfilled (the Watchman, the Chorus, Agamemnon and Clytemnestra in the 
Agamemnon), as impossible to be fulfilled (Electra and Orestes in the Libation Bearers), and as 
open possibilities (the Furies in the Eumenides). 
5.5. Conclusion 
This Chapter has focused on two of the most vividly experienced aspects of the future, its 
closedness and its openness, which become narratively self-evident through the techniques of 
foreshadowing and sideshadowing. It has been shown that foreshadowing is associated with 
foreknowledge of a fixed future which appears within prophecies (5.3.1), prayers and oaths 
(5.3.2), and dreams (5.3.3). Sideshadowing, on the other hand, is associated with the emergence 
of more than one possible futures which appear either as part of the tragic narrative as nodal 
points (5.4.1) and alternative futures (5.4.3), or as possible continuations of unexposed stories 
(5.4.2). Both concepts of foreshadowing and sideshadowing are of profound significance in my 
explorations of the future temporality in the Oresteia. 
In terms of the usefulness of this terminology within discussions of the different 
temporalities of the future, foreshadowing and sideshadowing are instrumental for how to 
approach the future. The compound they share reveals that the future in narrative appears as 
a shadow, both as a real image and as a projection of something that lies ahead. In the case of 
foreshadowing, the shadow of the future appears ahead of time, while in the case of sideshadowing 
it appears from the side. The spatial metaphor embedded in sideshadowing is useful in 
expressing the idea of futures coexisting simultaneously.  
While foreshadowing refers mainly to how the tragic narrative manipulates types of 
foreknowledge, sideshadowing refers to how the tragic narrative generates stories ‘from the side’ 
in the absence of foreknowledge. In the case of foreshadowing, these associations with 
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foreknowledge are put to the test, as the characters often fail to fulfil what only they (and not 
the readers and spectators) see as closed future. In the case of sideshadowing, any stories ‘from 
the side’ employ in a more direct way the sense of an open future which the readers and the 
spectators understand as sustained or frustrated.  
As such, the discussion of foreshadowing and sideshadowing and how they generate 
effects related with a closed or open future prepares for what follows in the next two chapters, 
namely ‘Suspense’ and ‘Surprise’. 
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The term ‘suspense’ is widely used to describe one of the most powerful elements in story-
making and refers to the effect generated through our engagement with any narrative. I argue 
that in Aeschylus suspense is treated in a way that makes its exploration important not only 
for an understanding of the Oresteia but also for an understanding of the concept of suspense 
itself. As per my first argument, I contend that, by recognising the inner workings of suspense, 
the reader and the spectator of the Oresteia achieves cognitive and emotional immersion in its 
intricate plot. This immersion is heavily dependent on the interplay of cognitive discrepancies 
as the main constituent of suspense. As per my second argument, the Oresteia is a case study 
for probing the specific circumstances under which suspense is created. The outcome of these 
considerations translates into a model which can be tested on other narratives with regard to 
their suspensefulness. Thus, the concept of suspense itself can be further elucidated and refined.  
Whether or not suspense is an important element of Aeschylus’ dramatic technique is 
something that has divided scholarship. Although scholars such as Barbara Goward and A. 
F. Garvie have argued for the significance of suspense in Aeschylus,1 others such as Thomas 
Rosenmeyer have downplayed its importance, especially when compared to Sophocles or 
 
1 Goward (1999) 58: ‘Suspense may be Aeschylus’ greatest contribution to the development of the drama.’ Garvie 
(1976, 66) acknowledges the importance of suspense which, however, for him prevails over surprise (see next 
Chapter 7). 
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Euripides.2 In what follows, I first seek to present some theoretical background for suspense 
as a popular matter in ancient and modern criticism but nevertheless under-systematised 
(6.2). Then, I discuss its operational modes and how they are actualised as constitutive 
elements of narrative. In doing so, I discuss suspense alongside two narrative modes, 
narrative progression (6.3) and narrative misdirection (6.4). These two sections showcase the 
diverse ways in which suspense is employed in Aeschylus’ plays and demonstrate how 
Aeschylus’ handling of suspense involves the readers and spectators ‘in a complex 
hermeneutic process’.3 This chapter takes a close look at the workings of dramatic suspense, 
and contributes to the broader discussion of how readers and spectators are subject to 
experiences which immerse them into the narrative cognitively and emotionally. This 
discussion will be complemented by an analysis of surprise in the next chapter. 
6.2. Theoretical prelude 
Outside its widespread uses in everyday language,4 the concept of suspense acquires 
several definitions and interpretations from the areas of literary criticism, narratology, 
psychology, and film theory: from Roland Barthes’ ‘veritable thrilling of intelligibility’,5 to 
Morson’s ‘sign of our belief in alternative possibilities’,6 Eric Rabkin’s all-inclusive definition 
according to which anything that takes a reader through a story is a narrative suspense 
element,7 Andrew Ortony’s definition of suspense as ‘a Hope emotion and a Fear emotion 
coupled with the cognitive state of uncertainty’,8 and Alfred Hitchcock’s insistence on the 
 
2 Rosenmeyer (1982) 323. 
3 Goward (1999) 57. 
4 The word ‘suspense’ is rooted in the Latin perfect participle ‘suspensus’ of ‘suspendere’ meaning ‘suspended’, 
‘hovering’, ‘doubtful’. Today suspense embraces several intellectual and emotional states such as ‘excitement,’ 
‘nervousness and anxiety,’ ‘a state of mental uncertainty,’ ‘a state of expectation,’ ‘desire for decision,’ and ‘pleasant 
excitement about an expected event.’ For the complete definition, see OED s.v. suspense. On the limited usefulness 
of the above definitions of suspense, see Zillmann (1996) 199–200. 
5 Barthes (1977) 119. 
6 Morson (1994) 42. 
7 Rabkin (1973) e.g., 5–6, 58–60. 
8 Ortony, Clore & Collins (1988) 131. 
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relation between suspense and an always informed audience.9 These ideas shed some light on 
the various uses and meanings of suspense and convey their allegiance to the relation between 
suspense and the knowledge of readers and spectators which is central in my analysis. 
However, for a detailed understanding of its nuances and a systematised approach of the 
workings of suspense in narrative, one needs to turn elsewhere. 
The question of how a narrative can immerse its receivers has drawn the attention of 
critics since antiquity, as also seen in the Theoretical Prelude of Chapter 5. Thus, one who 
seeks to explore how the Greek narrative, archaic and classic, employs the involvement of 
readers must direct their attention to pre-modern scholarship as well.  
 In Aristotle’s drama and rhetoric theory, although suspense is neither explicitly 
articulated as a specific type of readerly/ spectatorial participation nor formulated (let alone 
systematically scrutinised and conceptualised), relevant considerations encompass 
suspenseful responses as a result of the reception process.  Aristotle’s main idea which also 
works as the starting point for exploring the critic’s engagement with suspense is that the 
readers’ expectations for the upcoming events of the plot can be generated only through an 
artful plot. The specific components of a plot which Aristotle appreciates most as instrumental 
to its artfulness are the ‘reversals and recognitions’ (περιπέτειαι καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεις, 1450a33–
34). They are described as ‘tragedy’s most potent means of emotional effect’ and are 
repeatedly put forward to explain how the tragic emotions of ‘pity’ and ‘fear’ (ἔλεος, φόβος, 
1449b2710) are generated.11 As the Greek terms for reversal and recognition metabasis and 
metabole suggest, they both imply the advent of a change happening within a complex plot.12 
For the masterly emplotment of reversals and recognitions Aristotle sets as guidelines the 
elements of ‘probability’ and ‘necessity’ (τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, 1451a12–1513). The future 
events of the plot to be anticipated by the readers must be both probable and necessary to make 
 
9 On Hitchcock’s definition of suspense, see Truffaut & Hitchcock (1962), part 19 of recorded interview (from 
20:42 to 27:20). See also Beecher (2007, 255–56) who points out the difficulty of defining suspense and of deciding 
‘whether a study of suspense should begin in narratology or psychology’. 
10 See also 1452a38-b1 (definition of tragedy), 1452a2–3, 1452a38–1452b1, 1452b32, 1452b35, 1452b38–1453a7, 
1453b1, 1453b5. 
11 Halliwell (1987) 91. 
12 See 1452a16–18 (μετάβασις for περιπέτεια and μεταβολή), 1452a21–24 (μεταβολή for περιπέτεια), 1452a28–33 
(μεταβολή for ἀναγνώρισις). See also Halliwell (2002) 14 and n. 9. On references to reversal and recognition see 
for example:  1452a38–1452b1, 1452b8–9, 1452b38–1453a2, 1454b19–1455a20, 1456a18–20.  
13 See also 1451a38–39, 1451b9, 1452a20, 1452a23, 1452a34–35. 
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sense within their lives. Therefore, for Aristotle only a complex set of plot operations can be 
affective and only under the presence of coherent and tightly organised events that 
incorporate reversals and recognitions. 
The second point that works complementarily to this discussion comes from the 
Rhetoric, where the phrase  ‘their [the listeners’] understanding not be kept in suspense’ 
(1415a6) invites for a more explicitly articulated association of Aristotle’s ideas with the 
modern meaning of suspense.14 Similarly to what Aristotle implies with the terms ‘probability’ 
and ‘necessity’ in his drama theory, the critic here denounces vagueness and 
incomprehensibility with regard to the listeners’ expectations at the beginning of a speech or 
poem. Aristotle’s main view is that the writer must always share advance knowledge with the 
audience because lack of knowledge would potentially obstruct them from engaging with the 
narrative. As examples of poets who do inform their audiences at the beginning of their plays, 
the author has Euripides and Sophocles (1415a6–7), with no reference to Aeschylus. Despite 
etymological associations between the ancient and the modern meaning of suspense,15 the 
attribution of the modern meaning of suspense to κρέμηται of the Greek text can be 
misleading: this would imply, first, Aristotle’s rejection of the aesthetic effect of suspense 
overall, and second, its disruption by release of advance knowledge.16 None of those can be 
claimed as grounded in Aristotle’s thinking. 
On the contrary, Aristotle’s considerations above constituting the formula for a 
successful tragedy take into account elements closely associated with the modern concept of 
suspense. Some of these are the succession of events in a tragic plot, their causal relations, 
expectations of events and their frustration, the intelligibility of the plot, and the idea of chance, all of 
which I have considered to form the model presented in sections under 6.3 and 6.4 below. 
Although those references never formulate into explicit connections with suspense, those 
 
14 Bartlett’s translation (2019) of the Greek ἵνα μὴ κρέμηται ἡ διάνοια. 
15 See n. 4 of this Chapter. 
16 As I will show below, although Aeschylus’ prologues in the Agamemnon, the Libation Bearers, and the Eumenides 
refrain from using expository techniques, they do employ highly successful suspense-generating techniques (6.4). 
Although I include the Libation Bearers’ prologue in 6.4.2, I refrain from its detailed analysis, as the text has been 
under extensive reconstruction. On this, see Sommestein (2008) 209–12 and n. 1; Zeitlin (1985); Garvie (1970). 
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connections are implied in the terms ‘pity’ and ‘fear’, pointing to ways in which the tragic 
narrative can engage readers and spectators.17  
While in Aristotle suspense does not appear as a concrete idea, this becomes the case 
for another literary critic of antiquity, Demetrius (4th–3rd century BCE). In his work On Style 
suspense appears as a specific narrative principle and a narrative element able to secure 
readerly engagement. More specifically, Demetrius acknowledges the usefulness of 
withholding information during the plot, as this engages the readers and generates 
suspenseful emotions: ‘keeping the reader in suspense and forcing him to share the anguish’.18 
While in Aristotle the verb κρεμῶμαι is used to emphasise only the epistemological 
disadvantage of the listeners, in Demetrius the term κρεμνῶντα, the participle of the verb 
κρεμῶμαι, signifies the immersive effect of suspense as well. 
Moving on to other attested attempts at conceptualising readers’ and listeners’ 
responses in antiquity, the ancient scholiasts also employ terms which shed light on the matter 
of whether suspense is acknowledged as a primary consideration of ancient literary criticism. 
Overall, it is acknowledged that the writers create and increase readers’ anticipation for the 
future of the plot via specific narrative techniques. As already mentioned in the Theoretical 
Prelude of Chapter 5, these techniques are regulated by and are subordinate to the orders of 
oikonomia. In this section, I will only refer to instances where direct references to ideas 
comparable to suspense are encountered. However, most of those references highlight the 
preoccupations of the epic rather than of the dramatic narrative towards generating suspense.19 
Additionally, explicit references to notions and ideas of suspense in Aeschylus or any other 
playwright are also absent. 
One of the narrative techniques often commented by the ancient scholiasts which can 
be associated with the modern concepts of suspense is ‘to keep in store’ information 
(tamieuesthai) that would lead to premature unfolding of the plot.20 The employment of such a 
 
17 See Ferrari’s argument that the Poetics is an essay in ‘which Aristotle…imagines that the tragic art can be 
adequately analysed as the art of suspense, whose proper pleasure derives not from increased moral 
understanding but from the emplotment and eventual dispelling of the play’s suspense’ (1999, quote from 183). By 
the word ‘dispelling’ Ferrari implies the concept of catharsis (1999, 196–97) which I leave out of my discussion. 
18 The Greek text: κρεμνῶντα τὸν ἀκροατὴν καὶ ἀναγκάζοντα συναγωνιᾶν (216). See Grethlein (2017) 113–15, 
Nünlist (2014) 167, Meijering (1987) 43–44, 198–99. 
19 See Liveley (2019) 82; Grethlein (2017) 113; Fuchs (2000) 177 n. 212. 
20 See Meijering (1987) 144. 
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technique as early as in the prologue was already noticed by the scholiast of Aeschylus’ 
Eumenides arguing that Aeschylus postpones the climax by employing the idea of oikonomia 
via ‘keeping in store’ information (tamieuomenos) until the most favourable moment.21  I argue 
below that this technique at the prologue of the Eumenides, which usually works contrary to 
audience’s expectations, forms an example of suspense generation through narrative 
misdirection.22 The second example comes from a scholion in the prologue of Sophocles’ 
Oedipus the King, according to which the important aspects of Oedipus’ story are reserved for 
their unfolding later in the plot.23 More specifically, although it is Oedipus who introduces 
himself as the renowned Oedipus, no further reasons for this are provided, as the playwright 
keeps them in store for the most effective exploitation in the future.24 In both cases, the 
technique of tamieuesthai works in support of the generation of suspense in the sense that the 
climactic release of information is retained until it produces maximum suspenseful effect.25 
One could claim that the technique of tamieuesthai clashes with what Aristotle states in 
Rhetoric with regard to how much information must be released at the beginning of a work. 
While Aristotle argues that poets should not keep the audience in the dark, the ancient 
scholiasts praise the technique of reservation of information on the grounds that it can achieve 
the audience’s immediate immersion in the plot. However, I argue that Aristotle is not 
concluding against the function or the usefulness of suspense itself, but against vagueness and 
incomprehensibility as conditions of an unsuccessful arrangement of the available material 
which jeopardise the audience’s attention.  
As mentioned above, the three tragic prologues of the Oresteia do not pursue the future 
through narrative progression (6.3) but through narrative misdirection (6.4), in which 
vagueness and incomprehensibility excite the readers’ and the spectators’ attention and 
curiosity for the forthcoming events. This aspect seems to be outside Aristotle’s research 
interests. At the same time, suspense should not be solely linked to the technique of reserving 
 
21 Sch. on Aeschylus’ Eumenides 1: Smith (1976, 42, 16–18). 
22 See section under 6.4.3 ‘Suspense through action delayed’. 
23 Sch. on Sophocles’ Oedipus the King 8. 
24 See also Meijering (1987) 198. 
25 For more examples on the technique of tamieuesthai, see Nünlist (2009) 50–51. See also Nünlist (2009) 49, where 
this technique is discussed with relation to both suspense and surprise on the grounds that tamieuesthai introduces 
the reader/spectator into experiencing the climactic development of the plot (suspense), while also provides enough 
promise of surprise against monotony. See Chapter 7 on Surprise. 
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information. It is also the technique of releasing information which elicits suspense through 
references to the future of the plot or exposition of future events functioning as early hints for 
the ones who watch or read. I will discuss how the spectators and the readers of the Oresteia 
experience suspense through this technique in section under 6.3 (‘Suspense and narrative 
progression’).  
Another example from the scholia which could take us towards suspense is related to 
the term proanaphonesis. Although this term is discussed in relation to foreshadowing in Chapter 
5, it can here go beyond foreshadowing to notions of suspense not only as a technique but also 
as the effect of anticipating future events from the aspect of reading or watching.26 The ancient 
scholiast of Sophocles’ Ajax uses prophonesis (instead of proanaphonesis27) with references to the 
future of the plot: ‘Such prolepses do not, by anticipating the future destroy the story, but they 
make the spectator attentive, because he is curious how the evil will come about.’28  
For the purposes of this Chapter, the exploration of ancient scholia has mainly 
contributed to offer a broader framework of the origins and history of the concept, while also 
pointing out the early acknowledgment of the long-lasting effect as the main quality of 
suspense (by contrast to the abruptness of surprise, see Chapter 7). However, the scarce 
evidence of the extant scholia on drama and on Aeschylus specifically complicates any further 
connections with the employment of suspense in the Oresteia, which I set out to probe in what 
follows.   
 During the second half of the twentieth century is when the concept of suspense starts 
to attract the scholarly attention of literary critics and modern narratologists and to develop 
in a more systematic way as both a powerful effect and a narrative technique. In the 1980s the 
literary theorist Peter Brooks introduces suspense as a feature emerging from the design and 
the intended meaning of the plot.29 Although one does not come across a complete unpacking 
and definition of the term, Brooks’ argument that the effect of suspense is the favourable but 
strenuous outcome of an epistemological tension of the plot is enlightening. In doing so, 
 
26 Meijering (1987) 205–6. 
27 See Nünlist (2009) 39 n. 51. 
28 In Sophocles’ Ajax 389c. For similar examples from the scholia in the Iliad and the Odyssey, see further Nünlist 
(2009) 36–39. 
29 Brooks (1984) xi. 
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Brooks draws on Barthes’ semiotics, and, more specifically, on two out of the five codes 
interwoven in a narrative, the ‘proairetic code’ and ‘hermeneutic code’, implementing them 
as two coordinates that determine the suspensefulness of the plot.30 Those two codes have also 
been mentioned in Chapter 3 with emphasis on their contribution to how we conceptualise 
the closural associations of the plot. What Brooks’ argument brings to this Chapter is the 
cognisance that suspense is generated by the interaction between how those codes operate, 
and, mostly, how the ‘hermeneutic code’ affects the ‘proairetic code’ creating imbalances in 
the plot. While the ‘proairetic code’ emphasise the happenings of the plot, the ‘hermeneutic 
code’ creates the ‘space of suspense’ through which the reader is navigated to the fulness of 
meaning, through ‘partial revelations and misleading clues’.31 The idea of suspense evolving 
from the plot marks a significant step towards the ways one can delve into its properties. 
Those ways for the study of suspense in this thesis are narrative progression (6.3) and 
narrative misdirection (6.4). 
Before I move on to more targeted studies on narrative suspense, it is worth mentioning 
that suspense as an independent topic receives increased scholarly attention in the 1990s with 
the edited volume Suspense: Conceptualizations, Theoretical Analyses, and Empirical Approaches 
by Peter Vorderer, Hans J. Wulff, and Mike Friedrichsen.32 In this collective study, suspense is 
put forward, analysed, and discussed from different perspectives, angles, and schools of 
thought, as the recommended way of grasping its qualities more efficiently. It is in this 
inclusivity and diversification where the usefulness of this study lies. Suspense is suggested to 
be approached both at its production in various types of narratives (film, poetry, theatrical 
play) and through its experience by their receivers.33 For example, some essays are more 
focused on a reader-oriented approach (Wullf, Mikos, Vorderer, Mattenclott, Zillman, de 
Wied), others on the narrative-oriented features of suspense (Leonard, Wuss, Cupchik), while 
others discuss the issue of whether and how suspense can be present on rereading (Carroll, 
Gerrig, and Brewer). What brings those essays together is the appreciation that suspense 
 
30 Brooks (1984) 19. See also Brooks’ definition of the plot (1984, 18, 287): ‘Plot, we suggested, might best be 
conceived as a combination of the proairetic and the hermeneutic, or better, an overcoding of the proairetic by the 
hermeneutic.’  
31 Brooks (1984) 169. 
32 Henceforth, Vorderer et al. (1996). 
33 Vorderer et al. (1996) 14. 
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needs to be studied as both a narrative element and an experience in the context of framing 
expectations for the future.34 This type of approach also traverses the current chapter. 
Two scholars that refer to suspense in narrative terms, associating it with cognitive 
discrepancies generated by the plot are Seymour Chatman and Mieke Bal. Chatman defines 
suspense as ‘a particularly intense kind of narrative curiosity which stimulates an unusually 
strong expectation of possible consequences’.35 This definition warmly invites one to study 
suspense within the complex dynamics of the plot, as they are determined by  the interaction 
of different types of events.36 While the kernels are the logically essential events for the story, 
the satellites are important for the aesthetics of the narrative and they elaborate and complete 
the kernels in a way that makes reading and spectating a striking experience.37 With a focus on 
the reception process, Bal distinguishes suspense into four types on the basis of the reader’s 
and character’s knowledge which is manipulated by the focaliser.38 More specifically, the 
reader and the character may have equal possibilities of knowledge or ignorance:  in suspense 
types 1 and 4 they both share knowledge or ignorance , while in suspense types 2 and 3 their 
epistemological statuses differ substantially.  
Two other, interrelated, models of narrative suspense which have influenced my 
analysis in a more direct way are those by Meir Sternberg and by Raphaël Baroni. Both models 
situate suspense at the centre of their analysis of ‘narrativity’ (Sternberg) and of ‘narrative 
tension’ (Baroni). Sternberg defines suspense as the ‘expectant relentless and tentative 
hypotheses that derive from lack of information’ and links it to the lack of desired information 
concerning the outcome of a dramatic conflict.39 Baroni focuses on suspense as an element of 
narrative tension and divides it into several categories, among which the most useful ones for 
my purposes are suspense par anticipation, the suspense where the anticipation refers to an 
unknown end, and suspense moyen, where the anticipation refers not to the end, which is 
known, but to how this end will be reached.40 
 
34 Liveley (2017) 8. 
35 Chatman (1993) 21. 
36 Chatman (1978) 32, 54. 
37 Chatman (1978) 54. 
38 Bal (1985) 148. 
39 Sternberg (1978) 65. 
40 Baroni (2007) 269–95. 
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One final addition to the theoretical background of this chapter has to do with the 
paradox of suspense. According to Manfred Pfister, suspense is a technical quality that lies 
within the text but awaits the participation of the audience to actualise its effect.41 This so-called 
potentiality of suspense assumes a series of parameters, a system of pragmatics, that achieve its 
realisation outside the text, where levels of attention, reception context, conditions of performance, 
and other factors define the reception process. Despite the rigid specifications of Pfister’s 
framework, his approach considers the reception of the dramatic narrative as the conditio sine 
qua non for the generation of suspense, a condition which is at the core of this chapter. In the 
same context, discussions of ‘the paradox of suspense’ by Noel Carroll and Aaron Smuts,42 
‘anomalous suspense’ by Richard Gerrig,43 and Baroni’s ‘suspense paradoxal’44 conceptualise 
how suspense can exist despite conditions of re-reading and re-watching. This is fully in line 
with Ricoeur’s mimesis 3, the model I adopted throughout my dissertation. According to 
Ricoeur, the experience of suspense through the cognitive process from an imperfect or partial 
knowledge to clarity is independent from knowledge of how the story in fact will turn out. 
The amount of scholarly work which has dealt with the effect of suspense in Greek 
tragedy does not do justice to the value of the concept of suspense as a main conceptualisation 
of how we respond to tragic narratives. More specifically, suspense in Aeschylus has been 
discussed in a very limited scale.45 For example, Goward’s discussion is useful and 
illuminating but it lacks detailed analysis,46 while K. Paul Bednarowski restricts his discussion 
of suspense in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon and Suppliants to suspense as an effect only relevant to 
the original audience, whose prior knowledge is taken for granted. Additionally, 
Bednarowski discusses  suspense in relation to issues of characterisation.47 As for more general 
studies, Francis Dunn discusses suspense in the context of the shift of interest from the past 
to the present (while I argue that our preoccupation with suspense is related to our uncertainty 
 
41 Pfister (1988) 98–102. 
42 Carroll (2001) 254–70; Smuts (2008a), (2008b). 
43 Gerrig (1989a), (1989b). 
44 Baroni (2007) 279–95. 
45 For other studies on suspense in Greek and Roman drama, see Monti-Pouagare in Sophocles (1988); Hamilton 
(1978) in Euripides; Pratt (1939) in Seneca; Duckworth (1942) in Plautus; Flint (1922); Stuart (1918) in Euripides; 
Moriarty (1911). 
46 Goward (1999) e.g., 57–60, (2005) 47–51. 
47 Bednarowski (2015) and (2010). 
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about the future), and he limits himself to suspense only through narrative delay.48 Ohlander 
focuses on Euripides and shows how suspense is relevant to the author’s audience, which is 
limiting.49 The only exception is a comprehensive study of dramatic suspense in Greek 
tragedy, with emphasis on Euripides, by Andreas Fuchs.50 Fuchs distinguishes three 
individual categories of suspense, the knowledge category, the emotion category, and the time 
category. Although he does not focus on Aeschylus, Fuchs is useful because he discusses 
suspense from the lens of literary theory, ancient and modern, offering a critical framework 
which is not wholly defined by the issue of historical specificity.51 
In what follows, I show how suspense manifests itself in the four plays as generated 
through narrative progression and narrative misdirection which represent two main narrative 
movements of the plot associated with the distribution of knowledge. 
6.3. Suspense and narrative progression 
This section deals with how suspense is generated within conditions of narrative progression. 
Or, to put it another way, how narrative progression creates suspense. By narrative 
progression I mean the forward direction of the plot towards its ending, or as Phelan notes, 
‘progression refers to a narrative event, one that must move through time’.52 The audience’s 
and readers’ expectations are generated while the plot unfolds through three different 
approaches to the distribution, handling, and treatment of knowledge. While the first section 
looks at how foreknowledge as a dramatic technique produces suspense (6.3.1), the second 
section focuses on suspense as the outcome of the eventfulness of the plot (6.3.2). The third 
section looks at suspense in relation to exposition of information regarding the future (6.3.3). 
 
48 Dunn (2007) 96–98. 
49 Ohlander (1989). 
50 Fuchs (2000). He briefly refers to Aeschylus’ Suppliants as a case study for narrative suspense (2000, 314–17). 
51 Fuchs (2000) 128. 
52 Phelan (2002, 211–12) argues that narratives progress through ‘instabilities’ (within a story) and through ‘tensions’ 
(within discourse). The second term reflects my approach in this chapter. For a focused study on narrative 
progression and its employment within short stories, see Toolan (2009). 
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6.3.1. Suspense through foreknowledge 
As mentioned in the theoretical prelude, foreknowledge and foreshadowing create 
anticipation and anticipation creates suspense. This is central to what ancient critics say about 
epic and tragedy.53 In this section I explore two examples of foreshadowing that provide the 
readers and spectators with foreknowledge and create expectations for them to be fulfilled: 
Cassandra’s prophecies in the relevant scene in the Agamemnon and Clytemnestra’s dream in 
the Libation Bearers.54 There are no examples from the Eumenides in this section. As will be 
demonstrated below, suspense within narrative progression in the Eumenides is generated 
through action (6.3.2).55 
The Cassandra scene (1072–333) is significant for generating intense suspense as it 
meets Pfister’s main criterion, the ‘quantity and clarity of the future-orientated information’.56 
The main events which are prophesied are the murders of Agamemnon and Cassandra by a 
woman who turns out to be Clytemnestra (1107–11, 1114–18, 1125–29, 1136–39). The unfolding 
of the future starts at line 1100, where the phrase ‘new affliction’ captures the readers’ and 
spectators’ attention (νέον ἄχος, 1101). Apart from the newness of this affliction, it is also its 
proximity (‘is plotting here in the house’, 1102) and its extent, intensity, and irreversibility 
(‘great evil’, unbearable for kin’, ‘difficult to heal’) that maximise suspense. In the next lines 
Cassandra discloses the actual content of the upcoming disaster: it is a murder which will be 
executed by a woman against her husband (‘Cruel woman, will you take this to its end? | 
After you bathe the husband clean | who shares your bed…’, 1107–9). By using a net as a trap 
to murder him (‘the trap-net sharing his bed, sharing guilt for his blood’, 1116–17), she is 
striking him dead while bathing (‘she strikes; he falls in the vessel's water’, 1128). Cassandra 
soon realises that a second murder will take place as well, her own murder at 1136–39 (and 
 
53 See Grethlein (2017) 114, on scholia on Iliad 11 and Sophocles’ Ajax; Nünlist (2014) 174. On the presence of prolepsis 
in the ancient scholia, see also n. 10 in Chapter 5. For a discussion of these elements in the archaic epic narrative, 
see Rengakos (2005) & (1999); Meijering (1987); Duckworth (1934). 
54 The ‘Cassandra scene’ features other elements which create suspense, irony (6.4.2) and action delayed (6.4.3), as 
conditions of narrative misdirection (6.4). 
55 There are two more prophecies in the tetralogy, Athena’s in the Eumenides and, probably, Proteus’ in Proteus, 
which are discussed in 5.3.1 as foreshadowing techniques. I do not include them here as they both refer to a future 
which will not be fulfilled in the course of the plots. 
56 Pfister (1988) 99–100. Pfister also enlists open discussion of dreams. See also section under 5.3.3. ‘Dreams: 
Clytemnestra and the Furies’. 
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then 1149, 1156–61, 1172).57 The peak of her report comes with the revelation of the identity of 
the murderer and the nature of the deed, and leads to an explicit reference to Agamemnon’s 
murder by his wife (1223–45, and then 1246, 1256–78). Finally, before her departure from the 
stage, Cassandra summarises in one line what will follow: ‘Now I shall go to keen in the house 
as well, | over my fate and over Agamemnon’s’ (1313–14). This detailed presentation 
contributes to the readers’ and the spectators’ foreknowledge and maximise their anticipation 
to see how this foreknowledge will materialise. The matter of how Cassandra’s attempts fail 
to reach her internal audience will be explored as part of the section of narrative misdirection 
and, more specifically, of suspense through irony (6.4.2). 
My second example of how suspense can be built up through foreknowledge is 
Clytemnestra’s dream in the Libation Bearers (32–41). Dreams as foreshadowing narratives, 
contribute to foreknowledge and generate suspense.58 For instance, Pfister lists dreams among 
the narratives through which ‘future-orientated information is transmitted’.59 Although lines 
34–41 offer limited access to the content of the dream, and we will have to wait until line 523 
for the Chorus to reveal it, I argue that this is an example of suspense through foreknowledge 
and not of ‘suspense through withholding information’ (as discussed below in 6.4.1). Its 
position at the very beginning of the play provides the foreknowledge which the readers and 
spectators require to anticipate its future materialisation. 
After the appearance of Orestes in the prologue of the Libation Bearers (1–21), 
Clytemnestra’s dream in the parodos (22–83) complicates the plot by releasing information 
gradually. There are at least four stages in that process. First, the Chorus do not reveal their 
presence as bearers of libations at the tomb of Agamemnon until the second strophe (32–41). 
Second, neither the content of the ‘prophetic dream’ (ὀνειρόμαντις, 33) nor the identity of the 
one who had it are immediately apparent. Although the dream is identified through the 
adjective τορός as ‘clear’60 (also first word of the line), there is no clarity in the manner it is 
communicated by the Chorus. What we have in this strophe is only the response of the yet-
 
57 On the murder weapon, see Collard (2002) in 1149. 
58 For dreams as foreshadowing techniques, see section 5.3.3. 
59 Pfister (1988) 100. 
60 I opt for Sommerstein’s translation (2008) of τορός as ‘clear’, instead of Collard’s (2002) as ‘[p]iercing and shrill’. 
See similar meaning of τορός in Agamemnon 254, 616, 632, 1062, 1162, 1564. Garvie (1986 in 32–6) notes that τορός 
‘suggests both the piercing nature of the cry and the clarity of its message’. 
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to-be identified person who had the dream, who ‘yelled screaming at full dead of night | in 
terror from the inmost house, | falling heavy on the women's chambers’ (34–36). The next 
piece of information to be released is that the dream was immediately communicated to the 
interpreters of the house who decoded it as a message of a powerful portent of the wrath of 
the dead against the killers (41). The final piece of important information comes in the next 
strophe (42–53), where the Chorus reveals the identity of the individual that had this dream 
and their own attitude towards them. The phrase ‘godless woman’ (46) alludes to the female 
protagonist of the play, ‘the first direct reference to Clytemnestra in the play.’61 The Chorus’ 
account of the current situation in the palace (50–54) reaches a climax with the phrase ‘through 
the death of its master’ which sheds light on the previous reference in line 41 to the wrath of 
the dead against the killers. So far the readers and the spectators have collected foreknowledge 
which forces them to anticipate with suspense what is coming: a) The Chorus appeases the 
dead Agamemnon with offerings on behalf of a hateful woman, Clytemnestra; b) 
Clytemnestra wants to appease the chthonic powers and to avert the future which her 
nightmare foreshadowed; c) this event is also situated in the broader context of the familial 
crimes of the past (as narrated and seen in the Agamemnon) and of the future as anticipated. 
Although what we have here is not a detailed narrative of the content of the dream itself, I 
argue that lines 22–54 provide references to Clytemnestra’s dream which build suspense in a 
powerful way. Although these references do not fully disclose the content of the dream, they 
nevertheless come across as foreshadowing the future. By contrast to this passage where the 
dream contributes to foreknowledge, in lines 514–53 its operation as foreknowledge is 
suspended and substituted with its manipulation by Orestes.62 
In this section, I have demonstrated how suspense can be built through narrative 
progression and, more specifically, through foreknowledge which is distributed to readers 
and spectators through prophecy and dream. The expectations that Cassandra’s prophecies 
and Clytemnestra’s dream raise have to do not with the if (Baroni’s suspense par anticipation) 
but with the how their content will be fulfilled (Baroni’s suspense moyen). In both cases, of the 
murders of Agamemnon and Cassandra and Clytemnestra’s matricide, the suspenseful state 
with which readers and viewers anticipate the future events lies within the tension between 
 
61 Garvie (1986) in 43–6. 
62 This was discussed in section 4.3.1. 
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the certainty that something will happen and the ignorance about the circumstances under 
which this will be materialised. 
6.3.2. Suspense through action 
Another element which is pertinent to narrative progression and contributes to the generation 
of suspense by pulling the story forward is action. The key elements of this type of suspense 
have to do with the fast pace and unpredictability of the unfolding plot, both products of 
narrative tension.63 Here I use as examples the scene with Cilissa in the Libation Bearers (730–
82) and the trial scene of Orestes and the Furies in the Eumenides (576–680). I will also discuss 
briefly how Menelaus’ escape from Egypt in Proteus could have been a suspenseful scene. I 
do not include examples from the Agamemnon, as I argue that suspense through narrative 
progression in that play is based on foreknowledge (6.3.1) and on exposition of future 
planning (6.3.3). 
While the first part of the Libation Bearers provides limited action and the plot moves 
forward rather slowly, the scene of Cilissa demonstrates that in the second part of the play the 
story unfolds at a much higher speed and with a clearer sense of direction, featuring ‘tensed 
action’ and ‘a rallying plot’.64 In this respect, Halleran notes that ‘[t]he almost frenetic pace of 
this section of the play reflects the intensity of the action (Orestes is moving toward matricide) 
and stands in sharp contrast to the static, ritual-filled first half of the drama.’65 Although Dunn 
points out that ‘[s]uspense of this sort—uncertainty or anxiety as real alternatives loom—is a 
Euripidean novelty that serves, among other things, to draw attention to present 
possibilities,’66 I argue that in the examples discussed here suspense is already the result of lack 
of foreknowledge. 
 
63 Dunn (2007, 86) uses the term ‘accident’ to describe the action in the play and argues that none of Aeschylus’ 
plays are as ‘busy’ as Euripides’. Although this might be valid, the action in Aeschylus is not related to how busy 
a plot can be with many happenings, but to how scenes with action have significant dramatic purpose and effect. 
64 Rosenmeyer (1982) 311–12. 
65 Halleran (2005) 168. 
66 Dunn (2007) 92. 
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Cilissa and the Chorus are the protagonists of a deception which targets Aegisthusand 
maximises suspense because it accelerates the materialisation of his murder.67 Cilissa is on her 
way to Aegisthus to deliver the message about the arrival of the two visitors, unaware herself 
of the true identity of the foreigners, and about the news of Orestes’ death (734–43), for which 
she is devastated (743–65). Just before she departs, the Chorus asks two consecutive questions 
(766, 768), through which they extract the information that Aegisthus will arrive with his 
armed servants (769), following Clytemnestra’s orders. Instead of allowing Cilissa to deliver 
Clytemnestra’s original message, they instruct her to deliver an alternative message (770–73): 
Then don’t make that your message to our hated master, | but bid him with a 
cheerful heart, so that he hears without being frightened, | to come by himself 
as soon as he can. | It depends on the messenger to make bent words succeed. 
The Chorus acts like a playwright and a director who must secure that there are no loose ends 
to the plot towards the anticipated event which is the murder of Aegisthus. The two main 
points of the new message refer to Aegisthus’ appearance on stage: he must come ‘by himself’ 
and ‘as soon as he can’. This combined action aims to save Orestes’ plan and give him back 
control of the events leading to the matricide. However, the success of Cilissa’s new task 
cannot be guaranteed yet, and its outcome will remain unknown until Aegisthus’ entrance in 
line 838. This scene illustrates what Sternberg argues for suspense: it is ‘rooted in the 
enactment of humanity’s free will’.68 
One of the main characteristics of the Eumenides is its fast-changing temporal and 
spatial setting. While Orestes has been persecuted from Argos to Delphi (1–93) and, then, sent 
by Apollo to Athens (235–777), Clytemnestra’s ghost urges the Furies to hunt him down (94–
142). This can be seen as a manhunt, an organised search for someone charged with a crime. 
Like in a modern adventure film, the frequent change of time and space can keep suspense 
going, because there is a sense of motion and unpredictability, conditions associated with 
dynamic change. This is seen most clearly in the trial scene (576–753), where the narrative is 
 
67 Goward (1999, 14) sees this as the mirror scene to the ‘Carpet scene’, as both deceive and lead to the off-stage 
murder. 
68 Sternberg (2003) 593. 
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dominated by the tension between Apollo and the Furies, as opposed and equally fierce 
powers. Their first encounter (179–234) has already generated anticipation for this second 
encounter. Until the announcement of the final decision of Orestes’ acquittal (752–53), the two 
sides appear equally justified in their claims for and against Orestes’ matricide. Apollo 
appears as witness (μαρτύρησων, 576) and responsible for the matricide which Orestes 
committed (αἰτίαν δ’ἔχω, 579). The Furies appear as the prosecutors (διώκων, 583) who are 
instructed by Athena to present the case (ὀρθός πράγματος διδάσκαλος, 584). Then, a 
stichomythia of nineteen lines between Orestes and the Chorus increases the suspense as 
Orestes’ guilt appears undeniable (588–606). Apollo testifies on behalf of Orestes 
(μαρτύρησον, 609) on the grounds of the justice of his crime (614–21, 625–39, 644–51), while 
the Furies fight back (622–24, 640–43, 652–56). Their speeches are followed by Athena’s order 
to the judges to vote over the case (674–75). This climactic moment reaches its peak through 
the actual process of voting, while Apollo and the Furies continue to challenge each other’s 
arguments. Although the announcement of Orestes’ acquittal (752–53) meets the readers’ and 
the spectators’ expectations, these have been building up in a powerful way for roughly 200 
lines.69 
It is plausible to assume that there were action scenes in Proteus, aimed at provoking 
suspense. These scenes are likely to have dramatised eventful events such as Menelaus’ efforts 
to captivate Proteus and to escape from Egypt. In the first example, the audience’s suspense 
must have been the outcome of their anticipation for Proteus’ prophecies which would 
facilitate Menelaus’ return to Greece. In the second example, Menelaus’ escape from Egypt, 
there are two fragments that are possibly relevant. In fragment 213 the adjective ‘unpursuable’ 
in the plural (ἄεπτοι), may have described those escaping Proteus, thereby suggesting that 
Menelaus was not alone and must have had his companions and Helen. In fragment 214 the 
word ‘ship’ (ἀμάδα) may well suggest the means of Menelaus’ escape.70 We can therefore 
argue that the narrative of Proteus must have invited spectators to experience another type of 
suspense which is related to adventure rather than tragic catastrophe. 
 
69 Taplin (20032) 45. 
70 Marshall (2015) 84 and n. 95. 
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In this section, I have shown how narrative tension and suspense are generated by two 
mutually reinforcing elements of narrative progression: fast pace and unpredictability. In the 
Libation Bearers, the Chorus and Cilissa participate in a scene whose fast development 
generates suspense, not through surprise or frustration of expectations, but through 
enhancing anticipation for Aegisthus’ death. In the Eumenides, the scene of Orestes’ trial 
employs quick exchanges which generate suspense through the tension and conflict of a 
courtroom. 
6.3.3. Suspense through the exposition of future planning 
The concept of exposition is central to dramatic and narrative theory and is mainly related to 
how the background of the story is presented in order to introduce readers and spectators 
‘into an unfamiliar world.’71 In my analysis, exposition is associated not with the past but with 
the future, and, more specifically, with the accounts that characters provide of their future 
plans. Those accounts offer the construction of a future with specific content and build up 
expectations for its materialisation. In Sternberg’ words: 
All ‘‘plans’’ or ‘‘purposes’’ bear on what will happen, and to this extent, their 
enactment necessarily involves a suspenseful advance for the agent, possibly 
also for the reader, toward the yet unborn eventuality, humanly unknowable 
beforehand.72 
The quote above is in line with Pfister’s interpretation of exposition as a narrative which ‘can 
be part of a more dynamic situation that is already moving towards an as yet unknown 
future’.73 While ‘Suspense through foreknowledge’ (6.3.1) deals with how information related 
to characters’ future is distributed to the readers and the audience through the dramatic 
techniques of prophecy and dream, this section presents how similar, future-oriented 
information is accommodated within the narrative through the delivery of future planning by 
 
71 Sternberg (1978) 1. On bibliography of exposition in drama see Pfister (1988) 86 n. 58. 
72 Sternberg (2003b) 532. 
73 Pfister (1988) 100. 
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the characters themselves. The difference between the type of suspense discussed in 6.3.1 and 
the one discussed in this section lies in the fact that the former is shaped by the tension 
between the uncertainty of the future and the reliability of the information coming from divine 
intervention (prophecy, dream), while the latter is shaped by the tension between the 
uncertainty of the future and the characters’ purposeful planning. As both types develop 
through narrative progression, our expectations are not frustrated but developed and 
heightened. 
I offer examples of characters’ exposition of future planning which do not limit 
themselves to the beginning of the plot.74 In what follows I look at Orestes’ and Electra’s 
prayers (306–509) and Orestes’ murder plan in the Libation Bearers (554–84), and Apollo’s plans 
in the Eumenides (64–93). I do not offer examples from the Agamemnon for two reasons. First, 
the expository mode (as the characters’ exposition of future planning and not the past75) is not 
the main mode of presentation of future events in this play, and, second, the generation of 
suspense in the Agamemnon lies within other ways of creating anticipation, namely through 
foreknowledge (6.3.1),76 through withholding information (see below 6.4.1), through irony (see 
below 6.4.2), and through action delayed (see below 6.4.3). The following examples illustrate 
how suspense can be provoked under the influence of the characters’ expositions and in 
anticipation for how those expositions will materialise. 
In the Libation Bearers we witness how Orestes’ and Electra’s prayers are gradually 
transformed into a matricide plan which heightens our suspense for the upcoming revenge. 
In those lines (kommos 306–578), Orestes and Electra, accompanied by the Chorus, immerse 
themselves into a ritual of plotting revenge against the killers of their father by asking his aid. 
The rituals slow down the pace of the plot, creating the space within which the decision of the 
matricide will take shape for the first time. In lines 375–77, the nature of the revenge starts to 
become clear: ‘Yet here is the thud of a double lash coming: | Orestes has helpers below earth 
already, | and our rulers' hands are impure.’ In lines 418–22 and 429–33, Electra expresses her 
 
74 Pfister (1988, 86) notes that the exposition must not be restricted to the beginning of the play. See also Pfister 
(1988) 90–91, 74–75. For an introduction to the matter of exposition in Greek tragedy and with an emphasis on 
Aeschylus, see Spring (1917). However, it restricts its analysis to the meaning of exposition as account of the past 
instead of account for the future. 
75 Examples of exposition as the recount of the past in the Agamemnon are the Chorus’ account of Iphigenia’s 
sacrifice (122–249) and the Herald’s account of Menelaus’ catastrophe (636–80). 
76 Such as Cassandra’s prophecy, discussed above. 
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hatred against her mother and, in doing so, facilitates Orestes’ announcement: ‘For my father's 
dishonour she shall pay, then, | with the aid of the gods | and with the aid of my own hands’, 
(435–37). Some lines later, his determination to commit the deed is clearly articulated: ‘It shall 
be done’ (514).77 Then, the Chorus’ reference to the dream strengthens in the most efficient 
way Orestes’ and Electra’s desire to kill their mother. The completion of this scene finds the 
readers and spectators prepared for, and, at the same time, full of suspense and apprehension 
for, what is follow. 
In the second example, we witness Orestes’ detailed exposition of the plan of 
Aegisthus’ murder (554–84) which increases our suspense even more in the expectation of a 
second murder to take place in the near future. Orestes begins the delivery of the plan with 
the phrase ‘It's simply said’ (554) and, then, outlines its details through a sequence of future 
tenses: ‘I shall come (ἣξω) in the guise of a stranger...’ (561), ‘we shall both of us speak 
(ἣσομεν) Parnassian…’ (563), ‘we shall wait (μενοῦμεν) as we are’ (567). The final lines 
include the ultimate stage of the plan (571–78): 
Well, anyway, if I do get past (ἀμείψω) the threshold of the front door | and 
find him (εὑρήσω) on my father’s throne, | or if he arrives home and then 
speaks (ἐρεῖ) to me face to face, | then I assure you, as soon as I set eyes on him, 
| before he can say ‘where’s the visitor from?’ I ‘ll make a corpse of him (νεκρὸν 
θήσω), | draping him round my swift sword; | and the Fury, who has had no 
shortage of gore, | will drink a third draught of unmixed blood. 
Here suspense is the result of the tension between our preparation for the future and the 
uncertainty of how that future will materialise. We will have to wait until line 838, when 
Orestes’ second alternative is the one that takes place. The additional complication that 
Aegisthus is out of the palace and, thus, needs to be called back, is what Cilissa allows to 
happen with the crucial intervention from the Chorus (explored in 6.3.2). 
My final example comes from the Eumenides, where Apollo offers an overview of the 
plot (64–93), without, however, the foresight and certainty of a prophet, leading to the 
 
77 Garvie (1986) on 306–478: ‘The ritual appeal to Agamemnon serves as the setting for Orestes' vital decision.’ 
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growing anticipation of the events to come. First, Apollo declares that he will support Orestes 
until the end and will fight his enemies (‘I will not betray you, no; and through to the end I 
will | be your guard in standing near you, but also when I stand far | off; I will not be gentle 
with your enemies’, 64–66). He then instructs him to leave Delphi, where Orestes has resorted 
while pursued by the Furies (74). The point of Orestes’ destination must be Athens (81–83): 
and there we shall have judges for this | matter, and words to win them over, 
and find means to release | you once and for all from these miseries. 
This overview sheds light to the turns and twists of the plot of the Eumenides, while also 
activates the readers’ and the spectators’ imagination about how all this will take place leading 
to Orestes’ acquittal. It does, of course, also contribute to surprise through narrative 
misdirection as I discuss in 7.4.1, as it prepares for the plot only until line 777, but for the 
purposes of this discussion its significance lies not in what it withholds but in the many 
narrative leads it offers. 
The examples I have offered in the discussion of how suspense is created through 
exposition of the characters’ future planning show that large amounts of information do not 
necessarily lead to the kind of certainty that could potentially undermine suspense. The prior 
knowledge of the matricide and of Aegisthus’ murder in the Libation Bearers, and Orestes’ 
transition from persecution to acquittal in the Eumenides are all in line with our expectations. 
However, suspense is raised by the fact that the future is still opaque and not fully determined. 
6.4. Suspense and narrative misdirection 
While the whole of 6.3 was structured around the question of how suspense is provoked 
through narrative progression and distribution of information, this section explores the 
generation of suspense as an outcome of narrative misdirection where the distributed 
information comes to be undermined. I argue that this is employed within the narrative 
through three distinctive techniques: withholding information (6.4.1), irony (6.4.2), and action 
delayed (6.4.3). All three techniques frustrate the readers’ and the viewers’ expectations for 
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what is to come. The concept of narrative misdirection in classical scholarship in general was 
first employed by James Morrison who examines cases of misdirection in the Iliad.78  
Narrative misdirection in Greek tragedy has been mostly associated with Euripides’ 
plays, while Aeschylus’ plays have received limited critical attention in this respect.79 For 
example, Dunn argues that [t]he device of leading the plot down a certain course only to 
reveal belatedly that this was a blind alley is typically Euripidean’, while ‘[b]y contrast, in 
Aeschylus there are no blind alleys.‘80 In this section I argue that Aeschylus’ narrative also 
invites us to either challenge our expectations and entertain the provisional possibility that 
another path, other than the anticipated one, might be followed, or, at least, he diverts our 
attention from what we have been waiting for and immerses us to a narrative of secrecy, 
ambivalence, and awaiting. 
6.4.1. Suspense through withholding information 
In this section, I demonstrate how suspense is generated through withholding information, 
while in the cases of foreknowledge (6.3.1) and exposition (6.3.3) I presented suspense through 
information which is communicated. I discuss the Watchman’s opening speech (1–39), the 
Chorus’ insistence on withholding (99–103, 456–60, 975–1000, 1030–33), and Clytemnestra’s 
murder plans from the Agamemnon, and Orestes’ plan to kill Clytemnestra from the Libation 
Bearers. I do not offer any examples from the Eumenides, as I argue that in that play suspense 
through narrative misdirection is provoked by delayed action (6.4.3).81 
Although the prologue can generally work as a point of departure for building 
anticipation about how the story will develop all the way through to its conclusion, the 
prologues in Aeschylus’ Oresteia rather constitute fields for experimentation on diverse ways 
of how to set the narrative in motion and to create suspense. Goward compares Aeschylus’ 
technique in prologues with Euripides’ expository technique: ’Aeschylus’ narrative strategy 
works in exactly the opposite way and he deliberately does neither of these things: his purpose 
 
78 Morrison (1992) 4 and n. 7. 
 79 On misdirection in Euripides, see Dunn (2007) 90–99; Ohlander (1989); Arnott (1973). 
80 Dunn (2007) 91. 
81 In the Eumenides, suspense is also provoked through narrative progression and more specifically by action, as it 
has been discussed in section under 6.3.2. 
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thereby is to create suspense.’82 For the Agamemnon, she also notes that the information is 
‘notoriously deceitful, defective and ambiguous’,83 and ‘all the characters are reluctant to give 
a full account of what they know’.84 The general sense of the Watchman’s speech is that it 
withholds more information than it gives. The prologue of the Agamemnon (1–39) could have 
been the only prologue of the Oresteia which includes key information for the whole tetralogy. 
However, even the little information the Watchman presents raises a number of questions. On 
the one hand, the announcement of the beacon light signifies the Greek victory in Troy and 
creates anticipation for Agamemnon’s homecoming and the restoration of political stability in 
Argos. On the other hand, the secrecy of the whole scene and the allusions to Clytemnestra 
come to question those expectations. Even his eagerness to welcome Agamemnon, whom he 
greatly respects by contrast to Clytemnestra (34–5), is overshadowed of the final lines. This 
suppression of information reaches its peak in the last four lines of the prologue (36–9): 
The rest, I keep silent: a | great ox is treading on my tongue—but the house 
itself, if it | got a voice, would speak very plainly; I talk willingly to those | 
who know, and for those who do not know, I choose to forget. 
The quote above, with a metaphor (36–7) and a conditional of the ‘future less vivid’ (37), 
illustrates the character’s insistence on reticence. This attitude draws the readers’ and the 
spectators’ attention to his words and maximise their suspense, regardless of any familiarity 
with the myth. This is also brought up by the Watchman himself who divides his listeners 
into two types, ‘those who know’ (μαθοῦσιν, 39) and ‘those who do not know’ (οὐ μαθοῦσι, 
39). Whether these words are understood as an allusion to the mythological tradition and the 
background of the story, and, more specifically, to the adultery of Clytemnestra and her 
relationship with Aegisthus, or as vague reference to an ongoing, yet unknown, precarious 
situation of the house, their cryptic meaning complicate any expectations, while also creating 
great anticipation for Clytemnestra’s appearance in line 258. 
 
82 Goward (2005) 47. 
83 Goward (1999) 55. This comment refers to the Libation Bearers as well, while I argue that this second play includes 
this effect in a less obvious way. 
84 Goward (2005) 50. 
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The next example refers to Clytemnestra’s concealment of her plans later in the play. 
From her first appearance on stage in line 258 to her departure in line 1068, her speeches are 
dominated by obscurity. Although this can be explained on the grounds of dramatic economy 
by the fact that the other on-stage characters must stay in the dark, it also creates a significant 
dramatic effect. For instance, her prayer to Zeus following Agamemnon’s entrance in the 
palace (973–74) manages to heighten suspense due to its obscurity: 
Zeus, Zeus master-fulfiller, give my prayers fulfilment! And | may you indeed 
take care of whatever you mean to fulfil! 
Clytemnestra’s prayer to Zeus the Fulfiller refers to a future to which she is looking forward, 
but which is as yet undisclosed. Although there are other examples that could be discussed in 
this context, Clytemnestra’s language is even more interesting for the ways it generates 
suspense through irony, a topic to be explored in 6.4.2. 
The Chorus’ persistent withholding information about the present and the future of 
Agamemnon’s household causes mystery and secrecy which also contribute to the generation 
of suspense. With a range from subtle early statements in the play (99–103, 456–60) to 
emphatic remarks (975–1000, 1030–33), the members of the Chorus repeat their inability to 
express their ongoing thoughts and emotions.85 They speak about their ‘concern’ (τῆσδε 
μερίμνης, 99), ‘grim thoughts’ (κακόφρων, 100), ‘insatiable anxiety’ (φροντίδ’ ἄπληστον, 
101) and ‘pain devouring the spirit’ (θυμοβόρον φρενὶ λύπην, 103). Although they provide 
details on the nature of their feelings regarding the future, they keep the reasons behind these 
emotions concealed. Later on, they mention their ‘anxiety’ which ‘waits | to hear of things 
veiled over by night’ provoked by citizens’ ‘talking’, without, however, clarifying what is the 
content of those talks (459–60). After witnessing Clytemnestra’s prayer to Zeus where she asks 
for fulfilment, they burst into a song of fear for the future but without, again, revealing the 
reasons (975–1000). They are dominated by ‘terror’ (δεῖμα, 976) because they expect something 
bad to happen (995–1000): 
 
85 Goward (2005) 50–51, 59. 
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My innermost senses in truth are not idle; | with my mind correct | in 
judgement, my heart whirls round | at the fulfilment to come. | I pray that my 
expectations | turn out false and do not come to be fulfilled. 
Finally, they explicitly state that they know what may happen, but they again withhold that 
information from us. At the end of their song, they emphasise that they would speak if the 
circumstances were different: ‘my heart would have anticipated | my tongue here in pouring 
this out’ (1030–33). This is reminiscent to what the Watchman had confessed in the prologue. 
The more the Chorus’ emphasis on the need for silence, the more the readers’ and the 
spectators’ curiosity for what remains unsaid. In the Agamemnon, the Watchman, 
Clytemnestra, and, above all, the Chorus repeatedly urge the ones engaging with the narrative 
to forget what they know about the story and invite them to focus on what follows, which may 
be different.86 
In the Libation Bearers, while Orestes fully exposes his twofold plan for the murder of 
Aegisthus (554–84),87 there is no exposition at all of the plan for the murder of Clytemnestra. 
This absence frustrates our expectations created in the first half of the play. In the first half of 
the play, Orestes, Electra, and the Chorus have communicated with certainty that the event of 
the matricide will take place. However, Orestes, after declaring ‘It's simply said’ (554), restricts 
himself to explaining the plan of Aegisthus’ murder, and we never learn how he plans to kill 
Clytemnestra. The references to her in these lines are hidden behind three verbal forms in the 
plural: κτείναντες (556), ληφθῶσι (557), θανόντες (558).88 The lack of details for a crime such 
as a matricide intensifies our suspense, as we are left in the dark as to what will eventually 
happen. 
It is plausible to assume that withholding information was central to how suspense 
was generated in Proteus. Because of its fragmentary condition, one needs to turn again to its 
presumably closest predecessor. In the Odyssey, Proteus is the sea-god figure who holds large 
amounts of information about the past, present, and future. In Book 4 (390ff.), Menelaus 
 
86 Goward (2005) 51, where she points out ‘boldness of this strategy’. 
87 See section under 6.3.3 ‘Suspense through the exposition of future planning’ above. 
88 Garvie (1976) 78 and n. 45. He also attempts to give the reasons behind this concealment, while I am interested 
in the effect this provokes. 
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narrates how Eidothea advised him how to take advantage of the wide range of Proteus’ 
power of knowledge as well as what it takes to get access to this knowledge: ‘If you can 
somehow lie in wait and catch him, he will explain how you can get back home (νόστον, 
390), plotting your path where fish leap through the waters.’89 There is no reason to deny such 
a power to Proteus in the satyr drama, where he may have been the one who manipulates 
either the release or the withholding of valuable information. Although in the Odyssey he is 
not presented with the gift of prophesying, the future is considered similarly accessible to him 
as is the present and the past: all three are temporal spheres to be explained. In this context, 
Cassandra in the Agamemnon constitutes a useful parallel. By contrast to Proteus, Cassandra 
is presented with the ability of prophesying which, however, is not received as a gift. The 
certainty of knowing the forthcoming events does not leave her unaffected, while the kind of 
secure knowledge that Proteus can provide guarantees Menelaus’ safe homecoming after the 
shipwreck. By contrast to the Agamemnon, where, as I argued in Chapter 4,90 we witness the 
transition from catastrophe to certainty, in Proteus catastrophe is realised as a lived reality that 
must be left behind. And this is exactly the type of intervention that Proteus’ knowledge of 
the future makes possible. 
It is conceivable that Proteus’ withholding of information about the future is 
dramatised in two stages. First, in the scenes preceding Proteus’ capture by Menelaus and his 
transformation, the spectators must have experienced suspense in the context of Menelaus’ 
anguished attempts to find, capture, and extract valuable information from Proteus. The sea-
god knows more than any human, which increases Menelaus’ desperation to access that 
knowledge. In a second stage, in the scenes following Proteus’ capture, suspense may have 
been experienced by the audience on the grounds that what Proteus presumably offers to 
Menelaus is only a brief and cryptic glimpse of what the future will bring. This is precisely 
the type of unconventional foretelling that Menelaus extracts from Proteus in the Odyssey: 
although Menelaus’ nostos will be realised, the specific path to be taken and the post-nostos 
situation remain unknown. Similarly incomplete accounts of the future one can find elsewhere 
in the Odyssey with regard to Odysseus’ nostos, which is repeatedly prophesied in the course 
of the plot but does not signify the end of his troubles. 
 
89 Wilson (2018). 
90 In section under 4.5 ‘Proteus between present future and future present’. 
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As seen in the examples above, withholding information regarding the future of the 
plot is experienced by the spectators and the readers as creating obscurity and keeps them in 
suspense, due to uncertainty and lack of direction. The Watchman clearly expresses his 
decision not to disclose any information about the future, whereas Clytemnestra (in the 
Agamemnon) and Orestes (in the Libation Bearers) also deprive readers and spectators of the 
opportunity to prepare themselves fully for what is to follow. 
6.4.2. Suspense through irony 
The concept of irony has been present in literary and rhetorical criticism since antiquity,91 but 
it has also attracted a lot of attention recently.92 Although it has been explored within classical 
scholarship in relation to several authors and texts, Aeschylus has received less attention than 
Sophocles and Euripides.93 An extensive exploration of the concept of irony, its diverse 
definitions and types lies outside of the scope of this section. In essence, its different 
definitions as a figure of speech demonstrate as key element of irony the fact that it ‘asks to 
be understood in a sense other than that of the actual words’.94 Here I will focus only on how 
irony contributes to the generation of suspense through its potential to mislead its addressees, 
a largely under-explored topic which aligns irony with the purposes of this chapter. Suspense 
is created by cognitive discrepancies which the readers and spectators are invited to observe 
and resolve. For my purposes, two distinctive, unanimously acknowledged, categories of 
irony are important: ‘dramatic irony’ and ‘verbal irony’.95 While dramatic irony, which is 
traditionally associated with Greek tragedy, is created by ‘the discrepancy between the 
 
91 On Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and irony, see Colebrook (2004) 1–2, Barbe (1995) 62–64. On irony in Greek 
tragedy, see Rutherford (2012); Markantonatos (2009); Rosenmeyer (1982). 
92 See for instance, Garmendia (2018) with a focus on verbal irony; Colebrook (2004) on a detailed analysis of literary 
irony and its complexities from antiquity to post-modernity. For further bibliography, see Garmendia (2018) 16. 
93 See for instance, Rutherford’s claim (2012, 329–30) that tragic irony ‘is more fully exploited and in subtler and 
more sophisticated ways in the latter part of the century’ (additionally 335, 350 and 356). Along similar lines, see 
Rosenmeyer (1982) 324. 
94 In Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria (6.2.16): ‘quae diversum ei quod dicit intellectum petit’. See also 9.2.44, 401. For 
other definitions of irony: Garmendia (2018) 1–9; Colebrook (2004) 13–15; Rutherford (2012) 323 n. 1. 
95 For the distinction between dramatic irony and irony, see Pfister (1988) 55–56. For other types of irony see 
Colebrook (2004). 
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ignorance of the fictional protagonists and the awareness of the audience’,96 verbal irony is 
created by ‘the notion of a meaning or intent beyond what we manifestly say or intend’,97 
which points to a different kind of discrepancy between the ignorance of the audience and 
readers and the awareness of the narrative itself. Both dramatic irony and verbal irony operate 
across the divide between narrative and its recipients in ways that co-exist and interfere with 
each other. 
In the examples that follow, I demonstrate how the diverse employments of irony 
maximise suspense for what is to come, through the disparities they manifest. I focus on 
Clytemnestra’s speeches before and during her encounter with Agamemnon (587–614; 931–
43, 958–74), on Agamemnon’s entrance speech (810–54), and on the Cassandra scene in the 
Agamemnon (1033–350); on the scene leading to the recognition scene between Orestes and 
Electra and the scene itself (82–234) and the first encounter between Orestes and Clytemnestra 
in the Libation Bearers (653–718); finally, I look at lines 938–48, 958–67, 978–87 in the Eumenides, 
where the Furies promise an eternally utopian future for the Athenians. 
Although in the case of Agamemnon information from within the plot is mostly 
withheld (6.4.1), irony is, nevertheless, related to types of prior knowledge, whether outside 
or inside the narrative. For instance, in the case of Clytemnestra’s encounter with 
Agamemnon, both verbal irony and dramatic irony are at play, leading to tension and 
growing anticipation for Agamemnon’s death. Before their first and only encounter, one can 
observe in lines 587–98, 599–601, and 607–9 three examples of verbal irony. In the first, 
Clytemnestra expresses her joy for the Greek victory in Troy to the members of the Chorus (‘I 
cried out my joy’, 587). In the second, she speaks about how she will welcome Agamemnon 
(‘I shall learn the whole story from my lord himself; and I must | hasten to give my revered 
husband the best of welcomes now | he has come back’, 599–601). In the third, she refers to 
herself as a faithful woman (‘As to his wife, I wish he may find her | when he comes just as 
faithful in his home as the one he left | behind’, 607–9). All those examples have a different 
meaning for the internal and external receivers of her speech. While both groups have to 
accept Agamemnon’s return as the cause of her happiness, only the readers and the spectators 
 
96 Pfister (1988) 43, also cited by Fuchs (2000, 42 and n. 34). Garmendia (2018, 16) notes that dramatic irony is out 
of the scope of her study. 
97 Colebrook (2004) 15. 
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who have followed closely the plot will understand that the real source of her joy is that her 
plan has just started to look more imminent. The inability of the Chorus to recognise 
Clytemnestra’s verbal irony is the source of dramatic irony for the readers and spectators. 
Suspense is created by the interplay of verbal and dramatic irony. As soon as we overcome 
the discrepancy, and we engage with the irony, we realise Clytemnestra’s determination to 
commit the murder. Suspense, however, is also heightened by the anticipation of whether the 
Chorus will be eventually able to see the irony behind Clytemnestra’s speech. What we have 
here, therefore, goes beyond Pfister’s claim that the dramatic irony is only about ‘the 
discrepancy between the figure's intended meaning and the actual interpretation of it by the 
audience’.98 
The next example comes from Agamemnon’s entrance speech where the dramatic 
irony lies in the fact that, similarly to the Chorus in the previous example, Agamemnon knows 
less than we do (810–54). Agamemnon outlines the details of his re-establishment as the king 
of Argos through future forms: βουλευσόμεσθα (‘we must take counsel’, 846), 
πειρασόμεσθα (‘we shall try to avert’, 850), and δεξιώσομαι (‘I shall enter’, 852), framed with 
the future formations εὖ μενεῖ (‘may remain’, 847) and ἐμπέδως μένοι (‘remain steadfast’, 
854). Agamemnon’s explicit presentation of his future plans manifests vividly the discrepancy 
between the future which Agamemnon imagines for himself and the future which we know 
that Clytemnestra plans for Agamemnon. Suspense is generated by the questions of when and 
under what circumstances Agamemnon will come to terms with the future that Clytemnestra 
has in store for him. 
In her encounter with Agamemnon, Clytemnestra’s speech (855–913) also contains 
several examples of the interplay between verbal and dramatic irony that contributes to the 
generation of suspense. In lines 855–56 and 895–902, we witness the verbal irony of her 
declaration of affection and admiration for Agamemnon: 
Men of the city, senior Argives here present, I | shall have no qualms in telling 
you how I love my husband. 
 
98 Pfister (1988) 57. 
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Now I have endured all this, with a heart free from grief I | would call this man 
his palace's watchdog, a ship's forestay | keeping it safe, a pillar to a lofty roof 
sure on its footings, an | only-begotten son to his father, and land appearing to 
sailors | against their hopes, daylight most beautiful to the eyes after | storm, 
a stream welling for a thirsty traveller; it is sweet to escape from all stress. 
At this point, we also witness the inability of both Agamemnon and the Chorus to engage 
with the real meaning of her words. In line 911, Clytemnestra encourages Agamemnon to step 
on to the fine fabrics guiding him into the palace: ‘so that Justice may lead him into a home 
unexpected’ (911). The verbal and dramatic irony of this scene is escalated by the double 
meaning of the word ‘justice’. The use of ‘justice’ by Clytemnestra represents two 
contradictory meanings related to Agamemnon’s return: justice can refer to Agamemnon’s 
rightful victory against the Trojans but also to her own rightful revenge for Iphigenia’s death.99 
Suspense is provoked by the dramatic and verbal irony as a result of the cognitive 
discrepancies between us and the internal addresses of Clytemnestra’s speech. 
Another example of cognitive discrepancies between external and internal receivers of 
a speech can be found in ‘the Cassandra scene’ (1035–330). Those cognitive discrepancies are 
created by the Chorus’ inability, and perhaps unwillingness, to receive Cassandra’s 
prophecies as anything but unintelligible and unpersuasive: ‘I do not know of these 
divinations’ (1105–6); ‘I do not yet understand; I am at a loss from riddles made in black 
prophecies’ (1112–13). Even when the prophecy communicates a clear and direct message (‘I 
say that you will look upon the death of Agamemnon’, 1246), the elderly men resist to engage 
with her words: ‘Which man is to bring this evil thing about?’ (1251).100 As we watch or read 
this scene, we experience suspense not only by engaging with Cassandra’s prophecies (6.3.1), 
but also by anticipating the Chorus’ reaction. It is precisely this failed attempt to engage the 
internal audience which generates suspense as a result of maximum dramatic irony. 
Moving on to the Libation Bearers, dramatic irony comes across as important from the 
moment when Electra and the Chorus appear on stage (22). We already know that this man is 
 
99 See also 1412–25 where Clytemnestra invokes Justice. 
100 For similar statements by the Chorus in this scene, see lines 1072-73, 1076-77, 1080-81, 1085–86, 1140–45. 
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Orestes, as he has introduced himself in the prologue (4–5) and has also recognised Electra 
from afar (16–17). The physical presence of Orestes and Pylades, who have concealed 
themselves near Agamemnon’s tomb, contradicts the following lines, creating great irony and 
raising questions about how the scene will develop: 
CHORUS: Remember Orestes, even if he's abroad.   115 
ELECTRA: Orestes is in exile from his property.   136 
CHORUS: What you say makes me no less ready with my tears | if he is never 
to set foot in this land.      181–82 
The more the lines contradict reality, the more the irony is increased. The already increased 
anticipation for the meeting of the siblings escalates from the moment of Electra’s discovery 
of the lock of hair (168) and the footprints (205–6) at Agamemnon’s tomb, which we know 
belong to Orestes, and the eventual disclosure of Orestes. In their stichomythia (211–25), 
different levels of knowledge involving Electra, Orestes, and us clash. Electra refers to Orestes 
as if he is still away (216, 218), while she thinks that the man in front of her, who is Orestes, is 
a stranger (220–21, 224). Lines 215–23 also demonstrate the cognitive gap between the two 
characters, with our knowledge being aligned with Orestes’. Although this type of suspense 
through irony does not carry the associations with fear that we have seen in the Agamemnon, 
here suspense is provoked by the anticipation of Electra’s transition from ignorance to 
recognition, a prerequisite for the fulfilment of the matricide. 
The next example is one of the most powerful scenes in terms of generation of 
suspense, as it features the first encounter between Orestes and Clytemnestra (668–718).101 Its 
dramatic irony originates in the disparities between Clytemnestra’s ignorance and what we 
know together with Orestes. Clytemnestra’s ignorance becomes obvious by her use of the 
word ‘[s]trangers’ (ξένοι, 668), while we know that she addresses her own son. Orestes’ 
reference to himself as ‘stranger’ (674) and the false report of his own death (674–90) 
 
101 On their second encounter (885–930), see section under 6.4.3. ‘Suspense through action delayed’ below. 
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disorientate Clytemnestra even more. Our suspense is also intensified by Orestes’ use of 
verbal irony in lines 704–6, where a double meaning is given to the words ‘matter’ (πρᾶγμα) 
and ‘friends’ (φίλοις): 
I thought it would be near impiety in me however not | to bring such a matter 
to a head for friends when I had agreed | to, and now that I have been 
welcomed as their guest. 
While the word ‘matter’ is understood by Clytemnestra as the delivery of the news for Orestes’ 
death, it is interpreted by us as Orestes’ act of revenge. Although Clytemnestra understands 
‘friends’ as a reference to Strophius to whom, according to the false report, Orestes had 
promised to deliver the message (the ‘matter’), we interpret it as a reference to Electra and 
Agamemnon by whom his act of revenge is motivated. Clytemnestra’s reply (707–8) can also 
be understood in two ways without her intending so: ‘Be sure, you will not receive less than 
you | deserve, nor would you be less of a friend in the house’ (707–8). While she refers to the 
kind of hospitality the two strangers deserve, we can also connect this phrase to Orestes’ act 
of revenge. Those examples demonstrate how we are kept in suspense, awaiting to see the 
unfolding of Orestes’ plan, while also expecting Clytemnestra to recognise Orestes. 
In the Eumenides, the type of irony that is employed and addressed to the audience in 
lines 938–48, 958–67, and 978–87 goes beyond what we have seen so far.102 The difference lies 
in the fact that the prior knowledge required for irony to work does not originate either from 
our engagement with the plot or from our familiarity with the myth. Rather, it emerges from 
real life experience. Following Athena’s request (903– 15), the Furies as the new Awesome 
Goddesses will be acting as regulators of human affairs (930–31). In this context, they promise 
goods to the Athenian community which we as future beholders know that cannot be 
promised (938–48, 958–67, 978–87). For example, the fertility of the crops and livestock (938–
48), the cessation of misfortunes such as wars which cause premature deaths (958–67), and 
Athens’ immunity from civil strife (978–87) are bound to have a tint of irony for any spectator 
or reader, let alone when they are promised to last for eternity (975, 977). This type of irony 
 
102 Rutherford (2012, 325 n. 7) argues that irony is absent from this play. 
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generates suspense which is associated not with the uncertainty of what is coming next within 
the plot (as is the case with the Agamemnon and the Libation Bearers) but with a sense of 
uncertainty regarding matters that go beyond the plot (as discussed in Chapter 3 above). In the 
Eumenides, verbal irony coincides with dramatic irony, as the Awesome Goddesses’ confident 
assertion that they know about the future of the Athenian citizens more than the Athenian 
citizens themselves do can be proved unfounded. 
6.4.3. Suspense through action delayed 
In this final section of suspense through narrative misdirection, I look at how delay, ‘a 
prolongation of expected narrative duration’,103 contributes to the generation of suspense. The 
interrelation between delay and suspense and its significance in Aeschylus have been touched 
on, but not elaborated, by Goward: delay is ‘another temporal dolos highly typical of 
Aeschylus and productive of suspense’.104 Although Dunn also acknowledges that delays in 
Greek tragedy more generally are employed to ‘impede progress toward a known goal and 
thus help to generate suspense and interest in the reader’, he limits the employment of delays 
in Aeschylus to the imbalance between human and divine power.105 In what follows, I take a 
close look at six examples: from the Agamemnon, I discuss the omen in parodos (40–257), the 
Cassandra’s scene (1035–330), and the Chorus’s reaction to Agamemnon’s death cries (1346–
71); from the Libation Bearers, I examine Orestes’ and Clytemnestra’s second encounter (885–
930); from the Eumenides, I look at Pythia’s speech (34–63) and the Furies’ choral song before 
the beginning of the trial (490–565). 
The omen regarding Iphigenia’s sacrifice (104–259), situated within the Chorus’ 
entrance song of the Agamemnon (40–257), induces suspense by contributing to the 
manipulation of time. As I discussed in section under 5.3.1 ‘Omens, prophecies, dreams’, 
although the omen serves as part of an exposition of past events (Iphigenia’s sacrifice and the 
sack of Troy), it also foreshadows a catastrophe in the future. What I add in this section is that 
the omen is also employed to generate anticipation through narrative delay. The narrative of 
 
103 See Goward (1999) 62–64, 75. 
104 Goward (1999) 60, 62. 
105 Dunn (2007) 96–97 (quote from 96). 
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the omen and its interpretation extend over 150 lines, which creates ambiguity and 
foreboding, raising questions about what exactly it means (Baroni’s suspense par anticipation) 
and about how and when the foreshadowed events will materialise (Baroni’s suspense moyen).106 
One who knows that Agamemnon’s murder is the event foreshadowed experiences suspense 
about the specific circumstances this will take place (how and when). One who does not know 
experiences suspense about what kind of catastrophe is expected in the near future. 
The ‘Cassandra scene’ (1035–330) also contributes to provoking intense suspense by 
delaying action and deferring Agamemnon’s murder for 300 lines. Parallel to the generation 
of suspense through foreknowledge (6.3.1) and through irony (6.4.2), as previously discussed, 
this scene induces suspense by causing temporal extension.107 This manipulation of time is 
directed by the elements of achrony, repetition, and lack of sequentiality.108 While the 
anticipation for Agamemnon’s murder grows, Cassandra’s time travels immerse readers and 
viewers by drawing their attention to her experience of future present (0). She repetitively 
exclaims the future events she prophecies, in different modes, without order. During those 
lines, we are invited again and again to engage with her narrative, while the inability of the 
Chorus to act in a similar way, delays even more the completion of the scene. Although a 
pause in action can typically lead to a decline in the readers’ or the audience’s attention, in the 
case of the ‘Cassandra scene’ it concentrates their focus on the action to follow more 
effectively. 
Following the materialisation of Agamemnon’s murder, the anticipation of its 
consequences is not only kept alive but further reignited by a thirty-line delay caused by the 
Chorus’ reaction (as discussed in 5.4.1 above and 7.4.2 below). After the stretching of time in 
the ‘Cassandra scene’, another, this time shorter, extension is employed when the Chorus is 
divided into individual voices in response to the crisis (1348–71).109 Although each member 
explicitly suggests a plan for action, they completely refrain from action, or as Taplin observes, 
‘the words are an alternative to action’.110 While each suggestion gives us the time to realise 
 
106 See Grethlein (2017, 101) regarding the omen in Apollodorus’ Ethiopica. 
107 Goward (1999) 75. 
108 Goward (2005) 53. 
109 Taplin (1977) 323–24. 
110 Taplin (1977) 324. 
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what has just happened, it also adds more suspense due to the Chorus’ delay. When they 
finally agree on a plan, the opportunity for action has already been missed. However, another 
round of suspense has been introduced for anyone who follows the plot closely. 
Moving on to the Libation Bearers, the second encounter between Clytemnestra and 
Orestes (892–930) maximises suspense not only by delaying the materialisation of the 
matricide, but also by cultivating, even temporarily, the possibility of its cancellation. Orestes’ 
immediate address to Clytemnestra (‘It's you I'm seeking!’, 892) is not followed by him leading 
her inside the palace. Instead of moving closer to the matricide, more delay is experienced, 
which allows for Clytemnestra’s powerful manifestation of motherhood (896–98) and Orestes’ 
hesitation to go ahead with killing his mother (899). According to Goward, ‘the question 
creates an extraordinary moment of suspense’.111 Apart from the striking character of those 
events which will be discussed under ‘Surprise’ in the next chapter, we can observe again here 
a manipulation of time through the prolonging of anticipation for a pivotal event. Orestes’ 
next attempt to kill his mother is found in lines 904–5: ‘Follow me! Right by this man's | side 
is where I wish your slaughter.’ But this is again deferred for more than twenty lines, during 
which Orestes engages with Clytemnestra in another intense exchange (908–930), which keeps 
him away from his target and us in anticipation. 
My first example of suspense through delay in the Eumenides refers to the delayed on-
stage appearance of the Furies (in line 140),112 the anticipation of which is increased by Pythia’s 
speech in the second half of the prologue (34–63).113 Although this anticipation has started to 
build up through references to the Furies in the Agamemnon and the Libation Bearers,114 it 
escalates even earlier in this play. The employment of such a technique as early as the 
prologue was already noticed for the Eumenides in antiquity, with the ancient scholiast 
arguing that Aeschylus postpones the climax by employing the idea of oikonomia (οἰκονομία). 
According to oikonomia, the poet orders the events in a way that the readers and spectators 
 
111 Goward (1999) 67. 
112 I follow Taplin (1977, 369–74) who argues that the Furies do not appear before 140, rather than before 64. 
113 For the first half of Pythia’s prologue (1–33) and the hiatus before line 34, see Chapter 7 below (section 7.3.1). 
114 See for example, Agamemnon 1186–93; Libation Bearers 1048–50. 
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will be looking forward to their climactic unfolding. The delayed representation of Orestes’ 
pursuit by the Furies is ‘kept in store’ (ταμιευόμενος) as the scholion suggests.115 
 Along similar lines, Taplin argues that ‘the longer the revelation is held back, the more 
the suspense of waiting...’.116 Although Pythia exclaims that what she saw is ‘[t]errifying to 
describe’, she does offer a description in the type of an ekphrasis (45–58).117 However, Pythia’s 
attempt to define the spectacle inside Apollo’s temple takes longer than expected and is not 
at all straightforward: ‘—no, I do not mean women, but Gorgons; but on the | other hand I 
can't compare them to Gorgon-figures’ (48–49). She, then, recalls a painting with depictions 
similar but not identical to those in the temple: ‘I did see those in a painting once before, 
carrying off Phineus' banquet; | these however have no wings to be seen’ (50–51). In lines 52–
56, Pythia, finally, focuses on the Furies’ appearance, followed by further comments which 
cause even more delay (57–63). The delay of the Furies’ appearance does not end with the end 
of the prologue. Rather, their anticipation will be prolonged further: in line 64 we are 
transferred inside the temple where Orestes as a suppliant is advised by Apollo (64–93); their 
departure will then be followed by the appearance of Clytemnestra’s ghost (94–116). 
The second example from the Eumenides which increases suspense through delay is 
found in the choral song of lines 490–565. It is positioned just after Athena’s announcement of 
the new legal system with which Orestes will be tried (470–89). This makes the anticipation of 
the trial which will follow even greater (566–710). In this choral song, the Furies offer a full 
account of the horrific consequences in case of Orestes’ acquittal. For seventy-five lines, they 
describe the moral and social chaos awaiting humankind, where all sorts of afflictions will 
dominate: ‘catastrophe’ (490–91), ‘suffering’, 496–7), ‘rancour’ (501), ‘death’ (502), ‘torment’ 
(506), ‘disaster’ (509), ‘total destruction’ (552). The Furies’ simple answer to how order can be 
safeguarded and how people can be forced to obey laws and respect justice is ‘terror’ (516) 
and ‘fear’ (517, 519, 522). The repetitive character and the powerful tone of their song distract 
the spectators and the readers from the trial, while also creating suspense for what will happen 
 
115 Scholion on Aeschylus’ Eumenides 1: Smith (1976, 42, 16–18): οἰκονομικῶς οὐκ ἐν ἀρχῇ διώκεται Ὀρέστης, 
ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ δράματος κατατάττει, ταμιευόμενος τὰ ἀκμαιότατα ἐν μέσῳ. See Meijering (1987) 
144, 198. 
116 Taplin (1977) 371. Taplin concludes his sentence by ‘…and the greater the impact when it is finally made’, a 
matter to be discussed in Chapter 7 below. 
117 On this scene as an ekphrasis, see also Nooter (2017) 252, citing Frontisi-Ducroux (2006) 50. On ekphrasis and 
narrative delay, see Kania (2016). 
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should Orestes become acquitted. Even if one knows the outcome of the trial in favour of 
Orestes, this song thematises what the Furies state in line 544: ‘an end (τέλος) is appointed 
and waits (μένει)’. The emphasis lies on the verb μένει which highlights the prolongation of 
the anticipation, while τέλος points to the catastrophe as the fulfilment of this anticipation (as 
discussed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4). 
If we accept that Proteus’ transformations constitute a central part of Proteus’ plot, 
assuming it follows the Odyssey, it is very likely that those transformations must have kept its 
audience in suspense. Proteus, represented as a god in Aeschylus (unlike, say, Euripides), may 
well have demonstrated his capability of causing delay by changing forms.118 This may have 
taken place either off-stage, so we learn about it through a messenger speech, or on-stage. 
Both possibilities might have dealt with Proteus’ several and consecutive transformations, 
leading to narrative delay. This delay defers Menelaus’ discovery of the truth about his future, 
keeping the audience entertained and, at the same time, in suspense. This aspect of Proteus’ 
transformation will have also caused surprise, as will discussed in the next chapter (7.4.1). 
6.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have demonstrated that suspense in the Oresteia needs to be understood as a 
multifaceted concept and not as a concept with a single and absolute meaning. For this reason, 
I have argued that the process of familiarisation with suspense calls for a careful study of its 
narrative instigators, manifestations, and levels of experience. 
Instead of an abstract, speculative, and conventional, almost formulaic, use of the term 
‘suspense’ often found in the bibliography, my analysis has offered a specific, justified, 
inclusive, and workable model for the discourse of suspense. Suspense is an attribute of both 
narrative progression (6.3) and narrative misdirection (6.4), narrative movements through 
which readers and spectators build their expectations for the future of the plot unfolding. In 
the case of narrative progression, suspense is generated through foreknowledge (6.3.1), 
through action (6.3.2) and through the characters’ exposition of future plans (6.3.3). In the case 
of narrative misdirection, suspense is developed through withholding information (6.4.1), 
 
118 Marshall (2015) 87. 
Suspense 
Page 198 of 269 
through irony (6.4.2) and through delayed action (6.4.3), techniques through which our 
expectations are frustrated. 
More specifically, in the Agamemnon the distribution of information that prepares for 
Agamemnon’s death is mostly deceptive, while the action is largely delayed and undermines 
a clear sense of direction. In the Libation Bearers, there is an overall balance between 
progression and misdirection. While in the first half of the play suspense is increased because 
of the certainty that the matricide will happen, in the second half the readers and spectators 
witness the plot moving fast towards the major event of the matricide, with powerful touches 
of misdirection. In the Eumenides, the distribution of information takes place alongside the 
unfolding of events, with misdirection being employed as the play moves away from and 
beyond the event of Orestes’ acquittal. Finally, the satyr drama Proteus is also likely to have 
provoked suspense, not least, in relation to how Menelaus seeks to find his way back to 
Greece, against the challenges he experiences in the unknown land of Egypt.  
In the following chapter, I will show how those same aspects of the future become a 
foundation of surprise as well. 
 
Chapter 7 




The concept of surprise, similarly to the concept of suspense (Chapter 6), lies within the scope 
of the effects created by anticipation and manipulation of readerly and spectatorial 
expectations for the future. However, unlike suspense, the power of surprise needs to be 
found not in creating anticipation and rising expectations but in interrupting anticipation and 
demonstrating the unexpectedness of the future. While suspense rises climactically and 
depends on distribution of information, surprise takes place when climax has been reached 
and knowledge has been attained.1 Although Aeschylus is very well known, almost notorious, 
since antiquity for eliciting ekplexis (see 7.2), this is only one aspect of how Aeschylus employs 
the concept of surprise in his plays. In this chapter, I will first present an overview of the 
concept of surprise and its reception by critics, from antiquity to the twenty-first century. Then, 
following the logic of the previous chapter, I will look at how surprise in the Oresteia is 
achieved through narrative progression (7.3) and narrative misdirection (7.4). In this chapter, 
I argue that surprise in the Oresteia needs to be understood as equally important as, but also 
distinct from, suspense, as both a dramatic technique and an effect, which invites the readers 
and spectators to experience and, thus, to come to terms with aspects of the future such as its 
unexpectedness and its abruptness. 
 
1 Goward (1999) 58. 
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7.2. Theoretical prelude 
When it comes to the discussion of reading and spectating effects, it is customary in modern 
scholarship, first, to discuss surprise together with suspense, and, second, to prioritise 
suspense over surprise (both in word order and in semantics).2 In my approach, I argue that 
both are intimately related to responses to the uncertainty of the future and reflect the reader’s 
or viewer’s immersion into the narrative. Their difference lies in the fact that, while suspense 
is experienced in the context of thinking about an existing future, or, as Mark Currie puts it, 
‘waiting for its arrival, and for the object of thinking to pass from virtuality into actuality’, 
surprise is experienced in the absence of future.3 
Although definitions and approaches of surprise come from several fields of study, 
with varying levels of interest and engagement, the modern concept of surprise remains 
largely under-theorised. From the area of psychology, Ortony and his co-authors relate 
surprise with unexpectedness and argue that both terms describe a cognitive state rather than 
an emotional one.4 From the area of narratology, Seymour Chatman also highlights the 
cognitive quality of surprise which ‘depends on our ignorance’.5 By contrast, Gerald Prince 
describes surprise as ‘the emotion of a reader, which is obtained when expectations about 
what is going to happen are violated by what in fact does happen’.6 Elements of surprise 
mentioned in the definitions and ideas above point to possible directions such a discussion 
may take. Before we move on to more focused studies, it is useful to turn to the beginnings of 
the concept which has been around since antiquity. 
The concept of surprise as the readers’ and the spectators’ cognitive and emotional 
engagement with the narrative appears in Aristotle’s Rhetoric and the Poetics. More 
specifically, in the Rhetoric it signifies the effect related to fear and in the Poetics the aesthetic 
 
2 See, indicatively, Walton (1990) 259–71. Hitchcock, for instance, privileges the effect of suspense over surprise, as 
for him ‘the audience always have to know’. See Truffaut & Hitchcock (1962), n. 9 in Chapter 6 above. On suspense 
and surprise as interrelated elements (including in Hitchock’s filmmaking), see Lütticken (2006). Cf. Pyrhönen 
(2005, 578): ‘Although the interplay of suspense and surprise traditionally constitutes a feature of good plotting, 
they are not necessarily linked to each other’. 
3 Currie (2013) 11. 
4 Ortony, Clore, & Collins (1988) 32–33. 
5 Chatman (1993) 21. 
6 Prince (2003) 96. 
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effect that a tragedy must achieve. This wide range of the meanings of surprise in Aristotle is 
reflected in the multiplicity of the occurring terms. The link between surprise and fear is 
demonstrated through the association between unexpectedness and the effect of fear on the 
part of the audience (‘that at the hands of those from whom they did not expect it, in such a 
manner and at times when they did not think it likely’, 1383a).7 The idea of surprise as an 
aesthetic quality of a tragedy is incorporated within the constituent elements of the plot, the 
‘reversals’ and the ‘recognitions’, both of transitional and transformational character, with the 
phrase ‘when events occur contrary to expectation yet still on account of one another’ (παρὰ 
τὴν δόξαν δι᾿ ἄλληλα, 1452a4–7).8 Reversals and recognitions are unexpected, thus, 
surprising events, and at the same time subject to the forces of ‘probability’ (τὸ εἰκὸς) and 
‘necessity’ (τὸ ἀναγκαῖον), thus, within the range of the audience’s expectations.9 To 
emphasise the effect of the technique of recognition (anagnorisis), the critic uses the next 
relevant term: ἐκπληκτικόν ‘thrilling’, from ἔκπληξις (1454a4).10 The cognates of thauma 
(θαῦμα) as ‘awe’, θαυμαστὸν ‘awesome’ (1452a3, 1456a20–21, 1460a11–18), θαυμασιώτατα 
(1452a5–6) refer to the intensity of surprise, not as experienced by the audience, but as 
employed in the plot as the wondrous.11 Tragic plots pursue the element of the awesome, 
which again should incorporate the criterion of being probable (εἰκότα μᾶλλον), albeit 
impossible (ἀδύνατα), rather than being improbable (ἀπίθανα) and possible (δυνατὰ). 
Elsewhere, Aristotle returns to the issue of how the element of surprise is not spoilt by a high 
level of probability in the plot.12 Thus, in Aristotle the concept of surprise is projected to both 
reception-oriented and plot-related issues, while it must always be under the control of 
 
7 See also Aristotle’s Art of Rhetoric: ‘Again, men are angry when the event is contrary to their expectation (παρὰ 
δόξαν), for the more unexpected a thing, the more it pains; just as they are overjoyed if, contrary to expectation 
(παρὰ δόξαν), what they desire comes to pass (1379a); ‘he [the listener] has learned something when the conclusion 
turns out contrary to his expectation (παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχειν) (1412a). On para prosdokian in Aristophanes, see 
Kanellakis (2020). 
8Ferrari notes (1999, 190–91) that there is no adversative in the Greek text, thus, we should render as follows: 
‘against expectation because of one another’.  For the effect of ‘reversal’ (περιπέτεια peripeteia, μεταβολή) see, for 
example: 1450a35, 1452a22, 1451a15. For the effect of recognition (ἀναγνώρισις), see, for example: 1450a35, 
1452b9–13, 1455a15–21. See also Halliwell (1987) 117. 
9 1451b12–13, 1451b38–39. Despite the difference between the translations (see previous note), both scholars that 
this unexpectedness is not in contrast with the causal relations of events but part of it. This is very much in line 
with Ricoeur’s discordant concordance that I discuss below. See also Liveley (2019) 36. 
10 See also 1460b25: ἐκπληκτικώτερον ‘more thrilling’. Just to mention that the term ἔκπληξις has survived in 
Modern Greek as έκπληξη to signify surprise mostly in positive terms. 
11 See also Nünlist (2009) 145 for a similar use of thauma in the ancient scholia. 
12 For more on this issue, see Wohl (2014) 147–48. 
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specific plot regulations. As Halliwell points out, ‘[e]ven at the crux of the complex plot, where 
the twist of events is most acute and unexpected, Ar. still insists…on the fundamental logic 
or coherence of the dramatic action’.13 
The term ἔκπληξις for surprise as the audience’s reaction to the unexpected is used 
by Longinus as well in his rhetorical treatise On the Sublime. The author categorises surprise 
as the type of phantasia ‘visualisation’ one finds in poetical form, which is also the object 
(τέλος) of it.14 
Along the same lines, the ancient critics of dramatic poetry employ the idea of surprise 
with the terms ἔκπληξις and θαῦμα as the effect of the spectacular. The examples of criticism 
on Greek tragic plays I draw on come from Sophocles’ Ajax and, most importantly for the 
purposes of this thesis, from Aeschylus’ Eumenides.15 The word ἔκπληξις appears twice in Ajax 
to describe ‘the effect of a scenic presentation instead of a verbal report’,16 in two scenes of 
bloodshed, in the middle of the butchered animals and his suicide on stage.17 A scholion in the 
prologue of the Eumenides mentions the word ἔκπληξις with regard to Pythia’s reaction at the 
sight of the Furies and Orestes:  
All unawares she sees the Erinyes asleep in a circle around Orestes, and she 
informs the audience about it all. However, she does not simply relate what is 
happening offstage (for this is a novelty peculiar to Euripides), but it is owing 
to her fright (ὑπό δέ τῆς ἐκπλήξεως) that she talks of what has confused her: 
a clever trick of the poet (φιλοτέχνως).18  
The scholiast’s comment draws a comparison between Euripides and Aeschylus according to 
which Aeschylus’ employment of Pythia’s experience of surprise within the plot in the 
prologue is much more artistic than Euripides’. This comment demonstrates the ancient 
 
13 Halliwell (1987) 125. See also 117: ’Wonder elicited by a startling turn of events must, if conformity to the canon 
of probability or necessity is to be maintained, give way to a realisation of the underlying causation of events’.  
14 Longinus’ On the Sublime 15.2–3. I cite Russell’s translation (1964). 
15 For examples of ἔκπληξις from the Iliad and the Odyssey, see Nünlist (2009) 145. 
16 Nünlist (2009) 144–45. 
17 Schol. Sophocles’ Ajax 346a & 815a. 
18 Meijering (1987) 195–96. 
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critics’ awareness of how the dramatic representation of the effect of surprise in Aeschylus 
goes beyond the experience of surprise by the character, towards the experience of surprise 
by the audience as well: through her detailed narration Pythia re-experiences the horrifying 
spectacle from inside the temple alongside with the audience this time. 
Another example of ancient criticism on Aeschylus’ Eumenides with regard to the 
employment of surprise as ἔκπληξις comes from the Life of Aeschylus. There, Aeschylus is said 
to have used visual effects in his plays ‘for the sake of portentous shock (πρὸς ἔκπληξιν 
τερατώδη) rather than for the sake of beguiling the audience’,19 a comment heavily indebted 
to Aristophanes’ Frogs.20 The Life also includes a special reference to the compelling visual 
impact of the original production of the Eumenides, according to which Aeschylus ‘frightened 
(ἐκπλῆξαι) the people so much that some children lost consciousness and unborn babies were 
aborted.’21 This expressive and vivid comment of Aeschylus’ staging of the Furies, despite all 
the questions about its reliability, conveys something of the power of the play to ‘strike’ its 
audience.22 A similarly questionable historically but, nevertheless, telling variant of the above 
is also provided by Pollux: 
Formerly, the tragic chorus had fifty members, until the Eumenides of 
Aeschylus. For when the audience was scared out of their wits by their 
multitude, a law reduced the number of chorus members.23 
The ideas presented above are fused into the modern concept of surprise which has been 
further developed through detailed studies on surprise published in the twenty-first century. 
Those studies can be found in the area of scholarship which crosses the disciplinary 
boundaries of literary criticism, narrative, and philosophy of time, such as those by 
Christopher Miller, Vera Tobin, and Mark Currie.24 Miller’s study offers ‘a literary and 
 
19 Life 7=TrGF 3, T 1.25s. 
20 Lefkowitz (20122) 70. On the connection between ekplexis and powerful literature, see Segal (1962) 130–32. 
21 Life 9=TrGF 3, T 1.9. 
22 For instance, Taplin (1977) 39–40. 
23 Pollux’s Onomastikon 4.110=TrGF 3, T 66. 
24 Miller (2015); Currie (2013); Tobin (2018). 
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intellectual history of an emotion’, exploring a wide range of meanings of surprise,25 with 
examples ranging from seventeenth to nineteenth-century English literature. While it puts 
forward a useful overview of the history of surprise as an aesthetic term, its focus is rather 
narrow for the purposes of my Chapter. 
With a significant shift of focus, Tobin’s study explores the type of the ‘well-made 
surprise’, its constituents and techniques, and our cognitive engagement and subsequent 
pleasure, when this type of surprise is revealed, recognised, understood, and acknowledged.26 
The author draws on various cognitive theories of memory, perception, and narrative 
linguistics, and presents as case studies well-known works of prose fiction and film.27 This 
study provides us with a consistent systematised model which is put to test for explorations 
of surprise in novels and films. Additionally, the author’s chosen approach to work on 
elements of surprise instead of the concept as an undivided entity liberates us from dealing 
with its rigidity and impasses. Such an approach lies in similar lines with how I organise and 
develop my chapter and the whole thesis as well. However, Tobin does not deal with the 
aspect of surprise as shock, which is manifested verbally, aurally, and visually, a regular 
phenomenon in Greek tragedy.28 Also, not all types of surprise can fit within Tobin’s model of 
well-made surprises and their pleasurable effect. Most significantly, the study demonstrates 
minimum engagement with the alliance between surprise and the future temporality, which 
is what lies at core of this chapter and my thesis as a whole: the argument that narrative 
surprise simulates real-life experiences of the always unknown future ahead, while it is 
simulated accordingly by them. 
 This idea, being at the core of Ricoeur’s mimesis 3, is employed and further expanded 
by Mark Currie in his preoccupation with the philosophy of surprise. He emphasises the 
limited interest of the narratologists of the twentieth century in the concept of surprise and 
explains this as part of a more general tendency to hesitate to engage with the future.29 
Therefore, his study importantly puts forward future temporality and focuses on narrative 
 
25 Miller (2015) 1–6, quote from p. 2. 
26 Tobin (2018). 
27 Such as Othello by Shakespeare, Emma by Jane Austen, Great Expectations by Charles Dickens, Villette by Charlotte 
Brontë, Atonement by Ian McEwan. 
28 See section under 7.4.3 ‘Surprise through shock’. 
29 As discussed in the Introduction, section 1.1. See Currie (2013) 34–35. 
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surprise through the concepts of the unexpected and the (un)foreseeable. Those interests make 
Currie’s study more intellectually relevant to my thesis than the ones mentioned above. 
The central idea that runs throughout Currie’s study is that the narrative fuses together 
two apparently incompatible ideas of the future – the future which is to come and the future 
which is already there.30 The interaction between the foreseeable and the unforeseeable, which 
is outlined as the epitome of any narrative, does not occur between the past and the future, 
but between two types of future: the future as already happened and the unforeseeable future 
ahead. Thus, through the reading process, the future is not experienced as totally 
unforeseeable but as something which is re-visited, drawing on Ricoeur’s model of mimesis. 
On those grounds, the narrative surprise, as Currie argues, ‘becomes a question not of 
unforeseeable happenings, but of unforeseen disclosures.’31 Narrative surprise is no longer 
generated by the advent of unexpected events but by a way of narrative misdirection created 
within the plot.32 This new perspective that Currie suggests lies exclusively on the act of 
reading and revives the attention to the future temporality, which has been neglected in 
favour of explorations of the past. 
Meir Sternberg and Paul Ricoeur are exceptions to this general tendency, as they both 
situate surprise at the centre of their narrative models.33 Sternberg presents surprise as one of 
his master tropes which define narrative, together with suspense and curiosity,34 arguing that 
surprise is related to the disclosure of cognitive gaps from the past which the readers recognise 
at a later point.35 Precisely because of his focus on the past, rather than the future, Sternberg’s 
theory is less important for my analysis below. Ricoeur, on the other hand, argues that 
surprise needs to be defined ‘in terms of the relationship of expectation created by the internal 
course of the plot’, and not in terms of external knowledge.36 This view on surprise as 
 
30 Currie (2013) 13. 
31 Currie (2013) 44. 
32 Narrative misdirection is one of the main two types of narrative engagement which I employ in the structure 
and content of Chapters 6 and 7 (sections 6.4 and 7.4). 
33 See the relevant discussion in Currie (2013) 37–51, especially 37–39. 
34 Sternberg (2003a) & (2003b). 
35 On Sternberg’s surprise, see (2003a) 327, (2003b) 517–18, (1992) 524. 
36 Ricoeur (1984, I) 240 and n. 26. He continues the passage as follows: ‘Does the tragedy of Oedipus preserve its 
character of peripeteia for us who know the framework of the story and its outcome? Yes, …’. 
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‘discordant concordance’37 is central for my approach, as it explicitly and actively associates 
the spectating and the reading process with the coming of the future as a ‘disconfirmation’ 
which is what makes a story meaningful at the end.38 
In modern classical scholarship, a similarly wide range of views has been put forward. 
Although Francis Dunn discusses to some extent the employment of surprise in all three 
tragedians,39 he argues that, while in Euripides, and, to some extent, in Sophocles, surprise is 
a common feature, in Aeschylus there are no surprises. As he notes: ‘There is nothing like this 
in the plays of Aeschylus, who uses shock and surprise sparingly, reserving them for 
descriptive purposes.’40 Thomas Rosenmeyer associates surprise in Aeschylus, not with an 
outcome of the unexpectedness in the plot, but with a consequence of Aeschylus’ handling of 
‘the rhetoric of the scenes’,41 arguing that this works reductively for the spectator’s surprise, 
because the end is already in sight from the beginning.42 However, other scholars such as A.F. 
Garvie, Oliver Taplin, and Keith Bednarowski do acknowledge surprise as an essential 
dramatic effect in Aeschylus’ plays, albeit on different grounds. Although A.F. Garvie argues 
that the essential surprise is that of the characters and not of the audience, he explores how 
dramatic surprise is achieved through misleading the audience in Aeschylus’ plays.43 Taplin 
argues that striking elements are well-integrated in Aeschylus’ plots,44 while Bednarowski 
restricts his analysis of surprise in Aeschylus to issues related exclusively to prior knowledge 
of the original audience.45 
Drawing on the theoretical background outlined in this section, I argue that surprise 
does not lie so much in complexities that rise from given tragic conventions and from any 
 
37 Ricoeur (1984, I) e.g., 38, 67. 
38 On surprise as disconfirmation, Kermode writes (1967, 18): ‘Now peripeteia depends upon our confidence of the 
end; it is a disconfirmation followed by a consonance; the interest of having our expectations falsified is obviously 
related to our wish to reach the discovery or recognition by an unexpected and instructive route.’ 
39 Dunn (2007) 88–95. 
40 Dunn (2007) 88. 
41 Rosenmeyer (1982) 328–29. The scholar also mentions (ibid. 328) the scene from the Seven against Thebes, where 
Eteocles’ surprise and recognition that he will have to fight with his brother are so powerful, as if unexpected. 
42 Rosenmeyer (1982) 329: ‘But, once again, we note that the development is not entirely unexpected, and that the 
surprise is to the character rather than to the spectator’. 
43 Garvie (1976). 
44 Taplin (1977) 39–42. 
45 Bednarowski (2015). 
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familiarity with well-known mythological cycles. Rather, it lies in narrativity, in juxtapositions 
between different stages within the plot, and its experience by readers and spectators as a 
manifestation of what Ricoeur calls ‘discordant concordance’,46 the artful emplotment of 
eventfulness. 
7.3. Surprise and narrative progression 
I begin with passages where surprise is generated when an important piece of information for 
the future is revealed. As my focus is on surprise and narrative progression, I show how the 
surprising nature of such revelations contributes to our making sense of the plot and its 
development. What follows is structured around categories for three different techniques 
through which the readers and the spectators can be taken by surprise: at the beginning of the 
play, through off-stage action, and through the unexpected appearance of characters. 
7.3.1. Surprise at the beginning 
In this section, the effect of surprise is achieved through the occurrence of sudden events very 
early in the plot. In the previous chapter we saw that narrative in the prologue can provoke 
suspense through withholding information (5.4.1) and through action delayed (5.4.3). By 
contrast, in the examples that follow, we have the release of information in the shape of the 
emergence of events, whose unexpectedness lies in our ignorance of when they will happen. 
As Roberts notes, ‘[i]f audience knowledge precludes major surprises, it leaves room for both 
minor surprises and suspense (when and how will the expected ending come about?)’.47 No 
matter whether major or minor surprises are at play, in all three tragic prologues the speaker 
becomes interrupted by an unexpected event around which the whole plot has been built. 
This as a result creates further uncertainty for the future. 
 
46 See for example, Ricoeur (1984, I) 43. 
47 Roberts (2005) 141. 
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In the Agamemnon, surprise is experienced simultaneously by the ones who read and 
watch the play and the Watchman who is struck by the news of the beacon light in the middle 
of his prologue speech (22–24): 
The beacon! Greetings to you! You show daylight in the night, | and mean the 
setting up of many dances in Argos to mark this | good fortune! 
We have been informed for the significance of this beacon light in the very first lines where 
the character describes his watching duty: ‘the year-long watch’ (2); ‘And now I am on watch 
for a beacon's sign, a gleam of fire | bringing word from Troy and report of its capture’ (8–
10). Although it becomes obvious that the beacon light is bound to appear soon (as it is a 
prerequisite for the unfolding plot), its emergence comes as a surprise due to our immersion 
in the Watchman’s speech. First, his repeated references to his misery (1, 20) and his oblique 
insinuations for the current circumstances in Agamemnon’s house (9–20) draw our attention 
to the main events of the plot to come. The effect of surprise, especially for the readers of this 
scene, is also assisted by what Karen Bassi calls a practice of visualisation.48 The Watchman 
speaks about what he sees and what he wants to see, the roof (2), the night-stars' assembly (4–
6), the beacon fire (7, 21–22). The narrative invites us to visualise the roof, the stars, and the 
beacon light through a ‘watching’ act rather than necessarily through stage action.49 Lines 22–
24 find us unprepared and take us by surprise because they follow immediately after the 
Watchman has expressed for the second time his wish for the arrival of the beacon light (20–
21).50 Then, we become surprised by the visitation of the future. 
In the prologue of the Libation Bearers (1–21), as in the prologue of the Agamemnon, the 
appearance of the speaker is accompanied by the emergence of another surprising event 
which is instrumental for what follows. In this case, we have Orestes’ presence (1–9) which is 
overshadowed by Electra’s appearance (10–21). Of course, Orestes’ appearance may also be 
experienced as a surprise as well, as the starting point of this second play is completely 
unknown to us: the Agamemnon ends with Orestes in exile, while several references to his 
 
48 Bassi (2005) 260–64. 
49 On staging issues, see Taplin (1977) 276–77. 
50 For this as the Watchman’s future present, see 4.2.1. 
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return (877–86, 1280–85, 1646–48, 1667) do not necessarily anticipate his being the principal 
speaker in the prologue right from the beginning of the Libation Bearers. 
As soon as the play begins and we learn that the man who prays at Agamemnon’s 
tomb (4) is Orestes who has just returned to his homeland,51 the ceremonial sense of these lines 
is interrupted by a sight from a distance (10–16): 
What's this I see? Whatever is this company of women approaching, | so 
conspicuous in their black dress? What misfortune am I to picture from it? Has 
some new disaster befallen this house, or | would I be right in guessing that 
these women bring libations for | my father, appeasements of the dead? It 
could never be anything | else! Why, I think my sister Electra is there too, 
conspicuous | in bitter grief. O Zeus! Grant me vengeance for my father's | 
death! Be my ally if you will! 
The first element of surprise appears in line 10 and has to do with the arrival of a group of 
women. It is followed by a second and more important one in line 16 when Electra is identified 
among the women. The sight of the group of women approaching disrupts and unsettles 
Orestes and his initial planning, while also cancelling any expectations we may have about 
his moves. The moment Orestes recognises his sister among the women, he communicates 
this information, while the necessity for another readjustment to the new circumstances for 
the future becomes apparent. 
Moving on to the Eumenides, its prologue (1–63) consists of two monologues by Pythia 
(1–32, 33–63), which turn out to be two contrasting halves, separated by hiatus,52 whose form 
and content work against continuity and are strikingly contradictory. Pythia presents 
aetiologically and honours the previous residents of the temple of Apollo at Delphi (1–33).53 
Her appearance is identified with tranquillity, solemnity, and a sense of control, all created by 
her spiritual status. However, this sense of order is interrupted in line 33. Below, I quote the 
end of the first part of Pythia’s speech and the beginning of the second (30–33, 34–38): 
 
51 On the textual issues of the Libation Bearers’ prologue, see Chapter 6 n. 16. 
52 For a detailed analysis of the hiatus in the Eumenides’ prologue, see Taplin (1977) 362–63. 
53 On the succession myth in Delphi, see Bowie (1993) 14–16; Podlecki (1989) 129; Sommerstein (1989) 80–81. 
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And now I wish they may grant me better success by far than | at my entrances 
before. If there are any here from among the | Greeks, let them come as the lot 
assigns them, in the normal | way; for I give my prophecies as the god may 
lead me. 
Terrifying! Terrifying to describe, and to see with one’s | eyes-things to send 
me back out of Loxias’ house, so that I | have no strength and cannot stand 
upright. I am running on | my hands, without the quickness of feet and legs. 
An old | woman in terror is nothing- no more than a child! 
Although the prologue starts as expository, it ‘gives way to terror’.54 Pythia, despite her being 
the representation of legitimacy, departs in the middle of the prologue only to unexpectedly 
reappear after the hiatus. In this context, Taplin notes: 
This is unique in surviving Greek tragedy, which generally abhors a vacuum, 
and nearly always preserves continuity . . . The first half shows a pious routine 
which is the outcome of a peaceful Delphic tradition; the second vividly 
conveys the abhorrent and incomprehensible disruption which the Erinyes 
have brought into this orderly Delphic world.55 
In the lines that follow the hiatus (34–63), another element of surprise comes from Pythia’s 
detailed description of the terrifying Furies and the bloodstained Orestes. I provide a separate 
discussion of those lines under ‘Surprise through shock’ below (7.4.3). 
 There is no obvious reason why the Proteus would be an exception to the fashion of 
introducing surprising elements in the prologue. Those elements must have been 
accompanied by the arrival of the chorus, inviting audience to see from a new perspective. 
Having Menelaus open the satyr drama could well have been a succesful technique in terms 
of generating major surprise at the very beginning of the play. It can be assumed that one 
 
54 Goward (1999) 60. 
55 Taplin (1977) 362. 
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might have seen Menelaus as castaway at the shores of Egypt. This would have arguably 
caused major surprise, as we would not have heard about Menelaus since the Messenger’s 
speech in the Agamemnon (636–80), where the overall uncertainty for his survival reduced the 
possibility of his stage appearance. The appearance of the chorus expressing curiosity and 
their encounter with Menelaus might have been suitable material to position the audience at 
a state of amazement.56 
In all three cases, possibly in the case of Proteus as well, the opening lines are not 
primarily preoccupied with the exposition of information about the past or present of the 
story. Although this type of prologue would facilitate in a more direct way the readers’ and 
the spectators’ immersion, Aeschylus’ prologues remain focused on the future and seize the 
opportunity to engage the readers and spectators by bringing in conflict, disorder, and 
dissonance. 
7.3.2. Surprise through off-stage action 
Another type of eliciting surprise is associated with the emergence of off-stage events, and, 
more specifically, those that are brought to light and strike us through cries.57 This 
simultaneous presentation of off-stage events is possibly Aeschylus’ innovation, and here we 
find one of its first uses in surviving tragedy.58 According to Goward, this device is ‘another 
distinct narrative temporal category in tragedy, when an off-stage event is overheard, 
reported, and reacted to by those on stage’.59 (I discuss Cassandra’s on-stage cries under 7.4.2. 
‘Surprise through small-scale changes’ below). Nooter also argues that the employment of 
screams from off-stage ‘communicates frightening possibilities that cannot otherwise be 
shown to the audience.’60 
 
56 In this respect, Lissarague (1990, 235) argues: ‘Frequently the subject of the play is tied to a discovery or an 
invention’. 
57 On the broad issue of voice in Aeschylus, see Nooter (2017). For a list of off-stage cries in Greek tragedy, see 
Markantonatos (2002) 12–13 n. 31. See also Hamilton (1987) who provides a review of relevant scholarship and 
attempts to create a model based on off-stage cries and murders. However, none of the previous studies include 
the Furies’ off-stage cries in the Eumenides. 
58 Raeburn & Thomas (2011) on 1343–71, Arnott (1982) 38, Taplin (1977) 323. Hamilton (1987, 598) argues that 
Agamemnon is not the first play where off-stage cries are employed. 
59 Goward (1999) 2. For examples of simultaneous presentation of events in Greek tragedy, see Goward (1999) 32–
35. 
60 Nooter (2017) 28. 
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This section discusses how the three examples of off-stage cries we have in the Oresteia, 
by Agamemnon in the Agamemnon (1343, 1345), by Aegisthus in the Libation Bearers (869), and 
by the Furies in the Eumenides (117, 120, 123, 126, 129) are instrumental in generating surprise. 
What is distinctive in this technique is that surprise is not generated through the primary 
narrative (as in 7.3.1 above). Rather, the surprising element lies within a secondary narrative 
which rises from the background. This sudden and abrupt transmission of information 
substitutes, or in Goward’s words, ‘obviates’ the need for a messenger speech in the most 
compelling manner.61 The result is to take readers and spectators by even greater surprise. 
In the Agamemnon, although the event of Agamemnon’s death itself is not surprising, 
especially after Cassandra’s prophecies (1072–330), the emergence of his cries in lines 1343 
and 1345 strikes us due to two elements: our ignorance of how Agamemnon’s murder will 
materialise and our unpreparedness at this specific point in the play: 
ὤμοι, πέπληγμαι καιρίαν πληγὴν ἔσω.    1343 
O-oh! I have been struck deep, a fatal blow! 
ὤμοι μάλ᾿ αὖθις δευτέραν πεπληγμένος.    1345 
O-oh! Again! Struck a second blow! 
These lines come after a choral prelude (1331–42), where the Chorus reflects on Cassandra’s 
prophecies and on a possible reversal of fortune for Agamemnon. Although Agamemnon 
captured the city of Troy and retuned safe to his house (1335–37), he may now die paying for 
past crimes (1338–40). The transition from the Chorus’ reflective tone to Agamemnon’s cries 
is rapid and abrupt. With his two off-stage cries, Agamemnon himself delivers the news of 
his murder both through inarticulate cries (the interjections ὤμοι) and, then, immediately 
through logically formed utterances. What these utterances reveal is that he has been struck 
with a weapon. What they do not disclose is the identity of the murderer. This preserves the 
surprising element of line 1372, when Clytemnestra herself appears standing over the dead 
 
61 Goward (1999) 32. 
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bodies of Agamemnon and Cassandra (see above 7.3.3. ‘Surprise through unexpected 
appearances’ and below 7.4.3. ‘Surprise through shock’). The Chorus’ reaction to the abrupt 
visitation of the future comes in 1344 after the first cry (‘Quiet! Who shouted of a blow, as if 
dealt a fatal wound?’62), while after the second cry they split into twelve voices, a striking 
unprecedented stage event which will be discussed in 7.4.2 below (‘Surprise through small-
scale changes’). 
Moving on to the Libation Bearers, although Orestes’ plan to kill Aegisthus was exposed 
in detail (554–78), preparing for what is to come (see 5.3.3), Aegisthus’ cry coming from off-
stage strikes readers and spectators with its briefness and immediacy (869): 
ἒ ἔ, ὀτοτοτοῖ. 
Ah-ah! Otototoi!63 
Since line 854 when Aegisthus went into the palace, his murder was a matter of time. 
However, we were unaware how his murder would materialise and how the news of that 
murder would be communicated to us. This is further intensified by the intervention of the 
preceding choral song (855–68), whose dramatic function is similar to the function of the 
choral song we saw in the example of the Agamemnon above. The Chorus here pray to Zeus 
and express their agony for the outcome of Orestes’ fight, introducing an element of 
uncertainty that increases our suspense. The Chorus’ reaction shows that the cry finds them 
unprepared (‘What? What's that? | How do things stand? How has it been determined in the 
house?’ 870–71). Even when we finally hear Aegisthus’ cry of pain, the information it conveys 
is minimal. Unlike Agamemnon who complements his inarticulate cries with articulate 
utterances, Aegisthus provides no explanation of what is happening. Even the identity of 
victim remains unclear until 887.64 
 
62 In trochaic tetrameter catalectic whose effect is to ‘quicken the tempo at moments of high tension’, as Raeburn & 
Thomas (2011) 244. 
63 Sommerstein’s translation (2008), see n. 31 Chapter 4. 
64 Garvie (1986, 364) argues that line 869 is less likely to be unmetrical. Agamemnon’s cry above (1343, 1345) seems 
to be more fitted in the iambic metre. This contributes to its informational character, while Aegisthus’ cry creates 
the uncertainty of who is being murdered. 
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In the final example which comes from the Eumenides, the Furies’ off-stage cries in lines 
117, 120, 123, 126, 129, and 130 strike our attention as the first signs of their imminent 
appearance in line 140.65 Although most of those cries are based on ancient staging directions 
(παρεπιγραφή),66 their authenticity is not questionable. They are an element of simultaneous 
narration similar to the cries of Agamemnon and Aegisthus we have seen above. The Furies’ 
off-stage cries come as responses to the persistent urging by the ghost of Clytemnestra, whose 
appearance in 94 constitutes another element of surprise as discussed under section ‘Surprise 
through unexpected appearances’ below (7.3.3). The words μυγμός (‘moan’ in 117, 120, 129) 
and ὠγμός (‘groan’ in 123, 126) represent the Furies’ sounds as they start to awaken by 
Clytemnestra’s orders.67 The accumulative effect of their successive responses leads to major 
surprise when they articulate their excitement in words (130): 
(μυγμὸς διπλοῦς ὀξύς) 
λαβέ, λαβέ, λαβέ, λαβέ· φράζου. 
Seize! Seize! Seize! Seize! Put your mind to it! 
After Pythia’s description of the Furies in the prologue (46–59), engaging with their off-stage 
cries instead of their on-stage appearance is totally unexpected. What is even more striking, 
by contrast to the other two plays, is that there is no on-stage reaction to those off-stage cries: 
the audience and the readers are their only addressees. Despite their powerful effect, what 
those cries do not adequately prepare for is the when and how of the Furies’ appearance, which 
I will discuss in the section 7.3.3 below. 
I have shown how off-stage cries prepare for key moments of the plot: Agamemnon’s 
murder in the Agamemnon, Aegisthus’ murder in the Libation Bearers, and the Furies’ imminent 
entrance in the stage in the Eumenides. They prepare for such key moments by being 
 
65 Flickinger (1939) is one of the few studies which discuss, very briefly though (357–59), the Furies’ cries in the 
context of off-stage cries. On the arguments of the Furies’ appearance on stage in line 140, Chapter 6 n. 112. 
66 Taplin (1977) 15 n. 1 & 371 n. 3. See also Sommerstein (1989) on 117. 
67 The word μυγμός could have been represented as μυ μυ in the Greek text and the word ὠγμός as ὢ ὤ. See 
Sommerstein (2008) 369 n. 39, 371 n. 41; Collard (2002) on 117–29; Taplin (1977) 94. 
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unexpected, by being abrupt, by expanding the performance space, and by revealing 
information only partially in ways that pave the way for more surprises to come. 
7.3.3. Surprise through unexpected appearances 
This section discusses how surprise is generated by the unexpected onstage appearance of 
several characters. Apart from the appearances themselves as surprising elements, each 
appearance bears several connotations and develops complications related to the future of 
plot. What follows is only a selection of surprising appearances, as, first, an extensive 
discussion of all entrances would lie beyond the purposes of my discussion, and, second, such 
a discussion has been offered by Taplin’s comprehensive study on stagecraft in Aeschylus 
(1977). The examples I include here constitute cases of distinctively striking appearances for 
which we have not been adequately prepared or which challenge any pre-existent 
expectations. I discuss from the Agamemnon the unexpected appearances of Clytemnestra (587, 
1372), Cassandra (782), and Aegisthus (1577); from the Libation Bearers the appearances of 
Clytemnestra (668), Cilissa (730), and Aegisthus (838); from the Eumenides I include those of 
Clytemnestra’s ghost (94), the Furies (140, 244), and the secondary chorus which participate 
at the final procession (1003). 
Three striking elements feature in Clytemnestra’s appearance in line 587 of the 
Agamemnon: interruption, intervention, and domination. First, by contrast to her entrance in 
line 258 where, ‘if anyone but Clytemnestra were to have entered at this point, it would have 
been an extremely surprising turn’,68 her arrival from inside the palace in 587 is totally 
unexpected due to the fact that the Herald who has completed his speech (582) is about to 
enter, following the Chorus’ advice (584–86): ‘This news | naturally concerns the house, 
however, and Clytemnestra | especially.’ Not only does she interrupt the herald’s entrance 
due to the incisive character of her appearance,69 but she also obstructs it and determines the 
unfolding of events through her intervening power. Our surprise intensifies during her 
speech that follows (587–614). In those lines, she demonstrates her control over the release of 
 
68 Taplin (1977) 285. 
69 Taplin (1977) 289. 
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information, both when present and absent.70 In this sense, these elements influence even more 
our expectation for the future. 
Clytemnestra’s appearance in line 1372 is also striking for similar reasons. First, it is 
again abrupt and interrupts another character’s planned action, the Chorus’, who, alarmed by 
off-stage Agamemnon’s earlier off-stage cries (1343, 1345), is about to enter the palace in order 
to investigate (1346–71). Second, it is not only the timing of her appearance that creates 
surprise, but also its content, as the mystery of the whodunit question is finally resolved. The 
mystery of the how will also be soon resolved (see below under 7.4.3. ‘Surprise through 
shock’). Although several elements of foreboding since the beginning of the play function as 
preparatory devices (most notably Cassandra’s clear prophecy about Agamemnon’s 
imminent murder), Clytemnestra’s entrance standing over the dead bodies of Agamemnon 
and Cassandra takes us by surprise not only for its compelling character but also for its 
consequences on the future. 
The next case from the Agamemnon under examination refers to Cassandra’s first 
appearance on stage (782) which takes place without any preparation. Although she enters 
with Agamemnon who is magnificently announced by the Chorus (almost thirty lines before 
he speaks in 810), there are no textual references to Cassandra’s presence in their speech or in 
anyone else’s. The first reference to Cassandra comes at line 1035 when she is finally addressed 
by Clytemnestra. This technique of withholding information about Cassandra is what leads 
us to the second and, even more intense, surprise, when Cassandra finally breaks her silence 
in line 1072. By contrast to Clytemnestra’s previous appearances which were unexpected and 
unannounced (discussed above), Cassandra has been on stage for more than 160 lines before 
she is addressed (1035) and almost 200 lines before she speaks (1072). Further details of this 
scene that take us beyond the issue of Cassandra’s entrance will be discussed under ‘Surprise 
through small-scale changes’ below (7.4.2). 
Nobody is expecting a new character to enter the stage less than a hundred lines before 
the end of a play. However, this is precisely what we get with Aegisthus’ appearance in line 
1577, before the end of the Agamemnon (1673). The main events, the murders of Agamemnon 
and Cassandra, have materialised, the identity of the murderer has been revealed, and it looks 
 
70 Taplin (1977) 300. 
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like we move towards closure. However, Aegisthus will create surprise not only through his 
late arrival, but also by provoking a response by the Chorus which includes references to 
Orestes’ return (1280–85, 1646–48, 1667). Those references create anticipation for the second 
play, while also undermining the sense of closure of the present play (as discussed in 3.3). 
Additionally, Aegisthus’ appearance is totally unexpected ‘due to the minimal attention paid 
to him in the play so far’ (which itself is, of course, a surprising departure from earlier literary 
and artistic depictions of the myth).71 Both his late entry and any lack of preparation 
demonstrate how surprise in Aeschylus is again elevated to a dramatic technique fully 
integrated into the plot72 and linked to the idea of an open future. 
Moving on to the Libation Bearers, the appearance of Clytemnestra in line 668, when 
Orestes and Pylades, disguised, stand by the door, comes across as completely unexpected. 
This is a consequence of Orestes’ preceding speech which is addressed to the doorman (658–
66): 
Take a message to the masters of the house; they're | the ones I've come to, and 
with news! Be quick! Besides, | night's dark chariot is hurrying on, and it's the 
hour for | travellers to let their anchor down in a house open to guests. | Have 
someone with authority in the house come out, the lady | in charge—but a man 
is more seemly: the constraints of | conversation blur one's words; a man 
speaks to another | man with confidence and reveals his meaning with clarity. 
Although the beginning of the quote does not create any expectation for Clytemnestra to 
appear, some lines later, especially lines 663–64, such possibility begins to arise (‘Have 
someone…come out…’). However, even at this point Orestes’ preference to meet a woman 
gives way to his stronger preference to meet a man. After this, as Garvie notes, ‘Aegisthus 
should be in our minds when the door opens, and it is C. who appears.’73 In this instance and 
 
71 Raeburn & Thomas (2011) 231; Taplin (1977) 327. See also n. 70 in the Introduction. 
72 See Taplin (1977, 327–28) where he discusses Aegisthus’ surprising appearance in the Agamemnon as an 
undervalued Aeschylus’ technique. 
73 Garvie (1986) in 666–67 & (1976) 79. See also Taplin (1977) 342. 
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also in the other examples from the Libation Bearers, surprise is generated by the thwarting of 
expectations. 
I will discuss the next two cases of unexpected appearances in the Libation Bearers as 
interrelated. The first has to do with Cilissa’s appearance (730) whose unexpectedness lies in 
the fact that we are (again) unprepared. Additionally, as Orestes, Pylades, and Clytemnestra 
have already entered the palace at 718, what we are expecting for is the news of a murder to 
have taken place, possibly communicated through off-stage cries.74 Instead, Cilissa’s 
appearance works anticlimactically, disrupting the tension that has been built so far in the 
scene. The second case refers to Aegisthus’ appearance at 838. After the scene with the Chorus 
and Cilissa (730–82) and the following choral song (783–837), our expectation for the news of 
Aegisthus’ murder not only remains unfulfilled but it is also prolonged by the appearance on 
stage of Aegisthus himself, who remains on stage until the Chorus find a way to persuade 
him. 
The first example of unexpected appearances in the Eumenides refers to the ghost of 
Clytemnestra. Its emergence on stage at line 94 is entirely unexpected taking into account the 
preceding events both in this play and the Libation Bearers.75 The fact that her death was so 
central to the previous play obviously prevents us from anticipating her reappearance. To 
understand how striking is Clytemenstra’s reappearance from the dead in the Eumenides we 
also need to take into account the fact that the Libation Bearers had built expectations for the 
reappearance of Agamemnon as a ghost (through the continuous invocations by Electra, 
Orestes, and the Chorus, 315–22, 331–39, 345–54, 363–71, 456–57, 479–82). However, those 
expectations were never fulfilled, as the dead Agamemnon never appeared above his tomb.76 
The ghost of Clytemnestra shows up after Orestes and Apollo have left the stage, and in doing 
so it postpones the Furies’ appearance for the second time (with Orestes’ and Apollo’s 
appearance after Pythia’s compelling description in the prologue, 34–59, having been a first 
postponement). The emergence of the striking ghost creates both uncertainty for how the plot 
will proceed and anticipation for what will happen next.  
 
74 Hamilton (1987) 591 n. 13. 
75 On the staging of Clytemnestra’s ghost, see Taplin (1977) 365–67. See also Sommerstein (2008) 367 n. 32 & (1989) 
in 94. 
76 Garvie (1986) in 306–478. See also Garvie (2009) 260, on the appearance of Darius’ ghost in the Persians. 
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As mentioned in 7.2 above, the first appearance of the Furies in the Eumenides has 
attracted critical attention since antiquity. However, as a result of Aristophanes’ Frogs and the 
Life of Aeschylus all attention seems to have been directed to issues of performance and to 
spectatorial reactions to it, when, in fact, this is only one aspect of a more complex set of 
surprising elements around the entrance of the Chorus. First, the Furies do not appear by their 
own will, but as a result of Clytemnestra’s intervention. This is surprising, not least because 
they have been mentioned several times in the previous plays (for example Agamemnon 1189–
92, Libation Bearers 1049, 1061) and now in this play in Pythia’s speech in the prologue (46–52) 
and also through their own off-stage cries (see 7.3.2 above). Second, they turn out to be asleep 
(94), when one would expect them to be fiercely pursuing Orestes. Third, they enter the stage 
gradually from line 140 and on,77 from all around (σποράδην), rather than in the orderly 
manner in which the Chorus is expected to enter the stage.78 They are striking not only in 
visual but also in aural terms, as they do not sing in unison (143–48; 148–78).79 Fourth, at the 
point that we would expect them to display their full force, we are presented with another 
surprising moment. Their exit from the stage at 231 and their subsequent reappearance, 
although dramatically motivated, are nevertheless striking, challenging dramatic conventions 
for the continuous presence of the tragic Chorus.80 A similar shattering of the expected order 
takes place at lines 1348–71 of the Agamemnon, which will be discussed under 7.4.2 below 
(‘Surprise through small-scale changes’). 
The final example of this section comes from the procession in the last lines of the exit 
scene of the Eumenides (1003–32, 1032–37). This example generates a type of surprise different 
from what we have seen so far for mainly two reasons. First, the unexpected appearances of 
new characters emerge rather late in the plot, in line 1003, around 70 lines before the end of 
 
77 On the issue of when the Furies enter the stage, see Chapter 6, n. 112. 
78 On a perceptive comment about the Furies’ disorderly entrance, see Nooter (2017) 259. 
79 Sommerstein (2008) 374–75 n. 46, (1989) 109. The metrical analysis of their entrance song, mixed iambic-dochmiac 
metre, as opposed to the more conventional anapaestic metre for the entrance songs in Aeschylus. Docmiacs 
manifests extreme distress. See Sommerstein (1989) in 143–78. 
80 See for example, Brown (1983) 23. For scholarly attitudes to the breaking of this convention in this scene: see 
Arnott (1982, 35) & (1973, 54 and n. 2) who treats it as an exception to what becomes a norm only in Euripides; 
Taplin (1977, 375–76, 378) who discusses it only in terms of how motivated it is dramatically (‘explicit lapse of 
time’). Note that the Chorus in the Agamemnon also attempted to leave the stage to enter the palace and investigate 
the reason behind Agamemnon’s cries, but that was suspended by Clytemnestra’s abrupt appearance (See section 
7.3.3). 
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the play. A similarly late appearance was also Aegisthus’ in the Agamemnon who entered in 
line 1577, less than a hundred lines before the end. However, as discussed above,81 although 
unexpected, his presence serves dramatic reasons which are clearly related to the future of the 
plot. In the case of the Eumenides, the late appearance of new characters and the possibility of 
a formation of a secondary chorus are linked to the matter of closure as explored in Chapter 3 
(section 3.5). Second, the appearance of multiple new characters on stage which will escort the 
Awesome Goddesses to their new home is unprecedented. Although there is little paratextual 
evidence of the staging of this final scene, the textual evidence is startling. Lines 1005, 1010, 
1024, and 1028 suggest that the procession consists of the priestess of Athena, two adult 
assistants, a number of temple-servants, and, possibly, the jurors of the Areopagus court.82 
This visually compelling procession features torch lights (1005) and red robes (1028) as the 
Furies’ new attire (7.4.2. ‘Surprise through small-scale changes’). This, which comes as a result 
of the Furies’ surprising agreement with Athena (7.4.1. ‘Surprise through reversals’, below) 
draws our attention to the multiple characters that suddenly fill the stage, as we reflect on the 
possible implications of this celebratory ending. 
To conclude: this section has explored three techniques in surprise through narrative 
progression, surprise at the beginning of the play (7.3.1), through off-stage cries (7.3.2), and 
through unexpected appearances (7.3.3). These techniques demonstrate how the introduction 
of new information at various points in the dramatic narrative of the three plays elicits 
surprise through the abruptness and the unexpectedness of the future, and thwarting of 
expectations. At the same time, they are instrumental in bringing closer the materialisation of 
the main events, which is their main difference from the techniques of surprise to be explored 
in the section that follows. 
7.4. Surprise and narrative misdirection 
Moving on from surprise through narrative progression to surprise through narrative 
misdirection, the examples below show how the introduction of new information can be used 
 
81 See p. 193. 
82 Sommerstein (2008) 477, 483; Collard (2002) in 1004–6; Taplin (1977) 410–11. 
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for reversals, other types of change, and for the cause of shock. In this sense, it can contribute 
to misdirection, uncertainty, and confusion instead of clarity. 
7.4.1. Surprise through reversals 
Aristotle in the Poetics introduces the term περιπέτεια as the reversal of a character’s fortune 
from good to bad. In what follows, drawing on the theoretical background outlined in 7.2 
above, I use the term ‘reversal’ as an attribute of narrative created by unforeseeable events 
around which the plot is structured. More specifically, I will look at a small sample of reversals 
constructed to maximise surprise: from the Libation Bearers Orestes’ hesitation before the 
matricide (899) and his pursuit by the Furies after the matricide (1048–50), and from the 
Eumenides the reversals of the voting in Orestes’ trial (752–53) and of the Furies’ acceptance of 
Athena’s suggestion (916). I also touch on Proteus and the question of how it may have also 
employed reversals in the course of its plot. I do not offer an example from the Agamemnon: I 
argue that in that play surprise is generated through other techniques (see 7.3.1, 7.3.2, and 
7.3.3 above; 7.4.2 and 7.4.3 below). 
One of the most compelling moments of the Oresteia develops when we witness 
Orestes suddenly hesitating at the certainty of the imminent matricide (899): 
Pylades, what am I to do? Is such respect to stop me from killing my mother? 
Our surprise is generated by both the form and the content of Orestes’ utterance. First, Orestes 
turns to his friend who has been so far a silent character (see 7.4.2 below). Second, Orestes 
asks a genuine question by employing the non-rhetorical subjunctive deliberative (κτείνω) 
instead of the future indicative.83 
Nothing of what preceded this scene prepares us for Orestes’ hesitation. The first half 
of the play features the clear demonstration of Orestes’ and Electra’s determination to commit 
Clytemnestra’s and Aegisthus’ murders. Although Orestes exposes the details of the murder 
of Aegisthus without revealing any details about how he plans to commit the matricide, this 
 
83 Garvie (1986) 293. 
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does not shed any doubts on his determination to kill Clytemnestra. On the contrary, it 
increases the suspense about how this will finally take place.84 Orestes’ hesitation powerfully 
forces us to reconfigure our expectations and accept that Clytemnestra might not be 
murdered.85 However, this disorientation will not last. In the following lines, Pylades will 
bring everything back in track, by causing another surprise (900–2), as we will discuss in the 
next section. 
 The second reversal in the Libation Bearers takes place a few lines before the end of the 
play (1076), when a strong dramatic twist startles audience and readers (1048–50): 
A-a-ah! These grim women here | -like Gorgons with their dark clothing and 
snakes twined | thickly in their hair! I can’t stay here longer! 
Although less than thirty lines before the end of the play, the visitation of Furies constitutes a 
major plot reversal. By killing his mother Orestes saved himself from the Furies of his father, 
but he is now pursued by the Furies of his mother (which is completely independent of 
whether or not Orestes actually sees the Furies86), until his forced exit in 1062 (1053–54, 1057–
58, 1061–62): 
They are not fancies to me, the torments I have here: | these are clearly my 
mother's rancorous fury-hounds. 
Lord Apollo, here they are, multiplying now! | They drip and trickle from their 
eyes—loathsome! 
You don't see them yourselves, but I can see them! | I'm being driven, I tell 
you; I can't stay here longer! 
 
84 Garvie (1976) 77–78. See 6.3.1 ‘Suspense through the exposition of future planning’. 
85 See also section under 5.4.1. ‘Nodal points’. 
86 Garvie (1986) in 1048. 
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The emergence of the Furies finds us completely unprepared. Previously, Orestes and Pylades 
had forced Clytemnestra inside the palace (after line 930), while a choral song followed their 
departure (931–34), similar to the choral songs before Aegisthus’ murder (855–68) and before 
Agamemnon’s murder in the Agamemnon (1331–42). Orestes returns on stage as a winner, 
displaying his two victims, Clytemnestra and Aegisthus, and justifying his acts with a speech, 
with Chorus’ approval to follow (971–1047). The lines just before the appearance of the Furies 
are representative of the overall sense of the murders as acts of restoration of order and not as 
acts of destruction (1044–47): 
But what you did was good; and do not let your lips | be linked to damaging 
speech, nor put your tongue to things | of bad omen, now you have set all 
Argos' city free by your | clean severance of the two snakes' heads. 
However, this development of events, although broadly in line with our expectations, is 
violently interrupted by the Furies’ unexpected visitation. The process of restoration of order 
and return to stability of the house of the Atreides has been abruptly suspended once again. 
Both the address to a hitherto mute Pylades (899) and the unexpected appearance of the Furies 
(1076) feature surprises near the ending of the play which lead to misdirection, by contrast to 
surprises at the beginning of the play, which, as we have above (7.3.1), are linked to narrative 
progression. 
Moving on to the Eumenides, the first example of reversal is found at the scene of 
Orestes’ trial, and, more specifically, at the point when the outcome of the voting is announced 
which turns out to be surprisingly anti-climactic (752–53): 
 The man here goes free on the charge of bloodshed. | The numbers of the votes 
are equal. 
This is the conclusion of a trial process which commenced in line 566, when Athena re-entered 
the stage with the citizens as jurors. After almost two hundred lines of arguments between 
Apollo and Orestes from one side, and the Furies from the other, the jurors and Athena cast 
their votes. The possibility of equal votes was first raised by Athena earlier, based on her 
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argument in favour of the superiority of fatherhood over motherhood: ‘And Orestes wins 
even if in the judgement he has equal votes’ (741). With Athena having established a new 
system and appointed jurors, one would expect them to produce a clear verdict. On the 
contrary, these are all overshadowed by Athena’s intervention.87 Although that intervention 
does not frustrate our expectations that Orestes will be acquitted, it nevertheless contributes 
to misdirection. This misdirection is justified by the fact that it causes confusion and 
disorientation to the readers and the audience, as it moves them away from closure, opens up 
the possibility of an alternative outcome, and takes us to a section of the play beyond Orestes’ 
departure. As Garvie notes, ‘the whole plot changes after Orestes’ acquittal’.88 This leads on to 
another reversal to which I turn next. 
The Furies fully accept Athena’s proposition to incorporate into the Athenian civic life 
as newly established Awesome Goddesses, by contrast to what they threatened earlier at the 
prospect of Orestes’ acquittal. The first signs of this reversal take place through their question 
‘Queen Athena, what abode do you say I have?’ (892), while some lines later they announce 
their decision to radically alter their earlier future plans (916–26): 
‘I shall accept a home with Pallas, | and I shall not dishonour | this city which 
Zeus the almighty and Ares | hold as god’s outpost; | they delight in its 
guarding the altars of Greek deities. | For this city I make my prayer, | and 
prophesy with kind intent | good fortune in profusion to benefit its life, | 
burgeoning up from the earth | in sunshine’s bright gleam. 
This comes as a great surprise for the spectators and readers, as they would have expected the 
Furies to materialise their threats. That would have been consistent with their repetitive and 
constant threats as they feature from the beginning of the play. However, the play concludes 
with the Furies being convinced to take up residence in Athens and safeguard the city (see 
also 7.4.2 below). 
 
87 See Sommerstein (2010b). 
88 Garvie (1976) 81. 
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Both reversals in the Eumenides attract our attention through misdirection. First, we 
are convinced to expect that the main and single event is Orestes’ acquittal, and, second, we 
are taken by surprise by another event which follows up and leads the plot to its end. Our 
focus, therefore, shifts from one key event of the plot (Orestes’ acquittal) to another key event 
which comes as a surprise (the Furies’ willing protection of Athens). In this context, Bacon 
comments that ‘the Oresteia culminates not, as one might expect, in the resolution of the 
problems of Agamemnon’s heir in Argos, but in the establishment of a chorus of Furies in a 
new home in Athens’.89 This transition takes place through the two reversals discussed above 
and drives the plot to a surprising outcome. 
Finally, turning to Proteus it would be plausible to assume that reversals played an 
important role in it. Events that could have generated reversals are, for example, Menelaus’ 
encounter with Proteus’ daughter, Eido. If the satyr drama followed the Odyssey (Book 4, 351–
580), Eido could have been the one who informed Menelaus about her father’s prophetic skill 
and how to force him to exercise this skill and to predict Menelaus’ future. As Marshall 
suggests, Proteus’ transformations could have been either communicated to the audience 
through a messenger’s speech or, even more strikingly, represented on stage through Proteus’ 
reappearances with a different mask each time, ‘as an aggressive theatrical coup’, which, 
despite our limited evidence, we could claim it ‘would, without doubt, be a bold theatrical 
gesture’.90 Moreover, when Menelaus manages to find Proteus, his successive transformations 
must have also been startling and confusing for the audience who would look forward to 
learning about Menelaus’ rescue and future. When Menelaus finally captures Proteus, another 
reversal might have been included in Proteus’ prophetic words. Although this event brings 
us closer to the materialisation of Menelaus’ nostos, it does not preclude the possibility of other 
reversals which could have obstructed not only his return to Sparta, but also the return to a 
normal life. 
Surprises through reversals is one of the most compelling ways to capture readers’ 
and spectators’ attention not by inviting them to anticipate the future, but rather by driving 
them to clash with the unpredictability of the future. In both the Libation Bearers and the 
 
89 Bacon (2001) 48. 
90 Marshall (2015) 87. 
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Eumenides this reversal of expectations comes at the very end of the plot and creates a sense 
that the plays themselves may know more than we do. 
7.4.2. Surprise through small-scale changes 
While the previous section dealt with how surprise contributes to major reversals within key 
events of the plot, I now turn to how surprise plays a role through smaller-scale changes. I am 
dealing with aspects of the development of the characters which create surprise in the sense 
of puzzlement and uncertainty as to how the plot will advance: I discuss Cassandra and 
Pylades as seemingly mute characters who break their silence in the Agamemnon (1072) and 
the Libation Bearers (900) respectively. I also look at the Chorus’ split after Agamemnon’s cries 
(1346–71) in the Agamemnon. Finally, I focus on changes in the depiction of the characters of 
Apollo (574, 777) and the Furies (1026–27) in the Eumenides. 
While in section 7.3.2 above I showed how surprise is generated by the employment 
off-stage cries, the examples of Cassandra and Pylades show how surprise can be generated 
by silence.91 The matter of silences in Aeschylus has been the focus of critical attention since 
antiquity according to both Aristophanes’ Frogs, where the silent characters of Achilles (in the 
lost plays Myrmidons and Phrygians) and Niobe (in the lost play Niobe) are mentioned, and the 
Life of Aeschylus.92 Despite Aristophanes’ comic exaggeration, it is evident that the employment 
of silences in the Oresteia is raised to a device capable of evoking the dramatic effects of 
suspense and surprise. While suspense is achieved through the sustaining of silence, surprise 
is attained through its breaking. 
In the Agamemnon, Cassandra, who has remained silent for 300 lines (781–1072), is 
transformed into a character who breaks her silence, not through speaking, but through 
dramatically powerful but inarticulate cries. These cries accompany the realisation of the vast 
knowledge of past, present and, more significantly, future she possesses (1072–73): 
 
91 On silences in Aeschylus, see Taplin (1972). See also Podlecki (2013) 133. On silences in Greek culture in general, 
see Montiglio (2000). 
92 Aristophanes’ Frogs 911–13; Life 6. See Taplin (1972) 58–76. 
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Ototototoi, popoi, dah! | Apollo! Apollo!93 
What has preceded makes Cassandra’s outburst even more striking. Although Garvie notes 
that Cassandra is expected to speak, with us being unaware when she is expected to speak, I 
argue that, at least until line 1035, Cassandra is mostly considered a silent character, as our 
attention has never been directed to her. For instance, Agamemnon refers to her without 
raising any expectations that is likely to speak (950–55). Even when he departs (972), the 
emphasis does not shift to Cassandra who is left on the stage, but to his imminent murder.94 
However, after line 1035, the expectation of her becoming a speaking character, and of 
Aeschylus third speaking actor,95 starts to grow, when other characters address her 
(Clytemnestra in lines 1035, 1039, and 1059; the Chorus in lines 1047 and 1053–54). When she 
finally speaks in 1072, our expectations materialise. However, this materialisation does not 
adequately prepare for the way Cassandra breaks her silence.96 Her transformation from a 
silent character to one who delivers inarticulate cries and who the Chorus initially assumes 
she is unable to understand Greek, offers an unprecedented experience for those who engage 
with her performance. 
By contrast to Cassandra in the Agamemnon whose scene is prolonged for more than 
250 lines (1072–330), Pylades’ transformation in the Libation Bearers from a mute character to 
a speaking one lasts for only one line. Pylades’ prompt and direct answer to Orestes’ desperate 
question brings the plot back to its path and revives the audience’s anticipation that the 
matricide will take place in the imminent future (900–2):97 
 
93 Sommerstein’s translation (2008), see n. 31 in Chapter 4. Collard (2002, 147, n. 1072=1076) explains his attempt to 
reproduce this cry in a way that knowledge of Greek is not required. On Cassandra’s cries, see further, see Nooter 
(2017, 44–45 and n. 93); Prins (2005, 165); Heirman (1975) 258–59. 
94 Montiglio (2000) 213. 
95 Knox (1972) 114: ‘Aeschylus has taken the third actor Sophocles introduced to make the dialogue more flexible, 
complicated, and realistic, and used him to make the drama transcend the limits of space and time.’ 
96 See also Woolf (1925/1994) where she vividly describes Cassandra’s cry with a focus of its contribution to provoke 
surprise for the readers and spectators due to its intensity and immediacy. 
97 Goward (1999) 67. 
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Then where’s the future for Loxias’ oracles, | delivered by the Pythia, and the 
pledges sworn on oath? | Think of all men as your enemies rather than the 
gods! 
Although the technique of the third actor was not probably a complete innovation in 458 
BCE,98 and Aeschylus also uses it earlier in the case of Cassandra, its employment for Pylades 
in the Libation Bearers is instrumental for the generation of a type of surprise that Knox calls a 
‘dramatic explosion’.99 Effectively, this moment brings closely together two equally powerful 
but distinct types of surprise. Orestes’ hesitation (7.4.1) takes us away from the matricide. 
Pylades’ unexpected interjection (900–2) brings us back to it in a way that we could not have 
anticipated. 
Although both Cassandra’s and Pylades’ breakings of their silence work as catalysts 
to how surprise is generated, they do so differently. While Cassandra’s transition from a silent 
character to a speaking one is extraordinary in its intensity and time span, and lies ‘between 
the articulate and the inarticulate’,100 Pylades’ transition is brief, articulate, and full of logic 
and pragmatism. Although Pylades’ response resolves the situation and accelerates the plot 
towards the matricide, it creates a sense of misdirection in relation to our expectations 
associated with Pylades’ role.101 In both cases we are dealing with an intervention which is 
unanticipated and intense. In the case of Cassandra that intensity is due to its length, whereas 
in the case of Pylades’ that intensity is due to Pylades’ brevity. While, according to Taplin, 
only Cassandra’s (and not Pylades’) silence is a proper ‘Aeschylean silence’,102 I argue that in 
both cases the employment of silence is responsible for the development of one of the most 
powerful dramatic effects, the effect of surprise, which through the elements of the 
unexpected and the abrupt forces one to address the question of what it is involved in dealing 
with an open future. 
 
98 Knox (1972) 106–7. 
99 Knox (1972) 109. See also Halleran (2005) 172. Mastronarde (1979, 92) also argues for the intervention of a third 
party as a way of diversion, without, however, mentioning the relevant scenes from the Oresteia. For more on ‘The 
Rule of Three Actors’, see Marshall (1994). 
100 Brault (2009) 205. 
101 Marshall (2017) 120: ‘Aeschylus creates misdirection’. On the surprising effect of this scene in antiquity, Marshall 
(2017) 121–22. 
102 Taplin (1972) 94. 
Chapter 7 
Page 229 of 269 
Before we move on to the Eumenides, one more example of surprise from the 
Agamemnon takes place in lines 1346–71 and refers to the Chorus’ sudden division into twelve 
voices, which happens immediately after Agamemnon’s off-stage cries (1343, 1345). In 
addition to what we have discussed previously about the associations of this abrupt change 
with the concept of sideshadowing (5.4.1. ‘Nodal points’) and with suspense (6.4.3. ‘Suspense 
through action delayed’), the Chorus’ split and disagreement is also important for the surprise 
it generates. Their complete unity and unanimity are replaced by a complete disjunction in 
lines 1346–69, regarding how they are planning to act in the immediate future. In addition to 
the visually powerful effect of this choral phenomenon from the point of view of the 
performance, this transition from the single, collective voice to twelve individual voices 
strikingly reveals the extent of the crisis in the house: even the Chorus can suspend its function 
when the narrative reaches such a halt103 and the future looks unforeseeable. 
Turning to the Eumenides, Apollo reappears unexpectedly before the start of the trial 
(574), with role which is rather quite different from the role in his previous appearance in the 
play (178–234). Apollo is uninvited and unannounced, and disrupts Athena’s request for 
silence and attention (570–73, 574–75): 
For now that this council is being convened, it | will be helpful if all are silent 
and attentive to my ordinances— | both the whole city for all time to come and 
| also these men, so that the case may be properly decided. 
Lord Apollo, rule over your own domain. | Say what concern you have with 
this dispute.104 
The unexpectedness of Apollo’s arrival could have been discussed alongside with other 
unexpected arrivals of characters in section 7.3.3 above. However, in this section it is more 
important to focus on how different his role is compared to his role earlier in the play (64–88, 
178–234). By contrast to his earlier role as divine advisor, his return as Orestes’ advocate is 
 
103 Nooter (2017) 177–78. 
104 Drawing on Taplin (1977, 396), I attribute lines 574–75 to Athena and not to the Chorus. I quote Sommerstein’s 
translation (2008). 
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disruptive in the solemn atmosphere Athena is trying to create (571), and confusing 
considering that the prosecution does not call any witnesses.105 Although drawing on those 
issues Taplin suggests that the text is corrupt,106 I argue that Apollo’s abrupt reappearance can 
be better explained by the striking transformation of his role from god to Orestes’ advocate.107 
The manner of his departure as unmarked and informal shows that once he has fulfilled his 
task (753/777), he has no further role to perform.108 This is a minor transformation (does not 
mark a decisive turning point in the plot) that it can be seen as preparing for the major reversal 
that follows with the transformation of the Furies into benevolent deities. 
The second example from the Eumenides comes from the exit scene (1003–47), and, 
more specifically, from the moment when the Furies as the newly established Awesome 
Goddesses take on purple robes (1028), as announced by Athena in the final part of her speech 
(1024–27): 
The very eye of all Theseus’ | land will therefore please come forward, a 
glorious band of | children, wives and older women in procession with red-
dyed | clothing put on [lines missing] give [them] honour! 
Their transformation from Furies to Eumenides, what we explored earlier as a reversal (7.4.1), 
is now at this particular point visually marked as they conceal their fearsome, presumably 
black (as indicated in line 52), costumes with robes in purple, a ceremonial and celebratory 
colour. This live, on-stage costume change must have been a dazzling spectacle. The change 
of black clothing to purple clothing is also surprising because it is linked to the issues of 
inconsistency and conditionality regarding the role of the Furies previously discussed 
(especially in 4.3.1 and 4.4.3 above). While readers and spectators are puzzled by those issues, 
 
105 Sommerstein (2010b) 25. 
106 Taplin (1977) 397–401. Specifically: ‘Why does Aeschylus have the solemn preparation in 566–73 only to throw 
it away? Why should Apollo’s entry come at this surprising and inappropriate moment, rather than standing by 
itself at some less disruptive point? (397). 
107 See Knox (1972, 107–8) on the significance of the employment of the third-actor technique in this scene. 
108 Taplin (1977) 403. On the matter of a later departure in line 777, see Taplin (1977) 403–7. See also Sommerstein 
(2008) 451 n. 157. 
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the Furies’ new celebratory attire comes to further take them by surprise, as it fixes, legalises, 
and systematises their already ambiguous status. 
What the chosen examples above have in common is that they feature changes in both 
visual and verbal terms related to a number of different characters (Cassandra, Pylades, the 
Chorus of the Elders, the Furies). Although those changes are small-scale and do not lead to 
grand reversals as in 7.4.1, they do nevertheless interrupt the dramatic sequence, cause 
confusion, and manifest our unpreparedness for a future that lies open ahead. 
7.4.3. Surprise through shock 
The final section adds to the previous discussion by featuring compelling examples of the 
horrendous and the monstrous which develop the dramatic effect of surprise into shock. 
Surprise through shock in Aeschylus is precisely what attracted negative comment in 
antiquity (as mentioned in 7.2). However, I here argue that it stems from the artful 
combination of the vivid and the physical on the one hand and the impressive and the 
unexpected on the other hand. Some of the best examples of this kind of surprise can be found 
within scenes where Clytemnestra and the Furies play a leading part. From the Agamemnon I 
will look at Clytemnestra’s detailed account of the travelling of the beacon lights from Troy 
to Argos (281–316) and Clytemnestra’s appearance on stage standing over the bodies of 
Agamemnon and Cassandra (1379–92); from the Libation Bearers I will discuss Clytemnestra’s 
exposure of her breast (896–98); from the Eumenides I will look at Pythia’s description of the 
Furies (46–59) and the appearance of the ghost of Clytemnestra in the Furies’ dream (94–139). 
Clytemnestra’s speech in the Agamemnon 281–316, also known as the ‘Beacons Speech’, 
features a strikingly detailed narration of how the news of the Greek victory in Troy travelled 
to Argos through beacon lights.109 In thirty-five lines Clytemnestra manifests an absolute 
control of geographical overview of an area extending from Troy, to the islands and then to 
mainland Greece: from Ida (283) to Lemnos (283–84) and then to Athos (285), Macistus (289), 
Messapion (293), and then Cithaeron (298), next to the Geraneia mountains (303), and then to 
the Arachnaeon mountain (309), and finally Argos (310).110 Although Raeburn and Thomas 
 
109 For a detailed presentation of Clytemnestra’s ‘Beacons speech’, see Raeburn & Thomas (2011) 99–104. 
110 On geographical details of the beacon light travel, see Quincey (1963). 
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argue for Clytemnestra’s ‘tremendously vivid imagination’,111 I would stress, drawing on 
Goward, that, on the contrary, the narrative forces us to understand her narration as 
consisting of real events.112 Her use of past tense (for example: ἔπεμπεν, 282; ἐξεδέξατο, 285; 
παρῆκεν, 291; ἀντέλαμψαν, 294) and the employment of chronological sequence in her 
narration illustrate that the details Clytemnestra provides bear characteristics not of an 
imaginary description, but of a description based on solid knowledge. She identifies the 
information she introduces as historical events, her ‘token and proof’ (τέκμαρ…σύμβολόν τέ, 
315), thus, responding to the Chorus’ earlier request for ‘evidence’ (τέκμαρ, 272). Apart from 
the shock caused by the display of extraordinary knowledge, we are also amazed by how it is 
possible for a human to have sourced and acquired this information: Clytemnestra’s capacity 
to know the exact name places and route of the beacon fire before it reaches Argos goes well 
beyond her position as a spectator situated in Argos. Clytemnestra’s speech brings spectators 
and readers face to face with the realisation that they know much less than the unfolding 
narrative, leaving them in wonder and in uncertainty about what they will have to expect by 
her in the future. 
Although the dramatic convention speaks against the representation of murder on 
stage, Clytemnestra’s narration after the two murders she had just committed has a powerful 
dramatic effect of surprise through shock (1379–92).113 Before we look at the details of lines 
1379–92, it needs to be noted that Aeschylus’ treatment of the myth according to which 
Clytemnestra is the main perpetrator of the crime (and Aegisthus just the abettor) also 
reinforces the dramatic effect of the scene. Even if the leading role had been attributed to 
Clytemnestra before Aeschylus, it is now that it becomes an integrated part of the dramatic 
narrative which draws our attention to the openness and the unexpectedness of the future.114 
The visual impact of Clytemnestra’ sudden appearance over the dead bodies of Agamemnon 
and Cassandra is accompanied by an equally powerful description of the gory details of the 
murder (1379–92): 
 
111 Raeburn & Thomas (2011) on 281–316. 
112 Goward (2005) 64, where she also opposes to Fraenkel’s ‘rationalizing idea (1950, II, in 287) that her information 
is not ta genomena (‘what actually happened’) but hoia an genoito (‘the sort of thing that happens’). 
113 On Aeschylus’ treatment of this convention, Easterling (2005) 27 n. 16; Diggle (2005). 
114 For the issue of the date of Pindar’s Pythian 11, see Finglass (2007b) 17–19. 
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 I stand where I struck, over a deed completed; I did it this | way, and I shall 
not deny it, so there should be no escape, | no fending off death. A net with no 
way through, just as for | fish, I stake out round him (περιστοχίζω), an evil 
wealth of clothing; I | strike (παίω) him twice, and with two groaning cries 
his legs gave | way on the spot; and I deal (ἐπενδίδωμι) him a third blow on 
top now he | has fallen, a thank-offering vowed to the Zeus below the | earth, 
the saviour of the dead. And so he speeds (ὁρμαίνει) his life away | after his 
fall; he gasps out (κἀκφυσιῶν) quick blood from his throat | -wound and hits 
(βάλλει) me with a dark shower of gory dew, and I | rejoice (χαίρουσαν) no 
less than a sown crop does in Zeus’ sparkling gift | when the sheathed ears 
swell for birth. 
Instead of witnessing the murder as a spectacle on stage, we are offered the opportunity, both 
as readers and as spectators, to hear Agamemnon’s murder and then to go over it with the 
help of Clytemnestra’s commentary on it. The lines above constitute an ‘action replay’115 whose 
content and form are equally shocking. Although the vividness of Clytemnestra’s narration is 
supported by the use of the present tense116 and of motion-related words (above in bold), what 
we experience goes much beyond the sense of vividness, as it is startling and intricate. 
Clytemnestra offers a step-by-step, climactic narration of the event of a murder by the 
murderer herself, about how exactly she committed the crime and what exactly was the outcome 
of her act. She completes this narration with gruesome anatomical details, as for instance the 
reference to the strike on Agamemnon’s lungs which forces him to gasp out blood and which 
Clytemnestra herself receives as the crops receive god-sent rain (1389–91).117 The extended 
description of an act which probably lasted only a few brief moments prolongs its grim effect, 
illustrates Clytemnestra’s ‘continuous relish’,118 and makes us experience one shock after the 
other. In lines 1379–92 Clytemnestra manifests once more her impressive skill to offer 
 
115 Diggle (2005) 217. 
116 See Fraenkel (1950, III) in 1383. 
117 See also 1385–87. On the use of use of gruesome language in religious context, see Fraenkel (1950, III) on 1387. 
118 Collard (2002) on 1382–3. 
Surprise 
Page 234 of 269 
strikingly detailed descriptions, making the visualisation of Agamemnon’s murder not only 
upsetting but also irresistible. 
  In the Libation Bearers and the Eumenides, Clytemnestra shocks the audience and the 
readers through two bodily gestures: in the second play, just before her murder she bares her 
breast (896–98), and, in the third play, when she appears as a ghost she displays the wounds 
from Orestes’ blows (103). In the first example, through the gesture of pointing to her bare 
breast, Clytemnestra invokes the maternal bond between her and Orestes: 
 Stop my son! Hold back, from respect for this (τόνδε) | breast! You often 
drowsed at it while your gums drew out| its rich milk. 
While the gesture itself must have been a striking spectacle for the audience (however it might 
have been performed119), the text communicates the desired effects of the gesture on Orestes 
and, consequently, the readers, enhancing its impact.120 Although before lines 896–98 the 
future of Clytemnestra appeared closed with the certainty of her imminent murder to prevail, 
it now shockingly opens up through her ultimate effort to create another future for herself by 
requesting Orestes to cancel his plan. 
In the second example, the presence of Clytemnestra’s ghost in the narrative generates 
shock and horror due to its supernatural character and strong physicality (103):121 
See (ὅρα) these (τάσδε) blows, see them with your heart. 
Her appearance now as a ghost coming from the dead is striking not only due to her 
unexpectedness (discussed in 7.3.3), but also due to the emphasis on her wounded body, 
which is what gives to the scene the element of horrendousness. Additionally, Clytemnestra’s 
use of the sense verb ὁρῶ and the deictic pronoun τάσδε to point to her wounds by Orestes’ 
strikes forcefully reminds us of the horrific event of the matricide and create anticipation for 
 
119 Catenaccio (2011) 219–20; Segal (1985) 17–18. 
120 The scholiast of the Iliad describes as kinetikon and graphikon the scene where Hecuba bares her breast to Hector 
pleading him to stay (Book 22). See Nünlist (2009) 140 n. 18. 
121 On how the appearance of Clytemnestra’s ghost might have been staged, see Taplin (1977) 365–67. 
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Orestes’ imminent punishment. Unlike Darius’ ghost in Aeschylus’ Persians, she lacks the 
authority and oracular vision usually linked to ghosts,122 but her visceral appearance 
nevertheless shocks and incurs further future action.123 
 The final example, again from the Eumenides, shows how the employment of horror, 
having been introduced through the ghost of Clytemnestra, is developed further. The scene 
of Pythia takes us by surprise not only because she re-enters unannounced (see 7.3.1. ‘Surprise 
at the beginning’), but also because it provides Pythia a horrifying description of the Furies 
(51–55): 
they are | black, utterly revolting in their manner, snoring out a breath | which 
is unapproachable, while their eyes run with a loathsome | fluid. Clothing of 
this form is not right, to be brought | near gods' images or into men's houses. 
According to Pythia’s report, the Furies’ appalling appearance and odour exceeds all 
expectations regarding the anthropomorphic characters that normally inhabit the tragic space. 
The use of present tense demonstrates their proximity, inviting us to imagine how they look 
and how they feel, well before and in much more detail than when we will encounter them in 
line 140. 
To conclude, in section 7.4 I have shown how the effect of surprise is employed as a 
technique which is based on surprise, confusion, and shock. By contrast to 7.3, where the focus 
was on surprise as the acquisition of knowledge, I have demonstrated that the renewal or the 
cancellation of pre-existing knowledge can also be very effective. The examples discussed 
force us to realise that the uncertainties of the future are powerful not only through their 
unexpectedness and abruptness, but also through shocks which cause further unpredictability 
for what is to come. 
 
122 On the appearance of Darius’ ghost in the Persians, see Garvie (2009) 260. On the appearances of ghosts in Greek 
tragedy, see Collard (2008) in 681–851; Michelakis (2007) 75–82; Rosenmeyer (1982) 266. 
123 See also Chapter 5, section 5.3.3, where this scene is discussed in the context of the Furies’ dream as foreshadowing 
technique. 
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7.5. Conclusion 
In this final chapter, I have argued that in a discussion of dramatic effects related to 
conceptualisations of the future we need to examine not only suspense (Chapter 6), but also 
surprise. Surprise has been mostly identified as a feature of Euripides’ tragedy, but I have 
discussed how it can also be related to the temporal dynamics of Aeschylus’ plays, where it 
occurs under specific but varied circumstances. With the examples I explored above, I have 
shown that the understanding of the workings of surprise through a multiplicity of 
approaches and techniques sheds light to the inner mechanisms of the plot: surprise at the 
beginning (7.3.1), through off-stage action (7.3.2), through unexpected appearances (7.3.3), 
through reversals (7.4.1), through smaller-scale changes (7.4.2), and, finally, through shock 
(7.4.3). 
These sections have outlined my proposition about where exactly and through what 
kind of events one needs to look for narrative surprises. The process of their identification 
includes the recognition of their different grades of intensity, of the contexts in terms of plot 
construction, of the level of cognition (minimum to maximum) of the characters and of the 
readers and the spectators. Therefore, speaking about surprise in the Oresteia demands much 
more than asserting its presence. The model I have proposed offers the opportunity to put to 
test those narrative elements which under specific circumstances can generate startling 
readerly and spectatorial responses. 
Specifically, both in the Agamemnon and in the Libation Bearers, surprise is mostly 
accommodated within intrigue, human catastrophe, and thwarted expectations. However, 
whereas in the Agamemnon the employment of surprise is achieved through the withholding 
of information rather than through reversals, in the case of the Libation Bearers powerful 
reversals are central to the generation of surprise. In the Eumenides, surprise is generated by 
the regular introduction of new information rather than through the effectiveness of reversals. 
Finally, the plot of Proteus must have offered plenty of opportunities for the exploitation of 
surprise, especially in terms of stagecraft. Despite any differences, what the above examples 
have in common is that they invite us to recognise that the plot consists of both probable and 
necessary events which give shape and meaning to the plot, while also generating successive 
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and intense experiences of surprise. In doing so, they highlight the unpredictability and the 
unexpectedness of the future, undermining the sense of complete closure.  
In other words, I have argued that the analysis above invites us to understand the 
Oresteia, both the tetralogy and its individual plays, as a network consisting of interacting 
narrative elements of surprise. Those elements link different events together, increase the level 
of followability of the story, and command the rapt attention of readers and spectators. It is 
only through those elements that we are able to fully engage with central aspects of the plot, 
such as ‘the Cassandra scene’ in the Agamemnon, the matricide in the Libation Bearers, and 
Pythia’s prologue of the Eumenides: every single time a reader or spectator is struck by 
surprise, expectations are renewed, awaiting new surprises to take over and exceed them. This 
constant interplay structures a significant part of how the future is configured in the Oresteia. 
Both surprise and suspense can be associated with narrative progression (6.3, 7.3), but also 
with narrative misdirection (6.4, 7.4). Both of them are also intertwined with the ideas of 
anticipation and expectation. While suspense is generated through the development of 
expectations and the sustaining of anticipation, surprise is provoked through expectations 
contradicted and anticipation disrupted. While suspense introduces us to the expansion of 
time and the anticipation of the future, surprise forces us to confront a future that goes beyond 
our expectations. 
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8. Conclusions 
This study had a twofold objective: to highlight the functions of the future in Aeschylus’ Oresteia, 
and, in doing so, to make a case for the broader significance of the future in dramatic narrative. 
As stated at the outset of this thesis and argued throughout my chapters, these two goals are 
inseparably intertwined: according to my proposed framework, the detailed exploration of 
the future in drama needs to be carried out through its narrative configurations. This approach 
has also been dictated by my scope of pursuing this in the context of Ricoeur’s mimesis 3, that 
is, by examining closely the perspective of spectators and readers. The above, operating as the 
overarching argument and fundamental principle in all respects, have allowed for a 
contemporary reading of Aeschylus’ Oresteia which bring into sharp focus why the future is 
always at stake and how it is to experience it.  
This understanding of the future has been explored through a wide selection of critical 
terminology and methodological angles, as I argue that this is the only way one can overcome 
the difficulties involved in grasping the temporalities of the future. This multifold task has 
involved identifying and interpreting expressions of futurity, analysing instrumental future-
related occurrences and their meanings, putting into dialogue the plays with contemporary 
future thinking, and constructing models of understanding readerly and spectatorial 
responses to the unexpectedness of the future. It has been shown how the narrative of the 
Oresteia provides readers and viewers with unrestricted access to both conceptual and 
experiential understandings of the future, as well as offering them both abstract and tangible 
manifestations of the future as something immediate and affective.  
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Starting in reverse order from the final chapter, I have shown how expectation is an 
attitude towards future events of the plot, which opens up possibilities for how a reader or a 
spectator might deal with future events in real life. A powerful statement can be made for the 
future being at stake when we receive events of the plot as unexpected. In this light, I have put 
forward surprise as one of the primary functions through which the future manifests itself in 
narrative as in real life. This Chapter has provided the theoretical framework which enables 
one to dive into the conceptual implications, the how and the why of the affective power of 
surprise. At the same time, it has presented a diverse selection of examples from the Oresteia, 
ranging from reflex-stimulus type of responses to responses linked to full awareness of the 
advent of the future. Several techniques have been exploited in order for this to be one of the 
most thrilling dramatic effects: characters’ sudden appearances and events taking place earlier 
or later than expected, demanding our visual, aural, and, mainly, cognitive participation, and 
comprehension. Even being familiar with the story and the narrative and how it will end can 
be conducive to how we are taken by surprise, considering the intricacies and immersiveness 
of the plot. My argument that our preoccupation with the future calls for the exploration of 
the workings of surprise and its constituents is directly linked to how we conceptualise the 
future: we plan and prepare for it, under the influence of our expectations, whether they are 
based on a belief in a structure of the world that is orderly or disorderly (deterministic, causal, 
contingent). The fact that each of these types of expectation can be challenged in Aeschylus’ 
narrative universe suggests that there is always uncertainty lying ahead. Το the potential 
objection that this may relate to a contemplation of the future that is retrospective, reflective, 
or similar to the past, I argue that surprise must be identified with unexpectedness as the, 
always present, core element of futurity. The fact that this element, when narrativised, can be 
captured and scrutinised, does not take away anything away from its overwhelming 
influence. The process of studying and experiencing narrative surprise does not lead to 
learning, preparedness and, thus, overcoming of surprise in real life. On the contrary, those 
preoccupations allow us to accept that surprise is present even in cases where we consider a 
situation under control, either by following a story closely like the Oresteia or by making life 
decisions and plans ahead. 
By contrast to surprise as an instant response, my penultimate chapter has turned to 
suspense as a concept that captures the more prolonged state of thinking, constructing, 
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imagining, and preparing for the future of the plot. It is not only the unexpectedness of the 
future which compels readers and spectators to engage with the narrative but also the 
growing expectation, full of uncertainty, regarding which scenario is necessary and probable to 
be fulfilled. Again, familiarity with the story and the narrative does not decrease our 
suspenseful disposition: the Oresteia makes use of several techniques which are based on how 
the flow of information is regulated, whether facilitated or disrupted. These considerations 
address in a direct way the question of why anyone with an interest in the topic of the future 
in narrative needs to be involved in the study of suspense: the anticipation of the future events 
of the plot not only situates the reader and the spectator in the same state of anxiety and 
puzzlement as the dramatic characters, but it also offers them a set of models to reflect on. In 
real life, while we react to the unexpected with surprise, we do not find ourselves in suspense 
and, certainly, we do not call it so when we are occupied with evaluating our future 
possibilities. In narrative, on the other hand, the conceptualisation of this phenomenon 
through the mechanism of suspense shows how the future can come across as both uncharted 
and narrativised, and understood as such. Although it is not generally easy to separate out 
suspense and surprise, I have tried to show how they are informed by entirely different 
techniques which need to be examined on their own terms. 
Another pair of concepts I have employed to show how the future in the tetralogy is 
narrativised with all its uncertainty and volatility is foreshadowing and sideshadowing. Like with 
suspense and surprise, I have sought to keep these terms separate (in sections 5.3 and 5.4 
respectively). By mapping foreshadowing and sideshadowing techniques, I have argued that the 
narrative of the Oresteia gives prominence to two main qualities of the future, its openness and 
its closedness. One tends to associate foreshadowing with the future as closed and sideshadowing 
with the future as open, but I have shown that, in the case of the tetralogy, this is problematic: 
foreshadowing and sideshadowing submit to an interplay between certainty and uncertainty, 
constructing an intriguing synergy. More specifically, although those two critical terms bear 
certain and fixed features related to the anticipation of a future which is either always 
controlled or always undecided, their artful employment in the Oresteia constantly 
undermines our ability each time to predict with accuracy what is coming, another evidence 
of a future being always at stake. 
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Equally important is another pair of concepts through which I have sought to grasp 
the meaningful links between future and present, those of the future present and the present 
future (Chapter 4). By contrast to the approach I have followed in Chapters 5 to 7, the workings 
of those concepts in Chapter 4 are examined in each play individually, from the Agamemnon 
to Proteus. This play-by-play arrangement offers an alternative mode of analysis which invites 
us to zoom in on a selection of dramatic characters, exploring how they experience their future 
as either being in the making (present future) or being already complete (future present). The 
characters view and live their future in diverse ways. Future present is associated with 
passivity, while present future is associated with pursuit. Future present might signify fulfilment 
in one play and catastrophe in another play. Similarly, present future might force characters to 
action in the face of a desired future or, alternatively, in the face of an uncertain future. The 
reader and the spectator are confronted with a whole range of perspectives that differ from 
character to character and from play to play, which force them to face a whole range of 
possibilities for connecting our presents with our futures. 
Another important aspect of the future that this thesis has scrutinised is its teleological 
implications (Chapters 2 and 3). My thesis has shown that, in the Oresteia, the multiple 
meanings of telos as purpose, fulfilment, and ending provide access to a number of major 
temporalities of the future and how they are experienced. Like Chapter 4, Chapters 2 and 3 
have followed a play-by-play examination, and this has been carried out at a lexical level 
(Chapter 2) and at a narratological level (Chapter 3). In Chapter 3, I have shown that the 
teleological idea of the future as end cannot be fully contained within the narrative limits of 
the four plays. Their endings play with our expectations for complete closure by entertaining 
a range of possible outcomes: a desired and necessary but incomplete closure, a necessary but 
undesired open-endedness, a misleading sense of closure which is only presented as desired and 
necessary, and a neat closure which comes both as a necessity and as a desire. I have shown 
that, through the fulfilment of mimesis 3, we are compelled to engage with these types of 
ending and, then, to contemplate on how we position ourselves in relation to the need for 
control and planning, on the one hand, and the contingency of real-life crises on the other 
hand. Turning to Chapter 2, my study on telos would have been incomplete without a close 
reading of the language of Aeschylus’ narrative. My linguistic analysis of the word τέλος and 
its cognates in the Oresteia has demonstrated that their ordinary meanings and interpretations 
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need to be constantly informed by the dramatic narrative itself, for a more thorough and 
intricate reading of the preoccupations of the tetralogy with telos and, thus, with the future. I 
have tried to show that, for all its significance, it can only be a starting point for a discussion 
of broader issues that do not confine themselves exclusively to lexical considerations. 
My study has offered a number of insights into how each play of the Oresteia 
narrativises the future. In the Agamemnon, the future is defined in terms of its accessibility or 
its obscurity. The future is accessible to certain characters, namely to Cassandra and 
Clytemnestra (though this changes for Clytemnestra at the end of the play), while at the same 
time it is utterly or relatively obscure to other characters (utterly for Agamemnon, relatively 
for the Chorus). After the murder of Agamemnon and Cassandra, the future manifests itself 
as fulfilled, and only at the very end of the play are we invited to engage with a future that 
reverts to its default status of being ‘at stake’: this is thanks to the Chorus’ references to 
Orestes’ return in the distant future. The Libation Bearers picks up this sense of crisis which 
undermines the order Clytemnestra and Aegisthus now represent; their control of the future 
is disrupted by Orestes’ planning, which culminates in the murder of Aegisthus and the 
matricide. If, in the Libation Bearers, the future unfolds through planning, in the Eumenides the 
future unfolds through debate and compromise. In the Eumenides, the future breaks its bonds 
with the past, opens up, and transforms into something that lies in the sphere and 
responsibility of the community, rather than the characters themselves or the gods. This new 
conceptualisation is most clearly manifested at the end of the play when the Furies swiftly 
take on a new role in the community of Athens, as Awesome Goddesses, in a celebratory but 
incongruous ambiance. Finally, Proteus is likely to have offered a less threatening but by no 
means closed way of thinking about the future. Its preoccupations with being a satyr drama 
might well have invited a way of looking at the future as a field of new adventures, 
inventiveness, and experimentation. 
The discussion I have undertaken contributes to the ongoing research in the field of 
Classical studies in reference to two main areas: the future as a concept, and the dramatic 
narrative as a mode of storytelling. I have shown how both of them need to be pursued under 
the influence of Ricoeur’s foundational idea of the world that is being brought (mimesis 1) to 
a given story (mimesis2), and to the possibilities for transforming that world (mimesis 3). 
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Firstly, pertaining to the idea of the future as concept, I have demonstrated that, in 
contrast with the idea of timelessness which is usually attached to Greek tragedy (as for 
instance in Aristotle’s claims about the universality of poetry in the Poetics),1 what we need to 
seek out in these plays is the idea of timeliness. The idea of timeliness foregrounds the 
significance of every act of watching or reading for the present and, above all, for the future 
of the readers and the spectators. Shifting the focus of timeliness from the present to the future,  
readers and spectators are framed in their capacity not only to follow and believe in a story, 
but also to anticipate its possible continuations in accordance with their own untold futures. 
I have shown that by reaching out for tools, ideas, and methodologies from other research 
areas in the field of the Humanities (in my case those of narratology, philosophy of history, 
and literary criticism), one can undertake modes of analysis that existing debates within 
Classics have so far failed to pursue with urgency and vigour. 
Secondly, as far as the dramatic narrative is concerned, the paradigm of order for 
Ricoeur (following Aristotle) as a mode of storytelling, I have shown that by theorising 
dramatic narratives we can shed more light on perplexing narrative concepts. Ricoeur argues 
that such an approach to drama ‘is capable for extension and transformation to the point 
where it can be applied to the whole narrative field.’2 More specifically, I have shown that we 
can theorise the future in dramatic narrative, the focus of my thesis, through a back and forth 
between the future of the characters and the future of readers and viewers. Although this 
process may or may not provide firm answers for the future, and complications may or may 
not be resolved at the time of reading or spectating (which raises questions similar to 
Augustine’s distentio animi), it does, however, raise broader questions about human autonomy 
and responsibility in the face of indeterminacy and uncertainty of a future at risk of being lost. 
It is exactly this discordant concordance that is narrativised, drawing connections between art 
and life. As I have shown, in every act of reading or spectating, the world proposed by the 
text elucidates, reinforces, challenges, or contradicts the world of its readers and spectators; 
but also it is elucidated, reinforced, challenged, or contradicted by that world in turn. In my 
analysis, I have tried to do justice not only to the challenges but also to the promises of 
 
1 See Introduction p. 15. See also Halliwell (2002) 108. 
2 Ricoeur (1984, I) 38. See also Fludernik (1996, 348): 'the most important narrative genre whose narrativity needs 
to be documented'. 
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Ricoeur’s work on narrative, as it transcends conventional divisions and hierarchies between 
the world of the narrative and the world of those that encounter it, the original audience and 
the subsequent readers and spectators, the page and the stage and so on.3  
As mentioned in the Introduction, the Oresteia is by no means the only narrative where 
the examination of the topic of the future is worth undertaking. Material from Aeschylus’ 
other plays can offer the grounds for further research along similar interpretative lines, while 
such a project could also be expanded to include Sophocles’ and Euripides’ plays. In doing so, 
we would move towards the broader picture of the diverse conceptions of the future in Greek 
drama (both complete and fragmentary) and their contribution to shaping our own 
conceptions of our futures. For instance, in Aeschylus’ The Persians one could study techniques 
of foreshadowing (such as Atossa’s dream and the prophecy of the ghost of Darius) and their 
associations with an open or closed future, while in Aeschylus’ The Suppliants one could focus 
on the dramatic effect of suspense. In Sophocles’ Antigone, Creon’s idea of a predetermined 
future and Antigone’s idea of an open future could be examined in parallel. The uncertainty 
of the future could be a topic for discussion in Euripides’ Medea with regard to Medea’s 
process of planning to kill her and Jason’s children. In the prologues of Euripides’ Hecuba and 
Ion one could focus on their misleading predictions, while in the plot of Euripides’ Orestes we 
could explore the dramatic effect of surprise. Another suggestion would be to examine the 
idea of the alternative future, for instance in Euripides’ Iphigenia at Aulis, where a different 
and mostly non-tragic future for both the characters themselves and for the spectators and the 
readers lurks persistently at the background of the narrative. Turning to Greek comedy, 
Aristophanes’ Frogs is one of the most obvious places to start, as it dramatises the workings 
of the transition from the present to the future via the past. 
The above are only a selection of topics and narratives where the methodology of this 
dissertation may be applied. This kind of research would result in the expansion of ‘the future 
in narrative’ into other areas of Classical studies as they engage with current preoccupations 
in other fields of the Humanities. In a world where people are constantly trying to come to 
terms with change by minimising and avoiding the effects of the passing of time, the 
 
3 Despite the significance of Ricoeur’s theory of mimesis, one of the mysteries of contemporary criticism pinpointed 
by Currie (2013, 38) is that ‘Ricoeur’s work on narrative has so little informed literary critical and narratological 
approaches to time’. 
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narrativisation of different concepts of the future through acts of reading and watching 
emerges as a timely and compelling task. 
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10. Appendix: Τέλος-headwords in the Oresteia 
The lexical inventory below provides an overview of the occurrences of τέλος-terms under 
examination in Chapter 2. As explained at the beginning of Chapter 2, I employ Seaford’s 
fourfold semantic framework as the starting point of my discussion: telos as a) ‘completion’, 
b) ‘payment’, c) ‘ritual’, and d) ‘authority’. 
a) Τέλος as ‘completion’ (or ‘fulfilment’) 
ἀτέλευτον (adj.), ‘unending’      Ag. 1451 
ἐντελέων (adj.), ‘in their full prime’     Ag. 105 
ἐτελέσθη (v.), ‘come to fulfilment     LB 1067 
παντελής (adj.), ‘all-fulfilling’     LB 965 
τελέαν (adj.), ‘final’        Ag. 1458 
τέλει (v.), ‘give fulfilment’      Ag. 973 
τελεῖ (v.), ‘will end’       LB 1021 
τελεῖν (inf.), ‘to fulfil’        Ag. 974 
τέλειον (adj.), ‘fulfilled’      Ag. 1432 
τελεῖς (v.), ‘take to the end’       Ag. 1107  
τελεῖται (v.), ‘to be fulfilled’       Ag. 68, 1487; LB 385,  
τέλεον (adj.), ‘full-grown’      Ag. 1504 
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τελέσασιν (part.), ‘those who have brought it to an end’  Ag. 806 
τελεσφόροις (adj.), ‘fulfilled’      Ag. 998 
τελεσφόρον (adj.), ‘fulfilled’      Ag. 1000; LB 541 
τελευτᾷ (v.), ‘the end of’      LB 534  
τελευταῖος (adj.), ‘the last’      Ag. 314 
τελευτᾶν (inf.), ‘to grant an ending’     LB 308,  
τελευτήσαντ’ (part.), ‘who ended’      Ag. 929 
τέλος (n.), ‘end’, ‘completion’     Ag. 1109; LB 874; 
Eum. 243, 544, 729 
τελοῦντος (part.), ‘the accomplisher’    Ag. 1253 
τελουμένου (part.), ‘dead’      LB 876 
τέλους (n.), ‘end’       Eum. 64 
τελῶ (v.), ‘shall fulfil’       Eum. 899 
ὑπερτελής (adj.), ‘rising high in its strength’    Ag. 286 
b) Τέλος as ‘payment’ 
τελεσσίφρων (adj.), ‘purposeful’      Ag. 701 
τελείσθω (v.), ‘to be paid’       LB 310 
τελεῖται (v.), ‘to be paid’      LB 385 
τελουμένας (part.), ‘exacted’      LB 284  
τελουμένου (part.), ‘exacted’      LB 872 
c) Τέλος as ‘ritual’ 
προτέλεια (n.), ‘preliminary/first or prenuptial rites’   Ag. 65, 227 
προτελείοις (n.), ‘preliminary/first or prenuptial rites’  Ag. 720 
τελείας (adj.), ‘fulfiller (of marriage)’    Eum. 214 
τέλειε (adj.), ‘master-fulfiller’     Ag. 973 
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τέλειοι (adj.), ‘bringing to fulfilment’    Eum. 382 
τέλειον (adj.),  ‘the Fulfiller’      Eum. 28 
τελεσφόρου (adj.), ‘fulfilled’ (for prayers)    LB 212 
τέλος (n.), ‘fulfilment’ (for marriage)     Eum. 835 
d) Τέλος as ‘authority’, ‘duty’, ‘task’ 
ἀτέλεια (n.), ‘full authority’       Eum. 361 
τελείου (adj.), ‘master’       Ag. 972, 1432  
τέλεον (adj.), ‘with full authority’      Eum. 393 
τελεσφόρος (adj.), ‘with authority’     LB 664  
τελέως (adv.), ‘with final authority’     Eum. 320, 953 
τέλος (n.), ‘task’, ‘duty’      Ag. 908, 934, 1202; 
         LB 760; Eum. 434, 743  
 
 
 
 
